3 lives lost

This thread ought to be required reading by every pvt pilot.

"Mark" wrote in message
...
While I am sad for everyone involved, the little girl's death
is especially tragic.

And I really hope that her parents don't sue Cessna.

-Mark

Mark, all due respect to the grieving parents, that would be impossible
since the statute of repose under the General Aviation Revitalization Act
has run for a 1977 Cessna 172. Even if you could get around the statute of
repose, it would be foolhardy to attempt to attach an aircraft manufacturer
for liability in a case in which all the evidence points to pilot error by
attempting to fly in IMC.

GARA precludes the general aviation product liability which has plagued
manufacturers such as Piper, Beech and Cessna with litigation involving old
aircraft. The Statute of Repose immunizes a general aviation manufacturer
for an accident occurring more than eighteen (18) years after the delivery
of the aircraft to the customer or dealer. GARA applies to aircraft
certified by the FAA, which have a capacity of nineteen passengers or less
when originally certificated and only applies to aircraft not engaged in
scheduled, passenger-carrying operations.

"Peter R." wrote in message
...

Now, I realize that this seems unlikely, but I have read of accounts
here in this newsgroup of cases where fog developed very, very quickly
around an aircraft. I suppose there would have been tell-tale clues
ahead of time, such as a close temperature/dewpoint spread that the
pilot should have seen.

I know nothing about this particular accident, but I did once have a very
memorable incident where an obscuring layer of fog developed under me in the
space of five minutes. Yes, we were aware of the close temp/dewpoint spread,
and delayed the flight for an hour until the local graybeards deemed it safe.

Oh yes; this particular flight was one of my early student solos...in a
glider! All ended well, but the lesson about the quick-forming nature of fog
was well-learned.

Vaughn

Hi Bob...

I made the remark about Jean flying for 30 minutes or so
each time she flew was to make the point that she was "72 years
young"" and ONLY flew for pleasure. No business trips etc. She
could fly anytime their was good weather as she was retired.

My original post about this terrible event was for all us
pilots to maybe stop and think and try to understand how these
things happen. Hopefully to learn....

Fly Safe!

Terry

"Bob Fry" wrote in message
...
"Terry" writes:

"Jean" Bible was never IFR
rated and only flew 30 minutes or so each flight in clear
skies and
daylight.

Nobody has commented on this. It strikes me that with 24 years
of
flying experience she was only flying 30 minute flights in
clear
skies. Had she always done that, or only recently?

Tony,

With respect, I fear you miss my point.

I disagree that it is a big assumption that the accident pilot knew she
was launching into marginal VFR and/or IFR conditions.

My point is, that, as PIC, a pilot is responsible for determining those
conditions, or the liklihood of their developing, prior to flight. I
maintain that if she didn't know, she was remiss, and if she did know,
even more so. In either case, she failed to maintain wide safety
margins.

Assuming the conditions were as reported by the poster, the visibility
was less than one mile, and perhaps less than a quarter mile. No VFR
operation should be attempted in these conditions unless someone has a
gun to your head.

Further, the aircraft was airborne for about 1 min., and came to rest
100 yds off the runway centerline. The wreck could be heard--but not
seen--from a hangar 1/4 sm away.

You are going to have a hard time convincing me that this pilot could
reasonably be surprised by weather encountered in the first 60 seconds
after liftoff. Weather such as this should be completely obvious to
anyone who walked out to the aircraft without being blinfolded.

The sacred trust given to us by our passengers requires that we operate
at a higher level of responsibility. This means taking the
responsibility to find out what the weather is, and is likely to be,
and making a good, pessimistic assessment of what it is likely to
become. It means making highly conservative decisions about what
conditions we will fly in, as compared to our skills. In other words,
it means never even *remotely* approaching the 'edge.'

With deep respect to family and friends, I maintain that this incident
would never have occured if appropriately wide safety margins had been
maintained.

There is nothing I can do for those we have already lost. But please,
please learn the lesson offered in this tragedy: if you are not IFR
rated and current, stay out of marginal VFR conditions. Don't even get
close--especially if you are carrying the responsibility of passengers.
Sincerely,

Gene

Joe,

I suspect the two Stoneciphers are not the same person, but they might
be related.

I have worked with several people that went thru PIC, and I was not
displeased with the results. You must be aware, however, that any 7-14
day instrument rating will have limitations. By that I mean that after
you get home, you should consider yourself an instrument-rated novice.
This is not a bad thing, I just think you want to build your experience
and confidence gradually after getting the rating.

There is another short course I can recommend, and that is Maury's West
Coast Adventures. A couple of clients of mine have gone through the
program, and they were very happy. This program takes a group of three
students in a T182RG on a cross-country IFR adventure that is kind of a
tour of the western US. In the process you get a lot of experience in
a variety of weather, terrain and ATC environments.

Maury's course requires that you have your attitude instrument flight
skills and your written test report before you report for the course.
I believe the PIC course requires only the written test done prior.

Those are the only two short courses I can recommend. There are a lot
of others, but I have not seen another that I had any confidence in.

I have done a fair amount of business taking some of the people that
come out of some of the other short courses and bringing their
(deficient) skills up to the point that they could actually use their
rating without scaring themselves to death...

In all cases, I find the weakest area in most instrument courses, and
the short ones in particular, is the basic attitude instrument flying
skills. They act like the foundation of a great pyramid; use weak
stones in the foundation and as you add weight onto the upper courses,
the foundation crumbles and it all falls down.

Regards,

Gene

Hi Gene

I take your point 100%
I'm not disagreeing with a single thing that you said and can only
assume that you are attributing someone elses quote, from one of my
responses, to me.

Tony

--

Tony Roberts
PP-ASEL
VFR OTT
Night
Cessna 172H C-GICE


In article . com,
wrote:

Tony,

With respect, I fear you miss my point.

I disagree that it is a big assumption that the accident pilot knew she
was launching into marginal VFR and/or IFR conditions.

My point is, that, as PIC, a pilot is responsible for determining those
conditions, or the liklihood of their developing, prior to flight. I
maintain that if she didn't know, she was remiss, and if she did know,
even more so. In either case, she failed to maintain wide safety
margins.

Assuming the conditions were as reported by the poster, the visibility
was less than one mile, and perhaps less than a quarter mile. No VFR
operation should be attempted in these conditions unless someone has a
gun to your head.

Further, the aircraft was airborne for about 1 min., and came to rest
100 yds off the runway centerline. The wreck could be heard--but not
seen--from a hangar 1/4 sm away.

You are going to have a hard time convincing me that this pilot could
reasonably be surprised by weather encountered in the first 60 seconds
after liftoff. Weather such as this should be completely obvious to
anyone who walked out to the aircraft without being blinfolded.

The sacred trust given to us by our passengers requires that we operate
at a higher level of responsibility. This means taking the
responsibility to find out what the weather is, and is likely to be,
and making a good, pessimistic assessment of what it is likely to
become. It means making highly conservative decisions about what
conditions we will fly in, as compared to our skills. In other words,
it means never even *remotely* approaching the 'edge.'

With deep respect to family and friends, I maintain that this incident
would never have occured if appropriately wide safety margins had been
maintained.

There is nothing I can do for those we have already lost. But please,
please learn the lesson offered in this tragedy: if you are not IFR
rated and current, stay out of marginal VFR conditions. Don't even get
close--especially if you are carrying the responsibility of passengers.
Sincerely,

Gene

Thanks for the thoughtful response. Using google, I found the citation for
the article to which you referred on the FAA web site:

Bryan, L.A., Stonecipher, J.W., and Aron, K. (1954). 180-degree turn
experiment. University of Illinois Bulletin, Aeronautics Bulletin Number 11.

The current Boeing chairman is Harry C. Stonecipher, not the same person but
possibly related as you said.

It's a cliche, but I really regarded the private certificate as a license to
learn. I got it at 70 hours, and have had no passengers until recently (a
little over 200 hours). I've spent the intervening time practicing all the
various PTS maneuvers (solo stalls were a little intimidating at first!),
becoming more comfortable with talking to ATC, studying navigation,
building the 50 hrs of cross country time for the instrument rating,
attending FAA safety seminars, etc. My field is only 10 minutes away, so I
can usually schedule a plane at the last minute. Nonetheless, I've
cancelled due to marginal weather conditions on a number of occasions, and
have not regretted even the instances when the weather actually improved.
All this is a long winded way of agreeing with you that I think the IR is
also merely a license to learn. I wouldn't be eager to attempt an approach
at minimums the day after getting IR, accelerated or not. I'll check out
Maury's West Coast Adventures--thanks for the tip.

You and Gene are absolutely right. I thought about it after I posted and
realized managing expectations is really the way to go.

I've learned to manage expectations with my wife when I go up. I always pad
my estimated return time by one or two hours and call her if I get stuck at
another airport. Learned the hard way of course...

Marco Leon

"Bob Fry" wrote in message
...
writes:

I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front.

Amen brother!

Accidents are set up days, or even years in advance, by the attitudes
we develop in ourselves and others. Whenever I offer someone a ride,
or go on a cross-country for myself, I try to set up everybody's
expectations:

- wife: I might be a few days late for weather, I'll call every night
and let you know.

- job: Ditto. I might need more vacation time than planned, I'll
call if I get delayed.

- pax: We might get delayed. If you can't wait with me, I'll do
everything I can to put you on a bus or whatever you want to get back
home.

- sightseeing trips: I'll call you before you leave the house if it
doesn't look good. We may get to the airport and then it may not look
good, your safety and comfort are more important than this particular
flight, so we may have to reschedule at the last minute.

By acting as pilot in *command* well in advance, people are more
comfortable at the moment of flight.



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Ah, Tony, you are correct.

He quoted you in that post, but that line I attributed to you was
actually his. I am carrying on multiple conversations here at the same
time and I got that one crossed up.

I get a little intense over this issue, because I have been doing this
for 17 plus years and have watched *so many* repetitions of this same
accident. So when it happens, I tend to want to 'pound it in' to some
heads here and there, but only so as to try to reach one or two who
might learn something important from it.

I tell my Private Pilot students that if I *ever* catch them flying in
marginal conditions before they are instrument rated that they really
better die in the crash, because I *will* make it to the crash site
before the paramedics, and what will happen next will make 'em wish the
fire had got 'em long before I got there!

(Not true of course, but it helps get the message across.)

I actually had an ex student who managed to run out of gas once and
land (successfully) in a farmers field (no damage, flew it out). Funny
thing was, he hid from me for *months.* He was much more afraid of
*me* finding out than if the FAA did!

(That was years ago, and we are fast friends today--and he hasn't done
that again, at least, not that he has let me find out about.)
Kindest regards,

Gene