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#181
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Mike Williamson wrote in message ...
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote: The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany, thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared. I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may not be taking an overall view. Would it help is I mentioned the implied late 1943 and early 1944 and on heavy bomber escort missions? The P-38 had real problems with both tactics and equipment in this environment. Most of the problems with P-38 operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort, much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain. Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses. The P-38s had cockpit heating problems with rally degraded pilot performance, they also had problems with high speed dives, the pilots were very wary of them, and the Luftwaffe liked diving away from combat. It made it hard to use the dive tactic. Also, unlike the Pacific the P-38 was not significantly faster than the fighters it was engaging. The trouble with training is a limit on early deployment of effective fighters. In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the defenders) had about the same results as their brethren in -47s and -51s. As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do you have on the mission. The P-38 also proved highly successful with 9AF on low level interdiction sorties. Agreed. Adding in its ability to be adapted to do almost anything (how many P-51s were ever fitted with a Norden bombsight or pathfinder blind bombing radar system?) and the P-38 was highly successful in Europe. As a fighter bomber clearly it worked well. Unfortunately the requirement is for a high altitude long range escort fighter in 1943. It's reputation suffered from engine problems (which were absolutely unknown in the MTO, PTO, or even Alaskan theaters, and were quite possibly due to fuel problems which admittedly affected the turbosupercharged Allisons more than the Merlins) and from the inevitable process of being the aircraft tasked with proving that your current doctrine isn't working the way it should. And that meant the ability to put together a reliable escort force was significantly reduced. A poster noted that the use of P-38s in the photo-recon role (F-4 and F-5) limited the number of armed fighter types available, but strategically a squadron of long range high speed photographers (particularly in the Pacific) was almost certainly more valuable than another squadron of fighters - unless they are your escort for the day, of course. The poster was me, pointing out the reality of allocating scarce resources instead of the cardboard cut out "bad guys" approach to the history. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#182
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WalterM140 wrote:
snip Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone 1942. Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low relatively late. If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might have been overcome. But the P-38 wasn't "the only aircraft even remotely capable" of long range escort, especially not in 1943. Remember that the longest-ranged US escort fighter of the war wasn't a P-38 or P-51. As I pointed out in another post, the P-38 prior to the J had 300 gallons of internal fuel, and the P-47 prior to the D-25 had 305. Go he http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/More_P-38_Stuff.html and here http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/P-47.html And click on the links for the "Flight Operation Instruction Chart" for both a/c (it helps if you save them and then tile them side by side). This is for a P-38L w/410 gallons internal instead of 300, vs. an early model P-47 w/o water injection, but just compare the cruise ranges and gal/hr. fuel flows in say Cruise Condition IV at 25,000 or 30,000 feet, with each a/c assumed to have 250 gallons of fuel for cruise. You'll note that the range is identical at 700 statute miles, with the P-38L cruising slightly faster (an earlier version without the extra internal fuel would probably cruise a bit slower for max. range) but burning about 3-4 gal./hr. more than the P-47. The need was for a longer-range fighter, and the P-38, P-47 and P-51 could all be modified to increase theirinternal/ and/or external fuel carriage. And they all were. The P-38's original perceived range advantage was due to its large external, unpressurized 165 gallon ferry tanks, which was fine in the low/medium overwater cruise conditions typical of the PTO and MTO, but unacceptable in the ETO owing to the need to be above 20,000 feet relatively soon to avoid flak on crossing the occupied Dutch/Belgian/French coasts. Otherwise the P-47's 200 gallon ferry tank would have been reasonably acceptable in the ETO, and histories would be describing the P-47 as a long-range fighter from the get go. Instead, the tank was carried only half full so that all the fuel would be burned by the time the a/c reached about 22,000 feet or so, above which no fuel could be drawn. Better than nothing, but the a/c had to pay the drag for 200 gallons of fuel while only receiving the benefit of 100 gallons. The same would have been the case with the P-38, and there would have been no point in carrying more than a single 165 gallon tank for ETO high altitude escort missions. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly 3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos, radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in, then they had to re-tool before they could produce them. snip 3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the ETO. That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it. But they did not. Can't push what you don't know you need, They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else had tumbled onto it. Summarizing from Freeman, the first RFI for availability of drop tanks for fighters was sent from the 8th back to Air Materiel Command on 3 October 1942, which certainly implies that improved range was on someone's mind quite early. After it became clear that the 8th would only be dealing with the P-47 for some time, arrangements were made in January 1943 to ship Republic 200 gallon paper composite ferry tanks to the UK. A few arrived in February and were evaluated by VIIITH AFSC at Langford Lodge and by Cass Hough's 8th Air Technical Section at Bovingdon, numerous operational deficiencies being noted, including poor aerodynamics, lack of pressurization so fuel couldn't be drawn above 22,000 feet, the tank tended to impact the a/c upon release, and if fuel was left in the tanks for more than a few hours it started to leak. The tank also lacked the strength to be pressurized. Changes were designed and tested to improve the jettison behavior. Simultaneously 8th AFSC was requested to design a 100 gallon steel tank that could be attached under a P-47, and which wouldn't suffer from the faults of the Republic tank. Prototype testing was successful in March, and an order was placed to deliver 1,000/month starting in June, but shortages of sheet steel in England delayed production. Meanwhile, In May 8th ATS had managed to modify the P-47's instrument vacuum system to pressurize a drop tank, which meant that fuel could be drawn as high as 35,000 feet. Further improvements were made to the design as well as to the tank pipe connections to ensure a clean break on jettison. Production delays with the steel 100 gallon tank caused ATS to look at the British 108 gallon paper composite tank as a substitute. It had been examined earlier but was insufficiently strong to be pressurized. Investigation found that it was possible to strengthen the tank to withstand 17psi, and it was cleared for production on 7 July 1943. The first was delivered on 12 July. Meanwhile, because the need was so obvious, 8th FC decided to use the 200 gallon Republic tank despite its deficiencies, as being the only tank available in any quantity (1,150 on hand on 24 July 1943) at the time. It was only filled halfway owing to the lack of pressurization, and they were dropped at 23,000 feet. As an additional stopgap, in July 4,000 nominally 75 gallon (actually 84 gallon) P-39 tanks which had been ordered from the US had also arrived. These provided about as much radius increase as the half-full 200 gallon tanks owing to their far lower drag, and could be pressurized. However, modifications had to be made to the tanks and the P-47s to fit them to belly shackles. First mission use followed in late August 1943, after the 56th FG's a/c had been modified. At the beginning of September the first cylindrical 108 gallon steel tanks (the production version of the ATS 100 gallon design) started delivery, and the same month the strengthened 108 gal. cylindrical paper tanks began delivery, seeing first use on the 27 September mission to Emden. A problem with these tanks was that there was only 4 inches of ground clearance when mounted on the P-47's centerline, making them unusable on rough airfields. A request for a flat 150 gallon steel tank to avoid this problem was made in August, with the tanks being delivered starting in the following February. Meanwhile more 75 gallon P-39 steel tanks had been arriving, but further deliveries were cancelled in December, at which time 7,500 108 gallon tanks had been delivered. The 75 gallon tanks were then restricted to P-51 units until used up. In early 1944, P-47s had wing pylons added (a production change), which allowed a pair of 108 gallon (or even 150 gallon) tanks to be carried underwing, although some delay ensued owing to the need to improve sway braces. Only when this point was reached was the P-47's combat radius limited by its internal fuel capacity. The P-47D-25 with increased internal tankage and a bubble canopy was in production, but deliveries would obviously take some time to make it to the operating theaters. That was less of a problem than it might have been, as the P-51 and P-38J which had been going through much the same range improvement process (but without the big fuselage redesign also underway on the P-47D-25) were available in increasing numbers to provide the TARCAP, while the P-47s provided ingress and egress escort. Ultimately the P-47N became the longest-ranged escort fighter of WW2, but it took a near total wing redesign to do it, and the a/c just barely made it into the war in the Pacific. The point of all this is that the 8th was aware of the range issue and was doing what it could to improve it with the a/c (P-47) and resources available to it, from a very early stage. They were forced to utilize many stopgaps and work-arounds, but with two possible exceptions, it seems to me that the 8th was doing everything in their power to fix the problem (along with thousands of others). The first exception was Eaker's placing improved fighter range 4th on his priority list (and I've never seen what Nos. 1-3 were, so am not in a position to judge if the order should have been changed). The second exception was the relatively long time between the request for a 150 gallon flat tank and its availability. I assume this was probably due to materiel shortages, but don't know. Alternatively the P-47 could have been given wet wing pylons earlier, but that's probably requires a production mod (for wing strengthening at least), not a field retrofit. and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity for them to work out the bugs. Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December 1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa. The 78th arrived in Nov. - Dec., and the a/c and pilots were sent down to North Africa in February. In the meantime, few bombing missions were flown owing to the poor weather, and I'm not even sure if the 78th flew any combat missions at the time - they may well have been training, or rectifying equipment deficiencies. Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and equipment of new units." Perhaps what it comes down to is this: Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really started to hurt the Fortresses? You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it. As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in the world as far as Arnold was concerned. But not as far as the rest of the JCS, CCS and the respective governments were concerned, and Arnold was going to go along with them. If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have been provided. And they were, but only from about Nov. - Dec. 1943, as early as it was possible to do so, and six months after the requirement was identified. And the same holds true for every other theater, except that they got their long-range escorts even later. The P-38F/G/H was a useful interim "long-range fighter" in those theaters where altitude and climate performance wasn't the issue it was in the ETO, but it wasn't inherently any longer-ranged than the contemporary P-47. As far as long-range and combat radius goes, the best 1943 medium and high altitude fighter was the early Corsair, with 361 gallons internal and a 150 gallon tank. But the 124 gallons in the wings was a bit dangerous (not self-sealing, but inerted), and was deleted from later versions. Now there's a 'what if' for you, but it suffers from similar production number limitations as the P-38 in that timeframe. snip Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter of 1942/43. They should have. Why? Because they got their asses handed to them. Not prior to mid-43 they hadn't, so why should they be expected to be clairvoyant in late '42? snip Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have been increased. And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single P-38 they could get. Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's. I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say, this is the most important fighter we have? In the MTO and PTO, you bet they did. Which were the only theaters they were being used in at the time. The USAAF was sold on the Thunderbolt. And was doing everything possible to improve it, in the theaters it was being used in. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also. snip Not that I've seen, once the performance of the Mk.X conversion was known. But it took NA quite a while to a production design and then get it into production and service, and the Mustang was the fastest US fighter development program in the World War 2 period. I've seen no indication that there was unnecessary delay in that period; the delay seems to have been in the Mustang I era, when the USAAF was so dilatory in testing it. Guy |
#183
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"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII Bomber Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory." -- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton "During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit, Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly long escort missions." ibid, p. 114 I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that he communicated such with Lovett. So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during Eaker's period of command? You seem to have just made it up. Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history. You lied. You got caught. Again. You wrote: Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett such as you said he did. Bye, Sinclair. Walt |
#185
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Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Nele VII" AP Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: ArtKramr wrote in message ... ubject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Keith Willshaw" hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C as being unsuitable for combat use. Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to the Russians. Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace ))))) Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too few of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots to be acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians were not so fortunate Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#186
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"ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Nele VII" AP Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: ArtKramr wrote in message ... ubject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Keith Willshaw" hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C as being unsuitable for combat use. Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to the Russians. Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace ))))) Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too few of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots to be acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians were not so fortunate The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944. Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England. They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF fighter used in the European theatre. Keith |
#187
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Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: "Keith Willshaw" Date: 7/20/2004 7:09 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: "ArtKramr" wrote in message ... Subject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Nele VII" AP Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: ArtKramr wrote in message ... ubject: Night bombers interception.... From: "Keith Willshaw" hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C as being unsuitable for combat use. Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to the Russians. Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace ))))) Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too few of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots to be acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians were not so fortunate The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944. Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England. They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF fighter used in the European theatre. Keith The Med and the ETO were two world's apart. No comparison on any basis. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#188
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Geoffrey Sinclair" Date: 7/20/2004 2:24 AM Pacific Standard Time As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do you have on the mission. The only P-38's I ever saw in the ETO carried cameras for recon work. No guns.They used to come in at our field at Florennes for gas.on thier way home. Besides for the cost and labor to make a P-38 you could darn near make two P-51's, so why bother? Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#189
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These rockets
were very effective and often took out 3 or 4 bombers and broke up the formation. Often? That doesn't jibe with German claims - multiple claims from a single rocket salvo were VERY rare, as most of the pilots using them misjudged the release point for the often-erratic WGr 21s. Damage to more than one bomber was common; but destroying more than one was not. I haven't met a LW pilot that felt the rockets were a better choice than cannons - and I have heard more than one of them curse about those "damned rockets" that made their aircraft sitting ducks for escorts. v/r Gordon ====(A+C==== USN SAR Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine. |
#190
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As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do you have on the mission. They were certainly being used. An example: The 1st fighter group conducted 12 heavy bomber escort missions in April, 1945. That's down from 18 heavy bomber escort missions in April, 1944. But in that month the group conducted only one other operation--a strafing mission. However, in April, 1945, the 1st, besides the 12 bomber escort missions, conducted 29 photo escort missions, 14 dive-bombing missions, 10 armed reconnaissance missions, and two fighters sweeps. Busy schedule. Chris Mark |
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