Cirrus chute deployment -- an incredible story

You would think someone familiar with the Avidyne system would realize that
it is NOT a GPS, but an MFD. And someone familiar with the Cirrus line
would know that they ship with two Garmin GNS430's plus the Avidyne MFD,
plus the Avidyne PFD if it's a newer Cirrus.
The post was riveting. It's rare to hear a full report in the pilot's
own words and not just in quotes or [worse] sound bites.

Conspiracy theories are all around us.
CJS


"Mike Long" wrote in message
oups.com...
Are we sure this is real? Perhaps it is simply a typing error but you
would think someone familiar with his SR22 would realize it had an
Avidyne system and not Garmin.

Mike

Michael182/G wrote:
I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions.

Amen, Mike..

He made a snap decision based on what he thought was the right thing to
do. He lived to tell about it. Nobody else was hurt. Yes.. the plane is
totalled. Yes, that may impact someone elses insurance rates.. but ya
know what? He lived. The BRS did its job.

Could things have been done a bit better? Certainly.

The truth of the matter is... the pilot blacked out and KNEW that he had
blacked out. This happened without warning. He came back around in an
unusual attitude in weather that while not IMC was by his definition
"marginal". He had NO idea if he was about to black out again. It could
have happened at any moment.

How many here would have castigated this guy had he NOT pulled the
chute, blacked out and happened to crash into Indian Point, or spiral
into the fuel farm... or wipe out a playground full of children
somewhere along his path?

I'm glad it worked out "favorably" for him. It sucks loosing the medical
though... (from a medical standpoint, he is right, his flying days are
over... untreated, the tumor predisposes him to sudden incapacitation, a
disqualifying condition... treatment likely will require neurosurgery,
and more times than not, that results in the emergence of a seizure
condition that requires medication.. ALSO a disqualifying condition).

Kudo's to the pilot,
Dave

On 7/5/05 3:14 PM, in article
, "Michael182/G"
spewed:


Each pilot has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria,
but for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
Cirrus in the first place.


While I'm glad this guy made it down relatively safely, I have to wonder
about this statement. It seems that I'm taking a greater risk than I thought
when I started this flying stuff. Is my death actually greater than 50%, 1%
of the time? I'm no math Wiz by any stretch of the imagination, but at ~300
hours, I seem to be living on borrowed time.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino

Cartoons with a Touch of Magic�
http://www.wizardofdraws.com

More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic�
http://www.cartoonclipart.com

Michael182/G wrote:

I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions.

This *is* Usenet. Reactions of all types is exactly what you should have
expected.


--
Peter
























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Ben,

I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway

It's that tendancy to reject a known risk in favor of a future risk
(where the outcome could be much worse, but it *could* be much *better*)
that gets a lot of pilots into trouble.


I couldn't agree more.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Jose,

Nonetheless, I see this as a weakness in the Cirrus, not a strength.

In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude. A few moments
reflection would have been prudent; again a weakness of the "pull it
NOW" training that one is reported to receive with the Cirrus.


FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a hero,
I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything thrown at me,
and damn the torpedoes". Statistics show that a lot of pilots get into a
lot of trouble with this attitude. I would think that this attitude is
very prevalent among pilots, too.

This was the perfect example for the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Dave,

. He had NO idea if he was about to black out again. It could
have happened at any moment.


And there's the key point. Pulling the chute was THE ONLY smart option
in that case. It's a perfect example of the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

I think you are right to question the statement. They're numbers taken out
of context. I think it would have been better for him to simply say that he
invested in a BRS to increase the odds of survival. If and when to deploy is
debatable. What is not debatable is that having the chute gives you more
options than not having it.

Anyone else think that two-weeks for that amount of work at the "regular
50-hour inspection" was a lot? I can understand the broken shear coupling.
Probably a manufacturing defect despite FAA certification. Who would have
thought! But a fuel sender and a new gauge? Is there a recall on them or
something? Otherwise, it sounds like the A/P was fishing for a solution or
money.

Kudos to the pilot. He survived without causing injury except to himself or
damage except to his own plane. I think he did the right thing only because
I have no way to second guess him.

What a marketing challenge for Cirrus. People debate the value and emotions
of having the parachutes. People debate the value of using the parachutes
whether the pilot chooses to launch them or not. People debate whether lives
were saved by the chute or if they would have survived anyway. What a mess.

Only those that overcome the emotions and decide to give themselves one last
out will ever benefit. Only those who have faced disaster and pulled the
cord rather than roll the dice can truly understand.

-------------------------------
Travis

"Wizard of Draws" wrote in
message news:BEF0A6D7.7EB5A%jeffbTAKEOUTALLCAPS@TOEMAILwiz ardofdraws.com...
On 7/5/05 3:14 PM, in article
, "Michael182/G"
spewed:


Each pilot has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment
criteria,
but for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
Cirrus in the first place.


While I'm glad this guy made it down relatively safely, I have to wonder
about this statement. It seems that I'm taking a greater risk than I
thought
when I started this flying stuff. Is my death actually greater than 50%,
1%
of the time? I'm no math Wiz by any stretch of the imagination, but at
~300
hours, I seem to be living on borrowed time.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino

Cartoons with a Touch of Magic�
http://www.wizardofdraws.com

More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic�
http://www.cartoonclipart.com

Travis,

People debate


Ah, no, it's just us Usenet guys ;-) That's not "people". "People" are
buying Cirrii like crazy. That's what people do.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a hero,
I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything thrown at me,
and damn the torpedoes".

What underlying attitude? One has a blackout, wakes up to find
themselves in a high speed unusual attitude, recovers from it, and
decides to get ou the ground. No hero stuff here.

The question is, under pilot control or under a canopy.

Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still a
crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
consider all available options, including looking out the window before
pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).

My understanding of the Cirrus (I've never flown one) is that the chute
decision is to be made pretty much instantly (to preclude further
development of the spin for which it is designed). This training leads
to sub-optimal results when the emergency is not a spin.

He was at 1700 feet, no longer descending, and below redline speed.
After a fraction of a second of thought, he pulled the chute. Let's
consider his stated reasons:

no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather

Not time critical. No heroics involved in making a U-turn.

concern over the loss of altitude;

Not time critical. He is no longer losing altitude, and 1700 is safe in
that area. (were he still descending, it would be time critical
inasmuch as one needs some altitude for chute deployment to work, even
if it's ballistic).

concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the
high speed descent and recovery

This is somewhat valid, but since the plane is still intact I would look
out the window first, and slow the airplane down first. Once the plane
is slowed, the stresses on the airframe are reduced. Also, if the plane
did begin to break up, one could =then= pull the chute (assuming the
pilot didn't get knocked around too much).

concern that the weakness in my right leg might hinder
my ability to control the plane down to the runway.

Not time critical. Fly TO the runway and pull the chute over an open
area if you must. In the interim you may find that you could control
the aircraft enough to walk away, even if you couldn't reuse the plane.
I don't see this as heroic either.

There are some situations (in the Cirrus) where one must pull the chute
NOW, but others (such as this one) where this is not the case, and even
five seconds reflection would make a much better outcome. In fact, had
he done everything right, he would have landed right in the middle of
the fuel farm, and there might have been a huge fire and no internet
posting to tell the tale. No heroics, and the chute would have done its
job.

Jose
--
You may not get what you pay for, but you sure as hell pay for what you get.
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