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#21
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steve gallacci wrote in
: Ian wrote: "Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message ... George wrote: Cool... if (and only if): - the laser has the same optical path as the video- aiming device. (May be slaved to radar aim point, but it is essential the trigger-puller be able to SEE the effectiveness of the aim/shot). - all battles are over a sunny, clear desert. - there is no smoke from previous targets, ground or air. - There is no "Interlocks out" switch in the cockpit, so the pilot cannot short-cuircuit the mandatory charge time. (prevents him from firing "blanks"...) From what I've read, I'd say it is viable to do this, but questions have been asked about the "recharge" time for the laser? While lasers could be cool, I have doubts about effectiveness, especially once they become operational, as ablatives and other protections/countermeasures could reduce them to little more than over-built flashlights. What about the heat generated by it? A 100KW laser means many times that in generated electrical power. Where do you put it? Regards... |
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#23
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In message , Tony
Williams writes This does not mean that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. However, you have to load tracer for that: which reduces effectiveness in combat. They also provide an economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or drug-smugglers. "Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. Last time this occurred? The ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in dogfights. Only if the extreme attitude can be sustained and controlled long enough for a gun snapshot: meanwhile a less extreme diversion wastes less energy yet still allows an off-boresight missile shot. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight. Can't miss fast enough to win: and it takes significantly longer to get into guns parameters. Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run out, If an infantryman runs out of ammunition, should he continue to close with the enemy in hopes of getting into bayonet, buttstock, boots and teeth range? When you find yourself at a major disadvantage, it's rarely wise to press on through the killing zone. or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by circumstances. The trouble is that gunsights require significant sensor input: particularly if the aircraft is flying extreme manoeuvres to generate snapshots. This means that an enemy able to deceive radar-guided missiles is also generating miss distance for cannon rounds. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10 aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to lock on. 550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against low-flying helicopters"? Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it down. How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest? In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots were taken at extreme range). Again, how many gun shots were fired? The Iraqi aircraft were evading at the edges of the missile envelope: what improvements to the US aircraft's gunnery systems would have changed the outcome? Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost in weight and performance. Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches to evade enemy AAMs) One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles are capable. Restrictive ROE accounts for a great deal (Vietnam): limited conflict area (Middle East); and weapon availability (Falklands). Also, define "visual range". The definition usually cited is "within five miles", which is well outside guns range and only useful for head-on Sidewinder shots: "long-range" missiles may struggle to close five miles of seperation in a low-altitude, co-speed tailchase. There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure technology. And the gun is not immune, since it requires sensor input for any but the crudest shot. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat distances. And making guns use equally problematic, as snapshots become much more demanding and gyro gunsights demand tracking shots. Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. Only for range: not for angular rate. If planes eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane, calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming information accordingly, all without emitting any signals. If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than a cannon will allow? However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of the story than might actually exist. Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. And, curiously, the ground troops reported how the enemy refused to be suppressed, neutralised or destroyed by those strafing passes: though PGMs dropped carefully in "danger close" proved effective. Even RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives." I'm automatically wary of this variation of "If it saves the life of even one small child..." -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#24
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In message , Guy Alcala
writes There have been gun deletions (or de-emphasis) in the past, either in whole or in part -- the Tornado F.3 lost one BK 27 (space needed for Skyflash avionics, I think); The Tornado GR.4 also loses one gun IIRC, and the recce GR.1A and matching GR.4 version deleted the guns completely (as, from memory, did the German ECR variant) -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
#25
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Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
I have seen no concrete evidence that it was a "purely economic" decision (but see Tony Williams' post). I'm sure cost played a part, but I imagine there were a multitude of factors involved. I don't doubt that a lot of RAF people screamed at the idea, just as many people have screamed at virtually every deletion of some weapon capability (or loss of their personal warm and fuzzy), no matter how little utility it may have in changed circumstances. The battleship people screamed too. Who's right in this instance has yet to be proved. We all agree that there are some cases where a gun provides a useful capability, but then so does a sword. As always, it's a question of tradeoffs. Agree with the points you make, Guy. My argument would be that although the gun is no longer of primary importance in a fighter, it can fulfil a wide range of secondary roles (see my original post) especially in situations short of a 'hot' war. The theorists have frequently tried to keep their concepts 'clean' (what was the USAF fighter whose development was said to include 'not one pound for air to ground'?) but the even the most specialised interceptors have frequently found themselves carrying bombs once combat required it. I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft) makes it worth keeping. Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#26
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
In message , Guy Alcala writes There have been gun deletions (or de-emphasis) in the past, either in whole or in part -- the Tornado F.3 lost one BK 27 (space needed for Skyflash avionics, I think); The Tornado GR.4 also loses one gun IIRC, and the recce GR.1A and matching GR.4 version deleted the guns completely (as, from memory, did the German ECR variant) Thanks. I couldn't remember for sure on any of them except the F.3. Guy |
#27
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Tony Williams wrote:
Guy Alcala wrote in message ... I have seen no concrete evidence that it was a "purely economic" decision (but see Tony Williams' post). I'm sure cost played a part, but I imagine there were a multitude of factors involved. I don't doubt that a lot of RAF people screamed at the idea, just as many people have screamed at virtually every deletion of some weapon capability (or loss of their personal warm and fuzzy), no matter how little utility it may have in changed circumstances. The battleship people screamed too. Who's right in this instance has yet to be proved. We all agree that there are some cases where a gun provides a useful capability, but then so does a sword. As always, it's a question of tradeoffs. Agree with the points you make, Guy. My argument would be that although the gun is no longer of primary importance in a fighter, it can fulfil a wide range of secondary roles (see my original post) especially in situations short of a 'hot' war. The theorists have frequently tried to keep their concepts 'clean' (what was the USAF fighter whose development was said to include 'not one pound for air to ground'?) Of course, that wasn't true even at the time the claim was made, as a glance at a photo of the armament control panel and Master Mode Switches of an F-15A will show. but the even the most specialised interceptors have frequently found themselves carrying bombs once combat required it. Which is a question of adding a capability that has been routinely exercised by fighters in combat at least since they dropped Cooper bombs in WW1, right up through the most recent conflicts, and which, in the context of the air supremacy the US (at least) has enjoyed in our most recent wars, is more generally useful. I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft) makes it worth keeping. And I am essentially agnostic on the matter, perhaps leaning slightly towards the gun pod solution for those "short of hot war" situations. Kind of depends what makes it through the R&D pipeline. If, for example, the only place to put the black boxes and/or the laser itself for an active laser missile defense system to protect the a/c against IR SAMs was where the gun was, then it's probably bye-bye gun (depending on the delivery profile of the weapons and sensors of the a/c in question). Data links, almost certainly. that's a question of retro-fitting a/c currently in service or soon to be. The next generation, though, is another matter, as the tradeoff between potential airframe size and cost with/without a gun will be more obvious than is the case with removing a gun from an a/c already sized to carry it. Personally, I'd think that putting a gun (if necessary) on a long endurance UCAV along with various other weapons may be the way CAS will go, but that's without knowing a whole lot about what's practical now. Guy |
#28
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"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony Williams writes They also provide an economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or drug-smugglers. "Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free. No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10 aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to lock on. 550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against low-flying helicopters"? The A-10 was not equipped (nor are the pilots trained, AFAIK) for air-to-air gunnery. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it down. How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest? Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast. Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches to evade enemy AAMs) The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored kills with the gun. Nice theories about how engagements ought to go tend to break down in real life. If planes eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane, calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming information accordingly, all without emitting any signals. If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than a cannon will allow? Because an aircraft has far more space for sensors and computing capacity than a missile does. However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact, armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians. Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of the story than might actually exist. The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years? Then what? Do guns suddenly stop being useful for such purposes? Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#29
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Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Tony Williams wrote: I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft) makes it worth keeping. And I am essentially agnostic on the matter, perhaps leaning slightly towards the gun pod solution for those "short of hot war" situations. This is my comment on gunpods: "Podded guns have the advantage that they don't need to be lugged around unless the planes are in circumstances in which a gun is likely to be needed. Like any other piece of hardware, they can be fitted according to requirements. The downside of this is that you first have to make sure that the gunpods are available when required, you have to be psychic to determine when they might be useful, they use up a hardpoint which would otherwise be available for fuel or other weapons, they take some time to harmonise – and keep harmonised – when fitted, and even then are less accurate than integral guns. Gunpods generate more drag, usually affect handling and are also much less "stealthy" than integral guns; a factor likely to be increasingly important as stealth measures are leading to the internal carriage of all weapons. This solution is therefore very much second best, but it is better than nothing. The installation of weapons in purpose-designed conformal pods fitted directly to the fuselage and intended to be more or less permanent fixtures does reduce or avoid some of the above problems." Tony Williams Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/ |
#30
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In message , Tony
Williams writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ... "Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free. No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance. I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the best option, if that's a key driver. 550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against low-flying helicopters"? The A-10 was not equipped (nor are the pilots trained, AFAIK) for air-to-air gunnery. So? Helicopters are closer to air-to-ground strafing than air-to-air, looking at the velocity and altitude differentials. How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest? Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast. A few examples where this has befallen Western pilots would be handy. It was a problem in Vietnam for the USAF, for example, where they were plagued by poor reliability of the weapons and by doctrinal guidance to volley every selected weapon at a target (so a F-4 Phantom effectively had one Sidewinder shot and one Sparrow shot); the USN used different doctrine based on single firings and got much better results. A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara: though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen, and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara; Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on 8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a third kill with another Sidewinder...) Having the guns along when the missiles were exhausted was no guarantee of being able to get into range, let alone score disabling damage: with hindsight, trading the gun pods for more fuel and twin-rail Sidewinder launchers (giving four rather than two shots) would have been much more effective. Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches to evade enemy AAMs) The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored kills with the gun. The Iranians also used human wave attacks against prepared defensive positions, using unarmed schoolboys carrying plastic "keys to heaven" in the first wave (they were expendable, available, and revealed the locations of minefields and concealed bunkers for the armed fighters following). I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved. Nice theories about how engagements ought to go tend to break down in real life. True: like the notion that any gunless fighter is doomed If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than a cannon will allow? Because an aircraft has far more space for sensors and computing capacity than a missile does. But the gun is still a fixed installation and you have to point it at where the target will be one time-of-flight after firing: and you have to fly through the enemy's weapons envelope(s) to do so. Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of the story than might actually exist. The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years? They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the chances of a 'danger close'? Then what? Do guns suddenly stop being useful for such purposes? They were available then - the story seems to have more agenda behind it than it would like to admit. -- When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite. W S Churchill Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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