OK, what the hell has happened to the Brits?

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...

You're assuming secrets staying secret, again.


You're assuming they don't.

Yes. Welcome to the world of security.

[...]


Well, if nobody can explain how the secret can be compromised, and nobody
has, then the secret appears to be pretty safe.

That is a silly assertion. It assumes because nobody has done something
before, or has described how it can be done, that it will never be done.

It's akin to someone having said "man has never flown, and nobody can
describe how many will fly, so man will never fly." (just to stay on topic
{8^).

[...]
Well, if all programs fail, there's nothing we can do.

That is true. But each time you add a layer - and assuming that the layers
have independent failure modes, which is a simplification - you decrease
the likelyhood of *all* layers failing concurrently.

That's precisely the point: we make the case were "all programs fail" less
likely by increasing the universe of programs.


But you're not saying the marshal program MIGHT fail, you're saying the
,arshal program WILL fail.

Correct. If I'm wrong, then there's no problem. If I'm right, then we'd
better have something else ready to handle that case.

It's clear you're against armed marshals on
airplanes,

That reflects your reading skills; not my beliefs. As I wrote, it is a
balancing act. If we assume that it is less than P likely that someone can
smuggle a weapon on board, then putting an armed marshal on the aircraft
increases risk. If we assume that it is more than P likely, then putting
an armed marshal on board decreases risk.

The choice of P reflects the chances of the identity of the marshal(s)
getting out.

Personally, I believe that the chances of smuggling a weapon on board are
high, but that the chances of the identity of the marshal being released
are also high. This reflects not the nature of the problem, but my low
opinion of the people working to solve these problems...or perhaps their
paymasters.

In other words, I'd have more faith if the TSA weren't cutting budgets for
security staff and wasting time on ineffective ideas like flight
restrictions which effect only GA.

but it appears to be just an emotional issue with you. You
have not presented a cogent argument against them.

That's not true, but it is apparent I've not presented an argument that you
can follow. I'd be sorry for that were it not apparent that you've no
interest in following any argument which disagrees with your opinion.

- Andrew

G.R. Patterson III wrote:



Andrew Gideon wrote:

Yes. They'd also need to identify the marshal amongst the passengers, as
you noted. However, relying upon these "secrets" is relying upon
something
called "security through obscurity". It doesn't work in the long term.

It doesn't have to work in the long term. It has to work for the duration
of that flight.

If there were no pattern to the marshals used, you'd be right. For example,
if we randomly selected a couple of police officers for each flight, the
chances of this information being abused would be relatively small.

If, however, there's a relatively small population of marshals, then even
the release of one identity can cause a problem.

But don't ignore the possibility that an entire class, or even the entire
population, will become known to some terrorist group. How many people
will have access to this information? How well vetted are they?

You'd think, for example, that we'd be sure about the people permitted to
speak to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Wups.

Does nobody remember Robert Hanssen?

Further to keep in mind is that we're not speaking only of TSA staffers.
We've "marshals" from other nations handling security as well. More, some
of these nations aren't taking this program terribly seriously.

How well secured are the identities of those "marshals"?

- Andrew

So what? You never did explain how the terrorists identify the
marshals.

Lol - they train for the job!

Morgans wrote:
"Andrew Gideon" wrote in message
online.com...
Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

Please explain how having an armed marshal aboard is a "weak
point". How do the terrorists get the weapon away from the marshal?

Picture two terrorists, one walking to the restroom and one walking
back from. They meet where the marshal is seated. One grabs the
guy around the throat while the other goes for the weapon.

How did the terrorists identify who the air marshal was?

Trivial:
A third terrorist just attacks the cockpit door or assaults a cabin crew
member and pretends to strangulate him with shoe laces or a belt. The one
person who jumps up, draws a gun, and arrests the assailant is the air
marshal.

jue

Jens Krueger wrote:

But what puzzles me is, that the DHS now REQUIRES all planes to have
ARMED passengers (Air Marshals are just that: non-rev Pax.) on Board.

Not all, just a random sample.

I wonder how difficult it might be to become an Air Marshal on Saudia,
Emirates, EgyptAir, SaudiArabAir, PIA, Biman Bangladesh, Royal Maroc,
Royal Jordanian or whatever other Airline from the middle-to-far-east
flies to the US.

Good point. There was some discussion in the news recently to the effect that
AlQuaida is suspected of having managed to get some of their members positions
as airline pilots. It would probably take even less time to infiltrate the air
marshal program in Saudi Arabia, India, or the Philipines.

George Patterson
Great discoveries are not announced with "Eureka!". What's usually said is
"Hummmmm... That's interesting...."

Andrew Gideon wrote:

Yes. They'd also need to identify the marshal amongst the passengers, as
you noted. However, relying upon these "secrets" is relying upon something
called "security through obscurity". It doesn't work in the long term.

It doesn't have to work in the long term. It has to work for the duration of
that flight.

George Patterson
Great discoveries are not announced with "Eureka!". What's usually said is
"Hummmmm... That's interesting...."

In article , "Ron
Natalie" wrote:

] Uh, there are between 90 and 400 passengers on that plane. How do
your
two
terrorists know which one to grab, or that there aren't two of them?
The
penalty for guessing wrong is death.

He's the one sitting in first class and not drinking.

oh crap, now people will think I'm an air marshall.

--
Bob Noel

In article et,
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:

Well, if nobody can explain how the secret can be compromised, and nobody
has, then the secret appears to be pretty safe.

the secret can be compromised just like any other secret. Give enough
$$$$$ to the right people and you can found out anything.

--
Bob Noel

On 31 Dec 2003 21:07:01 GMT, Wdtabor wrote:


Uh, there are between 90 and 400 passengers on that plane. How do your two
terrorists know which one to grab, or that there aren't two of them? The
penalty for guessing wrong is death.

on the long run it will let the terrorists succeed. More "security" will be
established to the point where nobody trusts nobody else. Don't you see
that _you_ made them win the game already?

#m

--
harsh regulations in North Korea (read below link after reading the story):
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/04/04/open-mikulan.php
oooops ... sorry ... it happened in the USA, ya know: the land of the free.

On Wed, 31 Dec 2003 17:02:44 -0800, G.R. Patterson III wrote:

Good point. There was some discussion in the news recently to the effect that
AlQuaida is suspected of having managed to get some of their members positions
as airline pilots. It would probably take even less time to infiltrate the air
marshal program in Saudi Arabia, India, or the Philipines.


It would even be easier (as I believe that "Al Queada" has almost unlimited
financial ressources) to found their own airline, operate unsuspect for
some time and then .. well .. you get the picture ...


#m

--
harsh regulations in North Korea (read below link after reading the story):
http://www.laweekly.com/ink/04/04/open-mikulan.php
oooops ... sorry ... it happened in the USA, ya know: the land of the free.