MDW Overrun - SWA

Jim Macklin wrote:

But mistakes happen, see the picture at
http://boortz.com/nuze/index.html for Friday the 9th, check
the archive.

http://boortz.com/more/funny/redneck_pics_carjack.html

That is a real jack, did you check the optical illusion link
on the homepage?


"Darrel Toepfer" wrote in message
. ..
| Jim Macklin wrote:
|
| But mistakes happen, see the picture at
| http://boortz.com/nuze/index.html for Friday the 9th,
check
| the archive.
|
| http://boortz.com/more/funny/redneck_pics_carjack.html

Jim Macklin wrote:
That is a real jack, did you check the optical illusion link
on the homepage?

You mean the one about "FairTax" or "Boortzapalooza"...

This is all speculation, that is all true. Something that bugs me is
that
the ILS for 31C requires RVR of 4000 or 3/4 of mile visibility. The
METAR
from just before the accident pegged visibility at 1/2 mile. Seems to me
that the approach shouldn't have even started.

Well, for starters, prevailing visibility and a specific runway's RVR
can often differ by quite a bit. That's why RVR is controlling for an
airliner. It also changes minute by minute, and the hourly ATIS isn't
at all a good indicator of what the RVR was when that airplane landed.

Yep, thanks for that. The hourly METAR was:

KMDW 090053Z 10011KT 1/2SM SN FZFG BKN004 OVC014 M03/M05 A3006 RMK AO2
SLP196 R31C/4500FT SNINCR 1/10 P0000 T10331050 $

Showing the field visibilty as 1/2-mile and 31C's RVR as 4,500 feet -
greater than minimum.

The FAA accident report has the following for the weather:

0115 11007KT 1/2SM SN FZFG VV003 M04/M05 A3006 R31C/4500V500

This doesn't appear properly formatted, as with a V separator, it's supposed
to be minimum and maximum. It's possible that it's supposed to be a minimum
of 4,500 and a maximum of 5,000 feet, and the extra zero was dropped off.
Or it could be that visibility ranged from 500 feet to 4,500 feet. That I
find less likely.

It'll be interesting to get the CVR and ATC transcripts and find out what
the pilots were told.

Second, Southwest's 737-700 airplanes have a heads-up display that lets
them use 3000 RVR on that runway at MDW.

Interesting! Do you any additional info on that?

In article , Charles Oppermann
wrote:

The FAA accident report has the following for the weather:

0115 11007KT 1/2SM SN FZFG VV003 M04/M05 A3006 R31C/4500V500

This doesn't appear properly formatted, as with a V separator, it's supposed
to be minimum and maximum. It's possible that it's supposed to be a minimum
of 4,500 and a maximum of 5,000 feet, and the extra zero was dropped off.

That's incorrect -- it's not minimum to maximum. It's 4500, variable
to 500. In the ops specs for every airline operation with which I'm
familiar, including my current 121 airline, the "variable" portion is
advisory only. So as far as weather for starting the approach, it was
4500.

It'll be interesting to get the CVR and ATC transcripts and find out what
the pilots were told.

Yep. If the tower gave them a more up-to-date RVR (which is pretty
likely), that's controlling over the sequence weather you posted above.

Second, Southwest's 737-700 airplanes have a heads-up display that lets
them use 3000 RVR on that runway at MDW.

Interesting! Do you any additional info on that?

I don't have much info beyond that, specific to SWA. The HUD is an
option on the next-generation 737s, and many of SWA's are so-equipped.
It's a real safety enhancement in low visibility. (That should also
discredit the notion that the airline skimps on safety equipment -- it
doesn't.)

Here's a picture of it in one of their cockpits:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/868375/L/

Matt Whiting wrote:
Skywise wrote:
Matt Whiting wrote in news:ZA_mf.4154$lb.326571
@news1.epix.net:

Snipola

I'll make landings like that from time to time when alone, but I'll
never carry passengers into a situation where there is no margin for error.


Which is scary, considering in this accident the only fatality
wasn't even in the plane.

Yes, they were truly fortunate that this wasn't much worse. Had they
hit a large truck, or something more solid, the damage to the airplane,
crew and pax could have been substantial. Fortunately, that didn't happen.

There are oil and gasoline terminals in the area of Central Ave. &
I-55, so
it could have been one large fire-ball. And news reports of the SWA
pilot
debriefing mentioned issues with the Captain have problems engaging the

thrust reversers, the co-pilot had to "force" them.

JG


Matt

wrote:

There are oil and gasoline terminals in the area of Central Ave. &
I-55, so it could have been one large fire-ball.

I-55 is a LONG way from the departure end of 31C -- a little over a
mile. Remember, this was a landing accident, and they didn't even make
it across S. Central Ave.


...pilot debriefing mentioned issues with the Captain have problems
engaging the thrust reversers, the co-pilot had to "force" them.

That happens when the struts aren't compressed and/or you have no wheel
spin-up.

That night at MDW was the place for a crew who had cut their aviation
teeth on Great Lakes winter ops. The name "SOUTH WEST" doesn't paint
that kind of a picture for me.

WRT: Charles Oppermann's Blog:

http://spaces.msn.com/members/chuckop/

"Chicago Tribune: Midway radios crackled warnings"

The Chicago Tribune is reporting today that controllers and pilots
were concerned about the choice of runway 31C and the unavailability
of runway 13C, which would have been preferable given the wind.

[....]

I'm amazed that the Chicago Tribune authors would suggest that 13C
would be more preferable because it slopes upward by 5 feet from one
end to the other. I think it's a very minor benefit. That kind of
detail, while ignoring the actual length of the runway is curious to
me.


The five foot difference in elevation would not bother me much. The
tailwind incurred by operating on 31C rather than turning it into a
headwind on 13C, given all the other circumstances, would bother me a lot.

There comes a time when somebody in the airplane has to make a decision
unencumbered by concerns for schedule, cost, or convenience. When you
do, you can never know whether doing so made a difference, but you will
always know it was the right thing to do. Every Thanksgiving (and the
other 364 &1/4 days of the year) I give thanks that almost all of our
decisions are correct. But when we have to wait to know that until after
the fact, it's the same as rolling the dice.


Jack

That's incorrect -- it's not minimum to maximum. It's 4500, variable
to 500. In the ops specs for every airline operation with which I'm
familiar, including my current 121 airline, the "variable" portion is
advisory only. So as far as weather for starting the approach, it was
4500.

Hmmm, I was going by the various METAR decoders I have and a look at the
FAA's Aviation Weather Services publication (AC 00-45E). A detailed
breakdown at the following link:
http://www.met.tamu.edu/class/METAR/metar-pg8-RVR.html

This is academic parsing, and may not reflect actual practice.

I don't have much info beyond that, specific to SWA. The HUD is an
option on the next-generation 737s, and many of SWA's are so-equipped.
It's a real safety enhancement in low visibility. (That should also
discredit the notion that the airline skimps on safety equipment -- it
doesn't.)
Here's a picture of it in one of their cockpits:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/868375/L/

Very cool, thanks. Since it only exists on the captain's side, I wonder
what the CRM procedure is to shift roles if the first officer is the Pilot
Flying.

Thanks for the link.

On Mon, 12 Dec 2005 19:05:33 -0800, "Charles Oppermann"
wrote:

I don't have much info beyond that, specific to SWA. The HUD is an
option on the next-generation 737s, and many of SWA's are so-equipped.
It's a real safety enhancement in low visibility. (That should also
discredit the notion that the airline skimps on safety equipment -- it
doesn't.)
Here's a picture of it in one of their cockpits:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/868375/L/

Very cool, thanks. Since it only exists on the captain's side, I wonder
what the CRM procedure is to shift roles if the first officer is the Pilot
Flying.

I think the OPSPEC generally requires the captain to handle landing if
the weather is that bad.

Jack wrote:
wrote:

There are oil and gasoline terminals in the area of Central Ave. &
I-55, so it could have been one large fire-ball.

I-55 is a LONG way from the departure end of 31C -- a little over a
mile. Remember, this was a landing accident, and they didn't even make
it across S. Central Ave.

But tanker trucks in the intersection were a possibility, 55th st. is a
good alternative
when I-55 is gridlocked.


That night at MDW was the place for a crew who had cut their aviation
teeth on Great Lakes winter ops. The name "SOUTH WEST" doesn't paint
that kind of a picture for me.

They serve SLC, DTW, BUF, RNO and many cities in the Northeast, so
snow is nothing new. And the crew was based in BWI, plenty of snow and
freezing rain.


The Chicago Tribune is reporting today that controllers and pilots
were concerned about the choice of runway 31C and the unavailability
of runway 13C, which would have been preferable given the wind.

Aren't 31C and 13C physically the same? Just landing into the southeast
on 13C
as opposed to landing on 31C, into the northwest and with a tail wind.

JG