"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 10:24:01 GMT, eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article ,
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35,
which
was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
for CAS,
if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
need, the
more -35s we need.

With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
outset.

I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as the start
of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as a
lightweight fighter.

My impression was always that the YF-16/17 flyoff was for a high
volume replacement for the F-4 in ground attack roles while the F-15A
was solely air superiority. Both aircraft were going to be capable of
all of the A/G missions of the F-4 although both reflected de-emphasis
of the tactical nuke mission and neither was viewed at the time as a
potential Wild Weasel. CAS was part of the retained capability--this
despite the A-10.

In 1986, while ALO with the 4th ID (Mech) deployed to Ft. Irwin, I
watched F-16As from Nellis doing tosses of BDU-33s in live fire over
the heads of the FLOT and achieving direct hits (through the plywood)
on enemy tank targets. It should be noted that exercise referees
refused to give kill credit because "the fighters failed to over-fly
the target"--they didn't acknowledge the hits and applied criteria for
scoring that related to a previous generation of CAS aircraft.

We've still got a lot of that thinking with regard to CAS today.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 15:38:12 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'd argue for both - the major effort being special forces intermixed
with Iraqi units as advisors (and even leaders, given the customary
standard of Arab military leadership) with those Iraqi units as the
most visible end of the force. However, I still think there's a
powerful case for US units to be partnered up with the best Iraqi ones
to provide a localised presence in certain areas and under certain
conditions, mostly because I don't think there's enough Special Forces
available to do the job required, and the Iraqis aren't at the point
where they can handle substantial stand-up combat outside their base
areas yet.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

The only proviso as far as I can see - and it's a big one - is having
the level of intelligence required, which should be really
substantive. Short of that, risking people on the ground means risking
people on the ground, but if handled properly it can pay off with
better interactions with the locals leading to incrementally better
intelligence.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign.

As far as possible, yes. But if any action is taken against groups
such as Sadrs militia it will require a substantive and sustained
operation by sizeable US ground forces, even if this is disguised
behind token (or hopefully increasingly less token) Iraqi forces. In
short, I think US forces are still required to operationally influence
the situation to the point where Iraqi forces can cope, even as they
are also required to increase Iraqi capacity via training at the same
time.

Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

CAS (as opposed to selective airstrikes beyond the immediate area of
US force presence on the ground) has an advantage in larger operations
as the US/Iraqi/British forces can control the ground after the fact,
and the customary Arab hyperbole about innocent children being
murdered by the Yanqui imperialist warmongers becomes a little more
difficult to sustain when the bodies of the Mehdi army militiamen and
their AK 47s are visibly being pulled out of the rubble besides the
bodies of any collateral casualties.

On the disinformation side, this is where some accurate air strikes
and artillery can pay dividends - hitting a known mortar firing point
with observed air/artillery fire as the latest gang of "fire and flee"
militia men turn up and then attributing their demise to another
agency (no obvious sign of US forces on the spot in the morning when
their cousins and friends tentatively approach the body-strewn scene,
even if anything of intelligence value has already been lifted...)
always appealed to me, probably because I was never allowed to try it.

Gavin Bailey

--
Solution elegant. Yes. Minor problem, use 25000 CPU cycle for 1
instruction, this why all need overclock Pentium. Dumbass.
- Bart Kwan En

In article , eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article ,
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need the -35,
which
was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally designed
for CAS,
if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
need, the
more -35s we need.

With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
outset.

I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as
the start
of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as a
lightweight fighter.

Subtle difference. I understand now.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In article 7ilnh.34460$Ap5.8738@trnddc04, "Ski"
wrote:

I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their =
F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed =
to operate at its maximum capability.

Actually in my job I assume nothing of the kind.

The UAE F-16's have the advantage =
of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the =
same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the =
capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made =
much better.

I understand the limitations of technology, export laws etc. I deal with it
every day. The Block 60 AESA is still much better than the APG-68.
More than that I can't comment.

Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less =
capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.

Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready =
to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. =
The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all cranking.=20

Build rate is also supremely important. Building 2 a year will cost a lot more
than 2 a month, regardless of the final quantity.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Stand with you on all points and the reason we have to continue patrolling is because the Iraqi's just are not up to it yet and when left to themselves the militia police units overwhelm them and they "turn" into sympathizers of the local warlord. So it will take time and more casualties and without each little unit having back up and "high cover" they all go out and are limited to what they can see.

Also many things drive me crazy - there are optical scanners, laser scanners, audio scanners and other things that will pick up rifle fire, spot video camera lenses and sniper scope lenses and in a sense help provide a 2 second to 10 second warning that a sniper is about to shoot at something - none of this has been implemented in the field yet and the billions spent can not account for any serious effort to go after this hard and heavy. We put billions into robots, sensible but not practical for a moving force, so you try to spot an IED and then move around it, that becomes a shell game because there are now multiple plants predicting where you will "go around" the first one. Stuff like that could have simply been dealt with using many small manned aircraft with night systems. Would there be dull moments - absolutely - dull for everyone but the patrols and convoy personnel. The Army says that the local gomers stop moving around after 02:00 am, and most traffic stops but they are still moving and you would think for a minute that those moving around then would constitute folks doing something other then normal. Until only recently in the Baghdad crisis was there a systematic use of road blocks and curfews - I found this unbelievable but no **** the following existed right up until today:

(1) If you plotted where all the US casualties were made what would it look like - it would be clusters of dots collected along the main highway routes south to north through Baghdad branching off to Mosul and Tirkit. Well then the roads and the casualties overlap perhaps in more then 75% of the time.

(2) with that consistent for four years it would seem obvious that they enemy is coming after us since most of the time we are found in long convoys and patrolling along the main routes that connect the population centers - kind of challenges the notion of irregular and asymmetric warfare when things are so determined by bad habits and not corrected - starts to sound like repetitive guerilla warfare, but the enemy has made the war a business in that the skills and wares of the various cells can be scheduled and purchased to set IED's, provide ambush cover, set mortar harassment fires, etc. As long as we keep coming along the roads without controlling the roads and accesses regardless of how much we armor the vehicles or counter the IED triggers with jammers, or have robots to clear known IED finds - well as long as this continues we will be attacked because the enemy has no reason to change his habits

(3) Now knowing that one would aks - well how many units in the US and coalition forces are dedicated to road security an road access - answer NONE, nada, the road security mission is an add-on to those units that are assigned certain AO's that include the highways and the EOD teams (after the fact) are assigned to them but efforts to thwart and clear the highways are taken only with normal patrolling not with dedicated efforts except in special circumstances when helicopters were put up in groups for periods of hours but nothing could be sustained because under every rock and on every roof is an enemy with a rifle or RPG and they have a field day shooting at the helos that are heard for 20 plus miles away and can't turn fast enough to counter shots from a blind side.

(4) How many Iraqi units are dedicated to road security - very few and those involved are tainted by the militias. Note that if we allowed and encouraged the various towns and villages to set up toll sections the earned income would translate to a cash cow and there would be a firm interst in keeping the roads safe for our convoys. Well they would steal us blind - SO WHAT - at $2 billion a week that is nothing and it could provide jobs because we could demand that the roads be repaired and cleaned etc. Also alternative roads could be built for Iraqi normal traffic thus isolating the main roads for the convoys totally and many more jobs. Iraq has railroads, but they do not work - yet railroads have "rightaways"and rightaways mean you could build simple elevated rails on contrete pylons with steel tracks using sleds run by rubber-tires and electric motors (see http://www.megarail.com/CargoRail_Heavy_Cargo/) and low and behold the roads nurished by tolls that have rail rightaways running paralle could produce elevated rails capable of being manufactured in Iraq and on those elevated "T" concrete pylons you could then add pvc water lines, fibre lines, electric power lines, communications in the fibre etc and the same militias and local police collecting tolls and protecting the roads would have to protect the elevated rail segments that would rebuild the infrastructure piece by piece. Remember that over 1200 convoys a day, some miles long are required in Iraq. There are at least six major depot and garrison points - each one has over 8 to 10,000 people, so with 130,000 troops there you have around half in garrison every day - who the hell is fighting the war - a hand full of units going on patrol after patrol after patrol with no air cover and no real support. The generals see everything and in short can do very little because the sytem id set up to feed them not just keep them informed.



"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ...
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 23:09:40 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:55:08 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

I think you're singing bass and I'm singing tenor in the same choir.

I think you're missing an opportunity to reduce a constructive thread
to the normal level of usenet discourse.

It's a curse, I know.

Be that as it may, I would still differ on the importance of
patrolling. Reducing the visibility of the uniformed army on the
ground serves a valid purpose in reducing the 'occupier' propaganda
dynamic, but some level of patrolling is still required - covert and
overt - to maintain some independent contact with the community.

Without that, there won't be the level of intelligence required for
checking that the Iraqi forces are operating efficiently or even the
level of intelligence required to effectively use precision heavy
weaponry which is sometimes required.

I agree with your premise, but the model I'd go with would eliminate
US unit patrolling. As I suggested, the unit-level involvement
scenario would be on-call response to Iraqi security forces or intel.

The idea would be the classic Special Forces model. "Advisors"
embedded in national units. They keep the local force honest
(hopefully), correct errors in training, gain insight into community
relations/intel, and provide feedback to HHQ on progress. It reduces
external force visibility and hence the opportunity to use the
"occupier" propaganda against us.

I'm strongly in favour of
'minimum force' to reduce the asymmetric propaganda dynamic, but I
have to say bombing Zarqawi accurately from the air is a better
alternative to going though the door (or window, or wall) on foot,
always provided the intelligence is sufficiently accurate.

No doubt about it.

It will be a while (of ever) before the Iraqi forces can get to the
required level of operational proficiency, and they certainly won't be
delivering PGM attacks any time soon, so I personally see a valid role
for air strikes (in limited numbers) and therefore a USAF presence to
deliver them for some time to come.

Good point. But the essence of the tactic is that the front end,
visible security force is national not foreign. Where the indirect
fire support comes from is not readily apparent. (You could even mount
a disinformation campaign to deflect responsibility to newly
reconstituted Iraqi units....)

Gavin Bailey

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed you are soooo right and one would think that the USAF and Army are closer
but NOT, they are miles apart and going for distance


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
news
On Fri, 05 Jan 2007 10:24:01 GMT, eponymous cowherd
wrote:

In article ,
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

You complain that we need more CAS, and then say we don't need
the -35,
which
was designed for CAS. The -15,-16, and -18 were not originally
designed
for CAS,
if you count the -17 as the start of the -18 program. The more CAS we
need, the
more -35s we need.

With all due respect, the-18 was designed with CAS as a mission from the
outset.

I wrote that the -18 was not designed for CAS if "you count the -17 as the
start
of the program". I think that's a fair statement, the YF-17 was offered as
a
lightweight fighter.

My impression was always that the YF-16/17 flyoff was for a high
volume replacement for the F-4 in ground attack roles while the F-15A
was solely air superiority. Both aircraft were going to be capable of
all of the A/G missions of the F-4 although both reflected de-emphasis
of the tactical nuke mission and neither was viewed at the time as a
potential Wild Weasel. CAS was part of the retained capability--this
despite the A-10.

In 1986, while ALO with the 4th ID (Mech) deployed to Ft. Irwin, I
watched F-16As from Nellis doing tosses of BDU-33s in live fire over
the heads of the FLOT and achieving direct hits (through the plywood)
on enemy tank targets. It should be noted that exercise referees
refused to give kill credit because "the fighters failed to over-fly
the target"--they didn't acknowledge the hits and applied criteria for
scoring that related to a previous generation of CAS aircraft.

We've still got a lot of that thinking with regard to CAS today.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

yes - good discussion


"Harry Andreas" wrote in message
...
In article 7ilnh.34460$Ap5.8738@trnddc04, "Ski"
wrote:

I think that you will find that the UAE pays a different price for their
=
F-16's then the USAF in many ways.
You assume that each "type" with its component systems is being designed
=
to operate at its maximum capability.

Actually in my job I assume nothing of the kind.

The UAE F-16's have the advantage =
of AESA scanning and processing but they see targets essentially at the =
same ranges the USAF Block 50/52's to, subtle modes vary but the =
capability is fairly even despite the fact that it might have been made =
much better.

I understand the limitations of technology, export laws etc. I deal with
it
every day. The Block 60 AESA is still much better than the APG-68.
More than that I can't comment.

Also, the internal IRST is no more and perhaps less =
capable then the SNIPER or LITNING II - so it all depends.

Costs depend upon how many you want, what you have to spend to get ready
=
to build, and how many man hours required to produce what you want. =
The long poles are lead items and labor, after that it is all
cranking.=20

Build rate is also supremely important. Building 2 a year will cost a lot
more
than 2 a month, regardless of the final quantity.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

You make good comments - but in this insurgency just having something that
is flying above your head and talking to you is better then what is there
now. If it shoots something - better yet. If it can hit something -
vunderbar!!

In the beginning of the war and just out of Afghanistan the CAS concepts
were classical, the TACP team the radio's and the long discussion about
where everybody is and the "nine-line" descriptor and target coordinates all
passed verbally even though people were using GPS because the link between
the systems was moving to the Rover and not the simple IDM that operated off
the radios and could only pass data and a picture. So CAS was focused on
putting a precision bomb on a known target properly identified amongst
friendly positions. The targeting pods because a big helper for the
fighters, one generation after LANTRIN or more. Then the bomb's collateral
damage made it only usable when the house or target was a bit distanced from
friendlies but the enemy still collected a crowd to protect themselves, so
strafing came back and then even the 30 mm round became too big. This is
becoming a real tough job now - hence the Blitz fighter idea



"eponymous cowherd" wrote in message
...
In article RM_lh.8389$tc5.6241@trnddc01,
"Ski" wrote:

e Army failed to do that when its
"boots on the ground efforts" recognized that the armed helicopter
(mostly
Apache and Kiawa) were now unrealiable against a ground sprinkled with
armed
insurgents shooting wildly at them from all directions (Cobra II Chapter
14
and Fiasco Chapter 6).

I hope you are not referring to that single maneuver element fiasco during
the
initial invasion.



The war, which again remmebr is costing billions
every month and is taking nearly one hundred lives every month with many
more wounded has gone on now for five years.

Then declare defeat and leave. Let them fight each other down to the last
man
and let the last man be kicked to death by a donkey.



A new F-15E or F-16C or F/A-18E coming off the production line is in no
way
an "old" aircraft when considering whether it can do a job or not.

They are old. The wing loading on the -15E is too high for low level
attack such
as CAS. The -15 and -18 don't make use of relaxed stability. The -16
and -15
don't make use of vertexs created by LERX to reduce stall speed. That's
just the
stuff I know and can remember off hand. A lot of **** has been learned
since the
1970s. Aerodynamic research did not come to an end when NACA became NASA.



machines have been continually maturing and continually improve to the
point
that now they are more capable in just about every category of fighter
comparisons that you can think of except the materials and shapes that
lend
itself to so called stealth features. To say that the JSF has a mystical
integrative advantage over the F-15E is simply a case of displays,
antennas,
and circuit boards because the ever changing software tapes are
deliberately
held up as different beasts in different models because we have long past
the day when you could distinguish the difference between an F-16 or F-18
or
F-15 or B-2 or JSF radar - it is just boards, components and software -
all
of which is grossly overpriced and enornmously over-paced to drag out the


There is no way older aircraft can mix IR and radar info without
completely
redoing the cockpit and all electronics. A software upgrade will not do
it,
because on planes previous to the -22 and -35 the IR and radar systems are
seperate, they're ain't no stinking wires between them.

Integrating sensor data from other planes with your own is possible with
an
upgrade, but the value is questionable. In the older systems the displays
are
all committed, they show one thing all the time. In the new systems all
displays
are controlled by a single brain and can show whatever the programmers are
capable of coming up with. It takes a while to explain, maybe you should
just do
the work yourself.

all so true - but if the manpads is not just IR guided, say a digital beam
rider flying a laser, radar, or optical beam or with a sophisticated heads
so that it can shoot head on, then it gets tougher which is why surprise
helps and low noise does a lot there

Flying low and fast, that is nape of the earth and near sonic the JSF going
from A to B will do very well and in that case unless something warns the
ground defenses. The world is now a place where the second you taxi or
leave the ship the gomers are on their cell phones calling in the launch -
again this brings up how the Israeli's dealt with the IADS put up in the
Bekaa and how they tried to convince the US Navy not to go low in the
strikes conducted around Beirut in 1983. The idea being if you suppress the
radar SAMS (SA-2/3/6/8 etc.) then you kind of carve out the area above
15,000 feet and the AAA or manpads can not effectively shoot you there even
though they could reach the height kinematically. This goes on and on...
so going low or going high depends upon surprise, if it can be obtained, and
what you are trying to do. One thing for sure however, once you target the
SAM operators their attitude changes.

In the 90's the new Defense Minister of Lithuania was a missile officer who
served a tour with the Russians as an advisor in Hanoi during the Vietnam
war and was at the site off of Haiphong that would pick off so many of our
jets egressing. I had to take the son of a bitch to lunch as a favor to a
NATO person and got to like him, he introduced himself with "I think we met
before" - a good ice breaker. Since we are on war stories - the following
year I was dropped off at the Polish AF academy (Deblin) to help in the
transition and decided in all my good vision to convince the Chief of Staff
to allow us to commandeer his YAK and take the high grades in the senior
class to the Farnborough Air Show with an actual agenda to do some learning.
Well after a lot of hassle he agreed as long as he could go and then I
couldn't get any budget from the US but BAe became a great helper - nice
guys. Long story short in the process BAe insisted that the Polish pilots
get the Queen's tour of Warton and the Hawk & Eurofighter so we all tramp
over their shuttle plane for the flight to Warton and the class conspired
with the Brits to sit me next to the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force -
Gen Dong something - a guy with nine kills and looked and talked like a
fighter pilot in anybody's first rate air force. Never trust Lieutenants.
I felt about as big as you know what but he was entertaining knowing every
detail about his missions and kills - "what did you do in the war ole ski"
blurted his interpreter, well let's see, I bombed a lot of trees, damaged a
couple of jets, got blown out of a helicopter and basically was a miserable
noload for too long. Ahso and the fast talking interpreter was laughing up
a storm so I said - "well at least I got to kill a lot of folks like this
guy" Interpreter shuts up abruptly - General looks at me, smiles and in
perfect English says "me too". We drank all the way to Warton and talked
about the F-16 - I hope he gets his F-16's thinks the Su-27 is a pig - so
much for the enemy.


"eponymous cowherd" wrote in message
...
In article C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08,
"Ski" wrote:

Well what about the Rapiers and handheld IR SAM's - every one of these
jets
are too hot, too contrast prone for low altitude and all the too noisy -
so
they use countermeasures, tactics, and agility which is sometimes not
enough.
But for sure the Apache has been ruled out and the Cobra given real
trouble.


Speed helps a lot against MANPADs. They have a 3 mile range and you have
to push
a button to cool the seeker before firing. If a plane is moving through
that
range quickly it is a tough target for a MANPAD, though numbers can make
up for
that. Still, moving through the threat zone quickly helps a lot and the
F-35 has
tons of engine power.



Just for grins think of an extended development JSF leveraging all the
good
things now realized but add a real laser weapon to rid it totally of
racks,
weapons, and pylons - then merge in the UCAS/

I think the best lasers can currently do at converting electricity to
laser
light is 50% with the rest becoming heat. Until the efficiency goes up I
don't
think lasers will be a practical weapon. At 50% it means that if the laser
is
strong enough to melt a tank it is producing enough heat itself to melt a
tank.