FAA throws pilots under the Airbus

D Ramapriya wrote

But the point about LNAV (PROFILE in Airbuses) remains - why had the
A320's FMC not commenced descent from TOD unless these coves had left
open the option of manual initiation?

Ramapriya,...you have no concept of the airway congestion that we have
here in the USofA compared to the Middle East. I don't think that ATC
would even consider having all of those airliners autonomously starting
descent.

BTW, what is a "cove"? My "Webster's" doesn't seem to know either.

Bob Moore

D Ramapriya

And that's what most SOPs hereafter will I'm sure incorporate...
something along the lines of "shut down all laptops" after the
"Approach Briefing" item on the checklist. Or even a "Check flight
deck alertness" directive to the Chief Cabin Attendant ere TOD

At PanAm, the Flight Attendants were required to check the cockpit
every 10-15 minutes. Of course, this was before the 9-11 armoured
cockpit door.

Bob Moore
Remembering the "good ole" days of airline flying

On Oct 30, 4:43*pm, Robert Moore wrote:
D Ramapriya wrote



But the point about LNAV (PROFILE in Airbuses) remains - why had the
A320's FMC not commenced descent from TOD unless these coves had left
open the option of manual initiation?

Ramapriya,...you have no concept of the airway congestion that we have
here in the USofA compared to the Middle East. I don't think that ATC
would even consider having all of those airliners autonomously starting
descent.

BTW, what is a "cove"? My "Webster's" doesn't seem to know either.

Bob Moore


"guy", "bloke", "person", "cove", "sod", "chap", even "cobber"... all
the same

And thanks for the info on autonomous descents; didn't know that that
worry ATC

Ramapriya

On Oct 30, 4:43*pm, Clark wrote:
D Ramapriya wrote in news:0e1dac61-33d6-489b-a9c0-
:



On Oct 30, 12:00*am, Mike Ash wrote:
In article
,
*D Ramapriya wrote:

[snip]

But the point about LNAV (PROFILE in Airbuses) remains - why had the
A320's FMC not commenced descent from TOD unless these coves had left
open the option of manual initiation?

There is no point here. The aircraft cannot descend until instructed to or
approved by ATC. Setting the FMC to automatically descend would be contrary
to normal operations in the ATC system.


Yep, Bob's post said so. I wonder if ATCs around the world work
differently because on the one occasion I've been in the flight deck,
the letdown commenced automatically. I remember it well because I was
so awed.


Gotta love these "analyses" by folks with superficial knowledge. Maybe they
take their lead from newspaper and television reporters...
(that was an impolite way to say that speculation is pointless since the
foundation knowledge is lacking)


Point taken mate, however I've never claimed to have even superficial
knowledge, so pretence and/or dishonesty you can't accuse me of

Ramapriya

Robert Moore wrote:
D Ramapriya wrote
But the point about LNAV (PROFILE in Airbuses) remains - why had the
A320's FMC not commenced descent from TOD unless these coves had left
open the option of manual initiation?

Ramapriya,...you have no concept of the airway congestion that we have
here in the USofA compared to the Middle East. I don't think that ATC
would even consider having all of those airliners autonomously starting
descent.

BTW, what is a "cove"? My "Webster's" doesn't seem to know either.

Bob Moore


Cove: Old term in the English vernacular standing for 'fellow'
Refer to Wodehouse.

Brian W

brian whatcott wrote
Robert Moore wrote:
BTW, what is a "cove"? My "Webster's" doesn't seem to know either.

Cove: Old term in the English vernacular standing for 'fellow'
Refer to Wodehouse.

Yes Brian, I did already know due to my worldwide travels with PanAm,
and my British next door neighbors.
I was just yanking the chain of my very good personal friend, Ramapriya,
who does tend to us a lot of English words/phrases with which the
average American would be unfamiliar.

Bob Moore

On Oct 31, 7:10*am, Robert Moore wrote:
brian whatcott *wrote

Robert Moore wrote:
BTW, what is a "cove"? My "Webster's" doesn't seem to know either.

Cove: Old term in the English vernacular standing for 'fellow'
Refer to Wodehouse.

Yes Brian, I did already know due to my worldwide travels with PanAm,
and my British next door neighbors.
I was just yanking the chain of my very good personal friend, Ramapriya,
who does tend to us a lot of English words/phrases with which the
average American would be unfamiliar.

It's so nice to see English as it is spoken

"Dudley Henriques" wrote in message
...

I agree. This incident included several career ending actions even
before you get into WHAT they were doing to cause the actions in
question and the FAA was perfectly justified in lifting the two
certificates. In this business there exists an environment concerning
safety that allows no "first time offenses" in the area these two
pilots were operating. You commit offenses in the category involved
here and you are justifiably history.
Dudley Henriques

OK, I must admit that I must have missed something critical here .

I can personally think of a couple of really obvious possibilities, but I
don't recall any usefull discussion of those possibilities in the media or
(surprise) here on this NG. So, which career ending actions (or inactions)
particularly caught your attention.

The reason that I find the question necessary is that I used to work in
radio and television broadcasting, and transmitter operating logs are
required for all transmitters of significant power output. Log entries were
required, by the FCC, every 30 minutes in the old days; then every hour for
the next several years; and finally, by about 30 years ago, every 3 hours.
In the old days, it was very unusual for anyone to miss a log entry by more
than a couple of minutes; but, after the change to 3 hour intervals, it was
not uncommon to find someone trying to catch up his entries at the end of a
shift.

So, until I have heard or seen a presuasive argument for some other cause, I
am inclined to believe that the transition to closed cockpit doors a couple
of decades ago and then to further isolation of the flight crews since 2001
has led to a progressively less business-like working environment for the
pilots.

IMHO, it seems possible that we may just be substituting one set of problems
for another--that may be a little less potentially damaging or possibly a
little more...

Or as a former coworked likes to say it: "Every time we push it in
someplace, it pops out someplace else!"

Anyway, Dudley, which actions or inactions caught your eye?

Peter

On Oct 30, 6:01*pm, "Peter Dohm" wrote:
"Dudley Henriques" wrote in message

...

I agree. This incident included several career ending actions even
before you get into WHAT they were doing to cause the actions in
question and the FAA was perfectly justified in lifting the two
certificates. In this business there exists an environment concerning
safety that allows no "first time offenses" in the area these two
pilots were operating. You commit *offenses in the category involved
here and you are justifiably history.
Dudley Henriques

OK, I must admit that I must have missed something critical here .

I can personally think of a couple of really obvious possibilities, but I
don't recall any usefull discussion of those possibilities in the media or
(surprise) here on this NG. *So, which career ending actions (or inactions)
particularly caught your attention.

The reason that I find the question necessary is that I used to work in
radio and television broadcasting, and transmitter operating logs are
required for all transmitters of significant power output. *Log entries were
required, by the FCC, every 30 minutes in the old days; then every hour for
the next several years; and finally, by about 30 years ago, every 3 hours..
In the old days, it was very unusual for anyone to miss a log entry by more
than a couple of minutes; but, after the change to 3 hour intervals, it was
not uncommon to find someone trying to catch up his entries at the end of a
shift.

So, until I have heard or seen a presuasive argument for some other cause, I
am inclined to believe that the transition to closed cockpit doors a couple
of decades ago and then to further isolation of the flight crews since 2001
has led to a progressively less business-like working environment for the
pilots.

IMHO, it seems possible that we may just be substituting one set of problems
for another--that may be a little less potentially damaging or possibly a
little more...

Or as a former coworked likes to say it: *"Every time we push it in
someplace, it pops out someplace else!"

Anyway, Dudley, which actions or inactions caught your eye?

Peter

I'm in the flight safety business. My opinion on this matter reflects
ONLY that aspect of the incident and is not intended to reflect the
legal end of the equation.
For me, the answer is obvious. Had I been asked for input on what
transpired that input would directly address the fact that by
definition, this aircraft while in operation requires a pilot in
command at all times. In the flight safety context, this equates to no
action taking place concerning the operation of the aircraft that is
accomplished without the complete knowledge and consent of that pilot
in command. In other words, this aircraft was, at various times during
the progress of it's flight, NOT in control of the required decision
making process of BOTH the pilots in question AND the ATC on the
ground responsible for traffic separation.
As it happens, several actions occurred during the flight that
resulted in this aircraft proceeding outside the direct control of ATC
due to action by the aircraft without input of a pilot in command.
This alone in my opinion is a career ending action. Were these pilots
in my employ I would have terminated them immediately based on the
above observation alone.
In the flight safety business, what a pilot did prior to an incident
involving this kind of negligence is of absolutely no consequence
whatsoever. Were this the case, first time pilot error and negligence
would be non-existent as a possible cause. The fact that no accident
took place during this incident is fortunate but one has to consider
that ANY avoidance action resulting in no accident having taken place
has to be attributed to sources outside the aircraft. ATC, due to lack
of requested response had no choice but to take action designed to
insure the security and safety of this aircraft. Such action had to be
taken without the involvement of any pilot in command inside the
aircraft.
For me, as a safety adviser, there is absolutely no argument with the
FAA action based on the safety issue. As I said, the legal issues are
another matter yet to be decided.
Dudley Henriques

On Oct 28, 5:35*pm, Dudley Henriques wrote:

This incident included several career ending actions even
before you get into WHAT they were doing to cause the actions in
question and the FAA was perfectly justified in lifting the two
certificates.

And anything they might have been doing other than attending to their
duties is entirely irrelevant.

The evidence seems to consist mostly of the account/s of the crew
which amount to confessions of multiple counts of gross and willful
dereliction of duty, with little to contradict them.

"We suspect you did not respond to ATC because you failed to switch
frequencies and/or were asleep."

"Pfft. Are you ****tin' me? We heard 'em, we just ignored 'em."

That might be why a lengthy investigation was not considered necessary
and immediate revocation appropriate.

I can imagine the conversations with attorneys: Get an agent and write
a book: here's a name. You might check to see if you can get one of
those handicapped parking things for mental disabilities. Sign here.
Initial here. No, I don't need your cell number.
-----

- gpsman