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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns



 
 
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  #81  
Old May 7th 06, 04:30 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
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Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

Paul F Austin wrote:
"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
(Harry Andreas) wrote:

:In article ,
wrote: : :
(Harry
Andreas) wrote: : : :In article
, "Keith W" :
wrote: : : : : "Harry
Andreas" wrote in message : :
... : : In article
, : :
wrote: : : : : Note that this is
sort of the same approach that lost Germany the

war.
: : Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while
us

sloppy
: : folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could
because

we let
: : the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the
skilled : : 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages. : : :
: Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far. : : : :
Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser? : :
They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to :
: the early war versions. : : : : : : The German record
was very mixed : : : :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who
have said similar things, : :but I still object to Mr McCall's
statement that, in Germany, : :"Everything was hand-finished to
very high standards". : :That's just not true. As you point out,
it was very selective, : : Yes. The big ticket items (which was
what I meant by "everything", : since that is what wars are
actually fought and won with) got all the : hand finishing. Small
stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be : cheap and 'throw
away' generally weren't. : : So object and be damned to you. :
ude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone
:disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some
things...

Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue...


"Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German
production. Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The
Wehrmacht's besetting sin was not demanding superior (and useless)
manufacturing standards. The main problems were 1. refusal to stop
changing designs and 2. not fully mobilizing for production until
'way too late.

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."

Vince
  #82  
Old May 7th 06, 05:05 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
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Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

Vince wrote:
[snip]


Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.


One short war = short war
Lots of short wars = long time at war.

Weapons and ammunition used need replacing.

Blair and Bush need this explaining.

Andrew Swallow
  #83  
Old May 7th 06, 07:03 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
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Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

Vince wrote:
Paul J. Adam wrote:
Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very
good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at
how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at
least, be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged).


once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had
overwhelming strength at any point.


Not really, no: we were landing and supplying forces across beaches,
subject to the caprices of Channel weather (which could be, and was,
very nasty), and pitting inexperienced troops against veterans on
terrain they'd had time to prepare.

Certainly the men who seized the Odon crossings, held off
counter-attacks by elements of six panzer divisions, drew in the German
strategic reserves, and withstood the attacks that were supposed to
break them, would disagree that they had "overwhelming strength", but
their success suggests that the Wehrmacht had similar difficulties
attacking in Normandy countryside as anyone else (it was the inability
of the Germans to destroy 15th Scots, despite throwing in their entire
reserve, that led Rommel on 29 June to propose a fighting retreat to the
Seine)


Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an
expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the
Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced
with assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First
Alamein or even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too.


the Kursk was simply overwhelmingly strong.


Perhaps a maxim of excellent soldiers is "don't attack where the enemy
has built seven layers of defensive lines precisely in order to defeat
your plan"? While the Germans were good at "mission command" at lower
ranks, their commanders - with a few exceptions - ranged from spineless
to clueless.

Mind you, when a senior Wehrmacht officer admitted to an inconvenient
truth, he could find himself out of a job very fast (cf von Rundstedt in
July 1944, telling Keitel that Germany's strategic options in the West
consisted of 'Make peace, you fools!' and being promptly replaced by von
Kluge) which has to be included in any assessment of their ability.



--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
  #84  
Old May 7th 06, 10:28 PM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."


It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


  #85  
Old May 8th 06, 12:24 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."


It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.


  #86  
Old May 8th 06, 07:00 AM posted to sci.military.naval,rec.aviation.military,rec.aviation.military.naval
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

Jack Love wrote:

On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote:


"Vince" wrote in message
...
Paul F Austin wrote:

The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs,
making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as
important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen
until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first
years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win
by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and
the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only
peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the
Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of
types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right
carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev.



They had lots of problems
From the strategic bombing survey

Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a
great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively
few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry
and the average work week was below British standards.

Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a
continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to
the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope
for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early
1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst
inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in
armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot
be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it
suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier
years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top
government management in Germany was not efficient."


It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil
War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the
Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps
were....empty. Oops.


And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to
have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent
to winning the war.


They're hardly the only ones to suffer from that misconception (cough).

Guy


 




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