3 lives lost

On Sun, 2 Jan 2005 07:52:51 -0500, Peter R. wrote:

I have taken up several "first flight" people and in every conversation
we have, from day one right up to the drive to the airport, I discuss
the possibility that we might no be able to make the flight due to
weather or an unexpected maintenance issue.

I have been honored with the same, to taking first time people who have
never left terra firma, much less a single engine.

I have not been "weathered out" as I always do it on a spur of a moment
rather then plan a week ahead. Even on the spur of the moment, I take the
first time passenger in the FBO and through the weather briefing motions,
so they can see what preparation is needed before each and every flight.
This also helps me verify my go decision.

I always have the first time passenger go through preflight, and tell them
in plain English....

"The plane goes through a "three point" inspection (outside inspection,
inside inspection and an engine check) and if anything fails, we don't fly.
I'd much rather dissapoint you while we are on the ground, then find out
something is wrong in the air."

Allen

tony roberts wrote:

You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'


That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
play the odds with another persons life.

True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
doing this. None of us were there to see the weather at the time of
takeoff or know what else was going on. I don't know many pilots who
would intentionally put their passengers at risk, but sometimes it
happens. Never having had a crash, I don't know what a typical lead-in
scenario is and many pilots who crash don't live to tell us what they
were seeing and thinking.


Matt

nrp wrote:

Gene (and others too)

Not being an instructor but a 42 year Pvt Instrument (no longer current
by a long ways) -

In biennials, in your opinions, what fraction of the experienced (say
over 10 years experience) pvt-onlys are instrument competent (not
necessarily legal) when confronted by a sudden loss of visibility?

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.

For that matter - what fraction of experienced instrument people could
make that same rapid transistion to the gages?

You raise two interesting questions. I'm not a CFI or DE either, just
an instrument rated private pilot (who has passed the commercial written
recently though! :-) ) with 26 years of flying history.

I personally don't think many non-instrument pilots can handle
unexpected IMC. In fact, even many instrument rated pilots aren't
current and proficient enough to handle it. Also, I think there is a
pyschological "switch" that must be made even for instrument pilots when
encountering marginal conditions. You have to make a decision to
abandon your attempt to remain visual and go onto instruments full time.
I think the really dangerous part is trying to switch back and forth
and keeping hoping that you'll return to visual. I think this can trap
even proficient instrument pilots.


Matt

Jay Honeck wrote:

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come
back another time?


Awful, awful news.

As a newly minted private pilot, I had a similar opportunity to give a young
lad and his father their first airplane ride. As we pulled the rental plane
out of the hangar, the wind began to pick up substantially, and the sky
became covered with a low, scuddy layer.

Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was tremendous.
The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the wind direction,
and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan. If we were even
going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...

...and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

Yes, but not nearly as sad as being the cause of the kid's funeral. As
you said, you made the right choice.


Matt

wrote:

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

You sound like my kind of instructor. My instrument instructor was a
real pain also, but I appreciate every minute of it now. Almost every
training flight beyond the intial time of learning the basics of flight
by instruments was partial panel from takeoff to touchdown. I told my
DE that the check ride was the first time in months that I'd seen the AI
and DG!


I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

My primary instructor taught us to descend through an overcast in an
emergency by rolling full nose up trim in the C150, pulling the throttle
to idle and then use rudder to maintain wings level. This worked
amazingly well in that airplane. I never had to use the technique
fortunately.


I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

Absolutely. I just returned to flying after a four year layoff. I'm
competent to fly instruments, but I don't have the same level of
proficiency I had when I was flying often several years ago. Although,
I was up yesterday with a safety pilot to get in my 6 approaches and it
is starting to feel like the good old days now where I actually get
bored on the approaches waiting for the next waypoint/fix. To me,
having excess time during an approach is one sign that you finally have
it together again.

I got through my ICC pretty well back in the spring and even took one
long flight in IMC with my instructor that went well, however, I always
felt a little uneasy and it seemed I was always running at 95% mental
capacity on the approaches. I don't like that feeling and won't carry
pax in weather when I feel that way. Yesterday I felt like I was
running at 70% CPU during the approaches (and it was a bumpy and windy
day in the northeast) and had some capacity left for the unexpected.


Matt

"Terry" writes:

"Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
daylight.

Nobody has commented on this. It strikes me that with 24 years of
flying experience she was only flying 30 minute flights in clear
skies. Had she always done that, or only recently?

Yesterday there was a gap between storms in North California, so I
made a 30 minute local flight under broken clouds. There were a line
of rain showers to the west of the airport. Some spots had heavy rain
that I could not see through, others lighter rain. I flew through one
of the lighter areas, and back, just to remind myself what it was
like. The point is that one must challenge oneself on occasion, not
to routinely do risky behavior but to be a little prepared should
something bad happen. Hopefully one gets that on BFRs or Wings
excursions, but you can safely do it yourself too.

writes:

I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front.

Amen brother!

Accidents are set up days, or even years in advance, by the attitudes
we develop in ourselves and others. Whenever I offer someone a ride,
or go on a cross-country for myself, I try to set up everybody's
expectations:

- wife: I might be a few days late for weather, I'll call every night
and let you know.

- job: Ditto. I might need more vacation time than planned, I'll
call if I get delayed.

- pax: We might get delayed. If you can't wait with me, I'll do
everything I can to put you on a bus or whatever you want to get back
home.

- sightseeing trips: I'll call you before you leave the house if it
doesn't look good. We may get to the airport and then it may not look
good, your safety and comfort are more important than this particular
flight, so we may have to reschedule at the last minute.

By acting as pilot in *command* well in advance, people are more
comfortable at the moment of flight.

Terry,
I am very sorry to hear about your friend. It is truly unfortunate that
this accident occurred and my thoughts and prayers go out to the family.
It is amazing that flying into IMC can disorient you (and almost
incapacitate you) within seconds. Thanks for sharing.

Jon Kraus
PP-ASEL-IA
Student Mooney Owner

Terry wrote:

A terrible tragedy happened yesterday here at my home airport and I can't
get it off my mind as to "why" it happened.

3 people lost their life yesterday. The pilot was a very dear and wonderful
person, 72 years young and a pilot of 24 years. "Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear skies and
daylight. She was a very careful pilot and always used good judgement.

Yesterday she was to give a "first flight" to an 11 year old girl for a
Christmas gift given by her Aunt.

Visibility at the airport was less than 1 mile...you could not see the
opposite end of the runway and yet...for some reason know only to God. She
departed the runway and was airborne for about 1 minute before slamming into
the ground about 100 yards off the runway center line killing all three
people. From the hangar the "thug" was heard but you could not see the
airplane lying upside down about 1/4 mile away.

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come back
another time? Perhaps thinking she could maintain visual contact with the
ground and just to some touch and go's? Some way, some how, she "psyched"
herself into doing something that ended in a horrible tragedy.

This in a way is written for "Jean" the pilot and the two passengers that
died needlessly so that perhaps all of us can learn something. Pilots must
never give in to the pressures that be. We have our lives and the lives of
others in our hands. We will always make safety our top priority, know
ourselves, our limits.

I don't have the answers but I needed to write this...

Here's the link if interested..http://www.nbc4i.com/news/4035611/detail.html

Terry PP-ASEL

N6401F

True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
doing this.

I wasn't assuming anything. I was reponding to a previous post that
stated:

They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins,

We were not discussing this accident, we were discussing safety margins.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE

In article ,
Matt Whiting wrote:

tony roberts wrote:

You have no right to put your passengers in this kind of a situation.
When they get in the airplane, they have no way of knowing the level of
risk you are taking. They are literally trusting you with thier lives.
You job as PIC is to honor that trust by maintaining wide safety
margins, by not even remotely approaching the 'edge.'


That one paragraph could save so many lives, if only pilots adhered to
it. There is not one single excuse that gives any pilot the right to
play the odds with another persons life.

True, but this is making a big assumption that the pilot knew she was
doing this. None of us were there to see the weather at the time of
takeoff or know what else was going on. I don't know many pilots who
would intentionally put their passengers at risk, but sometimes it
happens. Never having had a crash, I don't know what a typical lead-in
scenario is and many pilots who crash don't live to tell us what they
were seeing and thinking.


Matt

Gene, you cited a 1954 Stonecipher report in an earlier post. Is this the
current Boeing chairman?

I admire your attitude regarding flying, and your remarks about this tragic
case. I'm a PP-ASEL with about 220 hrs and want to get my instrument
rating. What do you think of the accelerated programs? I'm thinking in
particular about PIC.