HondaJet: Not A Steam Gage In Sight

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 20:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

He probably wouldn't have been able to fix the problem en
route.

As the fix was to burn fuel from the wing tanks before switching to
the aux tank, it seems possible to have done it en route.

Mxsmanic wrote:
cjcampbell writes:

Most people know that the TV set turns off when the power goes out. You
would have to be incredibly stupid to not know that the panels will go
off in a power failure.

I'm talking about a reboot, not a power failure.

The emergency procedures address that. IIRC you shut the thing off,
wait something like 30 seconds, then restart. What happens after that
depends on the aircraft and the installation. It is possible that the
rebooting can be stopped by simply pulling the circuit breaker of the
offending unit, leaving the rest of the system operational. One of the
advantages of the G1000 over earlier, similar systems like Avidyne is
that you can shut it off and then restart it while still in the air.
This is a vast improvement over the earlier systems which, once you
shut them off, had no way of restarting themselves while the aircraft
was moving.

Mxsmanic wrote:
cjcampbell writes:

People who fly real airplanes know that anything can break. It is part
of the training.

I don't have the pilots in mind. I'm thinking of the vendor. If he
had the time and knowledge to create an emergency procedure, he had
the time and knowledge to fix the bug that can cause a reboot in the
first place, which would be far more responsible than simply
documenting it and forgetting about it.

You are a child, yet. Things don't work that way. The vendor comes up
with emergency procedures for every conceivable scenario. The
manufacturer knows that almost anything is possible, even though it
never shows up in development and testing, and tries to cover all
possible bases. Garmin certainly did not intentionally release
defective units.

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 20:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

He probably wouldn't have been able to fix the problem en
route.

As the fix was to burn fuel from the wing tanks before switching to
the aux tank, it seems possible to have done it en route.

IIRC, that procedure was opposite the instructions for the use of the aux
tank. As he wasn't able to get out and take a look at what was happening
en route, that would not have been a viable option because if the
instructions were correct (which he found out after the fact that they
weren't), it would have killed him.

Neil

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 10:19:40 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 20:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

He probably wouldn't have been able to fix the problem en
route.

As the fix was to burn fuel from the wing tanks before switching to
the aux tank, it seems possible to have done it en route.

IIRC, that procedure was opposite the instructions for the use of the aux
tank. As he wasn't able to get out and take a look at what was happening
en route, that would not have been a viable option because if the
instructions were correct (which he found out after the fact that they
weren't), it would have killed him.

My point it, that if the fuel gages were operational, and the pilot
observed anomalous fuel venting from the wing tanks while crossing the
Atlantic Ocean, he may have reasoned, that drawing fuel from the wing
tanks might have been preferable to jettisoning it overboard despite
the erroneous aux-tank operating instructions.

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 10:19:40 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 20:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

He probably wouldn't have been able to fix the problem en
route.

As the fix was to burn fuel from the wing tanks before switching to
the aux tank, it seems possible to have done it en route.

IIRC, that procedure was opposite the instructions for the use of
the aux tank. As he wasn't able to get out and take a look at what
was happening en route, that would not have been a viable option
because if the instructions were correct (which he found out after
the fact that they weren't), it would have killed him.

My point it, that if the fuel gages were operational, and the pilot
observed anomalous fuel venting from the wing tanks while crossing the
Atlantic Ocean, he may have reasoned, that drawing fuel from the wing
tanks might have been preferable to jettisoning it overboard despite
the erroneous aux-tank operating instructions.

I understand your point, but that's a pretty big "if", IMO. First, the
pilot would have to "observe anomalous fuel venting". Is this possible?
Next, the pilot would have to reason why the fuel was venting, and I don't
see how that would have been possible. It would seem as likely that the
conclusion would be that there was some problem with the main tanks, and
thus more reliance on the aux tank, aggravating the problem, etc. After
all, why would it be reasonable to suspect that fuel would be venting from
tanks that were shut off, supposedly taking them out of the system, and
that the "fix" would be to disregard the specific instructions on the use
of the aux tank? I think Mr. Rhine's analysis of his circumstances and
choice of action were right on, as the relevant information was only
obtained after-the-fact.

Neil

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 14:10:18 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 10:19:40 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 26 Oct 2006 20:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

He probably wouldn't have been able to fix the problem en
route.

As the fix was to burn fuel from the wing tanks before switching to
the aux tank, it seems possible to have done it en route.

IIRC, that procedure was opposite the instructions for the use of
the aux tank. As he wasn't able to get out and take a look at what
was happening en route, that would not have been a viable option
because if the instructions were correct (which he found out after
the fact that they weren't), it would have killed him.

My point it, that if the fuel gages were operational, and the pilot
observed anomalous fuel venting from the wing tanks while crossing the
Atlantic Ocean, he may have reasoned, that drawing fuel from the wing
tanks might have been preferable to jettisoning it overboard despite
the erroneous aux-tank operating instructions.

I understand your point, but that's a pretty big "if", IMO. First, the
pilot would have to "observe anomalous fuel venting". Is this possible?

Apparently it's not only possible, it actually occurred. You need to
read Mr. Rhine's narrative:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/nwpilot's_tranatlantic_flight.htm

Upon reaching FL095 I was on top and looked to my left -- and
really got scared!!! The aircraft vent was venting a large amount
of fuel out into space! Thank you, Cessna for the under-wing
courtesy lights!

Next, the pilot would have to reason why the fuel was venting, and I don't
see how that would have been possible.

Really? Surely your powers of deduction are capable of reasoning,
that fuel is exiting the vent because the tank is full.

It would seem as likely that the conclusion would be that there was some
problem with the main tanks,

That conclusion would be partially correct; they were over full.

and thus more reliance on the aux tank, aggravating the problem, etc.

Alternatively, an insightful pilot might have reasoned, that burning
fuel from over full tanks might alleviate the over full condition.

After all, why would it be reasonable to suspect that fuel would be
venting from tanks that were shut off, supposedly taking them out of
the system,

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, prior to departure, he would know, that
the wing tanks remain in the system regardless of the position of the
fuel selector and fuel shutoff valves.

and that the "fix" would be to disregard the specific
instructions on the use of the aux tank?

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, he would have a good chance of figuring
out what was occurring, IMO. I know I would have thoroughly
scrutinized the POH, and mentally analyzed the function of the fuel
system and its modifications, before departing.

I think Mr. Rhine's analysis of his circumstances and
choice of action were right on, as the relevant information was only
obtained after-the-fact.

I'm not questioning Mr. Rhine's action when he realized he had a
problem. There is little question, even if the cause had been
reasoned out, that it would be prudent to get back on the ground
pronto.

But I believe, that a pilot who had analyzed the fuel system's
operation before departure, would have had a good chance of, not only
diagnosing the cause of the fuel venting in flight, but questioning
the functionality of the fuel system modification before departure.

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 14:10:18 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in

After all, why would it be reasonable to suspect that fuel would be
venting from tanks that were shut off, supposedly taking them out of
the system,

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, prior to departure, he would know, that
the wing tanks remain in the system regardless of the position of the
fuel selector and fuel shutoff valves.

and that the "fix" would be to disregard the specific
instructions on the use of the aux tank?

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, he would have a good chance of figuring
out what was occurring, IMO. I know I would have thoroughly
scrutinized the POH, and mentally analyzed the function of the fuel
system and its modifications, before departing.

So, in essence, you are saying that Mr. Rhine's main problem was that he
didn't reverse-engineer the installations of the aux tank and electronics,
because had he done that, he would have known that the instructions for
the use of the aux tank were eroneous and that there were problems with
the electronics. Frankly, I think that would be beyond many (if not most)
pilots' capabilities. Given your own predisposition towards thinking that
the G1000's failure was in a problem of its design (e.g. calling Mr.
Rhine's failure experience a "mode") rather than a side-effect of a
botched installation of unrelated panel components, I think it may be
unreasonable to think that the average pilot could analyze such a
situation any better than Mr. Rhine did.

The most recent C172 that I've flown was our club's C172SP. I would not
call its construction as being conducive to such an analysis by anyone
other than an A&P. Since the instructions included by the installer of the
aux tanks were clearly wrong, the only way to understand the actual
installation of the aux tank and its impact on the C172's fuel system
would be to take the plane apart. I did not have the impression that this
was one of Mr. Rhine's options.

Neil

cjcampbell writes:

You are a child, yet. Things don't work that way.

That doesn't mean that they can't.

It's possible to build reliable software systems. Unfortunately,
people have been conditioned to accept catastrophic errors in software
systems as if they were unavoidable realities rather than simply the
avoidable result of carelessness. And they are usually unwilling to
pay the cost of error-free systems, anyway, even if it misking risking
their own lives to save money. But many of them don't realize the
actual magnitude of the risks they are accepting.

Software bugs are not imposed by Mother Nature or the laws of physics;
they are the result of poor design and construction, just like
physical engineering defects. There is no excuse for them in
safety-of-life applications, and companies should be held liable for
their reckless mistakes in building safety-of-life applications that
contain dangerous bugs.

The vendor comes up with emergency procedures for every
conceivable scenario.

The catastrophic software failures are often those that the vendor has
not bothered to imagine. It is the unhandled exception that causes
the catastrophic failure.

Garmin certainly did not intentionally release defective units.

Probably true, but that doesn't mean that it is blameless for defects.
There are still notions of due diligence and fiduciary duty, although
for some reason people seem reluctant to apply them to the software
industry, even though they might apply them ruthlessly in any other
comparable domain.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 16:21:49 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
:

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 14:10:18 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in

After all, why would it be reasonable to suspect that fuel would be
venting from tanks that were shut off, supposedly taking them out of
the system,

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, prior to departure, he would know, that
the wing tanks remain in the system regardless of the position of the
fuel selector and fuel shutoff valves.

and that the "fix" would be to disregard the specific
instructions on the use of the aux tank?

If the prudent pilot of a transatlantic flight has invested the time
required to familiarize himself with the design and operation of the
aircraft's fuel system upon which his safety depends for the over
water portion of his course, he would have a good chance of figuring
out what was occurring, IMO. I know I would have thoroughly
scrutinized the POH, and mentally analyzed the function of the fuel
system and its modifications, before departing.

So, in essence, you are saying that Mr. Rhine's main problem was that he
didn't reverse-engineer the installations of the aux tank and electronics,
because had he done that, he would have known that the instructions for
the use of the aux tank were eroneous and that there were problems with
the electronics.

I'm not saying anything about Mr. Rhine being wrong.

Frankly, I think that would be beyond many (if not most)
pilots' capabilities.

If a pilot is incapable of understanding his aircraft's fuel system,
he should not be certified to fly it.

Given your own predisposition towards thinking that
the G1000's failure was in a problem of its design (e.g. calling Mr.
Rhine's failure experience a "mode") rather than a side-effect of a
botched installation of unrelated panel components, I think it may be
unreasonable to think that the average pilot could analyze such a
situation any better than Mr. Rhine did.

I fail to understand how the Garmin G1000's continuous re-boot mode
can be seen as anything other than a failure mode. If Garmin had
conceived of a modular, fault tolerant design, such a failure mode may
not have occurred.

The average pilot doesn't fly solo across the Atlantic, so I'm not
sure your opinion is relevant.

The most recent C172 that I've flown was our club's C172SP. I would not
call its construction as being conducive to such an analysis by anyone
other than an A&P.

Does not the POH contain a fuel system schematic diagram and theory of
operation information? It shouldn't be beyond the average pilot's
ability to comprehend that information.

Since the instructions included by the installer of the
aux tanks were clearly wrong, the only way to understand the actual
installation of the aux tank and its impact on the C172's fuel system
would be to take the plane apart.

The ONLY way? Please. Why couldn't one request a similar aux fuel
system schematic diagram and theory of operation information as
contained in the POH from the aux tank STC holder.

I did not have the impression that this was one of Mr. Rhine's options.

A pilot always has the option of requesting more information, no?