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#31
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 14:04:35 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote: The current ACES II seats are zero/zero (will get a good chute with zero forward velocity and zero altitude). It is generally felt that the parachute landing and wrong body position cause the compression fractures, not the ejection itself. The seat senses the actual altitude and attitude, and this determines when it separates, although manual separation is also an option. You're not supposed to land on your feet, regardless. ********************************* To add some comments about early ejections. I had the Zero lanyard hooked up. One end was connected to seat and other end to rip cord. Normally it was only connect under 5K on take off and landing (low speed). If you used it at high altitude and high speed it opened the chute immediately and you could blow some panels in canopy and tear up some of teh shroud lines. A few seconds after ejection the seat belt blew open and the butt snapper(we called it) pushed me out of the seat. When I left the seat the zero lanyard pulled the rip cord and chute opened and was a good chute (no shroud lines over canopy, etc). These were 24 Foot round chutes and there were four shroud lines (two on each side toward the rear) that you cut with ur survival knife. This changed the shape of the canopy and it picked up some forward velocity. You could then do a little steering of this forward velocity to help pick a landing spot. I landed facing down wind like the book said and made a poor parachute landing roll due to the poopy suit and other things I had on me. On the way down I pulled the bottle in seat pack and the dingy inflated and hung about 10 feet below me all the way done. Was picked up by a Danish chopper about 3 1/2 hours after ejection and taken to the air base where Doc examined me for injuries. The Aces seats are wonderful and are Zero Zero. Quit a few have ejected either on the ground or very low and survived. Some got some injuries like a broken leg or arm but that is much better than burning in the crash. Hope some of the these comments help explain some of the discussions that have been made on RAP. Big John |
#32
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 08:32:53 -0700 (PDT), Le Chaud Lapin
wrote: On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote: Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots. After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not fly. Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun intended). When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs. If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage (to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...??? I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000 aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek. This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did, similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they survived. Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at least not the pilots. Let's look at it another way. Let us suppose that no warnings existed at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were found, someone would suggest... "How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is wrong? Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes. "Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably say yes. For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman and Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-Accidents/d... Fly Smart By managing risk better? One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be here, and some engineer would have figured out the error in true vs indicated speed, and noted that pilots would have attempted rotation at a speed that might have resulted in a crash, and pilots would have been lauded for their attitude toward risk management...in the $1.4 billion aircraft. Also, given that it's a B-2, and not a $40,000 Tomahawk, I would think one would have a slightly higher expectation of pilot's attitude toward risk management...or not. If it seems that I am nit-picking at this topic, I am. The more I read, the more I am discovering that vast majority of crashes, if one looks only at the facts, has to do with some erroneous decision that human made somewhere, not the machine itself. A year ago, before I started all this, I would have expected it to be entirely the other way around, the idea being that, the pilot would know that if they do something really stupid, death is a possibility. Some of the errors that pilots make are....ahem...plane silly. Making mistakes is ok, as no one is perfect. The problem, I think, becomes systemic when the community as a whole develops tendency to reject blame. That is what I, a student pilot, see each time I open a magazine, or read online material. -Le Chaud Lapin- ************************************************ Le Chaud Lapin Some comments. High speed aborts on Runway many times cause bird to go off end and burn. If stopped on R/W the brakes probably catch fire from the heat generated in the brakes in the abort. Even with antiskid brakes the tires would probably be blown in the abort and the magnisum wheels burn very good. These brake fires has led to loss of the aircraft after abort. The warning light was not the "fire warning" light??? as I understand. It just showed a system problem. If no fire, I probably would have continued the take off as the lessor of two evils. Don't know when light came on. If just after breaking ground then trying to fly was the correct option. Some may disagree with me but we all have opinions and I wasn't in the cockpit on take off when decision to continue was made. You'all have a nice day. Big John |
#33
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 21:43:33 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote: I only had to consider ejection seriously once while over Alaska when we got a master caution. After reading the book, we discussed ejection parameters and the ejection call. The most important thing was that we were told to never land in a stream or river, since even with the LPU the silt would fill the flight suit and drag you under, not to mention that there was still around three feet of ice even in May. We dropped our live Mk 84's in a single pass over the range, and then flew back to an uneventful landing, with the equipment following. Never did find out what caused the master caution/flaps light to come on. Even in the late spring I wasn't too keen about spending a whole lot of time outdoors in AK without more gear than what came in the seat pan. Still, the ACES II is a lot more advanced than the old Martin Bakers. ************************************************* *********** Viperdoc My seat pre-dated even the Martin Baker. Sounds like you did right (What was ur bird?). Most emergencies give you time to make an evaluation of the situation before taking any serious action. With that said I had a good friend (ANG Sq Commander)lose and engine (fire) in a F-89 and was given priority to land. When on final an idiot took the runway without clearance and my friend went around and stayed in pattern. On downwind leg the bird blew up and both he and his RO were killed. I hate to keep telling these stories about the accidents I am aware of and was close to. Ruins my day to bring those memories of yore back ( A nice day. Big John |
#34
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On 2008-06-08, Le Chaud Lapin wrote:
If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage (to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...??? But we don't know that, we don't even know when the master caution illuminated (at least, nothing I've read says when it illuminated). We know very few facts at this stage and it's all speculation. As an example, if the master caution illuminates *after* V1 has been reached you do not abort; at this stage you're committed. Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at least not the pilots. But we don't know that yet. The crash has to be investigated to find out who or what was at fault, and like most aviation crashes there will be an entire accident chain rather than one single screwup that had the results they did. Simply pointing fingers at people before the investigation has turned up the facts is unhelpful and unproductive. -- From the sunny Isle of Man. Yes, the Reply-To email address is valid. |
#35
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Mon, 9 Jun 2008 11:37:05 +0000 (UTC), Dylan Smith
wrote in : we don't even know when the master caution illuminated (at least Actually, there is mention of the computer warning at about the two minute point in the narration of the video clip: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZB-iziY2Bw&fmt=18 "... were warned by a Master Caution Light and Flight Control Systems Caution 19 seconds after brake release, while on takeoff roll. They observed air-data faults, but those faults resolved themselves within six seconds, and the caution was rescinded at approximately 120 knots indicated. But the airspeed numbers were wrong. When the pilots thought they had 158 knots, they actually had 124. With the false airspeed readings and faulty system that was exaggerating their control inputs, the pilots never stood a chance. ... " The main USAF B-2 page: http://www.acc.af.mil/accspecialrepo...ationboard.asp http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-056.pdf Executive Summary Aircraft Accident Investigation B-2A, T/N 89-0127 Andersen Air Force Base, Guam 23 February 2008 Page six of this document is obviously the source of the commentary in the video: http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-054.pdf Summary Of Facts At the bottom of page 17 it states: Within the B-2 community a defacto decision speed of 100 KIAS is utilized to determine whether to abort a takeoff or to continue into the air with an error, fault, or failure. In addition B-2 pilots distinguish between serious concerns meriting an aggressive decision to abort a takeoff presented by a red Master Warning light, and yellow Master Caution lights that are "analyzed" prior to taking action. Since the yellow Master Caution, rather than a red Master Warning, occurred after accelerating past 100 KIAS, the MC did not reflexively initiate an abort.... Here's the USAF opinion on not aborting the takeoff: http://www.acc.af.mil/shared/media/d...080605-058.pdf Statement Of Opinion MP1 asked Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) for a takeoff/abort decision. At approximately 120 KIAS, MP2 called "continue takeoff" as all caution indications had cleared and the MA was above the briefed 100 KIAS "decision speed." Decision speed is the speed at which pilots decide to continue the takeoff or abort. ... Video: Stealth Bomber Crashes http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/0...stealth-b.html http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/06/06/cra...ml#cnnSTCVideo |
#36
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
Dylan Smith wrote in
: On 2008-06-08, Le Chaud Lapin wrote: If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage (to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. But if you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...??? But we don't know that, we don't even know when the master caution illuminated (at least, nothing I've read says when it illuminated). We know very few facts at this stage and it's all speculation. As an example, if the master caution illuminates *after* V1 has been reached you do not abort; at this stage you're committed. Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution meant in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of redundant systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes, bull**** items on the master caution system are surpressed during the takeoff roll, however, that may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of time in the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted takeoff thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly bombers, or if they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I can ask, but even if I knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes real fast, over 300 knots" Bertie |
#37
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
"Bertie the Bunyip" wrote in message ... Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution meant in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of redundant systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes, bull**** items on the master caution system are surpressed during the takeoff roll, however, that may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of time in the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted takeoff thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly bombers, or if they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I can ask, but even if I knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes real fast, over 300 knots" Bertie Well then, just make up an answer as usual. |
#38
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Sun, 8 Jun 2008 19:44:02 -0500, "Viperdoc"
wrote in : I have seen at least one guy with a compression fracture after an ejection. Is it common for ejection injuries to result in permanent disability? |
#39
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
"Maxwell" luv2^fly99@cox.^net wrote in
: "Bertie the Bunyip" wrote in message ... Well, in addition to that we don't even know what the master caution meant in this instance. It could just mean that one of a number of redundant systems is malfunctioning. In most modern airplanes, bull**** items on the master caution system are surpressed during the takeoff roll, however, that may not be the case in the military, where they may prioritise things differently because of a different operating environment, i.e. people shooting at you. They also don't fly much but spend a great deal of time in the sim, so they may have a different POV on that whole aborted takeoff thing anyway. Most of the ex-mil guys I fly with didn't fly bombers, or if they did they were anteeks, so I don't know anyone I can ask, but even if I knew one he'd only be able to pass minimal info anyway. "Yep, goes real fast, over 300 knots" Bertie Well then, just make up an answer as usual. Nope. Bertie |
#40
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B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Crash Video
On Jun 8, 10:32*am, Le Chaud Lapin wrote:
On Jun 8, 9:51*am, Clark wrote: Most SOPs I am familiar with for heavy aircraft tell you to keep flying if a Master Caution illuminates on takeoff AFTER 80-100 knots. After 80-100 knots, hi speed aborts are done for Fires, Engine Failures, Windshear and if the PIC believes the airplane will not fly. Hmm....I think this sends the wrong signal to aspiring pilots (no pun intended). When I was reading the Risk Management section of my Jeppesen book, it specifically states that one of the major reasons that accidents happens is that pilots choose to ignore the warning signs. If you are saying that a high-speed abort would have done more damage (to the aircraft) than to continue to fly, that's one thing. *But if you are saying that it is ok for $1.4 billion machine to continue to takeoff simple becase it is more convenient than aborting...??? That is exactly the point. The pilots had a Caution, not a Warning. They did not ignore it but prioritized that Aviating was the primary task at hand, vs digging out a checklist rolling down the runway for a Yellow Caution light. This was an ambiguous cue when you look back at it with 20/20 hindsight. If they had decided in the design process that this could cause loss of life and/or property, it would have been a big, fat red Warning light with associated non-normal procedures and Warning notes. If you do some rooting around on google you will find the ends of runways littered with the hulls of airplanes that have aborted at high speed and high weight. I am sure that if I were to go to my flight instructor, and tell him that, from now on, if any warning lights come on in his sub-$400,000 aircraft, I will use my own judgement during an abortable take off to decide whether the warning is serious enough to abort, he'd shriek. Warning yes, Caution no. In a multi-engine aircraft, say, 757 on short runway with a engine fire light, better to go flying and fight fire airborne with suppression system than end up at bottom of ravine broken in two. Every aircraft plus every takeoff is diffeent, your instructor will help build your Assessment=Behavior=Consequence=Decision skills. Systems do not always fail in ways that designers envisioned. i had a hydraulic Caution light on a Huey once. The problem wasactually with the Master Caution and Warning system (erroneous indication), not the Hydraulics system. I had enough systems knowledge and supporting information to make an assessment, which was to land normally. The emrgency checklist would have had me doing a high-speed run-on landing, not so difficult but I would have toasted the skids. Your instructor will also spend some time going over the difference between Notes, Cautions and Warnings. Plus the fact that you can deviate from procedures if, in your estimation as Pilot In Command, the situation warrants. That's also in the US FARs. This crew had no idications to warrant an abort. After a certain threshold they are biased to continue and that is what they did, similar to Comair 5191. Blaming the pilots does not "un-crash" this aircraft. There are system issues to be corrected here. I'm glad they survived. Blame has to be placed somewhere, or shared, right? If blame is not placed, it starts to give the impression that no one is at fault, at least not the pilots. There are deficiencies in the system that can be improved. Blame is a culture issue and litigous society, and it makes some people feel better. Things I would look at here are why did ejection seats injure crew and the fact that moisture in the system started this whole sequence. The crew were the ufortunate ones to discover the deficiency. And is in most cases through history, the messenger gets shot. Let's look at it another way. *Let us suppose that no warnings existed at all in the B-2 Spirit, that everything looked normal right before ejection. There would be a thorough investigation, meeting rooms filled with technologists and top brass, and once the cause were found, someone would suggest... "How hard is it to add a warning light so that if moisture clogs the system, the computer at least tells the pilots that something is wrong? *Can you do that?" They engineers would probably say yes. "Would you pilots find that useful?" Again, the pilots would probably say yes. For a very good read on time compressed decision making and concurrent task management, get a copy of "The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents" by Dismukes, Berman and Loukopouloshttp://www.amazon.com/Limits-Expertise-Rethinking-Airline-Accidents/d... Fly Smart By managing risk better? One way to look at is...if they had aborted, the plane would still be here, and some engineer would have figured out the error in true vs indicated speed, and noted that pilots would have attempted rotation at a speed that might have resulted in a crash, and pilots would have been lauded for their attitude toward risk management...in the $1.4 billion aircraft. The pilots had all of the clues needed to rotate, just as they had done thousands of times. Also, given that it's a B-2, and not a $40,000 Tomahawk, I would think one would have a slightly higher expectation of pilot's attitude toward risk management...or not. If it seems that I am nit-picking at this topic, I am. *The more I read, the more I am discovering that vast majority of crashes, if one looks only at the facts, has to do with some erroneous decision that human made somewhere, not the machine itself. *A year ago, before I started all this, I would have expected it to be entirely the other way around, the idea being that, the pilot would know that if they do something really stupid, death is a possibility. Some of the errors that pilots make are....ahem...plane silly. Humans design airplanes and sensors. Is that a Human Factor or Material Factor. Trick question. All mishaps are caused by Human Factors. Making mistakes is ok, as no one is perfect. The problem, I think, becomes systemic when the community as a whole develops tendency to reject blame. That is what I, a student pilot, see each time I open a magazine, or read online material. So maybe there is something behind that, if you are seeing it everywhere? WE are trying o fix things and make families happy, not make lawyers happy -Le Chaud Lapin- |
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