3 lives lost

In article .net, "Terry"
writes:

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
ourselves, our limits.

I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

Thanks for the info on the crash. I read about it in the paper but didn't know
the details. Very sad but a lesson for us all !!

I still remember a couple of years ago when I said no to a "first flight" with
thunder storms in the distance. The storms didn't hit but I keep remembering
that my decision before the fact was correct. SWometimes it is not easy but it
is correct.

Chuck

This reminds me of a flight I did a few years ago on Thanksgiving.
I took my father on a flight in a Cessna 150 from Falcon Field,AZ to
Payson in the morning to "keep out of the way" of mom. A few high clouds
when we took off, nothing too interesting. There is a range of mountains
between here and there called 4 Peaks. After getting some breakfast and
looking around the ramp at Payson I looked at 4 Peaks in the distance
and the clouds had decended below the peaks. I told my dad we'd have to
wait until the clouds lifted. He told me how mad mom would be if we
didn't make it back on time for Thanksgiving, I mentioned how unhappy
she'd be if we never made it back. I also mentioned that if worse came
to worse we could get a rental car to get back. (It was a 45 minute
flight but would take 2+ hours by car to get back.)

Long story short, we waited 3 or 4 hours until the clouds were about
1500ft above the peaks and made it back for a later than normal
Thanksgiving dinner.

We just need to remember that we are in charge of safety here and not to
allow others to influence our decisions. After hearing many storys like
"Jeans" it only reinforces my decision that day.

Fly safe.
--
Bart D. Hull

Tempe, Arizona

Check http://www.inficad.com/~bdhull/engine.html
for my Subaru Engine Conversion
Check http://www.inficad.com/~bdhull/fuselage.html
for Tango II I'm building.

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PaulaJay1 wrote:
In article .net, "Terry"
writes:


How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
ourselves, our limits.

I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...


Thanks for the info on the crash. I read about it in the paper but didn't know
the details. Very sad but a lesson for us all !!

I still remember a couple of years ago when I said no to a "first flight" with
thunder storms in the distance. The storms didn't hit but I keep remembering
that my decision before the fact was correct. SWometimes it is not easy but it
is correct.

Chuck

Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled. It
seems to me to be out of proportion to what I otherwise see flying. Do
others see this to?, or is it my selective imagination?

We should withold any judgement until the accident has been
investigated. The stock 172N engine has some history of not responding
well to unusually cold starts and could have shelled out on her.
Tragic....

While I am sad for everyone involved, the little girl's death
is especially tragic.

And I really hope that her parents don't sue Cessna.

-Mark

Terry,

My sympathies to you, and everyone affected by this incident.

Just for reference, I am a 10k+ hr CFI, CFII, MEI, ASC, and have
studied for many years the human factors answers to the questions you
are asking.

I have had several experiences similar to yours over 17 years of
flying. I know how it hurts to see this happen--as you properly
say--needlessly.

In cases like this, we will never truly know the whole answer, as we do
not get the priviledge of interviewing the decisionmaker. However, we
can deduce the most likely scenario based on many similar experiences.

Here we have a non-IFR rated pilot departing into instrument
conditions. As often happens, they literally do not make it off the
airport property. If the aircraft was in flight for one minute, as you
say, then it is likely that the maximum alititude reached was less than
500 feet. This is almost certainly a spatial disorientation accident;
I will offer a prediction that the eventual NTSB report will determine
that, and state that no faults were found with the aircraft or engine.

Year after year we lose several hundred people to this or similar
scenarios; 40% of the light aircraft fatal accidents in the NTSB
database include "continuation of flight into weather for which the
pilot was not qualitied" as the proximate or a contributing cause.

I and other Accident Prevention Counselors across the country have been
fairly shouting this from the rooftops for years, yet we see the same
accident over and over again. Presumably everyone with a license has
been told that flying in such conditions without an instrument rating
is foolhardy. Hence your question: why does this happen?

I think you are close to the answer. Every time I hear about one of
these, I silently ask myself "Where was the time pressure coming from?"

Why does someone consider something they know is a bad idea, and then
decide to do it anyway? Why not just cancel the flight, head for a
restaraunt, and have lunch. You can wait for the weather to get
better, or schedule for another day.

But, no, she decided to do it now--when the evidence is all around that
we should *not* do it now. Visibility less than 1/4 mile? They do not
even allow us to complete an *instrument* approach in that kind of
weather. (Cat I ILS minima are 1/2 mile visibility or greater.)

Here is a person who, in your words, 'always used good judgment.'
Unfortunately, that is obviously not true. She did not use good
judgment on this day. I suspect that this was not the first time,
either, but you may never get to know that.

The bad news is that most people tend to make decisions on emotional,
rather than rational, criteria. That is most certainly true of this
pilot on this day. She allowed her emotional desires to drive her
decisionmaking instead of compying with a rational decision process.
Very likely she did not want to disappoint the passengers. Or maybe it
was to comply with some time constraint established by the parents. It
really doesn't matter which form the time pressure came in; what is
important is the PIC's failure to resist it.

Very often I get asked the question 'What does it take to become a
pilot?' People think it is great motor coordination, or math skills,
or good eyesight, or some such. I tell them, no, all you need is
average skills in those areas. What it takes to be a good pilot is
ultimately the *will to say no.*

You have to pre-define what your personal safety margins are; and then
you have to say no to yourself, and/or whomever else, no matter what
the emotional cost, when continuing will take you into that grey area
beyond those personal margins.

You have to say no when everyone will be mad at you. You have to be
able to say no when its going to cost you money you didn't plan on.
You have to say no when everyone else is doing it. You have to be able
to say no when they are all going to call you a 'wimp.'

I was interviewed for a fifteen minute segment on a TV show after John
Kennedy's accident. We went up in a Saratoga and demonstrated spatial
disorientation to the reporter. As we taxied back in, I told her that
the real thing that killed JFK Jr was not weather or lack of instrument
skills or spatial disorientation; all those things contributed. But
the real cause of these kinds of accidents is an inability to say 'no'
to yourselft--when you know youve done it before and it worked, you
know no one will see you and it will be easy to get away with doing
what you 'want.' But it is over the line, and you know where the line
is. You have to say no, anyway. If you can't do that, you need to
take up basketweaving or chess, but get out of aviation.

You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.' It is not fair
to shave off the safety margin just so you can show off, or save a
buck, or have a thrill or whatever. Once you let your emotional needs
become more important than maintaining wide safety margins, you have
violated a sacred trust.

Your passengers deserve better, and so did the little girl in this
accident.

John Kennedy Jr died because he failed to say 'no' to himself when the
margins closed in. Same thing happened in this situation.

The FARs are 'written in blood;' for every paragraph in there, somebody
died to prove to us we needed that rule. I wish that no one will ever
again have to give their life to teach us something; but they do it
anyway.

I just wish that if someone insists on making the ultimate sacrifice to
teach us something, would they please try at least to pick something we
don't already know?

Sincerely,

Gene Hudson
CFI-IA, MEI, ASC

nrp wrote:

Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled.

Because most of us buy the smallest aircraft that can reasonably do the job for
us?

George Patterson
The desire for safety stands against every great and noble enterprise.

G.R. Patterson III wrote:


nrp wrote:

Why do so many crashed aircraft have (nearly) all the seats filled.


Because most of us buy the smallest aircraft that can reasonably do the job for
us?

Probably a contributing factor, but most airplanes I see arriving for
fuel, etc., typically have only the pilot and maybe one other person on
board. Yet, it does seem that there are disproportionately few
accidents involving only the pilot. Ron, here's another research
article for you to do for Kitplanes or whoever will publish it.

It may just be my imagination, but I tend to agree with the OP that at
least my perception is that more accidents involve a number of
passengers as compared to the number of flights that include a full
load. It does make one wonder of the extra pressure to complete the
flight that carrying passengers entails is playing a role. I don't know
if any of the safety stats have the data required to determine this, but
it is an interesting question.

Matt

You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'

That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
play the odds with another persons life.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

Gene (and others too)

Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
by a long ways) -

In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.

For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

I would have thought that 25 years of experience would have at least
keyed this grandma into expecting something difficult. That's why I
would want to withhold judgement.

There is a journalistic attitude that attempts to simply blame pilots
(the tsk! tsk! type comments suggesting I wouldn't do that) rather than
search for the process where they get schnookered (sp?) into a stupid
situation.
I too hope Cessna doesn't get sued. I appreciate your thoughts. THX

On Sat, 01 Jan 2005 05:02:43 GMT, Terry wrote:

3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.

Hi Terry,

Sorry to hear such sad news.

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

Looking at the pictures provided at the link you gave in your post, I wish
we had answers. Snow cover and fog surely wasn't conducive of any type of
VFR work. I had met Jean when I lived in Morrow County. Very, very nice
down to earth lady.

I only hope we as pilots learn from prior people's mistakes and take them
to heart when we are tasked with a go / no go decision.

It's fresh in our minds now, but time tends to heal itself and we "forget"
our own vulnerabilities it seems as time rolls on.

Allen