Cat peeking out of the bag?

With this thread still active, I thought I'd take another crack at expousing
Jose's original query to those in the know about the accuracy of Tom's books
on the performance of the F-4 and -14 in Iranian air combat. The stuff on
the Tomcat could surely have a lot to say about the current picture of a-a
combat. Some of you guys must have an inkling about whether or not there
really was a lot of a-a combat as Tom suggests, or whether the "popular"
account of there being very little a-a action (and airworthy 'Cats!) is more
likely to be true. Thanks,

Tony

Pechs1 wrote:
Thomas- Which does raise the question ogf what might have happened
to Tomcat availability, etc, if it had been redeisgned from the
ground up in the early 1990s like the Super Hornet. BRBR

To late. If it was going to become the 'Super Tomcat or Tomcat 21, it
needed to happen in the 80s, when $ was everywhere.

I would say that the detailed Super Tomcat work would have been done in
about the same period as the F/A-18E/F, but you're quite right to point out
that the groundwork needed to be laid earlier. If in the early 1980s, they
had comitted to making the whole force into F-14Ds or equivalent, there
would have been a lot more reason to push a next generation version in place
of the Super Bug.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

Tom-I would say that the detailed Super Tomcat work would have been done in

about the same period as the F/A-18E/F,

It was, I saw briefs on the Tomcat 21 when I was in VX-4...late 80s but the USN
didn't buy it.
P. C. Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret.)
Old Phart Phormer Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and Combat Buckeye Phlyer

In article , wrote:

On 24 Oct 2004 14:33:05 GMT, (Pechs1) wrote:

Tamas- Otherwise all variable wing planes suck a great deal: heavy,
trouble-prone, cost a lot to maintain, wings mecha takes up precious
place in the fuselage, won't survive battle damage. No wonder the USN is
retiring all Tomcats. BRBR

It wasn't the swept wing that doomed the F-14. In my experience in 2 F-14
squadrons, the wing sweep mechanism was never a maintenance issue.

It's pretty much bulletproof, too, being overbuilt and armored. Wing
sweep problems are really rare. The folks at Pax tested the one wing
stuck aft flyability and landability (I don't remember whether they
tested trappability, though), I think as the result of that actually
happening once. That was fairly recently, like in the last decade, so
it's probably related to system wear.

It is an old design, never modified to it's full capabilities with available
technology. Analog, push rod type flight controls, tube type avionics,
****poor
engines in the majority of the A/C(TF-30).

What really did it in was LRUs, Line-Replaceable Units. These greatly
reduce the amount of plane-side maintenance by moving it to depots.
Instead of repairing or replacing components, the entire defective
unit is pulled out and a new working unit is plugged in. This is
quick and easy.

The LRUs were the result of the military emphasizing ease of
maintenance. With LRUs they increased up time, reduced maintenance
time, and reduced crew size.

We saw a huge improvement in all three at Dryden when we switched from
F-104s to F-18s. The USN saw something similar going from A-7s to
F/A-18s, according to a couple of captains I talked to back in 1990.

I started with Hughes in '78 and LRUs were the design standard then.
Can't speak for the rest of the electronics on the a/c, but the radar & EW
systems were designed as LRUs.

Here's the real difference today:
Prior to the mid-90's all maintenance was 3 levels; flightline, shop level
(local, on-base), and depot. The flightline maintenance comsists of
replacing the black box at the airplane.

The shop level tried to diagnose the problem with the black box, open
it up and replace the faulty assembly inside. This required a LOT of test
and evaluation equipment and highly trained electronics techs.
Sometimes even card repairs were done in the shop.

Anything that could not be diagnosed and fixed in the shop was sent to
the depot for repair.

This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;
No expensive test equipment, reduced need for trained techs, less
hardware in the pipeline, less facilities required, etc.
Now, the LRUs are pulled at the flightline and sent directly to the depot
with no attempt to repair at the base.

What allows this to be economical are three things, heavy emphasis
on reliability engineering, improved capability of embedded self-test,
and the FEDEX model of moving hardware fast overnight.

There were LRUs well before the F/A-18, but Mary is right in that the
emphasis on ease of maintenance and reliability paid real
dividends in system availability and uptime, and reduced cost.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Tamas- Otherwise all variable wing planes suck a great deal: heavy,
trouble-prone, cost a lot to maintain, wings mecha takes up precious
place in the fuselage, won't survive battle damage. No wonder the USN
is
retiring all Tomcats. BRBR

It wasn't the swept wing that doomed the F-14. In my experience in 2
F-14
squadrons, the wing sweep mechanism was never a maintenance issue.

It's pretty much bulletproof, too, being overbuilt and armored. Wing
sweep problems are really rare. The folks at Pax tested the one wing
stuck aft flyability and landability (I don't remember whether they
tested trappability, though), I think as the result of that actually
happening once. That was fairly recently, like in the last decade, so
it's probably related to system wear.

The wing sweep actuators ran on separate hyd systems but were interconnected
via a torque tube so that loss of one PC would not inhibit wing operation.
Problem was the torque tube was designed for emergency use, not every day.
Standard maint procedures would use only one hyd to power the system and
sweep the wings with the tube. Eventually one failed in flight and the
aircraft trapped aboard America in the IO with one at 20 degrees one at 35
(mid 80's, the cruise after I left VF-102). It was relatively easy to
control and except for higher approach speed (maneuvering flaps/slats only)
not that big a deal.

R / John

Delighted to hear your experience again, Mary! You really have a unique
point of view.
(although I still smart a little when my first post attempt on this group
was rejected years ago, when you said it was "almost good enough")
Were you the last moderator on this group?
Old Chief Lynn

Harry Andreas wrote:
This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;

Harry, there is still 3 level maintenance. In the USN, what you
refer to as flightline is usually called "O level" as in organization
(squadron). "I level" for intermediate, may be as close as across
the street on base, but it is a separate entity from the squadron.
(It is also usually a "good deal" for the maintenance folks for a
shore tour after their time in the squadron, especially if the guys
with families, because they don't have to move.) Depot level is
usually not on the same base, as one depot serves a geographical
reqion of several hundred miles radius or more.

From what I've seen so far, I agree with how you describe the
direction of the work on the flightline. Fault codes,
troubleshooting flowcharts, and replacing black boxes. The avionics
guys still know how to detail work like repair individual pins in
connectors, check for continuity, but I've seen major components like
an entire FLIR turret get shipped to swap out with a bad one on a
deployed aircraft.

By the way I'm a helicopter guy, not fast mover, but maintenance is a
pretty similar business through all of naval aviation.

Jim Carriere wrote in message ...
Harry Andreas wrote:
This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;

Harry, there is still 3 level maintenance. In the USN, what you
refer to as flightline is usually called "O level" as in organization
(squadron). "I level" for intermediate, may be as close as across
the street on base, but it is a separate entity from the squadron.
(It is also usually a "good deal" for the maintenance folks for a
shore tour after their time in the squadron, especially if the guys
with families, because they don't have to move.) Depot level is
usually not on the same base, as one depot serves a geographical
reqion of several hundred miles radius or more.

From what I've seen so far, I agree with how you describe the
direction of the work on the flightline. Fault codes,
troubleshooting flowcharts, and replacing black boxes. The avionics
guys still know how to detail work like repair individual pins in
connectors, check for continuity, but I've seen major components like
an entire FLIR turret get shipped to swap out with a bad one on a
deployed aircraft.

By the way I'm a helicopter guy, not fast mover, but maintenance is a
pretty similar business through all of naval aviation.

I worked intermediate maintenance (Marine Phantoms, S models) in the
late 80s; we deployed *alot*. In a three-year tour, each squadron had
two WestPacs and two WTIs to Yuma. However, it was always shore-based
deployment (from Kaneohe Bay to Iwakuni, then to Subic or Kadena). I,
being young and newly married, was always sent somewhere every few
months.

When we reported aboard Kaneohe, most of us were assigned to one of
the rotary wing or Phantom squadrons, which meant we deployed; some
were attached to the H&MS 24 squadron, which meant they didn't deploy.
Everyone in IMA worked in the same shop and on whatever gear from
whatever squadron needed work; the only difference was whenever
VMFA-212 was heading out, those Marines attached to 212 left too and
worked out of the local H&MS shop wherever they were deployed to.

At least once, at Subic, the APA test bench for the Phantoms broke,
which IIRC was a downing gripe for Phantoms since a myriad of flight
attitude information was routed through it. A carrier (the Ranger?)
had S-model Phantoms onboard and pulled into Subic for shore leave.
We got permission from the ship to come aboard -- called for a base
taxi, loaded the trunk with broken APA modules, and hauled them to the
ship. We went aboard, promptly broke the Navy's test bench too, and
were politely asked to leave and not come back anymore...

Thanks for the trip down memory lane,
Matt

Some complicating factors that came with the F-14:

1. Congress dictated, and the Navy agreed, that 70% of aircraft failures
would be repairable at the organizational or intermediate level.

2. Congress dictated that Grumman use many small-business minority-setaside
subcontractors. Many of these were frauds from the start; the president of
the company was last seen headed for Brazil with his secretary under one arm
and the entire assets of the company under the other. Once the company was
gone, where do we get the parts? Just get the drawings and find another
bidder, right? Wrong! The drawings were assets in bankruptcy, and
bankruptcy courts do not work for DOD.

3. From day one, the RAG's, fleet squadrons, the production line and the
Iranian buy were in competition for parts. It had been agreed that Iran
would receive a one-year AVCAL (spare parts allowance based on aircraft
quantity and projected flight hours) at the time of delivery of the first
aircraft. Shortly into production, it was decided we could get more oil
money back by providing Iran a two-year AVCAL with the first aircraft.

4. Every Congresscritter had to have an ankle to bite where the F-14 was
concerned. Practically all F-14 communications from the fleet to Washington
were by phone; any telegraphic message mentioning a fault or shortage would
be highlighted in Jack Anderson's newspaper column within hours.

5. Fleet introduction was the classic Chinese fire drill. The first fleet
F-14's that landed on Enterprise couldn't be launched; the nose launch bars
would not fit the ship's fittings. George Skurla, President of Grumman
Aerospace, was personally assigned a helicopter with crew and a machinist
mate with a set of micrometers and flew the parts ashore to a machine shop
in San Diego so they could be machined to fit.

6. By the time VF-124, -1, -2, -14 and -32 were outfitted, there had been
so many configuration changes that the maintainers had to carry a matrix
chart listing Bureau Numbers versus LRU dash numbers. Each LRU version had
a code for each BUNO: 1) Works OK; 2) Works - Degraded Capability, or; 3)
Don't Plug It In - Makes Smoke.

Truly, a flying miracle!

Rick

P.S.: Would one of you REAL old-timers give me the real scoop on the Wing
Flap Glove Vane System?










"Jim Carriere" wrote in message
...
Harry Andreas wrote:
This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;

Harry, there is still 3 level maintenance. In the USN, what you refer to
as flightline is usually called "O level" as in organization (squadron).
"I level" for intermediate, may be as close as across the street on base,
but it is a separate entity from the squadron. (It is also usually a "good
deal" for the maintenance folks for a shore tour after their time in the
squadron, especially if the guys with families, because they don't have to
move.) Depot level is usually not on the same base, as one depot serves a
geographical reqion of several hundred miles radius or more.

From what I've seen so far, I agree with how you describe the direction of
the work on the flightline. Fault codes, troubleshooting flowcharts, and
replacing black boxes. The avionics guys still know how to detail work
like repair individual pins in connectors, check for continuity, but I've
seen major components like an entire FLIR turret get shipped to swap out
with a bad one on a deployed aircraft.

By the way I'm a helicopter guy, not fast mover, but maintenance is a
pretty similar business through all of naval aviation.

In article , Jim Carriere
wrote:

Harry Andreas wrote:
This 3 level maintenance was the same for both USAF and USN.

Lately, since the mid-90's, contracts have gone to 2 level maintenance.
Getting rid of the intermediate shop has eased a lot of problems;

Harry, there is still 3 level maintenance. In the USN, what you
refer to as flightline is usually called "O level" as in organization
(squadron). "I level" for intermediate, may be as close as across
the street on base, but it is a separate entity from the squadron.
(It is also usually a "good deal" for the maintenance folks for a
shore tour after their time in the squadron, especially if the guys
with families, because they don't have to move.) Depot level is
usually not on the same base, as one depot serves a geographical
reqion of several hundred miles radius or more.


Yes, I know about O and I level. I try to KISS these subjects because
this newsgroup is read by a lot of people who who don't know.
I should have mentioned that many, many programs/platforms
still use 3 level maintenance; that what I described as 2 level
maintenance is really just now starting to hit the fleet with the
newer systems like the new APG-79 radar in the F/A-18E/F.
I recently worked the GPS receiver for the JSF. F-35 is using
2 level maintenance also.

From what I've seen so far, I agree with how you describe the
direction of the work on the flightline. Fault codes,
troubleshooting flowcharts, and replacing black boxes. The avionics
guys still know how to detail work like repair individual pins in
connectors, check for continuity, but I've seen major components like
an entire FLIR turret get shipped to swap out with a bad one on a
deployed aircraft.

By the way I'm a helicopter guy, not fast mover, but maintenance is a
pretty similar business through all of naval aviation.

Agreed. The philosophy of maintenance and testability is the same
regardless of platform.
As the older systems are replaced, 2LM will be increasingly common
and the costs should drop, as long as the PMA funds enough spare
LRUs for the pipeline.

r/

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur