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#201
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#202
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Was that in the MTO?
Yep. Figures. Whether a guy flew into Germany from the East or South makes so much difference? As a data point, these boys lost 18 pilots shot down in the last two months of the war, including the group CO. They lost five on April 15, 1945. But, being the MTO, this is of no significance or interest. Chris Mark |
#203
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"WalterM140" wrote:
I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that he communicated such with Lovett. So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during Eaker's period of command? You seem to have just made it up. Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history. You lied. You got caught. Again. Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant facts that ruin his preferred fiction. Sinclair wrote: Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett such as you said he did. I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations, You made the statement. You can't back it up. He did back it up, your comments and sources on the subject appear to be very thin. You lied. No that's your problem. You got caught. He caught you several times. Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett when Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the rapid development of such an aircraft at that time. You lied. You got caught. If Eaker didn't discuss it with Lovett during the Summer of 1943 who did discuss it with Lovett during that time? Lovett came back from that visit to England in the Summer of 1943 pushing for the development of a long range fighter. You can start here for a reference: The Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development Dduring The Interwar Years (1918-1943) by Major Robert A. Eslinger. research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay1997/acsc/97-0126A.pdf But you have already demonstrated you have an inability to read anything but the simplest text on any subject. |
#204
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
My text, deleted again it seems. Firstly some deleted text I wrote, on what Eaker said to Lovett, the source for my comments, Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91 and 121. This has to be deleted. It cannot exist if Walter is to try and smear. I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that he communicated such with Lovett. So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during Eaker's period of command? You seem to have just made it up. Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history. You lied. You got caught. Again. Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant facts that ruin his preferred fiction. Sinclair wrote: Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett such as you said he did. I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations, deleted text, "to make this claim but I doubt it. Alternatively he has read the Boylan book I referenced, but I doubt that as well." Yes folks, whenever I back up the claim the information has to be deleted it seems, otherwise the next sentence cannot be written. You made the statement. You can't back it up. You lied. You got caught. This is becoming very funny, every time I post the source for the information Walter deletes the reference and announces "lies". Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant facts that ruin his preferred fiction. Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett when Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the rapid development of such an aircraft at that time. Note by the way the new addition to the Walter claims, "the rapid development one". Another standard tactic, introduce a different claim and go on about it. I have little doubt Eaker would not be in the "rapid development" camp, but it appears he had a foot in the "good idea to develop one" camp. He was also doing it, with the efforts to put drop tanks on P-47s. I also note the new claim the idea Lovett did not discuss the idea of long range fighters with the commander of the air force he was visiting. Why not? Since it is clear the idea was going around, why did Lovett fail to raise the topic? It appears Eaker is set up as the 2 dimensional bad guy, so the fact the 8th did improve escort range and numbers during his command is to be ignored, the fact people have noted Eaker did understand the idea of long range escorts has to be dropped. You lied. You got caught. Silly isn't it? It seems Walter's idea of "bye" is to simply repeat claims of lies over and over. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#205
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Subject: Why not more P-38s?
From: "Geoffrey Sinclair" Date: 7/21/2004 9:43 PM Pacific So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during Eaker's period of command? I don't know about Eaker, but I flew missions where we had P-47's with drop tanks for top cover. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#206
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In article ,
"Emmanuel Gustin" writes: "OXMORON1" wrote in message ... I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to him during WWII. There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about which force used the better tactics during WWII, the RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless. At the time, both did the best they could, and in the end they were both reasonably successful. Just so. And the two efforst were complimentary. The Germans werent' able to get away with building one Air Defence System - they had to build two. (Well, actually, they could have built one, if they'd organized it right) But soon after the war was over, the USAAF tactics became a historical curiosity. With the exception of some B-29 operations in Korea, no post-war bomber force tried to fight its way into enemy territory in daylight and close formation. The preferred tactics were an extension of those preferred and developed by the RAF in wartime years -- a fairly diffuse approach, based on suppressing or misleading enemy air defenses and moving in bombers, if possible, unseen; defensive armament largely disappeared from bombers. Of course this trend was stimulated by the appearance of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and, in recent years, stealth. I think the big sea-change here wasn't that the RAF tactics were superior, but the incresdible jump in the lethality of an individual bomber. When the goal changed from getting an X-ton bomb pattern on a particular target to getting a single airplane over that target, the large close foramations of bombers became redundant. It's worth noting that in Korea, when the B-29s were bombing targets using conventional bombs, they used large, mutually supporting formations. Until they ran out of targets, that is. (It also makes the job of escorting the bombers a lot easier, if you have then all in one place, rather than spread out all over the sky. If the bombers can't protect themselves, at least the interceptors will be concentrating on one target, so that the escorts can gat at them.) Until the advent of SAGE, the big limitation of bomber defence was the limited ability of the GCI networks to handle interceptions. A Canadian study on the tactical use of the CF-105 Arrow specifies that interceptors can be vectored at targets at a rate of 1/minute. If the interceptors don't have a significant speed advantage over the bombers, and sufficient radius to be able to intercept a target that isn't obligingly flying directly at the interceptor's airfield, (Not a trivial issue, by any means), then it's fairly easy to saturate the system by flying in singletons at spacings of 30-40 seconds through the same GCI sector. In some respects, that's what teh British were doing with the Bomber Streams - concentrating teh airplanes through specific points to saturate the very, very brittle German GCI system. The bomber streams also helped by reducing the volume of sky that a bomber would be found in - Even with AI radar, the field of view/search of a night fighter was very limited. In order to find the targets, they had to get themselves pointed at teh target within a fairly short distance. The long wavelengths of German AI radars meant that angular discrimination was fairly poor, and the minumum range of teh radars was large, so they couldn't be used for the attack. (This also was a problem with the early Allied radars) This meant that at some point in the interception, the fighter would have to acquire the blacked-out bomber visually. Of course, once the fighters got into the bomber stream, they had an easier time of it, since the targets were fairly concentrated. Keeping the fighters out of teh bomber stream was aided by chaff, decoy and spoof raids, and buggering with the GCI net. For all its failings, Bomber Command pioneered modern air warfare, with its high emphasis on "blinding" enemy air defense systems. It is an interesting question whether eventually the nature of the problem will shift back, with increasingly sophistication creating tight air defenses that again can only be countered by a frontal assault with overwhelming strength. I expect not. I agree. Back then, an attacking airplane had only one option - fly over the target and place itself at teh proper point with enough precision to drop a load of dumb bombs. Nowadays, the attackers have much more flexibility - the systems on board the airplanes allow than to attack from any direction, speed, or height, and to acquire targets on the fly with very high accuracy. With PGM's and todays' standoff weapons, there's no need ot get close to the target. That increases the volume of space teh defence needs to be able to monitor and be able to intercept in tremendously. As the attackers become more stealthy, it also becomes necessary to increase the number of sensors (Radar/IR/Ground Obcervers/Ouija Boards) by an even more astronomical amount. -- Pete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster |
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