Comair investigation

Reading the recently released transcripts of the cockpit conversations,
I was surprised by their callousness. One pilot observes that there are
no runway lights, and the is "yeah". What??? When did this type of
callousness creep into the cockpit? The attitude of "yeah, sure,
whatever" does not even belong in a Cessna 150. There was no discussion
about asking tower to turn up the lights. For all that they knew, they
could have been lined up in front of a brick wall.

One pilot says "I'll take us to Atlanta", and the other pilot says
"sure". Now I don't know about airline operations, but is this decision
made while taxiing to the runway?

I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.

Andrew Sarangan wrote:
Reading the recently released transcripts of the cockpit conversations,
I was surprised by their callousness. One pilot observes that there are
no runway lights, and the is "yeah". What??? When did this type of
callousness creep into the cockpit? The attitude of "yeah, sure,
whatever" does not even belong in a Cessna 150. There was no discussion
about asking tower to turn up the lights. For all that they knew, they
could have been lined up in front of a brick wall.

One pilot says "I'll take us to Atlanta", and the other pilot says
"sure". Now I don't know about airline operations, but is this decision
made while taxiing to the runway?

I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.


Well it seem clear that there was a significant breakdown in cockpit
procedures leading up to the accident. I don't think that is a surprise
to anyone.

"Andrew Sarangan" wrote:

Reading the recently released transcripts of the cockpit conversations,
I was surprised by their callousness. One pilot observes that there are
no runway lights, and the is "yeah". What??? When did this type of
callousness creep into the cockpit? The attitude of "yeah, sure,
whatever" does not even belong in a Cessna 150. There was no discussion
about asking tower to turn up the lights. For all that they knew, they
could have been lined up in front of a brick wall.

Well, in the transcript you can see they discussed the airport lighting
while doing their checklists on the ramp. It was noted that the
glideslope was out, as were the REILs, and after a pause, the comment
that "... lights are out all over the place." This latter comment
paraphrases a NOTAM that had been in effect when they had lighting
problems.

Perhaps they had pre-conditioned themselves to expect no lights, and
didn't question the lack of lights on the runway as a result. That said,
the aircraft held short of the runway for about 45 seconds, and could
supposedly see the hold short sign and lights for the correct runway from
their position.

For those who want to read the raw transcript, as released by the NTSB,
it can be found he

http://www.kentucky.com/multimedia/k...ase/361245.pdf

You can read more about signage and lighting in this NTSB report:

http://www.kentucky.com/multimedia/k...ase/361096.pdf

One pilot says "I'll take us to Atlanta", and the other pilot says
"sure". Now I don't know about airline operations, but is this decision
made while taxiing to the runway?

This was not said while they were taxiing. They were discussing protocol
- as to who would normally fly the leg - during their checks on the ramp.
After a short discussion, the FO said he would fly, and the captain
agreed. They started the engines about six minutes later.

I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.

Pilots can be defensive or harsh in their criticism of fellow pilots.
They were all likely second-guessing themselves whether or not they could
have made the same mistake.

I can relate a somewhat parallel example where one crew had absolutely no
sympathy for another that had made a mistake. I was discussing the Exxon
Valdez with the captain (Master Mariner in this case) of a large coastal
ship. The Valdez, you might recall, managed to run against some submerged
rocks that were clearly shown on their navigation charts, and holed
itself.

The coastal ship ran passengers and provisions up the coast of Labrador,
stopping at perhaps fifty settlements to handle the traffic. The
Labrador coast is quite rocky, icebergs are common, and there are
virtually no navigation aids. The crews on coastal vessels have to rely
totally on charts, LORAN, radar, and the occasional navigation marker.
The coastline is also notoriously foggy, with frequent heavy weather, so
visibility can be poor.

At many of the places they stopped the ship had to enter a channel with
rocks along the side, there were often no dock facilities, and the ship
was held in position among the rocks by using the ship's engines and bow
thruster while freight was being slung over the side into large
outboards.

I thought the captain of the coastal ship might be sympathetic to the
crew on the Valdez, since what he was doing was no easy task, and he
might have felt that it was only luck that more vessels didn't run
aground as a result of a minor mistake, or lack of appropriate navigation
aids.

I couldn't have been more wrong. The coastal vessel captain had
absolutely no sympathy for the crew of the Valdez. None. The simple fact
that the vessel had strayed out of its channel was adequate proof for the
entire blame to be placed on the captain. No excuses or extenuating
circumstances were acceptable. He felt that he was put in command of the
ship to protect the owner's property, and if he failed to do so, it was
solely his responsibility. There was no possibility of any shared blame.

Now the attitude of the ship's captain might have been hardly removed
from the old adage that the captain goes down with the sbip, but it also
reflects a different perspective in assigning responsibility. Consider
that a ship is essentially self-sufficient, and has to rely on its own
resources for pretty well all navigation decisions.

Contrast that to the Comair flight. They were told by ATC what runway to
use. There were only two choices to keep track of. Up to the point of
takeoff, they had the luxury of being able to stop to sort out any
confusion, unlike when they are in the air. They set bugs and the FMS
with the departure heading as reminders. They had charts in front of
them that showed how the airport was laid out. The taxiway they followed
was painted with lines guiding them to where they needed to go. There
are large signs identifing each of the runways. When they were holding
short of the wrong, unlit, runway, the hold short sign and lighting for
the correct runway was visible. By company policy, they were supposed to
make a final heading check before advancing the throttles at the end of
the runway to ensure that they were in the right place.

What do you suppose the ship's captain would think of responsibility in
this case? How many more clues to you think the crew needed to short out
the correct runway?

On the other hand, the crew did make the mistake, and other crews have
made similar mistakes at other airports. Does this mean that additional
aids be installed to reduce the chance of such mistakes happening again?
It is all very good that the crew can be blamed, but it is small comfort
to the passengers, their loved ones, or the airline. Some advocate a
traffic light system at the proper runway to reduce the chance of error.
Are such systems necessary to further reduce the chance of error with all
the other clues that the crew had? How far does the FAA have to go to
protect crews from themselves?

On 2007-01-21, Andrew Sarangan wrote:
I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.

No, I don't think anyone failed to blame the crew on this group. The
dissenters instead pointed out that it would be far better to wait for
the investigation instead of launching into a tirade of self-righteous
castigation of the crew of that flight. Instead, it was suggested it was
better to see what the tapes and investigation revealed to find out what
lead the crew to make their fatal error.

--
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The decision about who will be the PF and PNF DOES sometimes take place
during the taxi.

I spent a couple of months flying (as S/O )turnarounds out of LGA. The
captain we were with disn't want F/O's landing at LaGuardia. So, during taxi
out, he would ask the F/O: "Ready to go to work?" (Which meant: "I want you
to fly this leg, because tomorrow I want to be the one landing at LGA")
"Andrew Sarangan" wrote in message
ups.com...
Reading the recently released transcripts of the cockpit conversations,
I was surprised by their callousness. One pilot observes that there are
no runway lights, and the is "yeah". What??? When did this type of
callousness creep into the cockpit? The attitude of "yeah, sure,
whatever" does not even belong in a Cessna 150. There was no discussion
about asking tower to turn up the lights. For all that they knew, they
could have been lined up in front of a brick wall.

One pilot says "I'll take us to Atlanta", and the other pilot says
"sure". Now I don't know about airline operations, but is this decision
made while taxiing to the runway?

I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.

"Andrew Sarangan" wrote in message
ups.com...

Reading the recently released transcripts of the cockpit conversations,
I was surprised by their callousness. One pilot observes that there are
no runway lights, and the is "yeah". What??? When did this type of
callousness creep into the cockpit? The attitude of "yeah, sure,
whatever" does not even belong in a Cessna 150. There was no discussion
about asking tower to turn up the lights. For all that they knew, they
could have been lined up in front of a brick wall.

One pilot says "I'll take us to Atlanta", and the other pilot says
"sure". Now I don't know about airline operations, but is this decision
made while taxiing to the runway?

I have spoken about this to other Comair pilots, and they seem to
vehemently defend the pilots actions, and blame airport signage and
runway lights. Try as I may, I can't see it that way. I know there were
several on this group who also said the same thing.


They think signage was the cause? I'd like to know what sign assured them
they were on the correct runway so convincingly that they could ignore the
many other indications that they were on the wrong runway.

Steven P. McNicoll writes:

They think signage was the cause? I'd like to know what sign assured them
they were on the correct runway so convincingly that they could ignore the
many other indications that they were on the wrong runway.

A poor workman blames his tools.

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