JASPO Experts On Civil Aircraft Survivability

Aircraft Survivability • Spring 2003 • http://jas.jcs.mil
Although susceptibility-reduction measures such as the installation of
IRCM systems on airliners would no doubt improve the survivability of
those aircraft, experience has shown that vulnerability reduction
should
not be overlooked. Simply focusing on the susceptibility side of
military
aircraft was not sufficient, and many pilots owe their safe return
from
hostile environments to vulnerability reduction efforts. Since no IRCM
system is likely to prove 100 percent effective against all current
and
emerging IR missile threats, it may be wise to direct additional
attention
towards reducing civil aircraft vulnerability. Regardless of the
measures used on any particular aircraft design—whether relying
on such familiar approaches such as dispersing redundant critical
components around the aircraft, armoring
hydraulic lines, installing self-sealing fuel lines, and installing
strategically-placed fuel shut-off valves, or whether one looks
towards fuel tank fire and explosion protection through the use of
powder panels or other
technology, adjusting fuel chemistry to reduce the chances of fire or
explosion,
improved turbine blade and disk debris containment, or even adopting
explosive-resistant and lightweight fuselage materials—focusing
additional
resources on vulnerability reduction should be a priority. An
additional benefit that comes from vulnerability reduction efforts is
that
they also provide a degree of protection against non-IR threats such
as RF
missiles, RPGs, high-caliber machine guns and sniper rifles, as well
as from
damage caused by explosives that might slip through the passenger and
baggage screening process.
The efforts of the survivability community have resulted in the design
of
combat aircraft that are significantly more likely to avoid and
survive
MANPADS attacks. One notable example is the success of the
F/A–18 Hornet during Desert Storm.
The time may have come to apply aggressively the lessons learned in
the military
context to the civil air fleet. This will not likely be cheap and will
in all
likelihood necessitate live-fire testing with an assortment of
commercial
aircraft of different sizes and different propulsion systems. Whether
such
tests are conducted on static aircraft or whether additional funding
can be
obtained to “drone” the test aircraft, to avoid conducting
live-fire testing
based on cost considerations would be shortsighted.
Regardless of the funding mechanism, arguments against such testing
based on cost considerations are misplaced.

Put that one in your pipe and smoke it brooks

"sid" wrote in message
om...

snip

Simply focusing on the susceptibility side of
military
aircraft was not sufficient, and many pilots owe their safe return
from
hostile environments to vulnerability reduction efforts.

There is controlling susceptability (via measures such as stealth and IRCM),
and then there is controlling susceptability (by keeping the birds out of
the main threat envelope)....

Since no IRCM
system is likely to prove 100 percent effective against all current
and
emerging IR missile threats, it may be wise to direct additional
attention
towards reducing civil aircraft vulnerability.

....and this is an example of that. IRCM? If the E-10 and ACS are operating
where they are supposed to be operating, they won't even need that, except
to hamper any would-be martyr lurking off the end of the runway hoping for
an approach or departure shot.

snip

Sorry, but the plain ol' fact is that commercial airframes are quite
sufficient for the roles of such aircraft as the E-10, ACS, C-40, C-21,
C/RC-12, ARL-M, etc.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
Sorry, but the plain ol' fact is that commercial airframes are quite
sufficient for the roles of such aircraft as the E-10, ACS, C-40, C-21,
C/RC-12, ARL-M, etc.


this really isnt the topic of my original post, but in response to
your deflection...

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf

• Without early air dominance, many ISR systems could not
have been used to optimal effect.
– Vulnerable manned aircraft like JSTARS & EP-3 operated deep
in Iraqi airspace
– Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR
– Unmanned vehicles nearly defenseless if attacked

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/...MR1398.ch4.pdf
Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets
Alan Vick, Richard M. Moore, Bruce R. Pirnie, John Stillion

If China continues to field increasingly advanced air defenses, such
as the SA-20, SA-15, and S-400, U.S. surveillance and strike options
will be constrained seriously.
China has significantly upgraded its air defense capabilities in
recent
years by deploying Russian-designed SA-10 surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) at several sites opposite Taiwan. In addition, the SA-10 is in
production under license in China, and the Chinese have offered an
indigenously designed anti-radiation missile (ARM) variant for export
that is specifically designed to attack high-value surveillance
platforms such as the AWACS and Joint STARS. By 2020, it is reasonable
to assume that the Chinese will have upgraded their SAM capability
to the level of the current Russian SA-20 system. The SA-20
is an advanced version of the SA-10. It has a 200-km range and
extremely
effective guidance and control systems that can intercept
aircraft flying between 10 and 30,000 m and tactical ballistic
missiles.

http://www.pakistanidefence.com/news...acsKillers.htm

October 19, 2003: Confirming China's acquiescence to support Pakistan
in dealing with the strategic challenge posed by Indo-Israel military
collaboration, reliable European defence experts have claimed that
Chinese "AWACS Killers" would play a key role in Pakistan's strategy
to counter Indo-Israel Phalcon deal.
FT-2000 commonly known as "AWACS Killers", surface to air missile
(SAM), designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the most
appropriate option, if the USA refuses to provide the same kind of
"AWACS" to Pakistan which are being sold to India by Israel under the
approval of Washington. "Pakistan is also considering a project to
produce FT-2000 "AWACS Killers" type of missiles, indigenously",
claimed an expert requesting anonymity. Pakistan and China are equally
concerned over the India-Israel Phalcon deal concluded with
Washington's acquiescence and are of the view that the transfer of
AWACS technology to India would challenge the delicate conventional
military equilibrium in South Asia, disturbing the no win situation
which guarantees peace in the region.
Indian clarification that it will use the Phalcons in only 'Kargil
type of intrusions' has failed to assuage authorities in Beijing, who
believe that the India-Israel-Russia Il-76-Phalcon deal is deleterious
for regional peace as Phalcons are force-multipliers and would
dramatically alter the conventional weapons balance in the region.
Pakistani Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat's
statement on Pakistani endeavours to counter the India-Israeli Phalcon
Radar System deal and his claim that 'the nation would hear good news
by June 30, 2004' has been interpreted by European experts in the
context of the perceived Pak-China cooperation on this issue.


http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...02/lambeth.doc

That said, however, JFCs in future contingencies will almost surely
have to contend with threats of double-digit SAMs, namely the Rus-sian
S-300PM (NATO code name SA-10) and the comparably lethal SA-12 through
SA-20, well before the F-22 and F-35 begin coming on-line in
operationally significant numbers. The SA-10 and SA-12 are lethal out
to a slant range of 80 nautical miles, five times the killing reach of
the earlier-generation SA-3.51 One SA-10/12 site in Belgrade and one
in Pristina could have provided defensive coverage over all of Serbia
and Kosovo. They also could have threatened Rivet Joint, Compass Call,
and other key allied aircraft such as the airborne command and control
center and the Navy's E-2C operating well outside enemy airspace.