Cirrus SR22 Purchase advice needed.

In article , Thomas Borchert
wrote:

C,

The Cirrus cannot recover
from a spin without pulling the parachute and did not do so in tests


Ok, quote me where it says that in the POH.

SR22 POH, Section 3 Emergency Procedures, page 20 (3-20)

In article , EDR
wrote:

In article , Thomas Borchert
wrote:

C,

The Cirrus cannot recover
from a spin without pulling the parachute and did not do so in tests


Ok, quote me where it says that in the POH.

SR22 POH, Section 3 Emergency Procedures, page 20 (3-20)

Section 3 Cirrus Design
Emergency Procedures SR22
Spins
The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or
certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and
demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus
Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section).
Because of this, if the aircraft ³departs controlled flight,² the CAPS
must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a
spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by
using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper
airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and
never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to
the stall (see Stalls, Section 4).
If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated
inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing
drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it
may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or
the beginning of a spin.
ï WARNING ï
In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from
which recovery is not expected before ground impact,
immediate deployment of the CAPS is required.
The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS
deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at
higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for
parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to
recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
Inadvertent Spin Entry
1. CAPS .................................................. Activate

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
"Vaughn" writes:

Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent
spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up
crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain." You
have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on the
plane.


Nicely put. Actually I think it must be pretty hard to spin just about
anything accidentally, but people do. The plane gives you a LOT of
warning before it stalls - any plane. For a start it slows down, which
is fairly noticeable. (I forget exactly what I was doing over the weekend,
but for whatever reason I ended up a few knots slow - nowhere near
stalling - and it immediately just felt wrong, before I even looked at
the airspeed and confirmed it). It has a high angle of attack. In many
planes (though not really the case in high-wing Cessnas) there is a buffet.
(There is in the Cirrus iirc). Then to spin a wing will start to drop, and
in the Cirrus you will still have some aileron control even if you do the
wrong thing and try to fix it with the stick. At this point in just about
any plane, Muller-Beggs will work fine (let go of everything and wait).

That said, it strikes me that everyone ought to do some spin training,
maybe after they've got a few more hours than during PPL training.
It's fun, it's interesting, and it could save your life.

Now if you want a plane that is a challenge to fly, I flew a Waco over
the weekend. Now THAT is different. Things like absolutely zero
forward visibility during taxi, take-off and landing - and precious
little even when you're flying. I'll admit that my first couple of take-offs
and landings were not that great (well, none of them were really
GREAT but they did get better). But boy, what a lot of fun.

John

Mike Beede wrote:


I've flown a Cirrus and while it does land fast compared to say a 182, it
didn't seem to be particularly hard to slow down compared to say a 182RG
with the gear up.

That's true, but I can drop the gear in my club's 182RG once below 140
(although I avoid doing so until below 120 just to be kind). The gear
doesn't add a *lot* of friction, but there's enough to make a difference.

- Andrew

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
"Vaughn" writes:


Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent
spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up
crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain."

True, but most planes can recover from a spin but not from a crash into
a mountain so I don't get your comparison.

You have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on
the
plane.

I am not blaming the plane! This is a serious plane that will be flown
IFR by owner-pilots who do not fly actual IFR every day; as such, it will
occasionally end up in a spin. The BRS will give a wonderful last-ditch
option that a certain Kennedy would have appreciated, but IMO that does not
substitute for the capability of recovering normally should you spin out of
the bottom of a cloud or (for example) end up in an inadvertant
training-induced spin.

Again, I love the BRS but think that it should not substitute for
live-saving flying qualities.


We can probably all recite the standard spin recovery procedure. I
suspect that a significant number of us have never experienced a spin
nor actually done the procedure, and should it happen in real life will
probably be really confused and disoriented for long enough to die.

That is a whole 'nuther thread.

Vaughn

Jeff wrote
the SR22 is fast compared to other planes with smaller engines, but compare it
to a plane with the same 310 HP engine, I dont think you will see much speed
difference.

what other planes out there have a 310 HP engine?

The 300 hp IO-550 is an option on at least the S-model Bonanza (and
probably many others). A friend of mine has one and I've flown it -
it's a great airplane, and it will comfortably cruise at 180 kts on
16-17 gph.

Michael

"C J Campbell" wrote
Therefore, the Cirrus cannot
recover from a spin when below 900' AGL. Many other aircraft can.

Name one aircraft that can cruise better than 170 kts, carry four
people, and can recover from a spin at 900 AGL.

Michael

I don't know for sure, but I would put 20 on the new lancair.


"Michael" wrote in message
om...
"C J Campbell" wrote
Therefore, the Cirrus cannot
recover from a spin when below 900' AGL. Many other aircraft can.

Name one aircraft that can cruise better than 170 kts, carry four
people, and can recover from a spin at 900 AGL.

Michael

"Dave Katz" wrote in message
...
"Vaughn" writes:

We are not talking about a trainer, we are talking about an
advanced,
owner-flown, plane that will occasionally end up in an inadvertant spin.
Any
pilot that has enough experience to be flying one shout at least be able
to
recite the standard spin recovery procedure.

Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent
spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up
crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain." You
have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on the
plane.


No, you don't have to be trying real hard to spin one. If this were true,
people would not be dying due to approach and departure stalls.

We are a many of us excellent pilots on the ground. Stuff happens in the
air. People make mistakes.



We can probably all recite the standard spin recovery procedure. I
suspect that a significant number of us have never experienced a spin
nor actually done the procedure, and should it happen in real life will
probably be really confused and disoriented for long enough to die.

When I moved to California I was able to recite the standard earthquake
procedure, but when it happened the first time I had no idea what was
happening to me until it was already over...

"Dude" writes:

though there isn't much data on the crash in Spain) were CFIT. Hard
to blame these on the plane per se.


"per se"?

Trying to separate out the "plane is a death trap" argument from the "plane
attracts idiots" argument.


Accusing those of us who think the statistics are relevant of hyperbole will
not save any lives, nor win the argument. The fatalities per 100,000 flight
hours stat is a very valid and fair stat.

And like all statistics it says only what it says, and drawing
conclusions from a statistic (particularly a single one) is very
risky. You have to ask a series of questions: What does the statistic
actually measure? Is the measurement statistically significant? Are
similar statistics comparable, and what do the comparisons mean? What
does the statistic have to say as a predictor for an individual (which
is really what people are concerned with)?

For example, if there's never been a fatality in a DA40, does that
mean that a Cirrus is infinitely more dangerous? If it turns out that
lots of idiots by Cirrus aircraft, does that mean that if you decide
to buy one then you as an individual are more likely to become an
idiot?

The statistics (assuming that they pass significance tests) really
tell you only that something is going on, but they can't tell you
what. This is a red flag to go and actually examine the accident
records and try to make an honest evaluation and decide for yourself
what they mean to you.

Once again, you can't take out the "stupidity factor" from one
manufacturer's stats, and not the others.

I fully agree, and herein lies the heart of the issue. Since there is
no independent "idiots per 100,000 pilots" statistic measured, it's
very difficult to quantitatively describe it. Furthermore, an
anecdotal analysis of GA accidents gives the impression that the
"stupidity factor" overwhelms all other contributors, which implies
that the planes, per se (there's that phrase again) are not a major
part of the problem. So unless the plane causes you to become an
idiot, as an individual thinking of purchasing one the statistics say
almost nothing about how much risk the plane itself poses to you in
particular.

I believe they are over a million fleet hours, and I am told that is
generally considered the time at which the numbers become valid.

This would imply an average of somewhere around 700 hours per
aircraft, which is way off the mark, considering that probably close
to half of the fleet was delivered in the last year. I suspect that
the fleet time is at most probably half of that, but of course we're just
making up numbers since this is never actually measured.

Another would be that everyone of us is likely to decide that we are not one
of those idiots. In fact, the ones that are dead likely thought that.

"Aviation, where all of the children are above average." ;-)

Either the design is safe or it is not.

C'mon, this is patently and obviously not true, unless your measure of
"safe" is "nothing bad ever happens" in which case all designs are
unsafe. Short of pieces coming off, it's almost impossible to measure
safety, except in very specific ways (things like impact tests, though
those are not necessarily predictors of anything useful either) or very
general ways (statistics, which don't tell you much.)

There is almost no practical
way to prove the cause without changing the results. Therefore, the design
is bad until it is found to be performing more safely. If Cirrus implements
a change, and then gets different results, then we can talk again. (the
parachute fix seems to have helped).

I think you're overreaching logically here. Perhaps I can restate it:
if there is a statistically significant difference in (accidents,
fatalities, choose your measure) then there is likely to be some
factor or factors that could be changed to reduce it. It's not just
"design" or training or even marketing; it's also things like low
time-in-type and mission profile (long XCs may be inherently more
risky due to unfamiliar terrain, multiple weather systems, etc.)

I don't see that a design change of the physical airplane will keep
people from doing stupid stuff (I suppose TAWS might reduce CFIT
accidents, but people would scream "crutch," which I agree with to a
point, though I suspect it will be standard in the avionics before
long.)

Cirrus has implemented changes to the training program, and COPA has
provided a number of resources, including recurrent training and
critical decisionmaking seminars, and a number of the insurance
underwriters are raising requirements for time and training. Whether
these changes will reduce the accident rate (or have already) will
take another chunk of time to determine. There are a few data points,
however; the rate of landing accidents (prop strikes, etc.) seem to
have dropped since they got rid of the original training organization
and started stressing speed and landing attitude control more. The
situation is not static by any means.

If the problem is indeed personality, perhaps they are selling the planes to
the wrong people. I would not necessarily disagree that this is the case
except to point out that they are not changing their sales practices and
other than looking at experience levels what are you going to do anyway.

I don't think either of us have any facts as to whether or not Cirrus
is changing their sales practices. And as you note, it's also not
clear how a sales rep is supposed to determine whether a customer is a
"wrong person" or not; they're not psychologists or mind readers, so
short of someone's experience level (or at least how they represent
it, as they're not getting a background investigation) there's not
much to go on, and it's unclear that overall experience levels
correlate with the accidents in any case.

Cirrus could get some good PR by simply dropping the SRV idea, and requiring
a high level of hours to buy their SR20 and SR22. I don't see this
happening, so I guess we will have a bunch more Thurman Munson Jr.'s.

It's unclear that this would actually help. One could make a case
that an SR20 or SRV would be an excellent aircraft in which to take
primary and instrument training, assuming that the pilot understands
that the process will take longer than it would in a 152. Typical
trainers are more forgiving, but after the first ten hours I'd argue
that this is a detriment, as it allows all kinds of bad habits (like
the 50' AGL roundout) to develop. Teaching speed discipline on
landing, and getting early and thorough exposure to the avionics,
could well make them better pilots. There are a fair number of pilots
who bought an SR20 to learn in, and so far as I know, none of them
have come to a tragic end. As such, their statistics look excellent,
for what that's worth.

The SR22 is arguably too much of a handful as a primary trainer,
though a few people have done it. The insurance people are the main
gatekeepers in this case. The number of low-total-time pilots flying
SR22s is probably quite small.