tow rope brake practice crash, what can we learn...

On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

Condolences to everyone involved. An unfortunately similar accident
over the weekend in Montana.
http://www.kpax.com/news/strong-wind...l-plane-crash/

Craig

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

A few years back I was at a SSA CFIG re-validation seminar in Seattle
and there was a discussion of rope break training prior to solo sign-
offs. I was a solo student at the time, just there to learn. I
mentioned that I had never done a rope break but had been signed off
solo and was made to stand and repeat that while the SSA safety team
(Carlson and Wander I think it was) listened with horror. The next
weekend I went to the field and performed 4 down to 200' and still try
to do 3 or 4 every year. Once you do a few and get it down it's a non-
event and probably good to have as a skill.

On the other hand during my check ride in a 2-22 the DE pulled the
release at 200' into a strong headwind and it was pretty exciting
getting that bird down when I had been doing them in a DG303 up to
then. That same DE is in a local hospital today after crashing while
performing a rope break in Montana last week, the other pilot was
killed. Those are two very different data points to try and reconcile.

Brian

On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

On Jul 11, 7:58*pm, Bart wrote:
On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

This discussion reminds me of similar discussions surrounding spin
training in the power world. So many students and instructors were
killed during spin 'training' that the maneuver was eventually
banished from the required training curriculum. We in the soaring
community should be taking a very hard look at how many pilots are
injured killed in actual PTT (Premature Termination of Tow) events vs
how many are injured/killed in SRB (Simulated Rope Break) events. I
would be willing to bet real money that the statistics do not support
the continued use of SRBs in training and/or BFRs. We don't do base-
to-final turn stall/spin recovery training for obvious reasons (so the
saying goes, "You can only do a base-to-final-turn stall/spin
demonstration ONCE"), and SRBs are just slightly less dangerous.

BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor. If we feel we must
continue to do SRBs as part of a training/review curriculum, they
should ONLY be done in Condor. The military, GA, and corporate/
airline communities figured this out a long time ago, and now that we
have a realistic soaring simulator, we should be doing it too. If you
haven't tried this in Condor, you should.

TA

On Mon, 11 Jul 2011 18:49:36 -0700 (PDT), Frank Paynter
wrote:


BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor.

Bullsh**.


Andreas

Rope breaks are definitely exciting. I vividly remember my first one,
six years ago prior to solo. It had me so worked up I had trouble
sleeping the night before, but the actual event was no where near as
bad as I'd imagined. The worst one I've experienced was when the tow
plane had "engine failure" and started slowing down after I was flying
but before it left the ground. Realistic, but my heart still beats
faster when I think of it. Another high stress situation, as pointed
out above, is when you're just below pattern altitude about to turn
downwind and you have lots of choices of what to do. But for all the
drama, I believe rope break practice is very necessary - in my short
soaring career I've seen 3 unintentional rope breaks. All turned out
just fine, because the pilots knew what they had to do.

-John

On Jul 12, 6:55*am, Andreas Maurer wrote:
On Mon, 11 Jul 2011 18:49:36 -0700 (PDT), Frank Paynter

wrote:
BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor.

Bullsh**.

Andreas

Have to agree - if you aren't there, you aren't there.

HOWEVER, I do have some difficulty with trying to come up with a bunch
of canned answers on how to handle each emergency.
In fact, I would suggest that the cure is worse than the disease. Too
many variations of problems.

I have had personal involvement in, or first hand knowledge of, at
least 6 events that could have been very serious. The solution to each
emergency was "fly the airplane-save yourself". After that is
established, say inside the first 2 seconds, the next common
denominator is "get rid of the rope". To heck with signals. In many
cases there is no way for the rope to back release. I have personally
witnessed a case where this was the difference between life and death.
Life won. I have personally been involved in a case where if the rope
had not released we would have been in big, big trouble. Signals in
NONE of these events would have had any effect on a safe outcome, in
fact they would have likely been detrimental due to the short time
limit involved.

I might emphasize - the same "save yourself first" applies to BOTH
ends of the rope.

On Jul 11, 9:49*pm, Frank Paynter wrote:
On Jul 11, 7:58*pm, Bart wrote:





On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

This discussion reminds me of similar discussions surrounding spin
training in the power world. *So many students and instructors were
killed during spin 'training' that the maneuver was eventually
banished from the required training curriculum. *We in the soaring
community should be taking a very hard look at how many pilots are
injured killed in actual PTT (Premature Termination of Tow) events vs
how many are injured/killed in SRB (Simulated Rope Break) events. *I
would be willing to bet real money that the statistics do not support
the continued use of SRBs in training and/or BFRs. *We don't do base-
to-final turn stall/spin recovery training for obvious reasons (so the
saying goes, "You can only do a base-to-final-turn stall/spin
demonstration ONCE"), and SRBs are just slightly less dangerous.

BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor. *If we feel we must
continue to do SRBs as part of a training/review curriculum, they
should ONLY be done in Condor. *The military, GA, and corporate/
airline communities figured this out a long time ago, and now that we
have a realistic soaring simulator, we should be doing it too. *If you
haven't tried this in Condor, you should.

TA- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

I completely disagree. Condor can be useful for many things but I do
not see how it will simulate the real world stress
that occurs during an emergency situation.
My experience is that most pilots will make at least one important
mistake during their first PTTT. Some of these include.
1- Not having a plan in mind that is correct and ready to implement-
the "what would I do?" scenario.
2- Many turn the "wrong " direction- most commonly to the right
because "that's what we always do".
3- Failure to recognize the situation in the first place- "why are his
wings rocking?"
4- Not establishing the correct attitude to maintain control with
adequate margins. It's not just nose down.
5- Failure to clear for traffic on return.
6- Not establishing proper glide slope back to safe landing point.
7- Huge tunnel vision due to surprise and related stress.
8- Release when tug rudder is wagged to indicate "something is wrong
with your glider".
9- Failure to recognize thr transition point from "I don't have enough
energy margin to return to the field" to "Now I can return".
Take off/ launch accidents are a significant portion of our losses. We
must continue to train and retrain these skills.
UH

On Jul 12, 8:34*am, wrote:
On Jul 11, 9:49*pm, Frank Paynter wrote:









On Jul 11, 7:58*pm, Bart wrote:

On Jul 11, 2:38*pm, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

Not much. Rope break at 400 feet should be a non-event. There must be
something about this accident that we do not know yet.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?
Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

FARs do not require rope breaks during a flight review, so it is up to
the instructor you fly with. Personally, if I was an instructor, I
would not sign off anyone who is not comfortable flying a simulated
rope break. Weather permitting, of course.

By the way, what seems to be a typical BFR - three flights, one of
which is a rope break - is actually illegal. Or, to be more precise,
it does NOT met the BFR requirements specified by the FARs: "Glider
pilots may substitute a minimum of three instructional flights in a
glider, each of which includes a flight to TRAFFIC PATTERN ALTITUDE,
in lieu of the 1 hour of flight training required..."

Bart

This discussion reminds me of similar discussions surrounding spin
training in the power world. *So many students and instructors were
killed during spin 'training' that the maneuver was eventually
banished from the required training curriculum. *We in the soaring
community should be taking a very hard look at how many pilots are
injured killed in actual PTT (Premature Termination of Tow) events vs
how many are injured/killed in SRB (Simulated Rope Break) events. *I
would be willing to bet real money that the statistics do not support
the continued use of SRBs in training and/or BFRs. *We don't do base-
to-final turn stall/spin recovery training for obvious reasons (so the
saying goes, "You can only do a base-to-final-turn stall/spin
demonstration ONCE"), and SRBs are just slightly less dangerous.

BTW, at the risk of starting a religious war, rope breaks, spins, and
other dangerous maneuvers can be simulated realistically, at any
altitude and weather configuration in Condor. *If we feel we must
continue to do SRBs as part of a training/review curriculum, they
should ONLY be done in Condor. *The military, GA, and corporate/
airline communities figured this out a long time ago, and now that we
have a realistic soaring simulator, we should be doing it too. *If you
haven't tried this in Condor, you should.

TA- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

I completely disagree. Condor can be useful for many things but I do
not see how it will simulate the real world stress
that occurs during an emergency situation.
My experience is that most pilots will make at least one important
mistake during their first PTTT. *Some of these include.
1- Not having a plan in mind that is correct and ready to implement-
the "what would I do?" scenario.
2- Many turn the "wrong " direction- most commonly to the *right
because "that's what we always do".
3- Failure to recognize the situation in the first place- "why are his
wings rocking?"
4- Not establishing the correct attitude to maintain control with
adequate margins. It's not just nose down.
5- Failure to clear for traffic on return.
6- Not establishing proper glide slope back to safe landing point.
7- Huge tunnel vision due to surprise and related stress.
8- Release when tug rudder is wagged to indicate "something is wrong
with your glider".
9- Failure to recognize thr transition point from "I don't have enough
energy margin to return to the field" to "Now I can return".
Take off/ launch accidents are a significant portion of our losses. We
must continue to train and retrain these skills.
UH

Hank,

Well, there is a huge body of evidence from GA, airline, corporate
aviation, and military aviation that indicates that ground-based
simulation is very a very effective training tool for emergency
procedures, and is MUCH safer than airborne training. In a simulator,
bad situations and/or bad decisions by the student can be allowed to
play out to bad endings, something that can't be done safely in flight
and is usually much more effective in getting the point across.

You may make the point that since the student knows he can't die in a
simulator, the real stresses can't be duplicated. However, I would
argue that with airborne training most students think they can't die
because there is an instructor right there to save them, so the same
argument applies.

A student can practice realistic rope breaks in Condor by having an
assistant hit the release unexpectedly, just as in real life. The
student must perform exactly the same functions (lower the nose,
establish a bank in the proper direction, look for an appropriate
landing area, etc) as in real life. I can pretty much guarantee you
that the first few times the student does this, their reaction will be
indistinguishable from their reaction in real life. Moreover, the
situation in Condor can be easily configured so the student has no
hope of returning to the field, and therefore must accomplish a safe
off-airport landing - try that in real life! After 10 or 20 (or 100)
SRBs in Condor, a student will be very well-drilled in rope-break
procedures for a wide variety of situations, much more so than a
corresponding real life only student who typically is exposed to only
a few well-planned and very safe SRBs.

For less than $300 (assuming you already have a decent PC) you can
have a training tool that has been shown over and over again to be
effective in saving lives. Need I say more?

TA