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#41
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your last statement here. Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No? No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the fateful decision to marry my first wife. I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa. Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert interceptor force was always deployed. I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach Saigon. I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn, Ubon or Danang. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
#42
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Ed Rasimus posted:
No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past.... I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he missed this detail. According to Pete Stickney's post... The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69, with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS, which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea, inactivated in May, 71. So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know, but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong). Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d. Regarding my reference to CHECO reports... I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert Futrell and Warren Thompson. I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of contemporaneous documentation. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,... Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don Muang.. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country... Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970 according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed. Juvat |
#43
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National Geographic Vol.128, No. 3, September 1965 "United States Air Force
Of Planes and Men" pages 302-3 has the picture you are looking for. It shows 2 Voodoos, 6 Delta Daggers, 1 Navy Sky Warrior and 1 Super Sabre. One of the Delta Daggers pictured is 56-1161 which was lost in a Viet Cong attack on Da Nang, Jul 1, 1965 so it had already been destroyed by the time this picture made it to press. This was one of my favorite issues as kid growing up as a SAC brat. snip Wrong. F-102's did serve in both Vietnam and Thailand (which is why every once in a while you see a photo of a Delta Dagger in SEA camo). If you can get a hold of an old National Geographic from that period that covered the war (sorry, can't recall which issue...), you'll note that a photo of Tan Son Nhut (or whatever the spelling was) showed F-102's sitting in sandbagged revetments. I believe three were listed as combat losses, one to a Mig, the remaining two to ground fire, and a few others were lost during VC sapper/rocket attacks on the ground. Served as interceptors, some escort duty, and even ground attack--there was even an experamental program where they went after NVA cooking fires at night with their IR Falcons. They also used their 12 unguided rockets against ground targets. |
#44
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin Brooks writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source. I believe the gent may be mixing up his situations a bit. There was an experament conducted in the theater of operations where F-102's used their IR sensor, paired with their IR Falcons, to strike heat sources along the Ho Chi Minh Trail--more of a nuisance program than anything else. A modified Sidewinder got similar use (AGM-87A Focus I, apparently) - said to be intended for use on truck headlights (visible or IR) according to Friedman. Wouldn't have thought the Falcon would be much use for the role, with its reliability problems and small warhead, but if it's what you've got I guess you use it and hope... I gather the objective was really little more than keeping the bad guys on-edge. Apparently the folks in charge were looking for ways to (a) use the F-102's they already had in hand, and (b) make life for the gomers on the HCM trail as troublesome as possible. The account I read indicated that the usual target was *cooking fires*, in hopes of killing a few relaxing bad guys and making them sweat over trying to get a hot bowl of rice to go with their fermented fish heads. Believeable when you consider some of the other even more exotic and off-the-wall things that were considered and even tried in an effort to interdict the NVA/VC supply routes (i.e., people sniffers, for one), or when you consider the amount of arty that was fired for H&I purposes (that term no longer even appears in our arty doctrine, from what my old Redleg buddies told me). Brooks |
#45
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Juvat wrote:
Ed Rasimus posted: No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I believe. But, I've been wrong in the past.... I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he missed this detail. In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. But, even he makes mistakes, such as calling all the ECM pods for the war, QRC-160. Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's, but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack. According to Pete Stickney's post... The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69, with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS, which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea, inactivated in May, 71. So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know, but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong). I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72. Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other tactical jets that could also carry iron up N. Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d. Regarding my reference to CHECO reports... I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote from CHECO and Red Baron reports. Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert Futrell and Warren Thompson. I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and Back" is excellent. Still, I like to deal with people who actually flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine. I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources. In a few years this crap will go unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll throw a bull-**** flag occasionally. Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of contemporaneous documentation. If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,... Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don Muang.. The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country... Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970 according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed. If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Of course, I was a member of a squadron that was deactivated at Korat in September of '72, so it's possible. There were movements all over the theater at that time, including the 35th and 67the TFSs coming from Kadena and the entire 354th TFW from CONUS as well as the F-4s from the 4th at S-J. And don't forget the F-111s and even the 561st WW from George. What was at Danang then and where did the 366th go in Thailand? Only the Marine F-4 det? Udorn still had a full house of F-4s and RFs until I left theater in July of '73. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (ret) ***"When Thunder Rolled: *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam" *** from Smithsonian Books ISBN: 1588341038 |
#46
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"Juvat" wrote in message ... Kevin Brooks blurted out: I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were activated and flew in Vietnam, Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that score. Yes? No? or to those "champagne unit" (your description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam? Methinks not... Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled" gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers. Is the military dedication, professionalism, or 'influence' of any other officer who served in the Texas ANG at that time in question? Or indeed any other non-draftee, who incidentially did not see combat during the Vietnam years? Or is it only some guy, who 30 years later, would become president? Hindsight is a wonderful thing. 15 years ago, a B-52 crew performing close air support over a battlefield was a laughable concept. They had basically a ZERO chance of 'being activated'. Times change. Tactics and A/C roles change. They could just as easily have changed for the -102 crews. Pete |
#47
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Juvat wrote in message . ..
Kevin Brooks blurted out: I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were activated and flew in Vietnam, Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in their meaning and intent. The original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that score. Yes? No? No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong) because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand (including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout the period of major US involvement). or to those "champagne unit" (your description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam? Methinks not... Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled" gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated and sent into harm's way. Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought, too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the manning that supported them. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers. Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness. Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the last F-102's left active duty? When? The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi (source: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/ch11-4.htm). They continued in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front line" service. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon" fighter, as he would call it, no? Since you did not even have a ghostly idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to believe your assessment of their operational status? Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons served. No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his "the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap. My brother served in the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad stroke, does it not? ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements" (see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for. Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed. Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as their AC counterparts. As to even the definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing alert on a routine basis. Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard 1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD commanders. I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same decade. Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of. OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly. My AD and ARNG service, you mean. I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money, organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really manifested? Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell me you were not "attacking". OK...I don't think he was attacking. Then you apparently share his view of the Guard as a whole during that period. Too bad. And I think it is fairly accurate to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s. Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat). Brooks Juvat |
#48
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Ed Rasimus posted:
In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP? Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's, but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack. So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY 523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.] I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72. I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and Back" is excellent. Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO. He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye witness account. Still, I like to deal with people who actually flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine. I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe. If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang to Takhli in June of 1972. So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am I doing all the citations/research? Juvat |
#49
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I posted:
Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. Kevin Brooks posted: No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in their meaning and intent. Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what? "What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam" What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up" an active duty unit? It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet that's how you're reading this thread. No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong) Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability." I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge). And history will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA. because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand throughout the period of major US involvement). Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence of ANY F-102s. Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought, too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the manning that supported them. Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG F-102 sqdns and Scott's post. ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered. The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am) The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the reasearch [sigh]. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101 guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You get the picture. No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in Vietnam, period. Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in error...but I bet you disagree with me. Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed. Not really. OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope. I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same decade. Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I mentioned the only activations during SEA. If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in SEA. Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great, then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor. Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA. Juvat |
#50
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"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message om... Juvat wrote in message . .. Kevin Brooks blurted out: I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were activated and flew in Vietnam, Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in their meaning and intent. The original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that score. Yes? No? No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong) because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand (including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout the period of major US involvement). or to those "champagne unit" (your description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam? Methinks not... Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled" gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated and sent into harm's way. Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought, too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the manning that supported them. If I recall my reading correctly(an article I read about 34 years ago), the ANG F100 units were flying "C" models, while the Regular Air Force was flying "D " models. A difference which may seem minor, but apparently was significant. |
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