russia vs. japan in 1941 [WAS: 50% of NAZI oil..]

E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message . ..
On Wed, 22 Oct 2003 02:42:58 +0100, "John Mullen" wrote:

"Mikhail Medved" wrote in message
. com...

(snip)

OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
world's
leading military power.

Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed
from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest
battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German
corps.

That battle was actually on the continent of Africa. The real biggest land
battle didn't come until 1944 when we teamed up with the US to invade
German-occupied France. Meantime we were fighting in the air, at sea, and in
the minor theatres like N Africa. Would have become important had we lost
though, doubt it not.

North Africa was hardly a minor theatre, in that given a German win,
the loss of mid-east oil & Suez would have been critical to the war
effort.

Agreed. That was why I said 'Would have become important had we lost
though, doubt it not.'

John

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
m...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
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"John Mullen" wrote in message
...

snip

We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
Neither
was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
overall
without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their
own
ways
hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced
upon
them.

Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
Anglo-German agreement.


Given that Stalin had

1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938

False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet
aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would
accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the
Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made,
should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak
government made no such request.


This is incorrect, the Soviet government did not respond
to Benes when he appealed for help under the terms
of the 1935 treaty.

The date and text of Benes' appeal please.

The Soviets prevaricated knowing
all too well what the consequences would be.

The date and text of the Soviet reply Benes' alledged appeal, please.

In his memoirs, Benes does not say that he made any such appeal:

"In September, 1938, therefore, we were left in military, as well as
political, isolation with the Soviet Union to prepare our defense
against a Nazi attack. We were alos well aware not only of our own
moral, political, and military prepardness, but also had a general
picture of the condition of Western Europe; as well as of Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy, in regard to these matters.

At that moment indeed Europe was in every respect ripe to accept
without a fight the orders of the Berchtesgaden corporal. When
Czechoslovakia vigorously resisted his dictation in the September
negotiations with our German citizens, we first of all recieved a
joint note from the British and French governments on September 19th,
1938, insisting that we should accept without amendment the draft of a
capitulation based essentially on an agreement reached by Hitler and
Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on September 15th. When we refused,
there arrived from France and Great Britain on September 21st an
ultimatum accompanied by emphatic personal interventions in Prague
during the night on the part of the Ministers of both countries and
repeated later in writing. We were informed that if we did not accept
their plan for the cession of the so-called Sudeten regions, they
would leave us to our fate, which, they said, we had brought upon
ourselves. They explained that they certainly would not go to war
with Germany just 'to keep the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia'. I
felt very keenly the fact that there were at athat time so few in
France and Great Britain who understood that something much more
serious was at stake for Europe than the retention of the so-called
Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia.

The measure of this fearful European development was now full,
precipitating Europe into ruin. Through three dreadful years I had
watched the whole tragedy unfolding, knowing to the full what was at
stake. We had resisted desperately with all our strength.

And then, from Munich, during the night of September 30th our State
and Nation recieved the stunning blow: Without our participationand in
spite of the mobilization of our whole Army, the Munich Agreement -
fatal for Europe and the whole world - was concluded and signed by the
four Great Powers - and then was forced upon us."

Dr. Eduard Benes "Memoirs", Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1954,
pgs 42 - 43.

Again, no such appeal recorded. In fact, the Czechoslovak government
rejected the idea of even making such an appeal.

Here's how Czechoslovak Information Minister Vavrecka put it on
30 September 1938:

"We had to consider that it would take the Russian Army weeks to come
to our aid - perhaps too late, for by that time millions of our men,
women, and children would have been slaughtered. It was even more
important to consider that our war by the side of the Soviet Union
would not only have been a fight against Germany but it would have
been interpreted as a fight on the side of Bolshevism. And then
perhaps all Europe would have been drawn into the war against us
and Russia."

So, faced with the prospect of a general European war against
themselves and the USSR, the Czechoslovak government decided to
accept the Munich dictate, and did not request Soviet help.

Later, Benes writes:

"I do not intend to examine here in detail the policy of the Soviet
Union from Munich to the beginning of the Soviet-German war. I will
mention only the necessary facts. Even today it is still a delicate
question. The events preceeding Munich and between Munich and the
Soviet Union's entry into World War II have been used, and in a
certain sense, misused, against Soviet policy both before and after
Munich. I will only repeat that before Munich the Soviet Union was
prepared to fulfill its treaty with France and with Czechoslovakia in
the case of a German attack."

Memoirs, pg 131.

It sounds to me, Keith, that Benes did not feel he had been let down
by the Soviets.

2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five
Soviet
marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
and 36,761 officers.

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

While losing ten times as many men

Actually, no.

In the Western campaign, France alone lost 1.9 million KIA and
prisoners, while the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch Armies
inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the Germans.

In the first nine weeks of Barbarossa, the Soviet Army lost 2 million
KIA and prisoners at the hands of the
German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, while inflicting
~83,000 KIA on the German Army alone in the first 7 weeks of
Barbarossa.

And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
been a military genius only after he was safely dead.


The purges had clear and direct effects on the Soviet military
which was found to be inadequate to the task of defeating
mighty Finland

But fully adequate to crush the Japanese. Considering how that very
same IJA defeated the US Army in the Phillipines and crushed the
Commonwealth forces at Singapore, we Westerners should consider
ourselves lucky we never really tangled with the Finns

snip

Got a better alternative for him?

Sure, stop selling the Nazis war materials would be a good start.

Why, to provoke a German attack in 1940?

Stuart Wilkes

Seraphim wrote:

:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically
:destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
:first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches
:was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French,
:the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
:this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.

France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
armor than the Germans did.

: In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
:were trying to avoild another WWI.

No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.


--
"Adrenaline is like exercise, but without the excessive gym fees."
-- Professor Walsh, "Buffy the Vampire Slayer"

"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
E. Barry Bruyea wrote in message
. ..
On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
for the Nazi variety.


What Anglo German negotiations ?

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'


So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred


therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the
program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
of power for another five years.


So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."


Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force

snip


From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made
everbody
understand the inevitability of war

Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
Anglo-German agreement:

"For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed,
but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace."

Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.

And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
Secretary of State for Colonies.


No he was a realist, the Soviet German pact was clearly intended
to give Germany a free hand to start a war against the West.
There's no suggestion here that Lloyd was in favour of such
an agreement or was stating that such an agreement was being negotiated.

He's simply pointing that AFTER the pact was signed it was clear
that Germany was planning war with Soviet connivance.


In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement

The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
Germany.

And the British offered to end those talks.


Molotov ended those talks.

They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive
alliance
against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
negotiations

Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
to commit to anything.



snip


Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
like their present form.

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose.

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
Eastern European States."



Clear evidence that the British were attempting to come
to an agreement with the USSR

Thank You


These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
secretly negotiating with Germany.

No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.

It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
split Poland between them.

Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.


Germany did get it all

Keith

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
news
"Tarver Engineering" wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
.. .
: Owe Jessen wrote:
:
: :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
: :Black Monk) :
: :
: :Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
: :Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader
of
: :Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
: :predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
: :
: :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
: :not have waged war, me thinks.
:
: And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
: than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
: foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.
:
:I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid
:schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very
charismatic
:man.

Then you should stop using the meth.

Widespread meth addiction was part of German society prior to WWII. Just
work straight through the night and pay those war debts.

"Stuart Wilkes" wrote in message
om...
"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" wrote in message
...
Stuart Wilkes wrote:

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
you are comparing. i.e:

Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.


Maybe he has better things to do than spend his whole life worrying about
ancient history like you?

Size of armies in the west and the casualties?

Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
the campaign in the West, while the combined
Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
Germans. In this case, the the Germans faced Anglo-French Armies
that were fully mobilized and alerted, their governments having
declared war on Nazi Germany nine months previous.

Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?

The Soviet Army suffered ~2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of
the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, during the first
9 weeks of Barbarossa, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army
alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. In this case, the Germans
faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength Rifle Divisions (~6000
men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the
advantages you get when you do a sneak attack. Ask the Japanese (c.f.
Jap sneak attacks on Port Arthur, Pearl Harbor) about the general
tactical advantages of a sneak attack on unprepared enemies.

And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
it after the Purges.

The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant.

Mr. Wilshaw brought them up to show that Western skepticism about
Soviet promises was warranted. My reply shows that they had little
actual effect on the West's perception of the Soviets.

What matters is the actual effect!

And by comparison to the performance of the advanced Western countries
the year before, it does not seem that the effect was particularly
great.

Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
been a military genius only after he was safely dead.

How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
matter?

It shows that the Purges had little effect on Western perceptions of
Soviet military effectiveness prior to WWII.

Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?

That the Purges really had little actual effect on Western perceptions
of Soviet military effectiveness and reliability. The Soviets were
totally discounted as a factor, both before the Purges and after.

Stuart Wilkes

Seraphim" first wrote:


:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
basically
:destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
:first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
trenches
:was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
French,
:the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
:this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.

France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
armor than the Germans did.

: In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
:were trying to avoild another WWI.

"Fred J. McCall" then wrote:

No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.



Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of
losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications
to prevent another "trench warfare" war.

Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried
out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare".

The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were
not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW
II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and
the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics /
strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders.

Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war"
scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and
with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale
manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described
by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to
changes in strategy / tactics.

On Thu, 23 Oct 2003 17:13:18 GMT, "Jim McLaughlin"
wrote:

Seraphim" first wrote:


:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
basically
:destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
:first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
trenches
:was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
n the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
French,
:the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
:this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.

France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
armor than the Germans did.

: In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
:were trying to avoild another WWI.

"Fred J. McCall" then wrote:

No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.



Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of
losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications
to prevent another "trench warfare" war.

Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried
out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare".

The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were
not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW
II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and
the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics /
strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders.

Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war"
scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and
with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale
manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described
by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to
changes in strategy / tactics.


They'd have gotten their butts kicked in the last war too, didn't
have reserves, didn't have telephones at HQ, unbelievable stuff.

Didn't help either that the Germans seem to have gotten hold of
the French/British troop dispositions. Security is also something
that had been heard of in WWI.

Peter Skelton

"Seraphim" a écrit dans le message news:
...
"Christophe" wrote in news:bn6dv5$pk9$1@news-
reader3.wanadoo.fr:
(snip)
Mmh... we were talking about WW1, not WW2.

No we wern't.

OK, I had not understood properly, as I said in a previous post.

(snip further considerations)

"Keith Willshaw" a écrit dans le message
news: ...

"Christophe Chazot" wrote in message
...

John

My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.

What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
achieved
in 1917-18...


Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the
generation
of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.

This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.


Keith

I was talking about what happened to our army in a strictly military field.
The morale questions were important too, and the massacre of WW1 certainly
had a reverse effect on the will to fight again 20 years later, as you
quote. By the way, the reluctance to take offensive in 1939 was also due to
the lack of drive of general Gamelin, a peacetime chief of staff who had
been promoted for peacetime reasons but who seriously lacked the required
skills for such a job at such a time. It was also due to some technical and
logistical shortfalls, that resulted from the budget cuts all along the
1930s and that were not corrected until it was too late, but that's a bit
off-topic on naval newsgroup.
Regards,
Christophe