The Red Baron Reports: What They Really Said

In the Fall Air Power History magazine, which you Air Force types
can get from your unit historian, William Sayers wrote an article "The
Red Baron Reports: What They Really Said".
He looks at the now unclassified USAF Red Baron reports and tries
to explain the disparity between USAF and USN/USMC kill ratios. One
major point was that the AF for the most part had to go through longer
routes that were not covered by US radars, while the Navy had cruisers
just offshore to cover their routes. As proof of this he shows that
when the US finally had TEABALL in place and while it was working, the
AF kill ratio greatly improved to 4:1 for the first two months. He even
correlates US losses to the times when TEABALL was not functioning.
Another factor he points out is that the longer AF routes required
flying at higher altitudes, where the VPAF GCI could pick them up
earlier. This gave the VPAF more time to set up a higher percentage of
kill intercept. The Navy could fly lower due to its shorter routes.
Because of these factors, the VPAF put its best aircraft against
the AF routes and maximized its AAA along the Navy routes. The Navy
lost more aircraft to AAA than the AF did. The Navy only shot down 8
Mig-21s (one from a cruiser's missle) while the AF shot down 40.


Joe

"Joe Osman" wrote in message
oups.com...
In the Fall Air Power History magazine, which you Air Force types
can get from your unit historian, William Sayers wrote an article "The
Red Baron Reports: What They Really Said".
He looks at the now unclassified USAF Red Baron reports and tries
to explain the disparity between USAF and USN/USMC kill ratios. One
major point was that the AF for the most part had to go through longer
routes that were not covered by US radars, while the Navy had cruisers
just offshore to cover their routes. As proof of this he shows that
when the US finally had TEABALL in place and while it was working, the
AF kill ratio greatly improved to 4:1 for the first two months. He even
correlates US losses to the times when TEABALL was not functioning.
Another factor he points out is that the longer AF routes required
flying at higher altitudes, where the VPAF GCI could pick them up
earlier. This gave the VPAF more time to set up a higher percentage of
kill intercept. The Navy could fly lower due to its shorter routes.
Because of these factors, the VPAF put its best aircraft against
the AF routes and maximized its AAA along the Navy routes. The Navy
lost more aircraft to AAA than the AF did. The Navy only shot down 8
Mig-21s (one from a cruiser's missle) while the AF shot down 40.


Joe


Kind of overlooks the fact that of the 1000's of sampans, junks, etc. that
100's of them had radios to provide early warnings to Hanoi. Also how about
the ever present Russian trawlers that broadcast the news of every launch.
Besides historians are always making up excuses as to why things happened
the way they did. If they have to change a few things around to fit what
they believe so be it.

I will always believe that what happened in the early years was because
there were still people in power in Naval Aviation that had a fighter/attack
pilot mentality, as opposed to those in power in the AF which had been taken
over by SAC thinking.

Oversimplification. First, the issue of transit time for USN strikes
versus AF--the carriers could launch and be to the target in Route
Pack VI in less than 30 minutes. Most of that time would be overwater
and at low to medium altitudes. Definitely a short available reaction
time. Additionally, with few exceptions the Navy targeting trended to
be coastal, even on those days that they went to Nam Dinh or Kep, they
would still be able to get in and out in less than 30 minutes from feet
dry.

The AF used both overland and overwater approaches to targets in RP VI
(as well as combinations--in by sea/out by Laos or vice-versa). We
always used refueling on RP VI strikes (and that's not the 1000 pound
post-launch taps on a buddy-tank that the Navy uses)--orbiting at 20K
feet with twelve tankers or more, each with a flight of four sucking
gas until drop-off time will provide a lot of early warning for
interceptor launch.

Probability that a surface sampan with a radio could transmit to a
land-based GCI with early warning info is low--radar/radio horizon from
surface runs about 20 miles. Integration of that kind of input assumes
a technology level that probably wasn't likely at the time.

But, I'll agree that the difference in training and doctrine between
the services was significant regarding air/air. The Navy had the
philosophy of specialization (F vs A tasking) while the USAF was a
"jack-of-all-trades" concept. Navy had dedicated training in the
fighter role while the AF chose to concentrate on ground attack with
A/A as a corollary mission. Neither service had dissimilar A/A training
and with the exception of the AF Fighter Weapons School and the USN Top
Gun program, there were few highly trained air superiority folks.

Further, the Navy's dual track initial training put jet guys into seats
for a long time, while the USAF flawed concept of the "universally
assignable" pilot meant a lot of unsuitable folks got funnelled into
fighters from bombers, trainers, transports, etc, that didn't belong
there.

And, the Navy didn't lose more aircraft to AAA or any other
cause--proportional losses (losses relative to sortie numbers flown)
are largely parallel.