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#81
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On Sun, 18 Jan 2004 02:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote: If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just in the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units required less service support committment than frontline combat units (where the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K personnel right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be very surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense effort against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E requirements. The real question is where would the personelly otherwise tied up in the AA defense be more useful to the German war effort. Most of the crews were not fit to serve in the front line units either because they were in the wrong age or sex group. Some of them weren't even Germans. Against one eight man gun crew you'd have one ten man B-17 crew. Which crew costs its parent country more to sustain in the combat? Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to dedicate personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope of the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more manpower into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH, the Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels was a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well. Their tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to continue the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have been present had the CBO not occured. This point is valid, with some limits. Indeed, Allies could afford to send their best human material into strategic bombing. The question is whether this human material who flew and supported strategic bombing offensive could have been used more efficiently. It shouldn't be forgotten that half of the bombs dropped by CBO on German controlled territory was dropped after September 1944 when German army and air force were thoroughly defeated and were unlikely to survive 1945 campaign season even if CBO completely stopped then. CBO was a consequence of Germany being fully engaged in Soviet Union with Allies reluctant to risk their ground troops until they became sure in the victory. If it weren't for collapse of France in 1940, I doubt British would choose to build Bomber Command on the expense of increased BEF. They did? And what were they? The PIAT? They had antitank guns too. Not too many, but on the other hand, II SS Panzer corps didn't have that many tanks either. You are dreaming here--they faced those panzers, and they did NOT hold out "for a long time". They were expected to hold for 48 hours. They held out for nine days and their opponents weren't limited to II SS panzerkorps. Their AT capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL problems with Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets, and that great unknown--the weather. Allies had a capability to make two drops on the first day. They chose not to exercise it. It was a mistake. If there were more troops at Arnhem, Urquhart would have had enough troops to attack towards the bridge and hold the DZs. With only one drop, he deemed capture of the bridge more important and sent troops there hoping that XXX corps would establish the land supply line. Drax remove NOSPAM for reply |
#82
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"Drazen Kramaric" wrote in message ... On Sun, 18 Jan 2004 02:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks" wrote: If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just in the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units required less service support committment than frontline combat units (where the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K personnel right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be very surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense effort against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E requirements. The real question is where would the personelly otherwise tied up in the AA defense be more useful to the German war effort. Most of the crews were not fit to serve in the front line units either because they were in the wrong age or sex group. Some of them weren't even Germans. Heck, a significant number of the "front line" Wehrmacht troops in 1944 were either not Germans or over/underage. The simple fact is that those manpower resources *were* tied up in the defense effort at a time when their services were needed over a wide range of areas; the germans were not only lacking combat infantry troops at this point. They actually had *reduced* the AA protection afforded their front line units to beef up the AA force in the Reich--if nothing else (and I strongly suspect this is the most minor of contributions those folks could have made elsewhere) they could have brought the forward AA assets back to a point where allied tactical airpower would have been harder to employ. Against one eight man gun crew you'd have one ten man B-17 crew. Which crew costs its parent country more to sustain in the combat? Not the issue. As you note below, the allies had the resources to risk some waste--the Germans did not. Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to dedicate personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope of the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more manpower into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH, the Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels was a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well. Their tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to continue the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have been present had the CBO not occured. This point is valid, with some limits. Indeed, Allies could afford to send their best human material into strategic bombing. The question is whether this human material who flew and supported strategic bombing offensive could have been used more efficiently. I fail to see how, given that the allied forces on the ground in France were already straining a rather tenuous logistics chain. We had plenty of mediums to handle the steikes at transportation nets, etc., closer to the FLOT, and the limiting factor on CAS was more often the weather than it was any lack of airframes for that mission. The heavies contributions to tying down, and later eliminating for the most part, the Luftwaffe such that they were never able to effectively support their own front line forces, and their contribution to both the deeper transportation disruptions and the vital petroleum resources available to those forward German forces, outweigh any likely value to be obtained from "rerolling" them to another task. It shouldn't be forgotten that half of the bombs dropped by CBO on German controlled territory was dropped after September 1944 when German army and air force were thoroughly defeated and were unlikely to survive 1945 campaign season even if CBO completely stopped then. It should also be remembered that had the CBO not been underway, the Luftwaffe would have had a few thousand more aircraft and pilots available to oppose the allied ground efforts on *both* fronts, meaning that by Sep 1944 the Luftwaffe would *not* have been "thoroughly defeated" (or lacking seriously in petroleum products), and the ground picture might very well have been somewhat different as well. CBO was a consequence of Germany being fully engaged in Soviet Union with Allies reluctant to risk their ground troops until they became sure in the victory. Tell that to the million or more allied troops slogging their way up through Italy from 1943 onwards. Yes, the CBO did provide a method of striking Germany while the allies built up their capability to go ashore in France. IMO, that is a *good* thing, as otherwise the Germans would have had free reign to reorient their less-plentiful resources away from defending the Reich to other more dangerous (to the allies) pursuits. Ever wonder what the impact would have been had the Wehrmacht *just* gained a couple of thousand more 88mm dual-use guns on each front, guns that instead were dedicated to that defense against the CBO? How much more effective German defensive efforts on the ground would have been had they not been short of fuel? What the effect of a a couple of thousand more German aircraft flying in support of those German troops would have been? If it weren't for collapse of France in 1940, I doubt British would choose to build Bomber Command on the expense of increased BEF. The UK had already committed themselves to build a Bomber Command before the fall of France. In fact, BC had existed before the war even began (founded in 1937), and the specs for the first modern RAF four-engined bomber were released in 1936, resulting in the Stirling. I find it hard to believe you never heard of the pre-war slogan, "The bomber will always get through." They did? And what were they? The PIAT? They had antitank guns too. Not too many, but on the other hand, II SS Panzer corps didn't have that many tanks either. They had a few 6-pounders. But not enough. Nor was their ammo supply that good. The plain fact of the matter is that airborne troops are not intended to face significant armored threats (and that has not changed much since then). You are dreaming here--they faced those panzers, and they did NOT hold out "for a long time". They were expected to hold for 48 hours. They held out for nine days and their opponents weren't limited to II SS panzerkorps. They did not, and indeed could not (not in any way due to any lack of courage or ingenuity on the part of those poor guys stuck in Arnhem, either) hold out long enough. Montgomery's plan was fatally flawed from the outset--it was too ambitious, it did not properly take into account the effect of the terrain, and it failed to accurately template the enemy force (despite concrete indications of the presense of that armored corps). It was born more out of Montgomery's desire to regain the spotlight and acheive a higher priority for his own force compared to the US elements to his south than out of solid military planning; exacerbated by the significant pressure towards using the First Allied Airborne Army in a major way (even George C. Marshall was apparently urging their use in *some* kind of offensive thrust). Eliminating the CBO would not have changed any of those facts. Their AT capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL problems with Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets, and that great unknown--the weather. Allies had a capability to make two drops on the first day. They chose not to exercise it. It was a mistake. If there were more troops at Arnhem, Urquhart would have had enough troops to attack towards the bridge and hold the DZs. With only one drop, he deemed capture of the bridge more important and sent troops there hoping that XXX corps would establish the land supply line. If the allies already had this capability, why would the elimination of the CBO have changed the situation? And I differ with you as to holding the DZ's; they were located in tank country and would have been rolled up rather quickly, IMO (definitely more quickly than the effort to root out the paras in the city proper). Brooks Drax remove NOSPAM for reply |
#83
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On Wed, 21 Jan 2004 16:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote: Heck, a significant number of the "front line" Wehrmacht troops in 1944 were either not Germans or over/underage. There were no 16 year olds in Wehrmach in 1944, but they did serve in the AA units. Girls too were not considered for the front line duties. The simple fact is that those manpower resources *were* tied up in the defense effort at a time when their services were needed over a wide range of areas There is nothing simple in this "fact". High school students who otherwise would do their homeworks or sleep served in the AA units. Girls who otherwise would stay at home served in German version of WAAC. The increasing mass of forced and slave labour replaced German workforce which in turn went to the front. the germans were not only lacking combat infantry troops at this point. They actually had *reduced* the AA protection afforded their front line units to beef up the AA force in the Reich How many divisions lost their organic AA to supplement the air defense of the Reich? Not the issue. As you note below, the allies had the resources to risk some waste--the Germans did not. I am pointing it out that Germans used many resources in AAA that otherwise wouldn't have been used in the war effort. I fail to see how, given that the allied forces on the ground in France were already straining a rather tenuous logistics chain. We had plenty of mediums to handle the steikes at transportation nets, etc., closer to the FLOT, and the limiting factor on CAS was more often the weather than it was any lack of airframes for that mission. The size of the Allied tactical air forces was getting bigger as the war went on. So, if instead of heavies, Allies concentrated on light and medium bombers they could have had more tactical aircraft available for the given logistical capabilities in UK and Mediterranean. The heavies contributions to tying down, and later eliminating for the most part, the Luftwaffe such that they were never able to effectively support their own front line forces, and their contribution to both the deeper transportation disruptions and the vital petroleum resources available to those forward German forces, outweigh any likely value to be obtained from "rerolling" them to another task. What is the difference between shooting down Luftwaffe near the front and above Germany? If the whole point of the war is to park your tanks on the enemy airfield (the ultimate air defense), isn't it logical to concentrate on the support for the army? Unlike Russia, there was no large strategic depth for Wehrmach to use in the defense of Ruhr. Once Allies were in France, Wehrmacht (inluding Luftwaffe) had to fight and win to prevent the invasion of Germany, i.e. Luftwaffe has to come up and fight. It should also be remembered that had the CBO not been underway, the Luftwaffe would have had a few thousand more aircraft and pilots available to oppose the allied ground efforts on *both* fronts, meaning that by Sep 1944 the Luftwaffe would *not* have been "thoroughly defeated" (or lacking seriously in petroleum products), and the ground picture might very well have been somewhat different as well. The history of air war in the Mediterraean gives a clear picture of the capabilities of Luftwaffe to interfere with Allied operations performed under the fighter umbrella. Whereever Luftwaffe rose to fight it was defeated with heavy losses. Without significant CBO, German planes were going to be shot down by Allied and Soviet fighters just as well. Tell that to the million or more allied troops slogging their way up through Italy from 1943 onwards. The number of Allied and German troops deployed against each other in 1943 was miniscule in comparison to Eastern front. Yes, the CBO did provide a method of striking Germany while the allies built up their capability to go ashore in France. IMO, that is a *good* thing, as otherwise the Germans would have had free reign to reorient their less-plentiful resources away from defending the Reich to other more dangerous (to the allies) pursuits. Ever wonder what the impact would have been had the Wehrmacht *just* gained a couple of thousand more 88mm dual-use guns on each front, guns that instead were dedicated to that defense against the CBO? First, they would have to train real soldiers to man them, second, they would have to create a logistical base to support them, third, they were going to face the increased number of tactical air that was built instead of heavies. How much more effective German defensive efforts on the ground would have been had they not been short of fuel? As long as Germans held Ploesti there was little air forces were going to do about it. Only when Soviets overran the place, Germans felt the real shortages. Anyway, Allies invasion of Normandy did not succeed because of any shortage of oil and once Allies established themselves in France, Germany was incapable of manning two fronts. What the effect of a a couple of thousand more German aircraft flying in support of those German troops would have been? None. They would have been shot down by the proportionally stronger Allied air forces. The UK had already committed themselves to build a Bomber Command before the fall of France. In fact, BC had existed before the war even began (founded in 1937), and the specs for the first modern RAF four-engined bomber were released in 1936, resulting in the Stirling. I find it hard to believe you never heard of the pre-war slogan, "The bomber will always get through." I heard it. Fortunately, there was a man in RAF who didn't believe it, Hugh Dowding. Anyway, in 1940 RAF did not posses the means for the substantial strategic bombing campaign against Germany. So, the force that eventually burnt Hamburg to the ground did not exist prior to the fall of France. In the case of fortunate event of France holding against German onslaught, I'd expect for British to expand the BEF and its tactical component, rather than leave the ground fighting to French alone and proceed with the building a historical sized Bomber Command. In 1940, there was no Eastern front and France itself was incapable of waging an offensive ground war against Germany. No ammount of 1940 bombers was going to compensate for the disadvantage at the front. It was the lack of ground front that left British with no valid alternative than pursuing strategic bombing on the large scale. They did not, and indeed could not (not in any way due to any lack of courage or ingenuity on the part of those poor guys stuck in Arnhem, either) hold out long enough. Montgomery's plan was fatally flawed from the outset--it was too ambitious, it did not properly take into account the effect of the terrain, and it failed to accurately template the enemy force (despite concrete indications of the presense of that armored corps). It was born more out of Montgomery's desire to regain the spotlight and acheive a higher priority for his own force compared to the US elements to his south than out of solid military planning; exacerbated by the significant pressure towards using the First Allied Airborne Army in a major way (even George C. Marshall was apparently urging their use in *some* kind of offensive thrust). Eliminating the CBO would not have changed any of those facts. Montgomery was hardly the only one to blame for the failure of Market-Garden. His plan was approved by Eisenhower and the alternative plans offered no substantial advantage over the Market Garden. The presence of _remnants_ of II SS Panzerkorps was not the fatal drop that killed the Market Garden. The bulk of troops that slowed down British 2nd army (don't forget that M-G wasn't a XXX corps operation only) came from German 15th and 1st Parachute armies, not from the SS. The "division" that fought British at Arnhem was division in name only, its strength was closer to the regimental "kampfgruppe" commanded by highest ranking officer in the division, Lt. Colonel. Harzer. King Tigers that eventually reached the battlefield came from Germany. If the allies already had this capability, why would the elimination of the CBO have changed the situation? And I differ with you as to holding the DZ's; they were located in tank country and would have been rolled up rather quickly, IMO (definitely more quickly than the effort to root out the paras in the city proper). I don't even know who originally tied M-G with CBO, but it wasn't my. I only replied to specific issues tied to the M-G. As far as I know, the original plan included the capture of nearby airfield to enable British 51st airlanding division to take part in the combat. The dual task presented to the 1st Airborne division (taking the bridge and securing the DZ) made Urquhart replacement dividing the forces which in turn were too weak to accomplish any of the missions. Drax remove NOSPAM for reply |
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