If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#31
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
Seattle Post Intelligencer on 14 October:
CLE ELUM, Wash. (AP) — General Motors says a glider that crashed at a Washington state airport, killing the pilot, was involved in filming a commercial for the automaker. The Kittitas County sheriff's office says the glider was being towed down the runway at an airport about 75 miles southeast of Seattle and was just starting to lift off when it crashed Thursday. A helicopter was filming the glider from above Cle Elum Municipal Airport. Sad. Judy |
#32
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 1, 6:54*am, JJ Sinclair wrote:
*Bill D wrote.......... If the glider has transitioned into a spiral dive, and the pilot does nothing or uses spin recovery controls, it's going to get nasty - especially at low altitudes. I believe the way to distinguish between a spin or a spiral is to take a quick peek at the airspeed indicator. If it is reading 60 knots or more, you are in a spiral, not a spin and need to roll the wings level and pull the nose up to the horizon. If you apply spin recovery controls (stick forward and opposite rudder) you will find yourself going straight down right now! Cheers, JJ One important lesson from this discussion, regardless if it is related to this accident or not, is the importance of practicing a spin recovery as well as spiral recovery. However when the pilot is the one who initiate the spin and/or the spiral dive, the recovery is straight forward, since your controls are likely in extreem position and since you initiated the manouver all you need is to basically reverse what you did. In a real stall/spin, there is the lement of surprise, and the controls are likely near neutral so the recovery is not as obvious as in practice. As such, the practice should be intitated by someone else than the pilot. So next time you do your BFR or fly with an instructor, instead of practcing stall/spin/spiral recovery the traditional way where the pilot initiate the manouver, ask the instructor to initiate the stall/ spin/spiral, preferably without warning, and let you take over the control to recover. This should be a standard part of instructions and BFRs. The current method mostly teaches you how to inititate spin and spirals but not how to recover from accidental one. Ramy |
#33
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 2, 3:39*pm, Ramy wrote:
On Nov 1, 6:54*am, JJ Sinclair wrote: *Bill D wrote.......... If the glider has transitioned into a spiral dive, and the pilot does nothing or uses spin recovery controls, it's going to get nasty - especially at low altitudes. I believe the way to distinguish between a spin or a spiral is to take a quick peek at the airspeed indicator. If it is reading 60 knots or more, you are in a spiral, not a spin and need to roll the wings level and pull the nose up to the horizon. If you apply spin recovery controls (stick forward and opposite rudder) you will find yourself going straight down right now! Cheers, JJ One important lesson from this discussion, regardless if it is related to this accident or not, is the importance of practicing a spin recovery as well as spiral recovery. However when the pilot is the one who initiate the spin and/or the spiral dive, the recovery is straight forward, since your controls are likely in extreem position and since you initiated the manouver all you need is to basically reverse what you did. In a real stall/spin, there is the lement of surprise, and the controls are likely near neutral so the recovery is not as obvious as in practice. As such, the practice should be intitated by someone else than the pilot. So next time you do your BFR or fly with an instructor, instead of practcing stall/spin/spiral recovery the traditional way where the pilot initiate the manouver, ask the instructor to initiate the stall/ spin/spiral, preferably without warning, and let you take over the control to recover. This should be a standard part of instructions and BFRs. The current method mostly teaches you how to inititate spin and spirals but not how to recover from accidental one. Ramy It seems to me the lessons of this crash are less likely in the "improper operation of the controls" general area and more in the "aeronautical decision making" area. What was the decision-making process that led to even trying a ground tow behind a 200 foot rope, with a plan to do a 180 at the end of the runway? To what extent was camera pressure involved? Getting to the end of the runway at 200 feet, slow speed, and nowhere to land ahead seems the question, not whether the pilot has a miraculous touch to avoid what's going to happen next. Though the FAA and flight instruction is focusing more and more on decision making, the NTSB seems not so interested, so it is unlikely we will hear the story well investigated from this aspect. John Cochrane |
#34
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
John,
The accident occurred toward the end of the second (and last) day in shooting the commercial. The filming involved at least thirty professionals at the airport location plus some very-expensive equipment. The glider was the star of the commercial. Also, the glider pilot was being paid a lot of money. These add up to a lot of motivation to do the stunts. I believe that "improper operation of the controls" probably took place in that the pilot pulled up too sharply and broke the rope. That being said, the tragic chain of events certainly began a few days earlier when the pilot (a high-time CFIG) agreed to launch his glider using a 230' rope on a 2500' runway with a plan to make a 180-degree turn and land back on the runway. I agree that the root-cause of the accident was the serious error in "aeronautical decision making." In terms of hazardous thought patterns, impulsivity, resignation and macho come to mind. This accident has reminded me how easy it can be to put safety concerns aside and how unforgiving aviation can be. Mark |
#35
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
As this accident happened at the end of the second day, had he
successfully performed the flight profile earlier or was this the first go? Mark |
#36
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 2, 6:05*pm, John Cochrane
wrote: On Nov 2, 3:39*pm, Ramy wrote: On Nov 1, 6:54*am, JJ Sinclair wrote: *Bill D wrote.......... If the glider has transitioned into a spiral dive, and the pilot does nothing or uses spin recovery controls, it's going to get nasty - especially at low altitudes. I believe the way to distinguish between a spin or a spiral is to take a quick peek at the airspeed indicator. If it is reading 60 knots or more, you are in a spiral, not a spin and need to roll the wings level and pull the nose up to the horizon. If you apply spin recovery controls (stick forward and opposite rudder) you will find yourself going straight down right now! Cheers, JJ One important lesson from this discussion, regardless if it is related to this accident or not, is the importance of practicing a spin recovery as well as spiral recovery. However when the pilot is the one who initiate the spin and/or the spiral dive, the recovery is straight forward, since your controls are likely in extreem position and since you initiated the manouver all you need is to basically reverse what you did. In a real stall/spin, there is the lement of surprise, and the controls are likely near neutral so the recovery is not as obvious as in practice. As such, the practice should be intitated by someone else than the pilot. So next time you do your BFR or fly with an instructor, instead of practcing stall/spin/spiral recovery the traditional way where the pilot initiate the manouver, ask the instructor to initiate the stall/ spin/spiral, preferably without warning, and let you take over the control to recover. This should be a standard part of instructions and BFRs. The current method mostly teaches you how to inititate spin and spirals but not how to recover from accidental one. Ramy It seems to me the lessons of this crash are less likely in the "improper operation of the controls" general area and more in the "aeronautical decision making" area. What was the decision-making process that led to even trying a ground tow behind a 200 foot rope, with a plan to do a 180 at the end of the runway? To what extent was camera pressure involved? Getting to the end of the runway at 200 feet, slow speed, and nowhere to land ahead seems the question, not whether the pilot has a miraculous touch to avoid what's going to happen next. Though the FAA and flight instruction is focusing more and more on decision making, the NTSB seems not so interested, so it is unlikely we will hear the story well investigated from this aspect. John Cochrane- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - I agree strongly with John. When doing something like this, there is HUGE pressure to do what the guy running the photo shoot wants done. He is in control of the "customer" satisfaction and the money. He is also an artist and likely not a scientist or aviator. He will ask for things that may become marginal, or worse, and assumes the pilot will say no if there is a problem with safety. This is a really hard situation to be in. We walked away from a partially completed project many years ago when we were being pushed too far in our judgement in terms of safety. It was hard, we lost some money, there were tears- but nobody got hurt. The sub topic of this related to spin recovery has little to do with this accident. At these altitudes, there is no ability to recover if the glider departs. The only way not to crash is to maintain controllability in the first place. FWIW UH |
#37
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
As regards the "aeronautical decision making", please think about
this. For a long time in the US, there has been the teaching of "Say 200 Feet out loud". Meaning, that this is THE decision point for an air tow. If you are at or above 200 feet, you can safely make a 180 to land. So, they say. Then, they put on the caveat, "conditions permitting". This means a lot of things. Airspeed, wind, obstructions to either side, runway behind (but soon to be ahead of) you, glide path altering capability, etc. But, things may not be the same for a ground launch. Our example. Pressure from the film crew to "just do it". Pilot knows he can do a 180 to a landing the other direction from 200 feet in his plane. He has done it many times before, as he instructs in the plane. Decides he can probably do it from a little less, as he always has time and altitude for openning the air brakes after the 180 in order to land and not go off the end of the runway. So, it will be "OK" to do this from a just over 200 foot long rope, and maybe not a full 200 feet of altitude. More pressure from the film crew, either real or imagined. Being paid to do this. It will be OK. I believe he likely had no real concerns about this, as he had done all the parts before. Ground launch. Low altitude rope breaks. Turn around to land the other direction. He just had not done them all at the same time. I can see in my mind exactly how this could have played out. He ended up at an altitude that would permit a safe return to landing the opposite direction, but without the airspeed required to do it. Please think about this for your training and day to day flying. The turn around to land the other direction depends not just on potential energy, but total energy. I think the plan was to be at the end of the runway, at a bit under 200 feet, but full normal pattern speed. This is the part that fell short of the plan. With results we have all read about. As Hank says, FWIW. Steve Leonard |
#38
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 3, 11:00*am, Steve Leonard wrote:
.... I can see in my mind exactly how this could have played out. *He ended up at an altitude that would permit a safe return to landing the opposite direction, but without the airspeed required to do it. Please think about this for your training and day to day flying. *The turn around to land the other direction depends not just on potential energy, but total energy. *I think the plan was to be at the end of the runway, at a bit under 200 feet, but full normal pattern speed. This is the part that fell short of the plan. *With results we have all read about. As usual, this thread has 2 topics: What Happened? and Things This Reminds Me Of. I continue to think, on the What Happened topic, that something unanticipated went wrong, either with the glider or the pilot, as there's no explanation for the "pitched up sharply" phenomenon. No experienced pilot would deliberately do this. Was there a release failure followed by an attempt to break the weak link? An elevator- linkage failure? A seizure or cardiac arrest or sudden vertigo? Other? Likely unanswerable, except for the elevator-linkage question. DanlJ |
#39
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 3, 11:00 am, Steve Leonard wrote:
Our example. Pressure from the film crew to "just do it". Not to mention that the pilot undoubtably signed a contract that he would "do it". So stepping away at the end of the second day (last day?) of shooting for the "big shot", breaking the contract, and potentially stepping away from the paycheck, would really take some cahones. I am glad I was not in this particular pressure cooker situation. - John PS (Uneducated opinion alert) - I think that the glider should have taken off only to 5-10 feet for a long shot from the departure end, run to the half way point, then settle back down onto the runway. Going to 100-200 feet takes the Caddy out of the picture - what good is that? And I would have had a fellow glider pilot driving the tow vehicle who knows that an aircraft doesn't have wheel brakes until it is back on the pavement (something non-pilots don't think about). Worse thing that might have happened would have been a crunched nose cone from impacting the bumper of the tow vehicle. My $0.02. |
#40
|
|||
|
|||
Cle Elum crash on NTSB
On Nov 3, 7:03*am, wrote:
On Nov 2, 6:05*pm, John Cochrane wrote: On Nov 2, 3:39*pm, Ramy wrote: On Nov 1, 6:54*am, JJ Sinclair wrote: *Bill D wrote.......... If the glider has transitioned into a spiral dive, and the pilot does nothing or uses spin recovery controls, it's going to get nasty - especially at low altitudes. I believe the way to distinguish between a spin or a spiral is to take a quick peek at the airspeed indicator. If it is reading 60 knots or more, you are in a spiral, not a spin and need to roll the wings level and pull the nose up to the horizon. If you apply spin recovery controls (stick forward and opposite rudder) you will find yourself going straight down right now! Cheers, JJ One important lesson from this discussion, regardless if it is related to this accident or not, is the importance of practicing a spin recovery as well as spiral recovery. However when the pilot is the one who initiate the spin and/or the spiral dive, the recovery is straight forward, since your controls are likely in extreem position and since you initiated the manouver all you need is to basically reverse what you did. In a real stall/spin, there is the lement of surprise, and the controls are likely near neutral so the recovery is not as obvious as in practice. As such, the practice should be intitated by someone else than the pilot. So next time you do your BFR or fly with an instructor, instead of practcing stall/spin/spiral recovery the traditional way where the pilot initiate the manouver, ask the instructor to initiate the stall/ spin/spiral, preferably without warning, and let you take over the control to recover. This should be a standard part of instructions and BFRs. The current method mostly teaches you how to inititate spin and spirals but not how to recover from accidental one. Ramy It seems to me the lessons of this crash are less likely in the "improper operation of the controls" general area and more in the "aeronautical decision making" area. What was the decision-making process that led to even trying a ground tow behind a 200 foot rope, with a plan to do a 180 at the end of the runway? To what extent was camera pressure involved? Getting to the end of the runway at 200 feet, slow speed, and nowhere to land ahead seems the question, not whether the pilot has a miraculous touch to avoid what's going to happen next. Though the FAA and flight instruction is focusing more and more on decision making, the NTSB seems not so interested, so it is unlikely we will hear the story well investigated from this aspect. John Cochrane- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - I agree strongly with John. When doing something like this, there is HUGE pressure to do what the guy running the photo shoot wants done. He is in control of the "customer" satisfaction and the money. He is also an artist and likely not a scientist or aviator. He will ask for things that may become marginal, or worse, and assumes the pilot will say no if there is a problem with safety. This is a really hard situation to be in. We walked away from a partially completed project many years ago when we were being pushed too far in our judgement in terms of safety. It was hard, we lost some money, there were tears- but nobody got hurt. The sub topic of this related to spin recovery has little to do with this accident. At these altitudes, there is no ability to recover if the glider departs. The only way not to crash is to maintain controllability in the first place. FWIW UH What happened might have looked very similar to these two videos on YouTube that most of have already seen. How he got himself into the situation was different, and the how and why of that is open to analysis and speculation, but the end result, a stall/spin from very low, unrecoverable altitude, was the same. I think the pilots in the videos survived, but they were very lucky. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfFGN...eature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxbulrrQVig |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Final NTSB report on Fossett crash | danlj | Soaring | 0 | July 10th 09 06:32 AM |
NTSB Factual Walton Crash | ChuckSlusarczyk | Home Built | 29 | September 5th 06 06:59 PM |
NTSB Preliminary report on HPN crash | Peter R. | Instrument Flight Rules | 83 | May 10th 05 08:37 PM |
Hendricks Crash- NTSB Prelim | C Kingsbury | Instrument Flight Rules | 10 | November 14th 04 02:18 AM |
NTSB: Co-pilot error caused AA 587 crash | Bertie the Bunyip | Piloting | 4 | November 3rd 04 04:30 AM |