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#81
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
Paul F Austin wrote:
"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message ... (Harry Andreas) wrote: :In article , wrote: : : (Harry Andreas) wrote: : : :In article , "Keith W" : wrote: : : : : "Harry Andreas" wrote in message : : ... : : In article , : : wrote: : : : : Note that this is sort of the same approach that lost Germany the war. : : Everything was hand-finished to very high standards, while us sloppy : : folks cranked out ten times as many tanks as they could because we let : : the tolerances be looser and eliminated a lot of the skilled : : 'touch-labor' in the finishing stages. : : : : Hmmm. I wouldn't ride that horse too far. : : : : Ever see a 1944 built Walther P-38, or Waffenfabrik Mauser? : : They didn't spend nearly any time finishing them as compared to : : the early war versions. : : : : : : The German record was very mixed : : : :Keith, I hear ya, and the other posters who have said similar things, : :but I still object to Mr McCall's statement that, in Germany, : :"Everything was hand-finished to very high standards". : :That's just not true. As you point out, it was very selective, : : Yes. The big ticket items (which was what I meant by "everything", : since that is what wars are actually fought and won with) got all the : hand finishing. Small stuff and aircraft designed specifically to be : cheap and 'throw away' generally weren't. : : So object and be damned to you. : ude, you can't say "Everything" and then get mad when someone :disagrees with you. Everything means everything, not some things... Dude, I don't "get mad". It's only Usenet. Try and rent a clue... "Everything was hand-finished..." wasn't the issue with German production. Read Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won". The Wehrmacht's besetting sin was not demanding superior (and useless) manufacturing standards. The main problems were 1. refusal to stop changing designs and 2. not fully mobilizing for production until 'way too late. The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev. They had lots of problems From the strategic bombing survey Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards. Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient." Vince |
#82
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
Vince wrote:
[snip] Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. One short war = short war Lots of short wars = long time at war. Weapons and ammunition used need replacing. Blair and Bush need this explaining. Andrew Swallow |
#83
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
Vince wrote:
Paul J. Adam wrote: Opinions vary, to be honest (with a consistent grouping around "very good", to be sure). Read Max Hastings' "Overlord" and you'll marvel at how the far-superior Wehrmacht won the battle of Normandy (or at least, be bemused how they could ever have been dislodged). once we had landed in Normandy (an incredible feat to be sure) we had overwhelming strength at any point. Not really, no: we were landing and supplying forces across beaches, subject to the caprices of Channel weather (which could be, and was, very nasty), and pitting inexperienced troops against veterans on terrain they'd had time to prepare. Certainly the men who seized the Odon crossings, held off counter-attacks by elements of six panzer divisions, drew in the German strategic reserves, and withstood the attacks that were supposed to break them, would disagree that they had "overwhelming strength", but their success suggests that the Wehrmacht had similar difficulties attacking in Normandy countryside as anyone else (it was the inability of the Germans to destroy 15th Scots, despite throwing in their entire reserve, that led Rommel on 29 June to propose a fighting retreat to the Seine) Flipping it around, though - if you can't make an attacker's life an expensive and painful misery at places like Monte Cassino or the Normandy bocage, what use are you? And when the Germans were faced with assaulting an extensively-prepared defence - such as First Alamein or even more dramatically Kursk, they failed too. the Kursk was simply overwhelmingly strong. Perhaps a maxim of excellent soldiers is "don't attack where the enemy has built seven layers of defensive lines precisely in order to defeat your plan"? While the Germans were good at "mission command" at lower ranks, their commanders - with a few exceptions - ranged from spineless to clueless. Mind you, when a senior Wehrmacht officer admitted to an inconvenient truth, he could find himself out of a job very fast (cf von Rundstedt in July 1944, telling Keitel that Germany's strategic options in the West consisted of 'Make peace, you fools!' and being promptly replaced by von Kluge) which has to be included in any assessment of their ability. -- He thinks too much: such men are dangerous. Julius Caesar I:2 Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#84
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
"Vince" wrote in message ... Paul F Austin wrote: The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev. They had lots of problems From the strategic bombing survey Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards. Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient." It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps were....empty. Oops. |
#85
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin"
wrote: "Vince" wrote in message ... Paul F Austin wrote: The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev. They had lots of problems From the strategic bombing survey Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards. Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient." It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps were....empty. Oops. And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent to winning the war. |
#86
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
Jack Love wrote:
On Sun, 7 May 2006 17:28:37 -0400, "Paul F Austin" wrote: "Vince" wrote in message ... Paul F Austin wrote: The Wehrmacht couldn't keep their hand off the production designs, making changes constantly. It made production inefficient and as important, made logistics a nightmare. Mobilization didn't happen until Speer was given overall responsiblity for production. The first years of the war (1939-1942), when Germany had a real chance to win by knocking the USSR out of the war saw single-shift production and the largest factory units (Adam Opel and Volkswagen) only peripherally contributing to war production. As a side note, when the Barbarossa attack went in, the Wehrmacht had litterally hundreds of types of trucks and motorcycles in use. Try getting the right carburetor kit for your broke down truck on the outskirts of Kiev. They had lots of problems From the strategic bombing survey Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards. Germany's early commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war. Nearly all German sources agree that the hope for a quick victory lasted long after the short war became a long one. Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, rationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the previous controls. A threefold increase in armament production occurred under his direction but the increase cannot be considered a testament to the efficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests the degree of industrial undermobilization in the earlier years. An excellent case can be made that throughout the war top government management in Germany was not efficient." It's remarkable how many "short wars" overstay their welcome: The US Civil War and WWI come to mind, particularly the effective cease fire on the Western Front after a few weeks of combat because the artillery dumps were....empty. Oops. And one particular piece of shortsightedness that the Germans seem to have been guilty of: thinking that 'winning the battle' is equivalent to winning the war. They're hardly the only ones to suffer from that misconception (cough). Guy |
#87
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
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#88
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F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
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