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russia vs. japan in 1941 [WAS: 50% of NAZI oil..]



 
 
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  #102  
Old October 25th 03, 10:03 AM
Cub Driver
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russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
to look in obscure sources to find out about it.


Well, not really. While there was a major border war at Nomonhan in
1939, that was entirely defensive on Russia's part. Once the Japanese
withdrew, there was no further military action. Nearly two years
passed between Nomonhan and Germany's invasion of Russia.

readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
china and direct conflict on the soviet border.


Russia did provide planes and indeed entire squadrons (planes, pilots,
and I assume ground crews) to fight on behalf of the Chinese
Nationalist government in 1938. By the end of 1940, these had all been
withdrawn. Indeed, it was the loss of the Russian squadrons that
prompted Chiang Kai-shek to send Claire Chennault to Washington in the
winter of 1940-41 to help organize a volunteer American air force to
fight in China--the genesis of the AVG Flying Tigers.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com
  #103  
Old October 25th 03, 10:34 AM
Stuart Wilkes
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(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message ...
On 23 Oct 2003 12:39:28 -0700,
(Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:
No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.


No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.


"I don't recall. It's not in my appointment book.... I suggest that
it is not necessary to pay much attention to Wohlthat." isn't a
denial.

And of course, the paying of little attention to Wohlthat is
facilitated by his files in the Public Records Office being sealed
until 2015.

I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
question.


Why? The German accounts of these negotiation show continued Soviet
suspicion of the Germans, and go so far as to say, as late as 4 August
1939, that the Soviets remain determined to sign with the British and
French if their conditions are met. Mr. Willshaw made a feeble
attempt to show that these Soviet conditions were unreasonable, but I
notice that he hasn't really responded to my showing that British
military types thought them just what the situation required.

about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.


How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...


Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
June 1939. [page 88]


How does this contradict Dirksen's cable of 24 July?

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred


Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.


Not according to Wilson.


"I have no recollection... My book shows seven appointments and there
is no mention of Wohlthat... I suggest that it is unnecessary to pay
much attention to Wohlthat..."

Which account you believe (Wilson or Wohlthat] is up to you.


On the one hand, we have the German account. On the other we have "I
have no recollection..." and the sealing of the relevant British files
until 2015.

In most cases people seem to allow their interpretation to be dictated
by their prejudices, and I don't think you're an exception.

Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
pg 89, on these negotiations:

"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
question would lose much of its importance for Britain."

Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.

"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
pg 90.


Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
not.


"I have no recollection..." is not a challenge to a statement of fact.

therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy.


So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
between the German themselves.


Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?


Confirmed by another German civil servant's (Dirksen's) account of
discussions held on 3 August 1939 with the very same Sir Horace
Wilson.

I wonder what his appointment book has to say about that.

Or, you're just trying to weasle out
of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.


I think you should be very careful when casting this sort of language
around,


Mr. Willshaw tried to portray Dirksen's cable as a report of
discussions within the German embassy about plans for negotiations.

"So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed"

He later tried to portray the Deputy Chiefs of Staff's favorable
opinion of one of the Soviet conditions as evidence the British side
were serious about the Moscow staff talks, despite the fact that the
British delegation wasn't authorized to agree to it.

given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland.


I do not assert that Hitler was informed of the Wohlthat-Wilson or the
Dirksen-Wilson talks.

I asserted that Hitler saw no evidence of British preparations to go
to Poland's aid in the event of a German attack on Poland.

Shore makes it explictly clear that there was no evidence that Hitler
was aware of them, in contrast to Ribbentrop.

Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained,


One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
out of their uncomfortable implications.


I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
references to Shore):

"Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
negotiations with Britain." [page 99]


Indeed. The Germans turned down negotiations with the British on 20
August 1939. And Chamberlain's concept of "...germany and England as
pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism" crashed
into ruins.

So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong


They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.


This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.


I do not reference Shore for this, but the war diary of
Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, entry
for 14 August 1939 describing one of Hitler's monologues:

"Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war
drawn out over years. Talk of Britain wanting a long war is
discounted. ... Britain has not gained in naval power over the last
year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up conscription can
take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress in the
air: bombers, fighters, improved ground organization. Air defense has
not made any basic imporvements. On the whole, everything is still in
the developing stage, similar to ours in 1934.

....

All these factors argue for the liklihood of Britain and France
refraining from entering the war, particularly since they are not
under any compulsion.

Pacts are not yet ratified. Formula: "Aid with all our power" lacks
good faith. Proof: Britain does not give Poland any money to buy
arms in other countries.

....

Further evidence that no determined action is expected on the part of
Britain may be inferred from Poland's attitude. Poland would be even
more insolent if she knew she had the unqualified backing of Britain.
Britain has strongly remonstrated with Poland over the latest Polish
notes and is a continually restraining influence. Tapped telephone
conversations in Poland! Even now Britain is putting out feelers to
find out how the Fuehrer envisages developments after Poland's
disposal."

"The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942" edited by Charles burdick and
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, presidio Press, 1988, pgs 23-24.

It appears that Hitler was not greatly impressed by the British
efforts to acquire the capability to go to Poland's aid in the event
of a german attack on Poland.

In fact Shore makes it clear that the source *you* are utilising to
indicate underlying British policy in the form of Wohlstadt's and
Dirksen reports, explictly contradicts this:

"Unable to gain an audience with Ribbentrop, Dirksen decided to send
yet another report summarising his previous cables and stressing his
conviction that Britain would fight to defend Poland." [page 98]
Shore claims this report was sent to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop. Note
that phrase ".. stressing his conviction that Britain would fight to
defend Poland."

Now, either you didn't read that last sentence or you are seeking to
selectively distort the actual meaning of the references you quote to
support your position.

Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
in this thread so far.


Again, Hitler himself saw little reason to be impressed.

...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force


And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat.


Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
about British intentions and what the British had established as their
intentions are.


And he was little impressed with British efforts to back those
intentions with forceful military action.

Ribbentrop was claiming to Ciano that the British
wouldn't fight over Poland on 11 August, and Hitler similarly on 12
August. Clearly, Ribbentrop at least knew of Dirksen's report by
then, which contradicted this. [page 98 again] So much for the value
of that report to the decision-making process in the Nazi hierarchy.

I personally suspect, as usual, that the Nazis selectively chose to
believe whatever bits of that report which fit in with Hitler's
perceived plan and their exisiting prejudices, and discarded the rest.
That would seem to have some parallel in this thread, at least.

No he was a realist,


A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!


Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
until the panzers rolled across his borders.


No. Before agreeing to Ribbentrop's visit, Stalin had agent
information, backed by decrypts of German diplomatic cables, that
showed that the Germans intended good relations to last about two
years.

He understood that he was merely buying time and depth. Which was
more than the British were offering him...

He had the news of Hitler signing the Barbarossa Directive within the
week of Hitler signing it.

In April 1941 he decared a "Special Period of Military Threat",
mobilized several Military Districts in the far East, and covertly
transferred forces from these Districts to the west. This initated
the process of "creeping up to war".

In May, he ordered a 99-division strategic reserve formed on the
Dneipr.

Seems a very modified
form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?


No, because I know that Stalin had no faith in Hitler's word.

It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
than his actions.


Not what Chamberlain was saying to his sisters on 23rd July, was it?


As long as you bring up his sisters, why was he telling them in
mid-September 1939 that
And the British offered to end those talks.

Molotov ended those talks.


Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.


And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest?


About four months, since the Soviet alliance offer to Great Britain
and France of 17 April 1939. But since Dirksen's 24 July cable
circulated through the insecure German embassy in Moscow on 11 August
1939, he may have thought he had reason for alacrity.

I note this kind of
deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it.


Shore shows that the British were informed how to stop Hitler - Agree
to the Soviet alliance offer. Chamberlain didn't want to.

To refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.


Is he to leave the field entirely to the British?

Stuart Wilkes
  #104  
Old October 25th 03, 09:08 PM
The Revolution Will Not Be Televised
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On 25 Oct 2003 02:34:14 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.


"I don't recall. It's not in my appointment book.... I suggest that
it is not necessary to pay much attention to Wohlthat." isn't a
denial.


Would you like to quote the relevant sections of Shore in relation to
what Wilson said to the 1951 inquiry in their entireity, or would you
prefer to leave that to me? You chose to disbelieve Wilson's denial
and emphasise Wohlthat's version of events. Fine. Just don't claim
contested opinions without supporting evidence as "accurate fact".

And of course, the paying of little attention to Wohlthat is
facilitated by his files in the Public Records Office being sealed
until 2015.


I'd prefer it if your conspiracy theories actually had a little more
in the way of evidence behind them. I'm not confident on your
prognostications on the contents of hitherto secret files on the basis
of your handling of Shore's text in this thread.

I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
question.


Why? The German accounts of these negotiation show continued Soviet
suspicion of the Germans,


....as they do of the Allies. Note that, as Shore observed and I have
echoed, Stalin had his choice. The wisdom of that choice is
self-evident on the basis of what happened subsequently.

about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...


Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
June 1939. [page 88]


How does this contradict Dirksen's cable of 24 July?


I observe the wriggling involved in holding you to account for your
own statements based on a reference which I presume you didn't
anticipate anybody would actually check you up on.

I don't see Wohlthat's contacts as a "British initative", as you
claim, and this appears to be an opinion shared by Shore, whose
account gave me the impression Wohlthat was the initiator in regard to
the discussions with Hudson and Wilson. What Kemsley did was far more
closely linked with Chamberlain (and Halifax) and represented a direct
contact with Hitler. Notice how that fared. Which is why, I presume,
you don't refer to it when presenting your interpretation of
Chamberlain's alledged policies in regard to secret contacts with
Germany. I'd be more impressed if you could account for evidence
which appears to contradict your assertions.

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred

Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.


Not according to Wilson.


"I have no recollection... My book shows seven appointments and there
is no mention of Wohlthat... I suggest that it is unnecessary to pay
much attention to Wohlthat..."


I prefer to have more than one disputed source to base my historical
interpretation upon. Clearly your differ with this approach.

Which account you believe (Wilson or Wohlthat] is up to you.


On the one hand, we have the German account. On the other we have "I
have no recollection..." and the sealing of the relevant British files
until 2015.


So you have one unsupported personal account and an absence of
evidence which you are now using as evidence. I presume you can
understand why that might make your approach questionable to other
people.

Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
not.


"I have no recollection..." is not a challenge to a statement of fact.


There is no established fact in this case, just Wohlthat's recorded
opinion, which is denied by the other party. In the absence of any
further evidence, your position simply seems to be based upon
indulging emotional prejudice rather than a rational evaluation of the
value of the evidence in question. You prefer to believe Wohlthat
rather than Wilson. Fine. But without any further evidence, this is
a question of belief and conjuecture. Nothing more. You, however,
have characterised it as "accurate fact". It is clearly not, and if
you had any pretensions to objectivity you would acknowledge it as
such.

Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?


Confirmed by another German civil servant's (Dirksen's) account of
discussions held on 3 August 1939 with the very same Sir Horace
Wilson.

I wonder what his appointment book has to say about that.


Given the propensity of officials from both sides to hear what they
wanted to hear, and how you seem to parallel this, I frankly doubt
that hard evidence is material to your convictions on the issue.

given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland.


I do not assert that Hitler was informed of the Wohlthat-Wilson or the
Dirksen-Wilson talks.


What you said was, and I quote:

"They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid."

They did. Even from Dirksen and Wohlthat. Thus the contradiction
with what you originally claimed. All the other stuff about the
Russian alliance being another test of intention is just that; another
issue. You can certainly argue that the one informed the other, as
Shore does, but in this case you are referring to the credibility of
the British guarantee to Poland, not the military consequences.

I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
references to Shore):

"Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
negotiations with Britain." [page 99]


Indeed. The Germans turned down negotiations with the British on 20
August 1939.


This was the formal dismissal. It was evident long beforehand that
the Germans had no serious intention of reaching any kind of
agreement. This is the kind of policy which you criticise the British
for when the Russians are the object of the same kind of
procrastination or evasion. I note the strange flexibility of
judgement on a similar policy when different nationalities are
involved.

And Chamberlain's concept of "...germany and England as
pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism" crashed
into ruins.


And Chamberlain's other policy of confronting German aggression with
force in the last resort came into action. Meanwhile, Stalin's policy
of reaching a non-aggression pact with Hitler and carving up spheres
of influence in eastern Europe went ahead full steam.

So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.


This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.


I do not reference Shore for this,


Just as well, as he contradicts you. If you are going to use sources
so selectively, you should be open about where your analysis diverges
from theirs. This shouldn't take you being called on it when you
clearly contradict a source you quote to support your position.

but the war diary of
Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, entry
for 14 August 1939 describing one of Hitler's monologues:

"Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war
drawn out over years. Talk of Britain wanting a long war is
discounted. ... Britain has not gained in naval power over the last
year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up conscription can
take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress in the
air: bombers, fighters, improved ground organization. Air defense has
not made any basic imporvements. On the whole, everything is still in
the developing stage, similar to ours in 1934.


Frankly, I don't find any of Hitler's monologues or table-talk to be
particularly credible as a measure of intimate intention. Would you
like to quote what Shore had to say about Hitler's statement of
intention towards the German generals and others at this point? What
Hitler gave were rationalisations for decisions he made on irrational
basis or made under very different rationales for the one he claimed.
I could sit here and quote literally dozens of examples of Hitler
berating his generals with dubious, contradictory or planly erroneous
statements, especially when it came to understating or dismissing
resistance to his policies.

In this instance all you have is what Hitler said to Halder to justify
his policy. I wouldn't confuse that with actual fact or even a
credible interpretation of fact. Neither would any historian. Nor
any objective layman.

All these factors argue for the liklihood of Britain and France
refraining from entering the war, particularly since they are not
under any compulsion.


You really do sound like a less hysterical version of Ribbentrop here.
In reality the Germans had plenty of warnings. They chose to discount
them.

Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
in this thread so far.


Again, Hitler himself saw little reason to be impressed.


[as I said before...]

Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
about British intentions and what the British had established as their
intentions are.


And he was little impressed with British efforts to back those
intentions with forceful military action.


Hitler, as always, chose to believe in his chosen policy and
discounted inconvenient contradictions to this policy from wherever
they came. You can adhere to this illusion of Hitler as a rationalist
as long as you want, but I'm afraid it's a minority view and likely to
remain one.

Meanwhile, whether Hitler had made a realistic appreciation of British
inability to militarily assist Polish resistance directly is not the
issue. Your assertions about the German administrations
understandings of the British to go to war over Poland are. I
appreciate eliding points like these makes it easier to avoid being
held accountable for specific distortions that you make, but we don't
all play that game.

A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!


Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
until the panzers rolled across his borders.


No.


Then you must be in posession of revolutionary new evidence that
reveals that Stalin wasn't suprised or shocked by Barbarossa. I
suggest you publish this fast and overturn the existing historical
consensus of Soviet suprise at the German attack in 1941. If the
steps Stalin took to mobilise reserve forces in depth in early 1941
impress you as evidence of a firm resolve to deal with Hitler, you
must have a similar appreciation of British rearmament after 1936 to
share with us (and specifically the British CHiefs of Staff
recognising Germany as the next major threat to Britain), not to
mention the introduction of peacetime conscription (regardless of
Chamberlain's stated objections to such a policy before he actually
did it). But I image we'll be waiting for a long time to see that. I
won't hold my breath.

Before agreeing to Ribbentrop's visit, Stalin had agent
information, backed by decrypts of German diplomatic cables, that
showed that the Germans intended good relations to last about two
years.


He understood that he was merely buying time and depth.


How much time and how much depth were still factors that he got
entirely wrong.

Which was
more than the British were offering him...


He got all that the British could offer in the second half of 1941,
and it was insignificant beside the resistance of the Soviet forces
and the mistakes of the Soviet command and government.

He had the news of Hitler signing the Barbarossa Directive within the
week of Hitler signing it.


And he clearly discounted it. So much for his perspicacity when it
came to German intentions. He gambled on reaching an accomodation
with Hitler, and failed. He wasn't the first, but it doesn't say much
for his "realism" and perception of Hitlers "sincerity" that he was
the last.

Seems a very modified
form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?


No, because I know that Stalin had no faith in Hitler's word.


Yet he still made an agreement with Hitler and was still suprised when
Hitler broke it.

Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.


And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest?


About four months, since the Soviet alliance offer to Great Britain
and France of 17 April 1939.


But the emisaries you refer to were not challenged by the Russians to
reveal their "authority to agree to anything" until when, 12th August
1939. Please don't seek to move the goalposts once you have
established them.

But since Dirksen's 24 July cable
circulated through the insecure German embassy in Moscow on 11 August
1939, he may have thought he had reason for alacrity.


He might. And thus ended up crediting Hitler's word on the basis of
an unsupported communication from a minor German official. He thought
the Nazis were more credible than the British, and paid the price
later.

I note this kind of
deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it.


Shore shows that the British were informed how to stop Hitler - Agree
to the Soviet alliance offer. Chamberlain didn't want to.


His cabinet had other ideas, and in the final analysis he did admit he
was prepared to conclude it one way or the other. Meanwhile Shore
shows a lot of things you were happy to omit from your references to
his analysis.

To refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.


Is he to leave the field entirely to the British?


I give up. I have better things to do than waste time with Trots
bizarrely defending Stalin.

Gavin Bailey

--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.
  #106  
Old October 27th 03, 12:08 PM
Cub Driver
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Posts: n/a
Default


The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
(oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.


There were Japanese soldiers at Wounded Knee ?


No, there were American soldiers.

The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
Americans. (Mind you, I have not yet read the book. The moral
equivalance of Chichi Jima and Wounded Knee was pointed out by a
reviewer.)

You will find this sort of equivalance in most people edcuated after
say 1980. It was famously express by a high-school student who wrote
that the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, so the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at
www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com
  #108  
Old October 27th 03, 03:40 PM
Steven P. McNicoll
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Posts: n/a
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"Cub Driver" wrote in message
...

The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
Americans.


Different eras. During WWII the Americans treated their enemy captives far
better than the Japanese treated their enemy captives.


  #109  
Old October 27th 03, 03:41 PM
Steven P. McNicoll
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Autocollimator" wrote in message
...

Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub and
shove it where the sun don't shine.


Some Piper Cubs are nicer than other Piper Cubs, but there are no crappy
Piper Cubs.


  #110  
Old October 27th 03, 05:36 PM
Mike Marron
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Autocollimator" wrote in message


Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub and
shove it where the sun don't shine.


Some Piper Cubs are nicer than other Piper Cubs, but there are no crappy
Piper Cubs.


We've had some heated arguments in the past, but on this I agree
with you 100,000,001-percent (just like there ain't no such thang as
bad pussy -- just that some pussy is better than other pussy! )

signed,
....Still waiting for the hooded coward to take off his "anonomator"
Halloween mask and reveal his real name.





 




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