A aviation & planes forum. AviationBanter

If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.

Go Back   Home » AviationBanter forum » rec.aviation newsgroups » Piloting
Site Map Home Register Authors List Search Today's Posts Mark Forums Read Web Partners

B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video



 
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
  #31  
Old June 9th 08, 03:30 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Big John
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 310
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 14:04:35 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote:

The current ACES II seats are zero/zero (will get a good chute with zero
forward velocity and zero altitude). It is generally felt that the parachute
landing and wrong body position cause the compression fractures, not the
ejection itself. The seat senses the actual altitude and attitude, and this
determines when it separates, although manual separation is also an option.

You're not supposed to land on your feet, regardless.

*********************************

To add some comments about early ejections.

I had the Zero lanyard hooked up. One end was connected to seat and
other end to rip cord. Normally it was only connect under 5K on take
off and landing (low speed). If you used it at high altitude and high
speed it opened the chute immediately and you could blow some panels
in canopy and tear up some of teh shroud lines.

A few seconds after ejection the seat belt blew open and the butt
snapper(we called it) pushed me out of the seat. When I left the seat
the zero lanyard pulled the rip cord and chute opened and was a good
chute (no shroud lines over canopy, etc).

These were 24 Foot round chutes and there were four shroud lines (two
on each side toward the rear) that you cut with ur survival knife.
This changed the shape of the canopy and it picked up some forward
velocity. You could then do a little steering of this forward
velocity to help pick a landing spot.

I landed facing down wind like the book said and made a poor parachute
landing roll due to the poopy suit and other things I had on me.

On the way down I pulled the bottle in seat pack and the dingy
inflated and hung about 10 feet below me all the way done.

Was picked up by a Danish chopper about 3 1/2 hours after ejection and
taken to the air base where Doc examined me for injuries.

The Aces seats are wonderful and are Zero Zero. Quit a few have
ejected either on the ground or very low and survived. Some got some
injuries like a broken leg or arm but that is much better than burning
in the crash.

Hope some of the these comments help explain some of the discussions
that have been made on RAP.

Big John
  #32  
Old June 9th 08, 03:52 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Big John
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 310
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 08:32:53 -0700 (PDT), Le Chaud Lapin
wrote:

On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote:
Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.


Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun
intended).

When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it
specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents
happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs.

If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???

I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him
that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000
aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to
decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek.

This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.


Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not
placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at
least not the pilots.

Let's look at it another way. Let us suppose that no warnings existed
at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before
ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms
filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were
found, someone would suggest...

"How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the
system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is
wrong? Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes.
"Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably
say yes.

For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent
task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking
Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman
and Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-Accidents/d...

Fly Smart


By managing risk better?

One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be
here, and some engineer would have figured out the error in true vs
indicated speed, and noted that pilots would have attempted rotation
at a speed that might have resulted in a crash, and pilots would have
been lauded for their attitude toward risk management...in the $1.4
billion aircraft.

Also, given that it's a B-2, and not a $40,000 Tomahawk, I would think
one would have a slightly higher expectation of pilot's attitude
toward risk management...or not.

If it seems that I am nit-picking at this topic, I am. The more I
read, the more I am discovering that vast majority of crashes, if one
looks only at the facts, has to do with some erroneous decision that
human made somewhere, not the machine itself. A year ago, before I
started all this, I would have expected it to be entirely the other
way around, the idea being that, the pilot would know that if they do
something really stupid, death is a possibility. Some of the errors
that pilots make are....ahem...plane silly.

Making mistakes is ok, as no one is perfect. The problem, I think,
becomes systemic when the community as a whole develops tendency to
reject blame. That is what I, a student pilot, see each time I open a
magazine, or read online material.

-Le Chaud Lapin-

************************************************

Le Chaud Lapin

Some comments.

High speed aborts on Runway many times cause bird to go off end and
burn. If stopped on R/W the brakes probably catch fire from the heat
generated in the brakes in the abort. Even with antiskid brakes the
tires would probably be blown in the abort and the magnisum wheels
burn very good. These brake fires has led to loss of the aircraft
after abort.

The warning light was not the "fire warning" light??? as I understand.
It just showed a system problem. If no fire, I probably would have
continued the take off as the lessor of two evils.

Don't know when light came on. If just after breaking ground then
trying to fly was the correct option.

Some may disagree with me but we all have opinions and I wasn't in the
cockpit on take off when decision to continue was made.

You'all have a nice day.

Big John
  #33  
Old June 9th 08, 04:30 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Big John
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 310
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 21:43:33 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote:

I only had to consider ejection seriously once while over Alaska when we got
a master caution. After reading the book, we discussed ejection parameters
and the ejection call. The most important thing was that we were told to
never land in a stream or river, since even with the LPU the silt would fill
the flight suit and drag you under, not to mention that there was still
around three feet of ice even in May.

We dropped our live Mk 84's in a single pass over the range, and then flew
back to an uneventful landing, with the equipment following. Never did find
out what caused the master caution/flaps light to come on. Even in the late
spring I wasn't too keen about spending a whole lot of time outdoors in AK
without more gear than what came in the seat pan.

Still, the ACES II is a lot more advanced than the old Martin Bakers.
************************************************* ***********


Viperdoc

My seat pre-dated even the Martin Baker.

Sounds like you did right (What was ur bird?). Most emergencies give
you time to make an evaluation of the situation before taking any
serious action.

With that said I had a good friend (ANG Sq Commander)lose and engine
(fire) in a F-89 and was given priority to land. When on final an
idiot took the runway without clearance and my friend went around and
stayed in pattern. On downwind leg the bird blew up and both he and
his RO were killed.

I hate to keep telling these stories about the accidents I am aware of
and was close to. Ruins my day to bring those memories of yore back
(

A nice day.

Big John
  #34  
Old June 9th 08, 12:37 PM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Dylan Smith
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 530
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On 2008-06-08, Le Chaud Lapin wrote:
If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???


But we don't know that, we don't even know when the master caution
illuminated (at least, nothing I've read says when it illuminated). We
know very few facts at this stage and it's all speculation.

As an example, if the master caution illuminates *after* V1 has been
reached you do not abort; at this stage you're committed.

Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not
placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at
least not the pilots.


But we don't know that yet. The crash has to be investigated to find out
who or what was at fault, and like most aviation crashes there will be
an entire accident chain rather than one single screwup that had the
results they did. Simply pointing fingers at people before the
investigation has turned up the facts is unhelpful and unproductive.

--
From the sunny Isle of Man.
Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid.
  #35  
Old June 9th 08, 02:51 PM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Larry Dighera
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 3,953
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:37:05 +0000 (UTC), Dylan Smith
wrote in
:

we don't even know when the master caution
illuminated (at least


Actually, there is mention of the computer warning at about the two
minute point in the narration of the video clip:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZB-iziY2Bw&fmt=18

"... were warned by a Master Caution Light and Flight Control
Systems Caution 19 seconds after brake release, while on takeoff
roll. They observed air-data faults, but those faults resolved
themselves within six seconds, and the caution was rescinded at
approximately 120 knots indicated. But the airspeed numbers were
wrong. When the pilots thought they had 158 knots, they actually
had 124. With the false airspeed readings and faulty system that
was exaggerating their control inputs, the pilots never stood a
chance. ... "

The main USAF B-2 page:
http://www.acc.af.mil/accspecialrepo...ationboard.asp

http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-056.pdf
Executive Summary Aircraft Accident Investigation B-2A, T/N
89-0127
Andersen Air Force Base, Guam
23 February 2008



Page six of this document is obviously the source of the commentary in
the video:

http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-054.pdf
Summary Of Facts

At the bottom of page 17 it states:

Within the B-2 community a defacto decision speed of 100 KIAS is
utilized to determine whether to abort a takeoff or to continue
into the air with an error, fault, or failure. In addition B-2
pilots distinguish between serious concerns meriting an aggressive
decision to abort a takeoff presented by a red Master Warning
light, and yellow Master Caution lights that are "analyzed" prior
to taking action. Since the yellow Master Caution, rather than a
red Master Warning, occurred after accelerating past 100 KIAS, the
MC did not reflexively initiate an abort....



Here's the USAF opinion on not aborting the takeoff:

http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-058.pdf
Statement Of Opinion

MP1 asked Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) for a takeoff/abort decision. At
approximately 120 KIAS, MP2 called "continue takeoff" as all
caution indications had cleared and the MA was above the briefed
100 KIAS "decision speed." Decision speed is the speed at which
pilots decide to continue the takeoff or abort. ...


Video: Stealth Bomber Crashes
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/0...stealth-b.html
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/06/cra...ml#cnnSTCVideo
  #36  
Old June 9th 08, 03:01 PM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Bertie the Bunyip[_24_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 2,969
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

Dylan Smith wrote in
:

On 2008-06-08, Le Chaud Lapin wrote:
If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???


But we don't know that, we don't even know when the master caution
illuminated (at least, nothing I've read says when it illuminated). We
know very few facts at this stage and it's all speculation.

As an example, if the master caution illuminates *after* V1 has been
reached you do not abort; at this stage you're committed.


Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution meant
in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of redundant
systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes, bull**** items on the
master caution system are surpressed during the takeoff roll, however, that
may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things
differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people
shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of time in
the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted takeoff
thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly bombers, or if
they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I can ask, but even if I
knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes real
fast, over 300 knots"


Bertie
  #37  
Old June 9th 08, 06:13 PM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Maxwell[_2_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 2,043
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video


"Bertie the Bunyip" wrote in message
...

Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution meant
in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of redundant
systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes, bull**** items on the
master caution system are surpressed during the takeoff roll, however,
that
may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things
differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people
shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of time
in
the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted takeoff
thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly bombers, or if
they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I can ask, but even if
I
knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes real
fast, over 300 knots"


Bertie


Well then, just make up an answer as usual.



  #38  
Old June 10th 08, 02:12 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Larry Dighera
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 3,953
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 19:44:02 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote in
:

I have seen at least one guy with a compression fracture after an ejection.


Is it common for ejection injuries to result in permanent disability?

  #39  
Old June 10th 08, 09:40 AM posted to rec.aviation.piloting,alt.usenet.kooks
Bertie the Bunyip[_25_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 3,735
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

"Maxwell" luv2^fly99@cox.^net wrote in
:


"Bertie the Bunyip" wrote in message
...

Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution
meant in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of
redundant systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes,
bull**** items on the master caution system are surpressed during the
takeoff roll, however, that
may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things
differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people
shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of
time in
the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted
takeoff thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly
bombers, or if they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I
can ask, but even if I
knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes
real fast, over 300 knots"


Bertie


Well then, just make up an answer as usual.


Nope.


Bertie

  #40  
Old June 10th 08, 01:40 PM posted to rec.aviation.piloting
Clark[_2_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 6
Default B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video

On Jun 8, 10:32*am, Le Chaud Lapin wrote:
On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote:

Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep
flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots.
After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine
Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not
fly.


Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun
intended).

When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it
specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents
happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs.

If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage
(to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. *But if
you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to
takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...???

That is exactly the point. The pilots had a Caution, not a Warning.
They did not ignore it but prioritized that Aviating was the primary
task at hand, vs digging out a checklist rolling down the runway for a
Yellow Caution light. This was an ambiguous cue when you look back at
it with 20/20 hindsight. If they had decided in the design process
that this could cause loss of life and/or property, it would have been
a big, fat red Warning light with associated non-normal procedures and
Warning notes. If you do some rooting around on google you will find
the ends of runways littered with the hulls of airplanes that have
aborted at high speed and high weight.


I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him
that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000
aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to
decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek.



Warning yes, Caution no. In a multi-engine aircraft, say, 757 on short
runway with a engine fire light, better to go flying and fight fire
airborne with suppression system than end up at bottom of ravine
broken in two. Every aircraft plus every takeoff is diffeent, your
instructor will help build your
Assessment=Behavior=Consequence=Decision skills. Systems do not always
fail in ways that designers envisioned. i had a hydraulic Caution
light on a Huey once. The problem wasactually with the Master Caution
and Warning system (erroneous indication), not the Hydraulics system.
I had enough systems knowledge and supporting information to make an
assessment, which was to land normally. The emrgency checklist would
have had me doing a high-speed run-on landing, not so difficult but I
would have toasted the skids.
Your instructor will also spend some time going over the difference
between Notes, Cautions and Warnings. Plus the fact that you can
deviate from procedures if, in your estimation as Pilot In Command,
the situation warrants. That's also in the US FARs.

This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain
threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did,
similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this
aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they
survived.


Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not
placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at
least not the pilots.


There are deficiencies in the system that can be improved. Blame is a
culture issue and litigous society, and it makes some people feel
better. Things I would look at here are why did ejection seats injure
crew and the fact that moisture in the system started this whole
sequence. The crew were the ufortunate ones to discover the
deficiency. And is in most cases through history, the messenger gets
shot.

Let's look at it another way. *Let us suppose that no warnings existed
at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before
ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms
filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were
found, someone would suggest...

"How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the
system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is
wrong? *Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes.
"Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably
say yes.

For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent
task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking
Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman
and Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-Accidents/d...


Fly Smart


By managing risk better?

One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be
here, and some engineer would have figured out the error in true vs
indicated speed, and noted that pilots would have attempted rotation
at a speed that might have resulted in a crash, and pilots would have
been lauded for their attitude toward risk management...in the $1.4
billion aircraft.


The pilots had all of the clues needed to rotate, just as they had
done thousands of times.

Also, given that it's a B-2, and not a $40,000 Tomahawk, I would think
one would have a slightly higher expectation of pilot's attitude
toward risk management...or not.

If it seems that I am nit-picking at this topic, I am. *The more I
read, the more I am discovering that vast majority of crashes, if one
looks only at the facts, has to do with some erroneous decision that
human made somewhere, not the machine itself. *A year ago, before I
started all this, I would have expected it to be entirely the other
way around, the idea being that, the pilot would know that if they do
something really stupid, death is a possibility. Some of the errors
that pilots make are....ahem...plane silly.


Humans design airplanes and sensors. Is that a Human Factor or
Material Factor. Trick question. All mishaps are caused by Human
Factors.

Making mistakes is ok, as no one is perfect. The problem, I think,
becomes systemic when the community as a whole develops tendency to
reject blame. That is what I, a student pilot, see each time I open a
magazine, or read online material.


So maybe there is something behind that, if you are seeing it
everywhere? WE are trying o fix things and make families happy, not
make lawyers happy

-Le Chaud Lapin-


 




Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

vB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Forum Jump


All times are GMT +1. The time now is 05:45 AM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.6.4
Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright ©2004-2024 AviationBanter.
The comments are property of their posters.