The Corps - no to the Super Hornet

look the whole thing is who "owns the ship" and the dilema that if you
have a AV-8B or F-35B on an assault ship you do not have enough
helicopters or V-22's. Just givin up F-35B's will then provide more
helocopters and V-22's but you will loose your fighters, enabling the
JFK (full deck - conventional) to replace the LHA(R) gives you first a
bigger deck for the fixed wing on a boat that could add many other
things that the Marine Expeditionary Brigade's have lost - such as a
hospital - and much more room for other much needed assets. The assault
ships are returned to maximize their helicopter and MV-22 load outs, and
the JFK could switch to the F/A-18E/F/G with more bang for you buck then
the F-35B and it would help the Navy. Now this carrier is a "Marine
ship" and paid for out of the excessive funds now required for the
LHA(R) - in fact the whole air wing of F-18's and the refurbishment of
the JFK all are paid for but scrapping the LHA(R) and the F-35B. Put
the F-35 on a decade of development to get it to where it would serve as
the attack craft of choice for a war with China or Iran and let the
F/A-18's fill in the void with a full deck assault carrier.

That is how it all fits in - the JFK would not be refurbish to try to
keep up with a new nuclear boat - it would be an assault aviation ship
plus more



"Arved Sandstrom" wrote in message
news:_C0fi.7332$xk5.5525@edtnps82...
Problem being, any form of F-18 is going to be an unreliable strike
aircraft. That's why the Marines are worried. Most of the time those
planes will not be supporting ground Marines. That's a given fact.
They won't be flying off gators, which means they won't be supporting
Marines on the beach. I have only ever called CAS with F-18's twice,
and that was pro forma...in fact in real war Marines would never see
F-18's. Not for quick reliable response they wouldn't.

AHS

The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...

Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).

Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
Japan...

P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

Right now the Navy has two remaining conventional carriers with others
in storage
JFK and Kitty Hawk

Now the refurbishment is not for open ocean drag-races, but for littoral
hang-arounds so the black oil burning makes sense
also, these ships could or should be home ported in theater - say the UK
and Japan and would also "command" each of the Marine Expeditionary
Battle Groups that they serve as a "Command Aviation Assault Ship" - the
funny thing is - and I worked the number in the last Congress, the
savings from the JSF (canx the "B" and extend the development 10 years
at $4 bill a year), killing the LHA(R) and adding back one LHA a year,
and fully refurbishing the JFK to include two less screws, two less
boilers, two less catapults and a crew reduction of 2500 with a one
Marine Battalion add back with another SOF --- you actually double (time
2) the total aviation resources in the MEBG - twice the fighters
(F/A-18E/F/G), twice the MV-22's and twice the remaining helicopter mix
which is really what the Marines want and need - more assault, while
owning their own deck means that they are not providing squadrons to
just beef-up naval airwings -
\
In fact with this arrangement the USN comes out with one excess air
wing - so the fighter (VF) squadron on the JFK could be a NAVY squadron
with all the Marines being VMFA types - it is a win-win-win and the Navy
gets high production F-18's at lower costs and the allies get F-18's in
the same big bag of about two years of 25 per month

So you save in home porting the big deck assault ships with the battle
group, and rotating the people



wrote in message
ups.com...
The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...

Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).

Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
Japan...

P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

you are right and that is why there is a need for a COIN Air Component
right now a full spread of platforms just for insurgency and that would
come with the assault ships





wrote in message
oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or
no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

wrote in message
oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

The Navy has noticed - so has the Marine Corps - that if you want very short
response times for CAS, going into places like Iraq and Afghanistan, you
aren't going to ship-base anyway. When we handled AV-8's in Camp Lejeune,
they routinely touched down on a main road aboard base, after they got there
from Cherry Point...little bit of training doing that, then back up in the
air to attack G-10 impact.

During GW1 Harriers and Cobras did most of the CAS and CIFS for Marines.
Close to 70 Harriers actually operated from airbases on land, and they were
closer to Iraq than any carrier air. Only 20 Harriers were at sea. The
average turnaround for the land-based planes was about 25 minutes.

Considering that I was in one of the first planned assault waves for more
than one Kuwait landing, I got a warm fuzzy from seeing a mean AH-1 perched
on the deck. We usually had a few on USS RALEIGH.

The problem with an area like the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea is shallow
water and Iran. You just are not going to want to get that close. As fast as
planes fly, CAS is no good if it takes an hour to get there. You need it in
10 minutes.

AHS

Jacek,

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

wrote in message oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek

wrote in message
ups.com...
The "big deck" assault ship idea is all right, but it seems you forget
about one of the most important things: DEPLOYMENT CYCLES...

Having only one such a ship would not make much sense, because that
would be usauble through only 6-to-9-month period within every 27
months (plus extensive overhauls required for such a weary vessel).

Sure, that would be a great tool for showing off (I can see the
headlines: "The situation in Bla-Bla Gulf is so tense, that the
President decided to send there a special assault ship, USS Kitty
Hawk, with over 50 Marine strike aircraft on board..." But it could
mean much more deterrence if the carrier was stationed at Guam, or
Japan...

P.S. To correct the squadron info: this fiscal year Marine Corps is
deactivating not one, but two deployable F/A-18 units, namely
VMFA(AW)-332 and VMFA-212.

For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

As it is, right now the USN "loans" out assets to support their amphibious
force. It's always been a struggle to get the Navy to provide that support -
gators aren't as sexy as the other ships are. The hell of it is, a deployed
Marine unit is probably one of the best and most flexible assets that NCA
has.

As far as ships go, that can support F/A-18's, my point remains. If flown by
Marines, they will *try* to support Marines. But as long as their floating
airfield is Navy, the planes will frequently be tasked for things that do
not support Marines. I myself totally support short-deck planes, because
they tend to be available for moving mud. So as much as I think the Hornet
is a nice plane, it's not what the Corps needs all that badly.

AHS

Arved Sandstrom wrote:
For decades we have had a mismatch in who owns what. To be honest, and this
is just my humble opinion, the Marine Corps should own the ships that they
need to use their primary aircraft. In fact, they should own every gator,
and it wouldn't hurt if the NGF situation got a little more resolved either
by having truly dedicated USMC gunships.

No.

There is no place in the USMC for a program to train marines to operate
and maintain large ships.

The Marines need to stay focused on the riflemen and those that directly
support the riflemen.

-HJC