Dallas-Fort Worth TRACON Management Routinely Misclassified Operational Errors and Deviations as Pilot Errors

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC? Very tacky.

And apparently there's a history of this malfeasance at the
Dallas-Fort Worth TRACON. If found guilty, what's it going to take to
get these criminals terminated from any and all government service?




http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releas...m?newsId=10213
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Washington Headquarters Press Release

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For Immediate Release
April 24, 2008
Contact: Diane Spitaliere
Phone: (202) 267-3883

FAA Takes Steps to Ensure Proper Reporting of Operational Errors


WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today
announced steps to strengthen the reporting system designed to
classify airspace errors, in response to a report by the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Inspector General (IG) that revealed
the intentional misclassification of operational errors at the
Dallas-Fort Worth Terminal Approach Control (TRACON).

In direct response to IG recommendations contained in a report
issued today, the FAA removed both the facility manager and assistant
manager at the Dallas-Fort Worth TRACON from their positions pending a
final determination on possible further personnel actions; additional
personnel actions may be taken. The Air Traffic Safety Oversight
organization has implemented unannounced on-site audits at the TRACON,
requiring monthly reports to the FAA’s acting administrator.
Additionally, the FAA will accelerate deployment of the Traffic
Analysis Review Program (TARP) — software that automatically detects
losses of aircraft separation at terminal facilities — at Dallas-Fort
Worth TRACON. The program will be implemented by the end of fiscal
year 2008.

“I am deeply disturbed by the findings in this report,” said Hank
Krakowski, chief operating officer of the FAA’s Air Traffic
Organization. “I am personally committed to making sure the IG’s
recommendations are implemented and that managers are held
accountable.”

Specifically, the IG found that management at the Dallas-Fort
Worth TRACON investigated operational errors and deviations, but
routinely and intentionally misclassified them as pilot errors or
non-events. The report was prompted by whistleblower allegations that
management was covering up operational errors and deviations. It found
that between November 2005 and July 2007, TRACON managers
misclassified 62 air traffic events as pilot deviation or non-events
when it fact there were 52 operational errors and 10 operational
deviations. The IG found no evidence of misclassification issues
beyond the Dallas-Fort Worth TRACON.

Krakowski said the FAA is putting measures in place to ensure that
misclassifications cannot happen anywhere else in the system. The FAA
will establish a nationwide, independent quality assurance position
that will report directly to the just-appointed vice president of
Safety Services for the Air Traffic Organization, Air Force Reserve
Brigadier General Robert O. Tarter. The position will oversee incident
reporting, make incident determinations, and audit the data integrity
of facility reports. Currently, responsibility for incident
determination lies solely with the facility manager. This move
increases accountability of the managers by adding senior-level
oversight. The FAA will also be accelerating the nation-wide
deployment of the TARP by the end of 2009.

“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority and will
not be compromised. The intentional distortion of reporting incidents
defeats our ability to understand the root causes of errors and enact
mitigation if we see a trend developing,” Krakowski said.

“Aside from the integrity issue, it’s a lost opportunity to gain
insight into causal factors,” Krakowski added. “That action is
fundamental to safety and we won’t tolerate anything less.”

The Safety Services organization will conduct audits of all air
traffic control incidents and coordinate the findings and responses
with the highest level officials in the FAA. Within the next six
months, the FAA will provide nation-wide training for Air Traffic
facility managers and safety officials about roles and
responsibilities for reporting and classifying airspace errors. The
agency’s inspector workforce will simultaneously be retrained on their
responsibilities for conducting investigations of reported pilot
deviations.

The FAA recently signed an agreement with the National Air Traffic
Controllers Association to create the Air Traffic Safety Action
Program, designed to foster a voluntary, cooperative, non-punitive
environment for the open reporting of safety concerns. This type of
reporting system — which is used throughout industry — will help to
create an atmosphere where controllers and managers can identify,
report and correct safety issues and emerging risks.

###





http://www.oig.dot.gov/StreamFile?fi...imony_9.20.pdf
Todd J. ZinserActing Inspector General U.S. Department of
Transportation
Before the Committee on Transportation and
InfrastructureSubcommittee on AviationUnited States House of
RepresentativesFor Release on Delivery Expected at2:00 p.m. EDT
WednesdaySeptember 20, 2006
CC-2006-074
Observations on FAA’s Oversight of Aviation Safety

During the first 11 months of FY 2006, the number of operational
errors has decreased—there were 1,242 operational errors compared to
1,358 during the same period in FY 2005. However, the number of
operational errors during the 11-month period still exceeds the total
number of errors experienced during all of FY 2004.

The increase in operational errors is significant, but it is
important to recognize that the number of errors reported in prior
years may not be an accurate benchmark. This is because, at the
majority of FAA facilities, FAA relies on an inaccurate system of
self-reporting operational errors.

In September 2004, we reported8 that only 20 of FAA’s 524 air
traffic control facilities had an automated system that identifies
when operational errors occur. At its towers and terminal radar
approach control (TRACON) facilities, FAA depends on an unreliable
system of self-reporting operational errors.

Recent investigations by our office and FAA at two locations found
multiple instances of unreported operational errors. Specifically, at
the Dallas/Fort Worth TRACON, we investigated claims by a
whistleblower that operational errors were being intentionally
underreported. We substantiated that operational errors were
systematically ignored and traced the cause to local management policy
that did not comply with national guidelines. Prior to our
investigation, the facility reported just two operational errors
during the 6-month period from January 1 to
--------------------------------------------
8 OIG Report Number AV-2004-085, “Audit of Controls Over the
Reporting of Operational Errors,” September 20, 2004.
--------------------------------------------
17
June 24, 2004. During our investigation, we identified five
unreported operational errors that occurred during May and June alone.

After instituting appropriate use of playback tools9 in June 2004,
the facility reported 36 operational errors during the next 6 months.
Facility managers also took actions to improve operations by training
all personnel on proper procedures for reporting and investigating
operational errors, redesigning facility-specific air traffic
procedures, and conducting refresher training to improve controller
performance. ...

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC?


No.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC?


No.

Based on past history of that TRACON, that's a sweeping assertion that is
probably wrong. It seems likely that supervisory malfeasance of the nature
reported could lead directly to uncorrected operation errors on the part of
controllers. Indeed, according to this Reason magazine article in 2005 on
"Another TRACON Scandal",

http://www.reason.org/atcreform28.shtml

the "FAA decertified one controller for committing a previously unreported
error...."

And in that case fellow controllers of the whistle-blower allegedly were
"hitting [her], making threats against her, and even trying to run her off
the road."

Not exactly behavior indicative of objective professionalism.

"Jim Logajan" wrote in message
.. .
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC?


No.

Based on past history of that TRACON, that's a sweeping assertion that is
probably wrong.


I don't think so. The question was asked of management, not of the
controllers.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Jim Logajan" wrote in message
.. .
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC?


No.

Based on past history of that TRACON, that's a sweeping assertion
that is probably wrong.


I don't think so. The question was asked of management, not of the
controllers.

Okay - but I appreciate the change from "no" to "I don't think so."
But it appears there are complaints (not mentioned in the story at the
start of this thread) against controllers and not just management:

"The FAA failed to follow through, however, and Ms. Whiteman and another
whistle-blower made new complaints last year of controllers issuing
faulty instructions to pilots."

Quoted from this report:
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcont...2.28095ea.html

If found guilty, what's it going to take to
get these criminals terminated from any and all government service?

We have friends employed by our gummint who joke that "...if we were caught
murdering a co-worker, we'd be sent to 'anger counseling'". They know
full well that they can't be fired.

In short, it would take an act of Congress to terminate the criminals.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

"Jim Logajan" wrote in message
.. .
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Jim Logajan" wrote in message
.. .
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC?


No.

Based on past history of that TRACON, that's a sweeping assertion
that is probably wrong.


I don't think so. The question was asked of management, not of the
controllers.

Okay - but I appreciate the change from "no" to "I don't think so."


I changed nothing. "No" still applies to Dighera's question, "I don't think
so" applies to your statement.

On May 1, 2:42*pm, Larry Dighera wrote:
Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC? *Very tacky. *

Dude, do you even fly or do you just spend your day looking for
irrelevant information on the internet?

-Robert

"Robert M. Gary" wrote:
On May 1, 2:42*pm, Larry Dighera wrote:
Are these the same ATC personnel with whom we entrust our lives in
IMC? *Very tacky. *

Dude, do you even fly or do you just spend your day looking for
irrelevant information on the internet?

Um - why are claims that deliberate re-classification of ATC errors to
pilot error not relevant for discussion on a piloting discussion group? If
that's not relevant to this group, what precisely is? Flame wars between
Bertie and Maxwell?

On Thu, 1 May 2008 17:08:21 -0700 (PDT), "Robert M. Gary"
wrote in
:

... do you just spend your day looking for irrelevant information on the internet?

Why do you feel the subject of on-the-job fraud among ATC personnel is
irrelevant to an aviation newsgroup?