IGC-approval levels for some types of Flight Recorders

Marc Ramsey wrote:
Greg Arnold wrote:

We are told that the old standards aren't strict enough, but has there
ever been an instance where someone used those lax old standards to
fake a world record claim?

Good question, how would we know? This is what we know: a) at least one
of the flight recorders meeting the pre-97 standards has had its
security broken as an academic exercise, and b) if someone used those
pre-97 standards to fake a world record claim, we would only find out if
there was some other reasonably obvious problem.

Marc

For a faked world record claim to have any plausibility, it would have
to be done by an excellent pilot on a day with absolutely spectacular
soaring conditions. Why would an excellent pilot fake such a flight,
since if the fake was discovered it would destroy his reputation?
Further, on such a spectacular day, other pilots would be flying, and
might notice that the claimant was nowhere near the places he claimed to
be, and that his flight was inconsistent with observed conditions (e.g.,
he recorded a climb where other pilots only saw sink).

Also, now with the internet and software such as SeeYou, any record
claim will be analyzed in detail on many computers -- I don't see how
you could construct a fake flight that could withstand such scrutiny.

I think we need only minimal standards, provided all flight logs are
posted on the internet for all to see. I suspect the people who make
the rules are in love with the technology, and this is blinding them to
reality.

Greg Arnold wrote:
For a faked world record claim to have any plausibility, it would have
to be done by an excellent pilot on a day with absolutely spectacular
soaring conditions. Why would an excellent pilot fake such a flight,
since if the fake was discovered it would destroy his reputation?
Further, on such a spectacular day, other pilots would be flying, and
might notice that the claimant was nowhere near the places he claimed to
be, and that his flight was inconsistent with observed conditions (e.g.,
he recorded a climb where other pilots only saw sink).

Perhaps. But the key characteristic of record breaking flights is that
you go farther and faster than anyone else. So, why would you expect
any witnesses during the majority of the flight? If one pilot finds a
10 knot climb in an area where others only find sink, is that not, in
fact, what distinguishes someone capable of a world record flight from
the rest of us?

Also, now with the internet and software such as SeeYou, any record
claim will be analyzed in detail on many computers -- I don't see how
you could construct a fake flight that could withstand such scrutiny.

My canonical example is simply scaling up an actual flight by some
amount. At what point would it become obvious that it was faked, 2, 4,
8, 10%? Can you prove it beyond a reasonable doubt? What about taking
a flight that was made at some point in the past, and changing the
dates? Or changing a declaration post flight?

I think we need only minimal standards, provided all flight logs are
posted on the internet for all to see. I suspect the people who make
the rules are in love with the technology, and this is blinding them to
reality.

I think most of the people who write the rules love glider technology
far more than computer technology. They listen to people that they hope
understand the computer things better than they do, and try to make
rules that make things convenient for the pilots, while maintaining some
level of integrity in the system. Then again, maybe they just do these
things to annoy people on r.a.s...

Marc

Marc Ramsey wrote:
Greg Arnold wrote:


Also, now with the internet and software such as SeeYou, any record
claim will be analyzed in detail on many computers -- I don't see how
you could construct a fake flight that could withstand such scrutiny.


My canonical example is simply scaling up an actual flight by some
amount. At what point would it become obvious that it was faked, 2, 4,
8, 10%?

If you can get a world record by scaling a flight up by 10%, you had a
spectacular flight to begin with -- the flight of the year, and perhaps
of the decade. And scale up a flight by too much, and people would
notice discrepancies -- such as high thermalling speeds but small circles.

Can you prove it beyond a reasonable doubt? What about taking
a flight that was made at some point in the past, and changing the
dates? Or changing a declaration post flight?

That won't give you a record.

In article ,
Marc Ramsey wrote:

My canonical example is simply scaling up an actual flight by some
amount. At what point would it become obvious that it was faked, 2, 4,
8, 10%? Can you prove it beyond a reasonable doubt?

Unless it's over dead flat land, very easily, by comparing the track
taken and the location of thermals to geographic features (obviously use
of ridge is even easier).

--
Bruce | 41.1670S | \ spoken | -+-
Hoult | 174.8263E | /\ here. | ----------O----------

Marc Ramsey wrote:
Greg Arnold wrote:


Also, now with the internet and software such as SeeYou, any record
claim will be analyzed in detail on many computers -- I don't see how
you could construct a fake flight that could withstand such scrutiny.


My canonical example is simply scaling up an actual flight by some
amount. At what point would it become obvious that it was faked, 2, 4,
8, 10%?

Scaling up distances will result in obvious anomalies if the track is
compared to the topography. And scaling up speeds will also result in
problems -- such as high thermalling speeds but small circles. Also, if
you can get a world record by scaling a flight up by 10%, you had a
spectacular flight to begin with -- the flight of the year, and perhaps
of the decade.

Bruce Hoult wrote:
In article ,
Marc Ramsey wrote:

My canonical example is simply scaling up an actual flight by some
amount. At what point would it become obvious that it was faked, 2, 4,
8, 10%? Can you prove it beyond a reasonable doubt?

Unless it's over dead flat land, very easily, by comparing the track
taken and the location of thermals to geographic features (obviously use
of ridge is even easier).

Well, I could point to plenty of my flights where the cloud streets
basically meander around with with seeming little relationship to the
very prominent ridge lines (wind out here does strange things to
convection), but there really isn't much point. Perhaps if you guys
would get off your duffs, get yourselves appointed as IGC delegates and
GFAC members, and change these silly rules, then I wouldn't have to
waste any more of my time coming up with bogus justifications...

Marc

Unless it's over dead flat land, very easily, by comparing the track
taken and the location of thermals to geographic features (obviously
use of ridge is even easier).


Well, I could point to plenty of my flights where the cloud streets
basically meander around with with seeming little relationship to the
very prominent ridge lines (wind out here does strange things to
convection), but there really isn't much point. Perhaps if you guys
would get off your duffs, get yourselves appointed as IGC delegates and
GFAC members, and change these silly rules, then I wouldn't have to
waste any more of my time coming up with bogus justifications...

Now you are making sense! Not sure about getting off my duff, though.


Marc

T o d d P a t t i s t wrote:
Ian Strachan wrote:

Which cryptographic algorithms are considered ``equivalent'' to
RSA?
What is the minimum key length prescribed?
DSA for one,
On key length, for a new type of recorder for IGC-approval for "all
flights" he answer is a private key of at least 512 bits.

This all seems to me to be roughly like putting a bank vault
door on a house with windows. Yes, the door is better, but
the thief's going to come through the window.

Public/private key cryptographic algorithms work like this:
Alice has a secret key and uses it to send a message to Bob.
Bob wants to make sure the message actually came from
Alice, so he uses the public key to decrypt and verify. The
relationship between the public key and the private key is
such that you can't determine the private key from the
public key. Thus, Bob can be sure that the message came
from someone who had the secret key, i.e., Alice and not the
bad guy Snake, who does not have the secret key.

In the world of gliders, Alice is the Flight Recorder and
has the secret key. Bob is the FAI and wants to make sure
the message is really from the FR. The pilot submitting the
igc trace is our Snake! However, since Snake owns and
controls Alice (it's his flight recorder) all he has to do
is open up Alice and get or use the secret key. I just
don't see how you can stop this by going from 128 bit to 256
bit to 512 bit keys. Regardless of length, Snake owns and
controls Alice.

Don't forget that Alice has a Chastity Belt!!! . ie a physical security
switch wich will void the security of the Flight Recorder when the case
is opened.

At 09:30 18 March 2005, Mottley wrote:

T o d d P a t t i s t wrote:
Ian Strachan wrote:

Which cryptographic algorithms are considered ``equivalent''
to
RSA?
What is the minimum key length prescribed?
DSA for one,
On key length, for a new type of recorder for IGC-approval
for 'all
flights' he answer is a private key of at least 512
bits.

This all seems to me to be roughly like putting a
bank vault
door on a house with windows. Yes, the door is better,
but
the thief's going to come through the window.

Public/private key cryptographic algorithms work like
this:
Alice has a secret key and uses it to send a message
to Bob.
Bob wants to make sure the message actually came from
Alice, so he uses the public key to decrypt and verify.
The
relationship between the public key and the private
key is
such that you can't determine the private key from
the
public key. Thus, Bob can be sure that the message
came
from someone who had the secret key, i.e., Alice and
not the
bad guy Snake, who does not have the secret key.

In the world of gliders, Alice is the Flight Recorder
and
has the secret key. Bob is the FAI and wants to make
sure
the message is really from the FR. The pilot submitting
the
igc trace is our Snake! However, since Snake owns
and
controls Alice (it's his flight recorder) all he has
to do
is open up Alice and get or use the secret key. I
just
don't see how you can stop this by going from 128
bit to 256
bit to 512 bit keys. Regardless of length, Snake
owns and
controls Alice.

Don't forget that Alice has a Chastity Belt!!! . ie
a physical security
switch wich will void the security of the Flight Recorder
when the case
is opened.



So let's say Snake is rich enough to afford two Alices.
He can sacrifice one Alice to find out all about where
the switch is, he now knows how to defeat the switch,
by cutting the case if necessary and has a nice clean
case from Alice 1 with which to rebuild Alice 2 having
done the dirty deed.

At 10:30 18 March 2005, Andrew Warbrick wrote:
So let's say Snake is rich enough to afford two Alices.
He can sacrifice one Alice to find out all about where
the switch is, he now knows how to defeat the switch,
by cutting the case if necessary and has a nice clean
case from Alice 1 with which to rebuild Alice 2 having
done the dirty deed.

and therein lies the problem with relying on this type
of security alone. The strength of RSA is that the
private (secret) key cannot be deduced from the public
key, well not easily. The weakness is that once you
have got the private (secret) key then all the units
that use that key are obsolete. Whoops. So if snake
gets the private key and publishes it on here then
all the units that use that key are insecure.

What are the OOs doing in relation to the false claims,
are they in on it?