Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

Navy opposition to STOVL is about SHIPS not aircraft. They oppose the
concept because they think it threatens 95,000 ton carriers. It is clever
sophistry to argue against STOVL JSF on the basis of the performance of the
Harrier and, Woody, you know that shipmate. The Harrier uses an entirely
different lift/propulsion system, the technology of which is fundamentally
unchanged from the introduction of the AV-8A in the early 70s. While later
models (Night and Radar/Night) added up-to-date avionics and defensive
systems, the lift/propulsion system is little changed. As a consequnce, its
accident rate is similar to the jets of the era in which it was designed --
F-4, F-14 etc. The design suffers from maintainability issues similar to
aircraft of its design era also. $$ for materiel issues have long been a
problem, but as materiel problems have been fixed (like the #3 bearing),
accident numbers have gone down. STOVL JSF is an entirely different animal.
It is simple to fly -- even fighter guys can do it on the first try (and you
don't take it to "near stall" to transition to the landing configuration
anymore than you do a conventional aircraft). For STOVL JSF to transition
to the SDD phase, the technology issues had to be assessed by the government
as "low risk." It is predicted to meet the performance KPPs even at its
current weight.

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?) And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft provides...?

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at, or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships, principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad. An additional
500+ sorties by the one land based squadron in Kuwait. At one point last
year, 100-ish of the roughly 110 fleet AV-8s were deployed in real-world
events somewhere in the world -- that total included a Det of land-based
AV-8s supporting the Army and SOF bubbas in Afghanistan for a year.

"Too little benefit..."?? I think not.

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article ,
"Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in
message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an
asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just
"nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient
bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last
year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was
able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers
(plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the
Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of
ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a
parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s
and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the
CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in
the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's
correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the
service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number
compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated
the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting
fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas.
It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air,
said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker
shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the
dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal
Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over
Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots
from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had
little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around
Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward
operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines
have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have
built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no
longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert
and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had
captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak
guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not
required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that
kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets
had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations,
the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could
be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those
F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why
is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with
their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely
hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by
ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in
Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130
mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being
able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be
a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that
would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as
regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's
get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like
flies.

Guy

In message , "Doug \"Woody\" and
Erin Beal" writes
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".

CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

And the equation for "time on station" includes time to and from home
base, and time to turn the aircraft around. For a given force size, the
nearer your bases for refuelling and rearming, the more aircraft in the
cabrank and the fewer in transit to and from. Tankers are useful
extenders, but only if fuel is the limiting factor: we're not yet able
to do air-to-air rearming.

Again, HMS Sheathbill in 1982 is instructive for the extension in cover
it allowed.

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

You could say the same about helicopters: IIRC helo crashes were the
biggest single killer of British troops in Telic / Iraqi Freedom.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 02:40:53 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:08:49 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:



JL Grasso wrote:

On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 02:45:53 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

JL Grasso wrote:

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:43:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:

The A-320 which crashed into the trees in France was performing a
fly-by demonstration, by a line pilot, not an Airbus test or demo
pilot. The profile was to fly by at 500 feet.

The pilot was making a scheduled revenue flight with passengers and came up
with the low slow fly by all on his own.

Actually, it was a charter flight. And not to split hairs, but the
low/slow fly-by was discussed by airline officials and both captains in a
prior briefing that day. The accident was officially caused by descent
below obstacle height combined with a delayed application of TOGA power to
exit the fly-by.

The F.O. was also declared mentally ill for demurring from the above
'explanation'.

Cite?

Crikey ! I thought it was common knowledge ?

Are you sure that you're not thinking of Norbert Jaquet? I thought that
Mazieres (the FO) flew for AF for some time after the accident. I could be
wrong, however.

If it was common knowledge, a cite should be a simple matter. Unless you
mean 'common knowledge' in the Tarverian sense.

I stand corrected, I got the 2 confused. It's been a long time since it happened. The
F.O. stayed 'shtumb' ( is that how you spell it ) and kept out of the way of the flak.

Is that what he told you?

Do you not think it strange that someone who criticised the official findings and
supported the captain being declared mentally insane is a very odd way to go about an
accident investigation ?

Air France was in charge of the investigation, eh?

Don't be silly. AF may have had it's reputation to protect but that was damaged already.
There were larger potential losers here.

Some 'body' had the flight recorders for 10 days directly after the crash who wasn't
entitled to be in custody of them according to French law. During that time they were
tinkered with. They shouldn't have been.


Besides, if you ran around saying "Captain Smith had the right-of-way",
I'd think you were mentally unstable too. And there is a significant
difference between unstable and insane.

So, you think that speaking out in defence of his colleauge was sufficient reason to
withdraw his flying license ?

Something about the whole investigation truly stinks. Also, the French aren't exactly
saints when it comes to bending the rules when it suits their purposes.

I don't argue that the crew got the a/c into a very odd flight regime. In part, it was poor
briefing that they received.

There were also known and documented defects with various A320 systems at that time -
including throttle response and height indication. Capt Assiline asserts that the a/c
showed 100 ft altitude when it was actually flying much lower.

In short, they were flying an a/c of questionable airworthiness. That *couldn't* be allowed
to come out in the investigation, so it was *fixed*.

Graham

(sid) wrote in message . com...
So, John, have you guys sim'd the scenario that the A-300 faced after
it was zapped leaving Baghdad? In short what would the loss of all
hydraulics, and use of control surfaces, coupled with that kind of
airfoil degradation do to a more modern 'bus flight control
automation?

The 300 is a totally different airplane. It pre-dates "Fly-by-wire"
which was introduced on the 320 series and incorporated in the 330/340
aircraft (and, I assume, the 380 as well). The 300 uses "old
technology" systems like the Boeings: hydro-mechanical flight
controls.

The 320 and beyond are electro-hydraulic flight controls. You can fly
without the electrons (not pretty, but it works: think 2-channel RC
model planes), but you have to have hydraulics. The good news is,
there are three hydraulic systems on each flight control and there is
a leak detection system that isolates the primary system (green) in
the 330 to preserve fluid for EMERG GEN and flight control use.

In any case, there is no way I know of to simulate that sort of damage
in the simulator. An interesting problem to be sure - would the bird
be able to retain enough fluid to operate the flight controls?

John Alger

Woody says, "...the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had
the Harriers not
been around to help out..."

There's a stronger case for the Harriers in OIF than there is for a CV Navy
that arrives in the stack with no time-on-station and an understanding of
air support that consists of "gimme a 6-digit grid."

Woody further states "Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a
bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate."

Who's being ridiculous? I guess it doesn't count as bona fide mission
unless it's launched from a CV eh? .



"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/28/04 11:06 PM, in article
, "Guy Alcala"
wrote:

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article ,
"Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in
message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an
asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just
"nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient
bed-down
SNIPPAGE... Lots of tanker stats
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the
AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was
around
al-Kut.

There's a shortage of USAF tankers in EVERY conflict--especially since the
demise of the A-6 and proliferation of the Hornet. Citing AV-8B ops in
OIF
is only slightly relevant. Of course, if you have STOVL capability, use
it
(OIF)--providing the threat will permit it. You've already sunk the blood
sweat and tears into it. My point is, the excessive risk in peace time
and
the reduction in payload/range isn't worth the small war time advantage,
and
the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had the Harriers
not
been around to help out.

Yes, it's romantic to operate from austere bases in country...
Leap-frogging
your way to Bagdad. No, it's not worth the risk/hassle.

SNIP
And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in
Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130
mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that
being able
to operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs)
might be a
good thing?

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built. Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF
is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

SNIP
What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills
too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so
let's get
rid of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been
dropping
like flies.

Guy

Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate. Why would you want to get rid of them?

--Woody

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 02:25:05 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:07:53 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 09:23:07 -0700, "khobar" wrote:

Pooh Bear wrote in message
...
JL Grasso wrote:

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:43:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"

wrote:

The A-320 which crashed into the trees in France was performing a
fly-by demonstration, by a line pilot, not an Airbus test or demo
pilot. The profile was to fly by at 500 feet.

The pilot was making a scheduled revenue flight with passengers and
came up
with the low slow fly by all on his own.

Actually, it was a charter flight. And not to split hairs, but the
low/slow fly-by was discussed by airline officials and both captains in
a
prior briefing that day. The accident was officially caused by descent
below obstacle height combined with a delayed application of TOGA power
to
exit the fly-by.

The F.O. was also declared mentally ill for demurring from the above
'explanation'.

You are aware that the DFDR presented in court to substantiate the official
story was NOT the DFDR from the crashed aircraft, yes?

... based on Assiline's assertion which he based on the appearance of the
box. IIRC correctly, he said that the one that he saw shortly after the
crash had vertical stripes on the housing, whereas the one in court had
diagonal stripes.

Pretty conclusive, yes?

Yes actually. I've seen footage of the DFDR being recovered and no way is it the
same one presented in court.

Surely there are some good still images from this footage available,
right? Can you provide a cite, or is this more 'common knowledge'?

It's so long ago, Jerry that I don't have cites readily to hand. I most certainly did
take a great interest in this crash. UK TV did too, with certainly more than one
decent documentary about this event. I believe I may still have a vid of at least one
of the documentaries in question. And before you try discrediting TV documentaries -
realise that in the UK we don't have the same commercial pressures as in the USA and
we make possibly the worlds' finest docs.

I'm sure.

I most certainly recall seeing the 'black box' being recovered in live recorded
footage - and it was a fairly tatty looking one ( well worn ). The one presented at
the investigation / court was entirely diiferent - almost pristine.

You're a complete kook.

No I'm not. I'm entirely rational. You're the 'kook' for believing what your're spoon-fed
without demur.


Citing your recollection of a news clip (which you saw live in 1998)

Please illustrate where I said that ? 1998 ! Uh ?

as
proof that photos you see months (or even years) later do not contain the
same components as in the live clip.

Actually the clip / photos were in the same documentary. I'm not talking about my memory
abilities, good as they are usually.


There is also I believe a question over 7 or 10 IIRC 'missing seconds' from the DFDR
record !!

Yes, it was on the internet - it must be so!

Well documented elsewhere.

Would you agree that after salvage of a flight recorder that it should be preserved
untouched until an expert organisation specialising in recovery of data is able to
'process' it ?

Just asking. I'm genuinely interested in your view. Is there a good reason for anyone not
ofiically involved in the investigation to step in regardless ?


I leave you to draw your own conclusions.

You hopefully leave people to do their own investigation. You're just
parroting a bunch of kooks.

This particular accident investigation is like no other. It stinks. So, you're saying
senior AF captains are kooks ?

Well.... actually, the 'Concordski' crash investigation was a stitch up too - and that was
also down to the French - hmmmm. Different scenario though.


Graham

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:03:00 +0000, Pooh Bear
JL Grasso wrote:
On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 02:40:53 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:
JL Grasso wrote:
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:08:49 +0000, Pooh Bear
JL Grasso wrote:
On Sat, 28 Feb 2004 02:45:53 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:
JL Grasso wrote:
On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:43:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"

The A-320 which crashed into the trees in France was performing a
fly-by demonstration, by a line pilot, not an Airbus test or demo
pilot. The profile was to fly by at 500 feet.

The pilot was making a scheduled revenue flight with passengers and came up
with the low slow fly by all on his own.

Actually, it was a charter flight. And not to split hairs, but the
low/slow fly-by was discussed by airline officials and both captains in a
prior briefing that day. The accident was officially caused by descent
below obstacle height combined with a delayed application of TOGA power to
exit the fly-by.

The F.O. was also declared mentally ill for demurring from the above
'explanation'.

Cite?

Crikey ! I thought it was common knowledge ?

Are you sure that you're not thinking of Norbert Jaquet? I thought that
Mazieres (the FO) flew for AF for some time after the accident. I could be
wrong, however.

If it was common knowledge, a cite should be a simple matter. Unless you
mean 'common knowledge' in the Tarverian sense.

I stand corrected, I got the 2 confused. It's been a long time since it happened. The
F.O. stayed 'shtumb' ( is that how you spell it ) and kept out of the way of the flak.

Is that what he told you?

Do you not think it strange that someone who criticised the official findings and
supported the captain being declared mentally insane is a very odd way to go about an
accident investigation ?

Air France was in charge of the investigation, eh?

Don't be silly. AF may have had it's reputation to protect but that was damaged already.
There were larger potential losers here.

Air France was the party who declared him "mentally unstable". You
pondered that this was a strange way to run an investigation. I am simply
stating that Air France was not in charge of the investigation. Do you
still assert otherwise?

Some 'body' had the flight recorders for 10 days directly after the crash who wasn't
entitled to be in custody of them according to French law. During that time they were
tinkered with. They shouldn't have been.

They were apparently in the possession of the DGAC, true. Your assertion
that they were "tinkered with" is apparently based on IPSC's claims. The
same "institute" putting forth the laughable notion that the stripes on
the boxes are oriented differently. This seems to imply that someone
apprently fabricated a recorder from scratch in some outlandish scheme to
save AI's reputation (as any recorder of the same model/part number should
bear the same outer markings).

Besides, if you ran around saying "Captain Smith had the right-of-way",
I'd think you were mentally unstable too. And there is a significant
difference between unstable and insane.

So, you think that speaking out in defence of his colleauge was sufficient reason to
withdraw his flying license ?

I haven't seen AF's case against the man, and what you are implying is
that they were definitely related. What do you base this on?

However, it would seem odd that these same "dark hats" would allow the FO
to continue to fly for AF for years afterwards. Odd, unless you understand
the CVR transcript.

Something about the whole investigation truly stinks. Also, the French aren't exactly
saints when it comes to bending the rules when it suits their purposes.

Well, that sounds like iron-clad evidence to me.

I don't argue that the crew got the a/c into a very odd flight regime. In part, it was poor
briefing that they received.

Oh, so the DFDR tampering was intended to cover for the DFO at Air France?
Which is it again?

Are the boundaries between the parties involved somewhat fuzzy to you?
Speaking to motive, of course.

There were also known and documented defects with various A320 systems at that time -
including throttle response and height indication. Capt Assiline asserts that the a/c
showed 100 ft altitude when it was actually flying much lower.

Anyone who would rely on a pressure altimeter to operate a low, slow
aircraft 100 feet from the ground when a radar altimiter was fucntioning
(and apparently giving accurate aural information) and available is not
making a prudent decision. The pressure altimiter (servo, ADC or
otherwise) is only required to be accurate to app +/- 30 feet at sea level
to begin with (and the DFDR was only required to show pressure altitude
resolution to +/- 100 ft, but may have been more on this unit). A radar
altimiter is accurate (depending on a given antenna/plane configuration)
to within 5 feet (and quite likely less) between wheel height and terrain.

Read the CVR transcript again and tell me how the Captain could possibly
be surprised later when told/shown he was below 100 feet during the
fly-over.

In short, they were flying an a/c of questionable airworthiness. That *couldn't* be allowed
to come out in the investigation, so it was *fixed*.

You have no idea what you're talking about. If you have a problem with how
you perceive airworthiness to be determined by the DGAC, you should take
it up with them. The only things questionable here are your understanding
of the event, of the aircraft, and your sources of information.

Not surprising for Puke Bear.

(sid) wrote in message . com...
"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in message . ..
(WaltBJ) wrote:

Are there two of these 'fly into the trees' accidents? The one I am
There was another Airbus CFIT accident a little bit later than the one
discussed here. IIRR the aircraft mushed into the upslope of a
mountain at night in bad weather. And lack of familiarity with the
automation was a factor.

This was the accident...
http://aviation-safety.net/database/1992/920120-0.htm

JL Grasso wrote:

On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 18:03:00 +0000, Pooh Bear
wrote:

snip old stuff

There were also known and documented defects with various A320 systems at that time -
including throttle response and height indication. Capt Assiline asserts that the a/c
showed 100 ft altitude when it was actually flying much lower.

Anyone who would rely on a pressure altimeter to operate a low, slow
aircraft 100 feet from the ground when a radar altimiter was fucntioning
(and apparently giving accurate aural information) and available is not
making a prudent decision. The pressure altimiter (servo, ADC or
otherwise) is only required to be accurate to app +/- 30 feet at sea level
to begin with (and the DFDR was only required to show pressure altitude
resolution to +/- 100 ft, but may have been more on this unit). A radar
altimiter is accurate (depending on a given antenna/plane configuration)
to within 5 feet (and quite likely less) between wheel height and terrain.

Read the CVR transcript again and tell me how the Captain could possibly
be surprised later when told/shown he was below 100 feet during the
fly-over.

With delight. Sorry about the lost formatting when text posting

(French text is translated into English)

Time: Source: Contents:

12.44:27 TOWER QNH Habsheim 1012 Fox Echo 9.8.4
Captain OK

12.44:31 Co-pilot Roger

12.44:32 Captain 9.8.4 put in 9.8.4

12.44:34 Co-pilot 9.8.4 QFE selected!

12.44:37 Good gear is down; flaps 2!

12.44:42 Captain Flaps 3

12.44:45 Co-pilot Flaps 3!
Captain That's the airfield, you confirm?

12.44:48 Co-pilot Affirmative

12.44:51 Co-pilot You see it LL 01, when we get there you're at 1 nautical mile, that's right.

12.44:55 [GONG!] - nosewheel valve

12.45:04.7 GPWS [Too Low Terrain!]
Co-pilot OK!

12.45:19.1 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:04.7 [GONG!] - GPWS cut off

12.45:05.7 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]

12.45.11 Co-pilot P.....G.....! (name of flight safety officer)

12.45:11.4 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]

12.45.12 Co-pilot G.. is going to ...eh!

12.45:14 Co-pilot OK, you're at 100ft there, watch, watch

12.45:13 Radio altimeter [One hundred]

12.45:19.1 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:23.6 Radio altimeter [Fifty]

12.45:26 Captain OK ,I'm OK there, disconnect autothrottle

12.45:27.5 Radio altimeter [Forty]

12.45:32 Co-pilot Watch out for those pylons ahaead, eh. See them?

12.45:33 Co-pilot Yeah, yeah, don't worry.

12.45:34.5 [Clack! Clack! Clack!] - power lever dentents

12.45:35.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:36.2 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:37 Co-pilot TOGA/SRS

12.45:38.3 Radio altimeter [Thirty]

12.45:39 Captain Go around track

12.45:39.9 Captain Sh...!

12.45:41.5 END OF TAPE



NOTE

12.45:11.4 Radio altimeter [Two hundred]
12.45:13 Radio altimeter [One hundred]

that's a sudden sink rate of 4000 fpm as reported by the 'radio altimeter' whilst at around
100ft !

I assume that the second time is actually incorrect since it's out of sequence but I found the
same on another copy of the transcript.

Let's assume say it should be 12.45:15 ( more in lline with other timings ) - still indicates a
sudden sink @ around 1800 fpm !

So the radio altimeter was accurate ? I think not. And that was known to be one of the weak
spots in the A320's systems at that time IIRC.

I'm guessing that Capt Asseline realised that the radar altimeter was malfunctioning and
reverted to baro readings.


Regds, Graham

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , "Doug \"Woody\" and
Erin Beal" writes
On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".

CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

And the equation for "time on station" includes time to and from home
base, and time to turn the aircraft around. For a given force size, the
nearer your bases for refuelling and rearming, the more aircraft in the
cabrank and the fewer in transit to and from. Tankers are useful
extenders, but only if fuel is the limiting factor: we're not yet able
to do air-to-air rearming.

Again, HMS Sheathbill in 1982 is instructive for the extension in cover
it allowed.

To be precise, prior to HMS Sheathbill (the Harrier FARP) going operational, on an
avg. 1 hour and 15 minute Sea Harrier sortie, 65 minutes was spent in transit to
and from the carriers, 10 minutes on CAP. After HMS Sheathbill was established,
33 minutes was spent in transit to CAP, 37 minutes on CAP, five minutes to HMS
Sheathbill for refueling/rearming. Reverse the above mission, or turn Sea
Harriers at Sheathbill all day, giving 65 minutes on CAP, 10 minutes in transit
to/from the FARP. And then there were the Harrier GR.3s sitting ground alert for
CAS (25-30nm away from their targets), instead of 200-250 nm away on the carriers.



I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

You could say the same about helicopters: IIRC helo crashes were the
biggest single killer of British troops in Telic / Iraqi Freedom.

US troops too, I suspect. Certainly the case in Afghanistan, along with those
disasters waiting to happen, the C/KC-130s. Subsequent to the major fighting in
Iraq helo accidents/shootdowns have made up a fair percentage as well, although
probably less than those from IEDs and ground vehicle accidents. Wait, we'd
better get rid of those latter too, especially those damned HMMWV deathtraps. And
then there were those tank and LAV crews that drove into rivers or canals and
drowned; away with them all, I say. They're obviously far too dangerous to be
used by military personnel.

Guy