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#21
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
"Jay Honeck" wrote:
Stuck in IMC over the North Atlantic, in the dark, no primary displays, a possible carbon-monoxide leak, a known fuel leak -- I simply can't imagine it getting any worse. Snakes. ;-) |
#22
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
Jay Honeck writes:
http://www.alexisparkinn.com/nwpilot's_tranatlantic_flight.htm Man, if the new details of his story doesn't chill ya, nothing will! There's no excuse for the G1000 to reboot. I guess nobody has to test safety-of-life systems any more. -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#23
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
Ron A. writes:
Garmin needs to wake up! To have out-of-bounds sensor inputs reboot the system continuously, especially something as unreliable as fuel sensors, is horrible system design. It implies that the system was designed by desktop programmers, instead of people with experience building mission-critical computer systems. I guess people will have to die to get bugs fixed. There is never any excuse for a safety-of-life computer to reboot, short of a power interruption. What do you want to bet that there is a bunch of other safety critical, software driven devices that are prone to this? Unfortunately, there are probably a great many of them, including anything built by Garmin. Think about this for a second. What if there was some unexpected transmission from a GPS satellite due to an incorrect software load to the satellite that caused the G1000 to reboot continuously. Now extend that. Take your Garmin portable GPS out to save your butt and it ALSO includes the deficient algorithm and continuously reboots. Scary. I would bet the portables share quite a bit of logic and decision trees with the panel mounts. Probably. And you can bet that nobody is verifying the generated binaries bit by bit, the way people used to verify safety-of-life software in the old days. If it compiles without errors, it's ready to ship! -- Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail. |
#24
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
("Jay Honeck" wrote)
Steven, I'm curious to know what your thought processes were in that dire situation. "If I die out here, I'll never hear the end of it from the gang at rec.aviation." Montblack :-) |
#25
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
"John Gaquin" wrote in message . .. "Larry Dighera" wrote in message A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have Do you have a machine to pick those nits, or do you do it all by hand? Consider the source... --- avast! Antivirus: Outbound message clean. Virus Database (VPS): 0639-4, 09/29/2006 Tested on: 10/1/2006 7:06:48 PM avast! - copyright (c) 1988-2006 ALWIL Software. http://www.avast.com |
#26
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
Stefan wrote:
Larry Dighera schrieb: A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting. He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they think they know better than the book. So you think Al Haynes and crew screwed with their DC-10 improvisation? Personally, I think it is imperative that pilots create their own ad hoc procedures when the book is wrong or nonexistent. I'm much more afraid of pilots who keep doing what the book says and are afraid to think and improvise. Matt |
#27
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
Emily wrote:
Stefan wrote: Larry Dighera schrieb: A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting. He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they think they know better than the book. You're completely right. I'm an A&P, but I'm not going to sit up there in IMC miles from land and try to diagnose a fuel problem if the other option is heading for land and landing ASAP. As an engineer, I'd do both! :-) Matt |
#28
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
..Blueskies. wrote:
"Jay Honeck" wrote in message ps.com... : http://www.alexisparkinn.com/nwpilot's_tranatlantic_flight.htm : : Man, if the new details of his story doesn't chill ya, nothing will! : -- : Jay Honeck : Iowa City, IA : Pathfinder N56993 : www.AlexisParkInn.com : "Your Aviation Destination" : See Jay, another reason to get the instrument rating! Yes, Jay, this is very true! You can't scare yourself nearly as well VFR as IFR!! :-) Matt |
#29
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
On Sun, 01 Oct 2006 17:40:52 -0500, Emily
wrote in : I'm not going to sit up there in IMC miles from land and try to diagnose a fuel problem Right. You'd have studied the fuel system while you were on the ground. |
#30
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NW_Pilot's Trans-Atlantic Flight -- All the scary details...
Matt Whiting wrote:
Stefan wrote: Larry Dighera schrieb: A more experienced pilot who had studied the aux tank system may have been able to mentally diagnose the cause of the fuel venting. He did everything by the book, but the book was wrong. A pilot is not supposed to assume that an FAA approved book is wrong! In fact, I'm scared of pilots who establish their own ad hoc procedures because they think they know better than the book. So you think Al Haynes and crew screwed with their DC-10 improvisation? Al Haynes' situation was a little different. He had multiple crew members and a lot of backup on the ground. A single pilot doesn't usually have the time to do troubleshooting like the United crew did. |
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