"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions.

I'm afraid we are. The major watershed was the change from
conventional resistance to the US invasion to an insurgency against
"occupation". Subsequent changes have included the evolution of a
multi-agency insurgency (al Queda, Sunni nationalists, then Shia
militias), and then the speculation about training/supporting the
local forces to take the lead.

This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces.

If the maneuvering of insurgent forces could be foreseen at a minute
tactical level, the US would be able to defeat them. Until the next
crop of recruits continued the conflict days, weeks or months later.

The enemy has an operational and tactical advantage attained by
abusing the status of civilians and hiding amongst them both to
protect their heroic skins from US military action and to
hypocritically garner support when that action causes civilian
casualties.

It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force

Who said it was? Don't make the mistake of assuming that I accept the
axiomatic assumptions of "imperialist intervention" which pass for
understanding of the issue in some quarters.

--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.

There is also a real, albeit fundamentally distorted perception of
fighting foreign occupiers, however. That this is rampantly
overstated by Arab prejudice and indoctrinated anti-Americanism
doesn't alter the fact that many insurgents and their supporters
sincerely believe it.

Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

Tito was a lot cleverer about masking Serb supremacy with some
pretensions at multi-ethnic window dressing, though. Saddam's
Tikriti-Sunni ascendency was a lot less subtle.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife.

I'd agree with that. It's not as if there are American commentators,
analysts and even some politicians who understand and understood this,
which is where I think there is some grounds for legitimate criticism
of the neo-con ideological approach to the issue. Dissenting views on
tactics were available, and not just from clueless goons in the media,
or unthinking and reflexive anti-war narcissists.

It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

All true, nonetheless ideological allies (Vietnamese who genuinely
opposed communism/Iraqis who genuinely desire democracy) do exist
amongst the murkier sectarian, ethnic and class divisions. And the
issue isn't about the existance of these other competing loyalties,
but the extent of them and how to 'shape the battlefield' to minimise
the conflicts between 'tribalism' and 'progressive democracy'.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects;

Only two of which are fundamentally relevant, and which have numerous
fractures within the sects concerned. SCIRI, for example, are not
identical with Sadr's militia. The larger Sunni/Shia split parallels
the catholic/islamic split in the Philippines.

2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule

Instead they got if from Spanish and American colonial rule. Sorry,
but I don't see this as a critical difference.

; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship;

Yet the divisions in place now reflect the situation in the 1920's
Iraqi revolt, absent maybe the socialist pretensions of the rump
B'aathists. I'd certainly accept that thirty years of B'aathism and
Saddam made things much worse and with more potential for conflict.

4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation;

There have certainly been seperatists in the Philippines, most notably
the Moros.

5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum

This has been de rigeur everywhere historically, but particularly over
much of Asia in the post-colonial era.

and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

That's certainly unique to Iraq, but even then hasn't been of much
relevance to the situation now. The Kurds would still hate Saddam and
distrust Sunni rule without Hallabjah. The Iranians don't need the
victims of chemical attacks to produce casualties suffered by Iraqi
aggresson under Saddam by the same token.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

It means winning against a uniformed enemy without comprehending that
this does not conclude the conflict. The US has plenty of experience
in dealing with insurgencies, and plenty of innovative, thinking
leaders with excellent practical and educational experience. Some
(but not all) of the problems the US forces have faced in Iraq have
been due to the use of counter-productive and innappropriate tactics.
Most of these stem from the early stage of the insurgency, where some
commanders, and certainly the DoD, were reluctant to admit that they
were even facing such a beast, let alone embrace the concept of
modifying tactics and operational strategy to beat it.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion.

It certainly was under Rumsfeld and the "we don't do occupations"-era
Pentagon.

It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

The problem with this is when this approach conflicts with winning the
war. Either you change approach or admit that inflexible operational
doctrine trumps the achievement of strategic aims. Building a
military machine that could destroy the NVA or VC in almost any battle
it chose did not win the Vietnam war.

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

In article , eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article 0i0ih.948$Eo.624@trnddc08,
"Ski" wrote:

When considering the present wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, where we seem
to need more Close Air Support (CAS) kind of machines that can both strafe

You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35, which
was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
for CAS,
if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
need, the
more -35s we need.

With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the outset.

and the occassional PGM Bomb, what does the JSF offer over just producing
more F-15 / F-16 / F-18 aircraft and if anything finding a follow-on for

It's cheaper than these aircraft and better suited to CAS.

Cost is open to question as the beast has not gone into production yet, so
any discussion of cost comparison is bogus: comparing projected cost
against an established serial production cost will not illuminate the issue.
There's too much BS involved to make it in any way a useful comparison.

It has stealth. It
uses the same engine as the -22 which will cut down on maintenance
costs. Using
the same plane cut down on maintenance. It is just as good a fighter as
the -16,
-18.

As above, it remains to be seen. F-35 is not in production yet.
When a production F-35 flies against a -15, -16, or -18 then a
judgement can be made. Before that is just idle hot air.

It has stealth. The Turd World seems to have given up on ever matching
Western air forces and are placing their faith in Russian SAMs. This makes
stealth even more important.

something more like an A-10 then a high performance fighter.

90% of the tank kills recorded by the A-10 during GW1 were made using the
Maverick missile. The value of the A-10s gun is overestimated due to
misinterpreting the number of tank kills credited to it during GW1.

Cogent comparisons are important.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:19:49 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 16:36:44 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:



Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)

I note the lack of personal abuse in this followup. Have you no
shame?

Gavin Bailey

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

In article , eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08,
"Ski" wrote:

f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might
say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all
this, but
with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that
goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.

Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
either
the -16 or the -15.

Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs
of the
-16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price
keeps going
up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each. A
quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
estimated $80
million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and the
-15 you
will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15
has two
engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
extremely low.

Don;t disagree in principle, but your comparison is inapt.
UAE bought Block 60s which are much more expensive than the
Block 50s that USAF buys.
Cost comparisons are bogus when just looking at airframe costs
without regard to capability. Any jet with an AESA is far more capable
than one without, but an AESA initial purchase price is higher than
older mechanically scanned radars. You get far more capability
but at higher cost.
System capability must be factored in.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In article 8%0nh.2291$Fs2.1617@trnddc05, "Ski"
wrote:

It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
"venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
again the needs of the components - so you never know.

One of the major reasons for the A - C upgrade was AMRAAM.
The APG-66 radar was not AMRAAM capable, nor was the F-16's
weapons system. AAMAF it was reported at the time that the
AMRAAMs internal radar had a longer acquisition range than
the APG-66.

Large capability change drives airframe cost and complexity

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage



"The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion"
wrote in message ...
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required. I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

Generally anything done increases cost - for sure, the AMRAAM came to the F-16 faster then expected because the F-15 had flutter problems with AMRAAM carriage and the F-16 had a problem with asymmetric loads carrying Sparrows, although the Taiwan Block 25 and Air Defense versions adapted the AIM-7. The real issue with AMRAAM was "fratricide" in that the missile once active was on its own and the AIM-7 you could at least shut off the CW. The pit-bull AMRAAM (active missile radar locked on fired without hand off) was always there, but the data link and other hardware adapting the full AMRAAM kit made little differences here and there. The first AMRAAM kills were F-16.

The multi-shot capability is what causes the real problems, if you just looked at a narrow search pattern where all the power out is dedicated to a small area then the early F-16 radars could find targets at the ranges consistent with using an AMRAAM at it full capability, but if you opened up the scan to include multiple targets the range of using the AMRAAM compressed greatly but all multi-shot missile have that problem.

Think of it this way, project a 60 degree cone in front of you as a searching radar, and realize that targets rightdown the boresight are in your view longer then those that pop up on the edges of the cone, they slip through and the effective field of regard for the missile requires that you narrow up your search pattern until you get to around 20 degrees on either side so the targets would be seen by the radar long enough to talk to the AMRAAM on a max range shot - hence track while scan modes generally have / use narrow scans unless you are in an F-14.

To open up your envelope you have to keep the target in the cone longer so you slow down, then when you are slower you need a bigger missile with a bigger motor to intercept and maneuver against a fighter that has a greater speed advantage. Eventually you become a C-130 at 80 knots firing a Patriot missile, and now you can see why F-14's targeting cruise missile using ship fired or submarine fired missiles that are updated by the F-14's is a much better idea then many F-18's with AMRAAM, but then again AMRAM's could be shared also.

The problem is bigger then you think and it is not only the radar and its trons - point is how do you work it. Taking off out of Kirovskye in the Crimea with a vanilla Su-27 and the radar in standby carrying two long-burn AA-10's on taxi you get a 220 km target (out on the range waiting for you) placed on your scope by the Russian ground based air defense system, by the time you are gear up the system is plotting missile solutions and you have not turned the radar on yet - the radar is asked to be turned on just to provide CW for the missile at around 80 km and the scan and target hand off is automatic. The MiG-31 networks a flock of fighters and multiple sensors within a flight package and adds the external inputs just for fun and confirmation. Each family of systems has there own way to do things, and not any one sensor or thing counts all the points.


"Harry Andreas" wrote in message ...
In article 8%0nh.2291$Fs2.1617@trnddc05, "Ski"
wrote:

It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
"venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
again the needs of the components - so you never know.

One of the major reasons for the A - C upgrade was AMRAAM.
The APG-66 radar was not AMRAAM capable, nor was the F-16's
weapons system. AAMAF it was reported at the time that the
AMRAAMs internal radar had a longer acquisition range than
the APG-66.

Large capability change drives airframe cost and complexity

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed to operate at its maximum capability. The UAE F-16's have the advantage of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made much better. Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.

Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all cranking.



"Harry Andreas" wrote in message ...
In article , eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08,
"Ski" wrote:

f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might
say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all
this, but
with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that
goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.

Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
either
the -16 or the -15.

Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs
of the
-16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price
keeps going
up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each. A
quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
estimated $80
million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and the
-15 you
will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15
has two
engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
extremely low.

Don;t disagree in principle, but your comparison is inapt.
UAE bought Block 60s which are much more expensive than the
Block 50s that USAF buys.
Cost comparisons are bogus when just looking at airframe costs
without regard to capability. Any jet with an AESA is far more capable
than one without, but an AESA initial purchase price is higher than
older mechanically scanned radars. You get far more capability
but at higher cost.
System capability must be factored in.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 04:44:44 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

In a insurgency where the enemy is running generally inside your ability to
react (OODA Loop) - could be seconds instead of minutes - I think there
should be a general rule or baseline for conduct of operations. That is
that no unit, small or large, that goes outside of their safe-zone, goes
without a suitable "eye-in-the-sky" that can provide both day and night
early warning, persistent surveillance, and near instant ability to either
call in or provide weapons on target. If we simply had that - and after
billions spent needlessly it is not a big order - many lives could be saved
and many IED and ambush type situations would be thwarted and many escaping
bad guys would be dealt with. Only by having a "hammer" to react to being
fired upon first (unfortunate general situation for the friendlies in an
insurgency) can the friendlies retain anything like an offensive advantage

Having aerial recce makes a difference, and having efficient CAS
within reach can be a life-saver. However, the insurgents are
incorporated in the local population, and will be feeding off accounts
of US activity when the helicopters can be heard, and even observing
aircraft movements in some cases.

One of the primary tactics in this sort of situation is to be prepared
to use small infantry patrols, planned, routed and operated with
skill, to provide observation without the insurgents and locals
knowing that they are around. This is exceptionally difficult in some
areas in Iraq, but not all of them. Paradoxically, the more
technological resources you deploy to secure them (AFVs, aircraft,
etc), the harder it is to make that kind of basic operation
successful.

I suppose it all comes down to using the appropriate tactic in the
appropriate context; doctrinaire responses to the situation - of all
kinds, including "no CAS" or "no artillery", as well as "maximal
forece protection" - will tend to prove inefficient. My view is that
anything beyond a specific and discriminate use of air power risks
counter-productive results, while aerial recce complements
ground-based observation and visa versa.

Gavin Bailey


--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En