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#152
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The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had
a cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE (Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs. Arthur Kramer Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there at all. |
#153
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin) Date: 7/18/2004 3:51 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had a cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE (Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs. Arthur Kramer Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there at all. It's the way we did it in the good ol' 344th. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#154
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Chris Mark wrote:
I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another. The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with slightly different attributes. No disagreement from me - I'm not the one who's been arguing that the B-26 was used in the ETO exclusively because the B-25 was inferior, was less able to take damage, had a higher loss rate, etc., in the face of all the evidence and ignoring all the factors you mention above. It's always bugged me that the B-26 is trumpeted as having the lowest loss rate in the ETO, when it was the _only_ medium bomber in the ETO (operated by the US). Since there's nothing to directly compare it to in that theater, attempting to draw conclusions about its relative survivability are meaningless. That is not the case in the MTO, which is why I would still like to know if you can break down the MTO numbers for the B-25 and B-26, excluding North Africa. I've got the North African data somewhere, but only have overall "European War" data on bomber sorties and losses, rather than the more specific post-North Africa MTO numbers. If you can supply sorties and losses for the B-25 and B-26 for that period, I'd be much obliged, because I haven't been able to find that anywhere else. Guy |
#155
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WalterM140 wrote:
formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight formation flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or Halifax IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that high (owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel loads). Guy That's interesting. Didn't the RAF typically operate at @ 15,000 feet over German targets? Depends on the period, the target and the individual crews, but in general not the heavies, although Stirlings and squadron dogs might be that low or lower. For the Nuremberg raid (except for Mossies, all Halifax and Lancaster) a/c were assigned one of four cruise heights, 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet, although 1 Group were given dispensation to cruise lower, 13-16,000 feet IIRR until they reached the Rhine or some other river, in the hope of hiding in forecast cloud, climbing to the same height as everyone else after that. The cloud wasn't there, and they were hit hard. Once the attacks started, anyone who could went higher -- one Halifax crew in a new a/c were delighted to find that they could get up to 26,000 feet, and cruised safely above the carnage below. Others jettisoned some of their bomb load to improve their ceiling. Crews flying average a/c, or those with less experience or more determination to follow orders stayed at the assigned altitude bands, and were the main targets of the fighters. Dog a/c were stuck even lower, and on that particular mission it actually saved many of them -- one crew couldn't get their Lanc above 12,000 feet and in this case were fortunate, as the fighters were going after the main stream above them. On at least one occasion, B-17' were briefed to attack Berlin at 27,000 feet; once to beat the clouds a group bombed from 30,000. That's the effect of the turbos. Two-stage two-speed supercharged Merlins (or other) would have given similar altitude performance for the British heavies. I have a vague memory that at least one small group of B-17s dropped from close to 35,000 on one occasion, but that must have been very late war with the B-33 turbos. I've got the navigator log data for one B-24 crew's entire 35 mission tour in 1944-45, and the highest bombing altitude recorded (for the plane) is 29,000 feet. One run was at 28,000, another at 26,700, but the majority of runs were in the low 20s. For lightly defended targets they might drop down a few or even several thousand feet - the lowest recorded is 9,000 feet, with another at 12,000. Guy |
#156
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Keith Willshaw wrote:
"WalterM140" wrote in message ... Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered in height to minimise flak damage. That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could fly in the tight formations used by the B-17. It has more to do with the doctrine of the self defensing bomber that was adopted by the USAAF. You'll find that B-24's also flew in such formations. I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I shouldn't think as at high an altitude as the B-17. B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night. True but irrelevant since bomber command didnt fly defensive formations by day after 1941. I believe they did from 1944 on, but it was a somewhat looser formation than the US flew. The RAF apparently preferred to allow a little more room for minor evasive action. Guy |
#157
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I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2 at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger pilot saw. Walt BJ |
#158
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WalterM140 wrote:
No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go around, owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed development due to the crash of the prototype. "The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently. The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to faciliate mass production." --Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A Johnsen Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone 1942. Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low relatively late. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly 3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos, radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in, then they had to re-tool before they could produce them. snip 3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the ETO. That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it. But they did not. Can't push what you don't know you need, and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity for them to work out the bugs. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it. It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things more complicated, don't you know. But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17 bomber boxes met their match and were overborne. Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter of 1942/43. They should have. Why? The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to attack the heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and were inflicting only light to moderate casualties. We were still flying shallow penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) until January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the poor weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo tanks that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was possible. Production was very limited at the time. Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for P-38's the production could have been ramped up. Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s because they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was what it was. Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have been increased. And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single P-38 they could get. The MTO was the highest priority theater in late 1942 and most of 1943 (at least until after Salerno), so if any one was going to get them it was the MTO. Guadalcanal got a single squadron (339th) in December 1942 while that outcome was still in dispute, and the PTO wanted more. The ETO was well down the list, because there was no ground combat underway, and the base was safe. I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace any more than it was. I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it. Arnold was a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, who determined allocations after their respective governments had decided which theaters had priority. Throughout the period in question, the MTO had priority, and Arnold gave them first choice, often re-directing units which had originally been planned to go to the ETO. Eaker got what was left. Only after Salerno, when it became clear that the necessary air superiority required for D-Day had not yet been established, and the commanders started to relocate to the UK from the Med, did the ETO move to first priority. Then there's the extra training time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units operational/providing replacement pilots. That doesn't seem that big an issue to me. It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine on t/o. The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942. And for units trained from the start for multi-engine, that may be correct. But there's still the extra training time factor, and in 1943 you're talking about transitioning single-engine pilots to twins, if you want to crew these P-38s that are supposed to magically become available. The 55th's experience with hastly transitioned pilots was apparently less than wonderful. ibid p. 14 Yes, it might to pure hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14 Oct. '43. Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still made the (apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense from a logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective. Second Scheinfurt was late in the game. Sure. OTOH, it was entirely possible to write off Regensburg/Schweinfurt as everything going wrong that could go wrong (it did). It was hardly a typical mission, so Eaker probably felt that a sustained effort was necessary, with the large size force he believed was necessary to succeed. And of course, although he knew that the German fighters were inflicting damage on the bombers, he still believed that the bombers were badly attriting the fighters. Hence October 10th-14th. After that, there could be absolutely no doubt. Eaker was wrong, but he wanted to win just as much as anyone did. As one of the prime apostles of the very doctrine he was employing (Hansell being another), no one was in a better position to give it a full test. Guy |
#159
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WalterM140 wrote:
Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the P-38 was the best allied fighter. Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110. Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51, and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf 109 that may not have been as profitable. You're right about Galland. There was another high scoring German ace who spoke well of the P-38. OTOH, McFarland and Newton quote the Luftwaffe advice re the three US fighters they were facing over Germany. IIRR it was alongthe lines of "If P-51s, avoid always. If P-47s engage at low and medium altitudes, but avoid at high altitudes. Engage the P-38 anywhere, anytime." Which is odd, because at low/medium altitudes the P-38 was arguably superior to both the ME-109 and FW-190. It could out-turn either at slow speed, could probably out-sustain climb the FW-190A if not the ME-109, and didn't suffer from compressibility in the dive at those altitudes. Roll acceleration was bad, especially compared to the FW-190, but visibility and firepower were good to excellent. Galland had one of the toughest fights of his life against a P-38 flown by an ace, andwas lucky to get away unscathed, but that was the pilot more than the a/c. The P-38 was the first "energy" fighter. The top two Americans aces of the war did fly the thing, after all. And the results would likely have been the same if they'd flown the Corsair, P-47 or P-51. P-38's didn't have to dogfight with the Germans any more than it did the Japanese. The idea was to keep the Germans from massing and to keep the ME-110's out of the game. True, the type of fighter was less relevant than the range of the fighter. If the range was shorter than the Mustang, it was still adequate. Until the P-38J with LE tanks came in, the range was substantially the same as the P-47. Also, for a long time, there -were- no Mustangs. And no long-range P-38s, either. At least, not at ETO bomber escort altitudes. Drop tanks that you can't draw fuel from above 20,000 feet or so aren't much use in the ETO escort business. Guy |
#160
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Mike Williamson wrote:
bendel boy wrote: Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110. Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51, and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf 109 that may not have been as profitable. The P-38 was the first long range fighter the US produced, and had comparable or longer range than the P-51 throughout the entire war. Slightly less, I'll buy. Comparable or longer, no. As a quick exercise, look up the first Allied fighter escort mission to appear over Berlin... Uh huh, and these were J models with 410 gal. internal. (205 per engine), vs. the P-51B/D's (with aft tank) 289 gallons and lower drag. Also look up the airfield locations, and you'll note that a -38 had to fly quite a bit farther to fly a round trip to Berlin than a -51 did. snip Depends on the unit. The 55th and 20th at Nuthampstead and King's Cliffe were well west, but then so was the 4th at Debden and the 78th at Duxford, whether flying P-47s or P-51s. The 479th was at Wattisham, forward of the 4th and 78th, as were the 364th at Honington and the 55th after it moved to Wormingford. The 56th was just about the most forward fighter unit when they were at Halesworth, but moved south and a bit west to Boxted in 1944. Guy |
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