Is the 787 a failure ?

McNerney gets paid $400,000 per week for this? Yow!
| ...
| In 2008, as problems and delays continued to mount for the
| Dreamliner, Mr. McNerney toured several of Boeing's key
| suppliers. At one plant, which made part of the fuselage,
| he asked managers what was keeping their production line
| from moving. They told him they were waiting on a part that
| Boeing itself made. Mr. McNerney expressed surprise,
| according to someone present at the meeting.
|
| Mr. McNerney has conceded that Boeing went too far in
| spreading out the 787's supply chain. "We got a little bit
| seduced that it would all come together seamlessly and the
| same design rules would be applied everywhere in the world
| and corners wouldn't be cut and financial realities
| wouldn't hit certain folks," Mr. McNerney told an audience
| at an event in September.
|
| To hasten completion of the complicated new aircraft, the
| CEO aggressively replaced key managers.
| ...
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324039504578260164279497602.html

--bks

The integrated approach isn't working, so they
bring in new people who aren't integrated and
probably don't work together?

I'm not optomistic.

Christopher A. Young
Learn more about Jesus
www.lds.org
..

"Bradley K. Sherman" wrote in message
...
McNerney gets paid $400,000 per week for this? Yow!
| ...
| In 2008, as problems and delays continued to mount for the
| Dreamliner, Mr. McNerney toured several of Boeing's key
| suppliers. At one plant, which made part of the fuselage,
| he asked managers what was keeping their production line
| from moving. They told him they were waiting on a part that
| Boeing itself made. Mr. McNerney expressed surprise,
| according to someone present at the meeting.
|
| Mr. McNerney has conceded that Boeing went too far in
| spreading out the 787's supply chain. "We got a little bit
| seduced that it would all come together seamlessly and the
| same design rules would be applied everywhere in the world
| and corners wouldn't be cut and financial realities
| wouldn't hit certain folks," Mr. McNerney told an audience
| at an event in September.
|
| To hasten completion of the complicated new aircraft, the
| CEO aggressively replaced key managers.
| ...
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324039504578260164279497602.html

--bks

On Mon, 28 Jan 2013 20:57:11 -0000, "Keith W"
wrote:

Mr.B1ack wrote:
On Mon, 28 Jan 2013 08:16:31 -0800, Delvin Benet wrote:

On 1/28/2013 5:08 AM, Mr.B1ack wrote:
On Sun, 27 Jan 2013 12:49:32 -0800, Transition Zone wrote:

On Jan 27, 2:19 am, "Mr.B1ack" wrote:
On Sat, 26 Jan 2013 12:30:42 -0800, Transition Zone wrote:
On Jan 25, 9:54 pm, "Mr.B1ack" wrote:
Strictly speaking, the 787 is not an engineering failure. Like
anything complex and new it has a few issues. So far these
issues haven't caused any fatalities.

But, the then-new EU Airbus airliner (A320) did have mostly
fatalities on an opening day mess-up, back on June 26, 1988, at
Mulhouse-Habsheim Airport. Airbus's A380 had terrible delays,
too.

Irrevelant.

It did not acquire the REPUTATION for being dangerous.

And the A320 didn't?

That's all-important.

That's all that counts.

The 787 is *done*.

I *way* doubt that.


Put it this way ... *I* won't fly on one.

I don't fly much any more - it's a miserable experience since 9/11 no
matter what the plane is - but I wouldn't have flown on the 787
until it had been in service for a year or so.

This battery problem is worse than the average sort of aeronautical
hiccup - more like a serious case of indigestion - but they'll
overcome it.

They'll overcome it - technically - but will that
help in terms of public *perception* ? If the public
thinks it's a deathtrap then why would airlines buy
any ? Switch to Airbus instead.

Remember Value-Jet ? Remember the flaming CRASH ?
The *name* 'Value-Jet' became inviable - and they
had to change it to "Jet-Blue".

I don't think Boeing can try that trick.


erm Valujet did not change to JetBlue thats a quite
different airline

Recall the planes, spend a year REALLY debugging
them ... then re-issue them as the '797' instead.
Tweak the cosmetics a bit too ... then it will
*seem* like a new plane and public paranoia will
be avoided. Yea, it'll be 99.5 percent the 787,
but *perception* is what's gonna count.


Says the man who perceived Jetblue as the reincarnation of Valujet.

The reality is that MANY new aircraft have suffered minor
engineering issues that caused them to be grounded for
a while including the new Airbus 380


Keith

http://articles.businessinsider.com/...cal-stabilizer

Im trying to remember which prop job in the 1950s kept going
down...British aircraft IRRC....which had the tails snapping
off...some sort of metal fatigue/harmonics issue which took them
awhile to find and correct. They did a movie about it in the 1960s
IRRC

Gunner

The methodology of the left has always been:

1. Lie
2. Repeat the lie as many times as possible
3. Have as many people repeat the lie as often as possible
4. Eventually, the uninformed believe the lie
5. The lie will then be made into some form oflaw
6. Then everyone must conform to the lie

On Tue, 29 Jan 2013 15:09:25 -0500, "Jim Wilkins"
wrote:

"Max Boot" wrote in message
.. .
On 1/29/2013 7:42 AM, Jim Wilkins wrote:

Struck a nerve, I see. I'm guessing you've never traveled. In
fact, it's all but a certainty.

Don't hire yourself out as a detective.

I wore out a set of Reifen travelling around Europe as a field sevice
repairman for two years.


LOL

Gunner, 55-65,000 miles a year for the past 15 yrs as a service tech.



The methodology of the left has always been:

1. Lie
2. Repeat the lie as many times as possible
3. Have as many people repeat the lie as often as possible
4. Eventually, the uninformed believe the lie
5. The lie will then be made into some form oflaw
6. Then everyone must conform to the lie

On 2/2/2013 6:46 PM, Stormin Mormon wrote:
The integrated approach isn't working, so they
bring in new people who aren't integrated and
probably don't work together?

Yep, that group might not help at all. On the other hand, it's hard to
imagine how getting fresh minds with fresh ideas working on a tough
problem like this can be a bad thing. Compared to the cost of the
problem, the cost of this team is miniscule.

(Trollish crossposts to unrelated groups snipped)

On Sat, 02 Feb 2013 16:48:44 -0800, the renowned Gunner
wrote:


Im trying to remember which prop job in the 1950s kept going
down...British aircraft IRRC....which had the tails snapping
off...some sort of metal fatigue/harmonics issue which took them
awhile to find and correct. They did a movie about it in the 1960s
IRRC

Turbojet, but maybe this one?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet

They didn't understand metal fatigue very well in those days- nice big
square windows in the early models.


Best regards,
Spehro Pefhany
--
"it's the network..." "The Journey is the reward"
Info for manufacturers: http://www.trexon.com
Embedded software/hardware/analog Info for designers: http://www.speff.com

|
| Company engineers blame the 787's outsourced supply chain,
| saying that poor quality components are coming from
| subcontractors that have operated largely out of Boeing's
| view.
|
| "The risk to the company is not this battery, even though
| this is really bad right now," said one 787 electrical
| engineer, who asked not to be identified. "The real problem
| is the power panels."
|
| Unlike earlier Boeing jets, he said, the innards of the 787
| power distribution panels -- which control the flow of
| electricity to the plane's many systems -- are "like Radio
| Shack," with parts that are "cheap, plastic and prone to
| failure."
| ...
| "The supplier management organization (at Boeing) didn't
| have diddly-squat in terms of engineering capability when
| they sourced all that work," he said.
| ...
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020275838_boeingoutsourcingxml.html?prmid=4939

--bks

|
| Boeing has deployed hundreds of engineers to fix the
| battery-related trouble that grounded the 787.
|
| But what about its 10 supposedly independent directors, who
| serve on the board chaired by Chief Executive James
| McNerney?
| ...
| Taken together, it's a cozy board largely of elite
| professional managers and political movers. The risk of
| living in a bubble is significant. There's no shareholder
| activist. No union member. No cantankerous John Smale to
| ask tough questions and demand change. Not one aircraft
| engineer.
| ...
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020268550_biztaltoncol03xml.html

--bks

On 03/02/13 16:05, Spehro Pefhany wrote:
On Sat, 02 Feb 2013 16:48:44 -0800, the renowned Gunner
wrote:


Im trying to remember which prop job in the 1950s kept going
down...British aircraft IRRC....which had the tails snapping
off...some sort of metal fatigue/harmonics issue which took them
awhile to find and correct. They did a movie about it in the 1960s
IRRC

Turbojet, but maybe this one?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet

They didn't understand metal fatigue very well in those days- nice big
square windows in the early models.
The same aircraft type flew for many years after that in a marine
defence anti submarine role

Edward A. Falk wrote:
Marvin the Martian wrote:

I love it when people who have no ****ing idea what's going on, make ****
up like "a minor tweek will fix it".

I used to write the firmware for battery charging systems for a living.
At two different jobs. This qualifies me as someone who *does* have
a ****ing idea what's going on.

This will be, relatively speaking, a minor tweak.

| ...
| Hajime Tozaki, a Waseda University professor specializing
| in transport policy, said it may take "up to a year" to
| determine the cause, given that a variety of innovative
| technologies were used in the new fuel-efficient jet.
| ...
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/04/business/787-to-weigh-on-airlines-as-safety-concerns-drag-on/#.UQ62zn1AbAM

--bks