Fatal crash Arizona

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 6:38:20 AM UTC-7, Renny wrote:
In doing some research last night I sadly came upon another fatal glider accident that also happened at Aguila, AZ. This occurred 8 years ago to the day in 2006. The NTSB report is at this URL:



http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/br...10X00545&key=1



In a strange twist of fate this accident also occurred on May 3 and it also happened during the early portion of the launch when the glider reached approx 150 feet on tow.



Let's all hope that important lessons are learned and that everyone can be more aware and better prepared in case of a problem early in a launch.



Thx - Renny







On Monday, May 5, 2014 11:07:50 PM UTC-6, wrote:

On Monday, May 5, 2014 8:17:31 PM UTC-7, kirk.stant wrote:



On Monday, May 5, 2014 1:38:32 PM UTC-7, Mike the Strike wrote:







I have flown into and out of Sampley's a few times. The terrain at Sampley's rises to the east and falls to the west. Heading west, you are over slightly falling terrain with open fields for landing. On an easterly departure, you may be at an indicated 200 feet above take-off but may only be 100' over terrain. Straight-ahead landing options are not very enticing to the east once you've passed the end of the strip, so a turn back from an indicated 200' may seem like the best option.























Minor correction: Sampley runs North-South, with takeoffs invariably uphill to the South. South gets slowly higher until some hills (all raw desert), North gently slopes down to the center of the valley (mostly agricultural fields - all landable).















Not too many good options if PTT is really low taking off to the South; you pretty much have to either get back to the runway or accept a desert landing.















Sad.















Kirk







66







I took off about 15 minutes ahead of Bob (was 1st in line and he was 3rd). There were the usual bumpy spots (up and down gusts) in the first 50 or so feet AGL and then the usual booming lift at the end of the runway. As we got to the end of the runway we were lower than I had experienced previously there, and I have probably 10 years of flying from there. The tow plane was running fine, it just seemed like we towed through some bumpy sinking air til the big boomer at the runway end.







One of the pilots made the comment Saturday evening that the release on a Zuni could "self release / back release" without pilot input.... it was not a Tost, and required the big ring. If that is correct, the bumpy air down low could have caused yo-yo effect and an inadverdant release. That would have probably put Bob in the sinking air around the big lift at the end of the runway about the time of release To me, the only options would have been straight ahead, either hopefully on what was left of the runway or into the bushes past the end. Other than "south of Cliff's hanger" I don't know how far down the runway he was when he crashed / how much, if any runway was left in front of him. Wind on the ground at the north end of the runway, where we were staged was 5-15 mph SSW.







Whenever I take off I constantly calculate where I would have to go if the rope were to break, and, as I was lower than usual that day, I was looking at that. A damaged or totaled glider is still better than taking a chance on a stall-spin. My count to 200 ft. AGL) lasted until we had been in the boomer past the runway end for a few seconds. If Bob had been in exactly the same air, any release before the runway end, he would have been under 100'AGL.







I enjoyed my conversations with Bob before we gridded, and thinking of him now gives me an erie feeling. Such a nice guy, happy with gliding, and willing and eager to learn more about desert flying. But, in the end, what can be said other than it was just his time to go. Yes, gliding is dangerous. I've been into soaring since 1996 and he was the 7th I've known to be called to the other side.







We try to learn from others' mistakes, but in this case, as there were no glider pilots who observed the event, little can be learned.







My heart goes out to his family and friends.







Bob T
Interesting coincidence... same date, same place. But, the similarities stop there. Russ's 2006 crash was due to medical event reasons. While in line to fly he did not feel good and considered backing out. As the line got shorter he changed his mind. There are a number of medical issues and pharmaceutical issues that I won't get into, but he just shouldn't have even tried to fly that day.

In talking with Tom Knauff (no relation to Bob Knauff that I know of) a few months ago, he commented that he was shocked at the number of fatal accidents that involved medical and / or pharmaceutical issues.

And, perhaps for superstitious reasons it might not be a good thing for glider ops on May 3, 2015 at Samply airport?

Bob T.

Glider was a Zuni. Crash not observed by any glider pilots. Tow pilot felt the sudden lack of pull behind him, circled back and observed the wreckage a bit east of the runway among homes and bushes. Bummer day.


My condolences to the family and friends of Mr. Knauff.
Is it known whether the tow rope failed or did it come out of the release? Just curious.
Uli

The rope was intact. We don't know what caused the release. I'm not even sure we know if he turned back or rotated 180 during the spin. No pilot saw what happened.

Boggs

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 1:42:53 PM UTC-5, Waveguru wrote:
The rope was intact. We don't know what caused the release. I'm not even sure we know if he turned back or rotated 180 during the spin. No pilot saw what happened.



Boggs

I heard Tom Knauff speak at the Senior Soaring Championships in March about in flight medical issues. (A great presentation by the way.)

One possibility is that Bob Knauff was experiencing a medical emergency and, in a last act of heroism, released to save the tow pilot.

We may never know but if this is the case, hats off to General Knauff.

Lou

Given no one actually saw the final moments of the ship's flight, all any of
us can do is draw our own conclusions. Cutting and inserting from others'
comments...

Not too many good options if PTT is really low taking off to the South;
you pretty much have to either get back to the runway or accept a desert
landing.

From descriptions of the launch field, "...or accept a desert landing" is a
key point below safe-turn-around altitude (whatever that might be for the
location/conditions of the day). It's critical ANYwhere. History - and slight
use of one's imagination - both suggest it's far, far better to hit the ground
horizontally than vertically. Screw the airframe, it can be rebuilt and it's
likely going to get broken regardless of the mode of ground contact at a lot
of western-U.S. strips.

One of the pilots made the comment Saturday evening that the release on a
Zuni could "self release / back release" without pilot input.... it was
not a Tost, and required the big ring.

I've had two uncommanded-by-me back releases on aerotows, both due to LARGE
bows in the rope induced by strongly shearing western thermals, which on both
days resulted in significant airspeed variations of tug & glider (hence the
bows). So far as I was concerned, both back releases showed the releases had
operated as the designer intended, though neither bow put the glider at risk
of rope entanglement because both times I was above the rope, "admiring the
bow." The ships were an HP-14 and a Zuni (which has a functional copy of
Schreder's dirt-simple release mechanism; between both ships I've 760+ tows;
you can do the arithmetic). Under similar circumstances, I expect a Tost
belly-hook should've similarly self-released.

The HP incident was at Taos, and I've never been so terrified of a rope break
in my life, as the first big bow appeared below turn-around height, above the
tallest sagebrush I've ever seen (taller than I). The actual release occurred
at 1500' agl (whew!). I mentally wrote the ship off until WELL above return to
the airstrip height on that one...

I never again towed from Taos, given the lack of options below turn-around
height; for me the potential return wasn't worth the risk.

The Zuni incident was at Buena Vista (CO), again sufficiently high agl to
climb away and go soaring.

If [uncommanded back release] is correct, the bumpy air
down low could have caused yo-yo effect and an inadvertent release.

See above...for the record, the mechanical engineer in me happens to like the
Schreder release design for a number of reasons, though as with everything
aeronautical, it does contain compromises...

That
would have probably put Bob in the sinking air around the big lift at the
end of the runway about the time of release To me, the only options would
have been straight ahead, either hopefully on what was left of the runway
or into the bushes past the end...

I'm a Big Fan of "accepting the bushes..."


Whenever I take off I constantly calculate where I would have to go if the
rope were to break...

....as should every glider pilot on every launch...

... and, as I was lower than usual that day, I was looking
at that. A damaged or totaled glider is still better than taking a chance
on a stall-spin.

The concept in the preceding sentence can't POSSIBLY be overemphasized!!!

My count to 200 ft. AGL) lasted until we had been in the
boomer past the runway end for a few seconds. If Bob had been in exactly
the same air, any release before the runway end, he would have been under
100'AGL.

I enjoyed my conversations with Bob before we gridded, and thinking of him
now gives me an eerie feeling. Such a nice guy, happy with gliding, and
willing and eager to learn more about desert flying. But, in the end,
what can be said other than it was just his time to go. Yes, gliding is
dangerous. I've been into soaring since 1996 and he was the 7th I've known
to be called to the other side.

We try to learn from others' mistakes, but in this case, as there were no
glider pilots who observed the event, little can be learned.

Not intending to quibble, but unless he was so unlucky as to center punch or
slide into something very hard with the fuselage after non-vertical impact
with the earth, the "little [to] be learned" is some variation of "Fly it into
the crash!" It's critical whenever flying anything with wings into ground contact.

My heart goes out to his family and friends.

As does mine...

Bob W.

While in no way do I wish to speculate on the cause of this accident or
indeed suggest that my comments in any way address the cause of this
accident.
I feel that comment is needed on some of the things said here. We have a
rule here in the UK, launch failure on aerotow below 300ft a landing should
be made ahead, or slightly to one side. No attempt should be made to turn
back below this height.
The reason is simple, a controlled crash into difficult terrain is likely
to result in a better outcome than an uncontrolled arrival on the airfield.
The important bit to keep intact is the bit you are sitting in, the rest of
the glider does not really matter too much. The best chance of achieving
that is flying to the ground with the wings level. It has only happened to
me once, there was a field ahead but it was full of the Tiger Moth tug that
had landed in the middle. I discovered that there was just enough space for
a Skylark 2 as well. I have no doubt that a turn back would have resulted
in an accident. I was at 250ft agl max.
If there really is nowhere to land ahead you should really ask the
question, "should I be taking a launch".
Frankly I would be horrified to be required to conduct a turn back at
200ft, I would suggest that this is one of those occasions where the danger
of practice is to great to justify.

On Saturday, May 3, 2014 9:27:10 PM UTC-7, Waveguru wrote:
Premature termination of the tow at 100ft. Did not complete the turn back to the runway.


It is so disheartening to me..... that the industry hasn't picked up
my technique of teaching about requiring students to be speaking aloud during the
departure climb --

"I can land here (xxxxxx) ,
I can land there (xxxxxx ) ,
I can turn for a downwind landing (meaning sufficient altitude and within-limits tailwind component),
I can make an abbreviated pattern into wind,
I can make a full pattern."

Meaning -
they can land straight ahead somewhere on the remaining airport.
they can land somewhere ahead or aside/outside the premises in the 'best available' place,
they know they have enough to land downwind ( if appropriate - sometimes you would never choose DW),
they can make a teensy, tight short pattern onto the upwind end of the airfield.
they can make a pretty leisurely, semi-normal landing into wind on the airfield.


The simplistic rote teaching of requiring students to say aloud --

200 feet --

That doesn't get them 'ahead of the glider' and actively looking, thinking,
assessing where they can go during each moment of the departure climb.
IF pilots were taught to think that way,
I believe,
we would eliminate these PTTT turn/stall accidents almost entirely.

Folks might land in less than wonderful places, but it would
be a landing, not an example of gravity in control. Arriving in a
comparatively level and comparatively slow descent rate is
hugely more survivable than what we see in these types of
accidents.

If any CFIGs would like to discuss their airfield, their trainings ships and tugs, and their departure options, I would be happy to assist them in understanding and incorporating this training protocol.

With great regret for the loss of another pilot,

Cindy Brickner

Caracole Soaring
(760) 373-1019 cell phone

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 1:41:23 PM UTC-7, Don Johnstone wrote:
While in no way do I wish to speculate on the cause of this accident or

indeed suggest that my comments in any way address the cause of this

accident.

I feel that comment is needed on some of the things said here. We have a

rule here in the UK, launch failure on aerotow below 300ft a landing should

be made ahead, or slightly to one side. No attempt should be made to turn

back below this height.

The reason is simple, a controlled crash into difficult terrain is likely

to result in a better outcome than an uncontrolled arrival on the airfield.

The important bit to keep intact is the bit you are sitting in, the rest of

the glider does not really matter too much. The best chance of achieving

that is flying to the ground with the wings level. It has only happened to

me once, there was a field ahead but it was full of the Tiger Moth tug that

had landed in the middle. I discovered that there was just enough space for

a Skylark 2 as well. I have no doubt that a turn back would have resulted

in an accident. I was at 250ft agl max.

If there really is nowhere to land ahead you should really ask the

question, "should I be taking a launch".

Frankly I would be horrified to be required to conduct a turn back at

200ft, I would suggest that this is one of those occasions where the danger

of practice is to great to justify.

I have also voiced my concern at this tow termination training. Most times, it is a planned event and the towplane flies a modified pattern to give the trainee the best opportunity of returning to the launch runway. I have done several of these and they are not problematic. They also don't much resemble what happens in the real world when a rope break or disconnect is unplanned.

I have had only one of these in nearly 50 years of gliding. In one of my biannual tests, the instructor reassured me that no low altitude rope breaks would be simulated and then pulled the plug on me at a hair under 200 feet. Being unplanned. my reaction time was much longer - you have to work through the "holy ****, the tow rope's gone" thought process before taking any action. I landed successfully, but not on the departure runway - a story for another day. it did teach me that I didn't want a rope break under 200 feet and preferably not under 500 feet!

I have had several ropes break on the initial acceleration but none in the air. I have had three tugs lose power - two on the take-off run and one during climb-out. From my experience, I am skeptical that rope breaks between take-off and 200 feet are common enough to warrant the attention and training they get here in the USA..

I can also comment on the weather the day of the accident. It was perhaps one of the strongest (and highest) blue days I have seen in Arizona. The atmosphere was stable and dry under a dominant high-pressure system. Thermals were created by heating the air so much it had to rise, but these conditions resulted in very narrow, very strong, often multi-core, thermals surrounded by vicious sink and turbulence. These can be challenging if encountered on tow and can rapidly erode any height margin you have. You can expect to bash your head a few times (and perhaps your shins) on a day like this.. Good when you're high, but nasty below pattern altitude.

Mike

On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 2:41:23 PM UTC-6, Don Johnstone wrote:

Frankly I would be horrified to be required to conduct a turn back at

200ft, I would suggest that this is one of those occasions where the danger

of practice is to great to justify.

If you should check out in the USA, you'll be required to demonstrate competence in this maneuver. Every pre-solo student is required to do so and more than a half century of safety records do not suggest a problem. In fact, even with low performance gliders, there's quite a large safety margin. The most likely outcome is a pilot will find the glider uncomfortably high for a downwind landing requiring full spoilers and a slip.

The logic is simple - it's better to have pilots trained for the option. No one says a pilot is required to turn back or that 200' is always adequate to do so. What is illogical is to suggest a pilot be required to crash in unlandable terrain when a safe option exists to land on the departure runway.

At 22:22 06 May 2014, Bill D wrote:
On Tuesday, May 6, 2014 2:41:23 PM UTC-6, Don Johnstone wrote:

Frankly I would be horrified to be required to conduct a turn back at
=20
200ft, I would suggest that this is one of those occasions where the
dang=
er
=20
of practice is to great to justify.

If you should check out in the USA, you'll be required to demonstrate
compe=
tence in this maneuver. Every pre-solo student is required to do so and
mo=
re than a half century of safety records do not suggest a problem. In
fact=
, even with low performance gliders, there's quite a large safety margin.
T=
he most likely outcome is a pilot will find the glider uncomfortably high
f=
or a downwind landing requiring full spoilers and a slip.

The logic is simple - it's better to have pilots trained for the option.
N=
o one says a pilot is required to turn back or that 200' is always
adequate=
to do so. What is illogical is to suggest a pilot be required to crash
in=
unlandable terrain when a safe option exists to land on the departure
runw=
ay.

What are you trying to save? The pilot or the aircraft? The priority should
be survival of the soft bit, that is you and me.
As an instructor with nearly 50 years experience I know that when I
initiate an emergency procedure I do so allowing a margin to ensure my
survival if it does not work out, I have been bold but never certifiable.
Most living instructors have the same survival instinct. That is why I have
lived long enough to do 10,000 launches, and of course landings. It has
already been hinted that the practice you describe involves modifying what
you normally do, in my view that probably makes it pretty useless and not
real preparation for the event. If you did carry out the training in
exactly the same way as the possible real event you might find that the
results were very different, not to mention painful. I will stick with my
300ft thank you, I know it works. Low turns, below that height may have
been acceptable in old wooden gliders, the minimum height in T31 and T21
gliders was 150ft, but for modern glass gliders it is just far too low, you
only have to look at the accident statistics to see that low final turns
figure to a large degree in accidents so why plan for it?
I repeat a controlled descent with wings level is far more likely to have a
better result than hitting the ground in a turn or even worse spinning in
trying to avoid it.

PS Despite all that there have been times when I have initiated a practice
emergency and very quickly wished I had not, no plan survives first
contact.