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#71
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E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message . ..
On Wed, 22 Oct 2003 02:42:58 +0100, "John Mullen" wrote: "Mikhail Medved" wrote in message . com... (snip) OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the world's leading military power. Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German corps. That battle was actually on the continent of Africa. The real biggest land battle didn't come until 1944 when we teamed up with the US to invade German-occupied France. Meantime we were fighting in the air, at sea, and in the minor theatres like N Africa. Would have become important had we lost though, doubt it not. North Africa was hardly a minor theatre, in that given a German win, the loss of mid-east oil & Suez would have been critical to the war effort. Agreed. That was why I said 'Would have become important had we lost though, doubt it not.' John |
#72
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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message m... "Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ... "Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message om... "John Mullen" wrote in message ... snip We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won overall without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own ways hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon them. Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue Anglo-German agreement. Given that Stalin had 1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938 False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made, should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak government made no such request. This is incorrect, the Soviet government did not respond to Benes when he appealed for help under the terms of the 1935 treaty. The date and text of Benes' appeal please. The Soviets prevaricated knowing all too well what the consequences would be. The date and text of the Soviet reply Benes' alledged appeal, please. In his memoirs, Benes does not say that he made any such appeal: "In September, 1938, therefore, we were left in military, as well as political, isolation with the Soviet Union to prepare our defense against a Nazi attack. We were alos well aware not only of our own moral, political, and military prepardness, but also had a general picture of the condition of Western Europe; as well as of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in regard to these matters. At that moment indeed Europe was in every respect ripe to accept without a fight the orders of the Berchtesgaden corporal. When Czechoslovakia vigorously resisted his dictation in the September negotiations with our German citizens, we first of all recieved a joint note from the British and French governments on September 19th, 1938, insisting that we should accept without amendment the draft of a capitulation based essentially on an agreement reached by Hitler and Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on September 15th. When we refused, there arrived from France and Great Britain on September 21st an ultimatum accompanied by emphatic personal interventions in Prague during the night on the part of the Ministers of both countries and repeated later in writing. We were informed that if we did not accept their plan for the cession of the so-called Sudeten regions, they would leave us to our fate, which, they said, we had brought upon ourselves. They explained that they certainly would not go to war with Germany just 'to keep the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia'. I felt very keenly the fact that there were at athat time so few in France and Great Britain who understood that something much more serious was at stake for Europe than the retention of the so-called Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. The measure of this fearful European development was now full, precipitating Europe into ruin. Through three dreadful years I had watched the whole tragedy unfolding, knowing to the full what was at stake. We had resisted desperately with all our strength. And then, from Munich, during the night of September 30th our State and Nation recieved the stunning blow: Without our participationand in spite of the mobilization of our whole Army, the Munich Agreement - fatal for Europe and the whole world - was concluded and signed by the four Great Powers - and then was forced upon us." Dr. Eduard Benes "Memoirs", Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1954, pgs 42 - 43. Again, no such appeal recorded. In fact, the Czechoslovak government rejected the idea of even making such an appeal. Here's how Czechoslovak Information Minister Vavrecka put it on 30 September 1938: "We had to consider that it would take the Russian Army weeks to come to our aid - perhaps too late, for by that time millions of our men, women, and children would have been slaughtered. It was even more important to consider that our war by the side of the Soviet Union would not only have been a fight against Germany but it would have been interpreted as a fight on the side of Bolshevism. And then perhaps all Europe would have been drawn into the war against us and Russia." So, faced with the prospect of a general European war against themselves and the USSR, the Czechoslovak government decided to accept the Munich dictate, and did not request Soviet help. Later, Benes writes: "I do not intend to examine here in detail the policy of the Soviet Union from Munich to the beginning of the Soviet-German war. I will mention only the necessary facts. Even today it is still a delicate question. The events preceeding Munich and between Munich and the Soviet Union's entry into World War II have been used, and in a certain sense, misused, against Soviet policy both before and after Munich. I will only repeat that before Munich the Soviet Union was prepared to fulfill its treaty with France and with Czechoslovakia in the case of a German attack." Memoirs, pg 131. It sounds to me, Keith, that Benes did not feel he had been let down by the Soviets. 2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five Soviet marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67 corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders and 36,761 officers. Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3 times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week campaign in the West. While losing ten times as many men Actually, no. In the Western campaign, France alone lost 1.9 million KIA and prisoners, while the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch Armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the Germans. In the first nine weeks of Barbarossa, the Soviet Army lost 2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have been a military genius only after he was safely dead. The purges had clear and direct effects on the Soviet military which was found to be inadequate to the task of defeating mighty Finland But fully adequate to crush the Japanese. Considering how that very same IJA defeated the US Army in the Phillipines and crushed the Commonwealth forces at Singapore, we Westerners should consider ourselves lucky we never really tangled with the Finns snip Got a better alternative for him? Sure, stop selling the Nazis war materials would be a good start. Why, to provoke a German attack in 1940? Stuart Wilkes |
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Seraphim wrote:
:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French, :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly. France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better armor than the Germans did. : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they :were trying to avoild another WWI. No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly. -- "Adrenaline is like exercise, but without the excessive gym fees." -- Professor Walsh, "Buffy the Vampire Slayer" |
#74
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"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message om... "Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ... "Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message om... E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message . .. On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes) wrote: Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them for the Nazi variety. What Anglo German negotiations ? The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to Berlin of 24 July 1939: "General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out... About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!' So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed. The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment, it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention of power for another five years. So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong ...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations, and the British interest in Poland will be diminished." Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would support Poland in resisting force by force snip From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made everbody understand the inevitability of war Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of Anglo-German agreement: "For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate indeed, but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe, for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars of the World Revolution. The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint possibility of an honorable peace." Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited. London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Colonies. No he was a realist, the Soviet German pact was clearly intended to give Germany a free hand to start a war against the West. There's no suggestion here that Lloyd was in favour of such an agreement or was stating that such an agreement was being negotiated. He's simply pointing that AFTER the pact was signed it was clear that Germany was planning war with Soviet connivance. In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle Germany. And the British offered to end those talks. Molotov ended those talks. They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive alliance against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in negotiations Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority to commit to anything. snip Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything like their present form. We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if, at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a common purpose. The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the Eastern European States." Clear evidence that the British were attempting to come to an agreement with the USSR Thank You These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already secretly negotiating with Germany. No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany. No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them. It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and split Poland between them. Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all. Germany did get it all Keith |
#75
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"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message news "Tarver Engineering" wrote: :"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message .. . : Owe Jessen wrote: : : :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The : :Black Monk) : : : : :Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen. : :Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of : :Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler : :predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years. : : : :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would : :not have waged war, me thinks. : : And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather : than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss : foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen. : :I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid :schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very charismatic :man. Then you should stop using the meth. Widespread meth addiction was part of German society prior to WWII. Just work straight through the night and pay those war debts. |
#76
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"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message om... "Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" wrote in message ... Stuart Wilkes wrote: Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3 times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week campaign in the West. What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that you are comparing. i.e: Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that. Maybe he has better things to do than spend his whole life worrying about ancient history like you? Size of armies in the west and the casualties? Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in the campaign in the West, while the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the Germans. In this case, the the Germans faced Anglo-French Armies that were fully mobilized and alerted, their governments having declared war on Nazi Germany nine months previous. Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties? The Soviet Army suffered ~2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, during the first 9 weeks of Barbarossa, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the advantages you get when you do a sneak attack. Ask the Japanese (c.f. Jap sneak attacks on Port Arthur, Pearl Harbor) about the general tactical advantages of a sneak attack on unprepared enemies. And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided it after the Purges. The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant. Mr. Wilshaw brought them up to show that Western skepticism about Soviet promises was warranted. My reply shows that they had little actual effect on the West's perception of the Soviets. What matters is the actual effect! And by comparison to the performance of the advanced Western countries the year before, it does not seem that the effect was particularly great. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have been a military genius only after he was safely dead. How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius matter? It shows that the Purges had little effect on Western perceptions of Soviet military effectiveness prior to WWII. Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter? Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive? Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show? That the Purges really had little actual effect on Western perceptions of Soviet military effectiveness and reliability. The Soviets were totally discounted as a factor, both before the Purges and after. Stuart Wilkes |
#77
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Seraphim" first wrote:
:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French, :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly. France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better armor than the Germans did. : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they :were trying to avoild another WWI. "Fred J. McCall" then wrote: No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly. Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications to prevent another "trench warfare" war. Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare". The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics / strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders. Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war" scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to changes in strategy / tactics. |
#78
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On Thu, 23 Oct 2003 17:13:18 GMT, "Jim McLaughlin"
wrote: Seraphim" first wrote: :I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French, :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly. France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better armor than the Germans did. : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they :were trying to avoild another WWI. "Fred J. McCall" then wrote: No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly. Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications to prevent another "trench warfare" war. Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare". The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics / strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders. Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war" scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to changes in strategy / tactics. They'd have gotten their butts kicked in the last war too, didn't have reserves, didn't have telephones at HQ, unbelievable stuff. Didn't help either that the Germans seem to have gotten hold of the French/British troop dispositions. Security is also something that had been heard of in WWI. Peter Skelton |
#79
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"Seraphim" a écrit dans le message news: ... "Christophe" wrote in news:bn6dv5$pk9$1@news- reader3.wanadoo.fr: (snip) Mmh... we were talking about WW1, not WW2. No we wern't. OK, I had not understood properly, as I said in a previous post. (snip further considerations) |
#80
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"Keith Willshaw" a écrit dans le message news: ... "Christophe Chazot" wrote in message ... John My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18. What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was achieved in 1917-18... Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the generation of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again. This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland. Keith I was talking about what happened to our army in a strictly military field. The morale questions were important too, and the massacre of WW1 certainly had a reverse effect on the will to fight again 20 years later, as you quote. By the way, the reluctance to take offensive in 1939 was also due to the lack of drive of general Gamelin, a peacetime chief of staff who had been promoted for peacetime reasons but who seriously lacked the required skills for such a job at such a time. It was also due to some technical and logistical shortfalls, that resulted from the budget cuts all along the 1930s and that were not corrected until it was too late, but that's a bit off-topic on naval newsgroup. Regards, Christophe |
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