Navy enlistment questions

: Part of the problem is the Navy's culture of leadership, or lack
: thereof. As I understand it, other services begin training people in
: leadership at the E-3 level. In the Navy, leadership training barely
: starts at the E-4 level. Until a Sailor makes E-5, they get very
: little formal leadership training. Sailors are not taught to command
: or make decisions. They are taught to simply read the tech manual/PMS
: card/work package and obey it. Learning is by rote memorization of
: facts and figures. So now we have a whole generation of Sailors -
: people going up for the Chief's board - who don't even know how to
: make a simple decision without referring to documentation. Those who
: know how to make decisions are afraid to for fear of reprisals from
: above.

It seems that part of this stems from the very "specialness" of
the CPO itself, as viewed by the enlisted community. In my experience, a
PO was PO was PO. There were only really two types of enlisted people,
Chiefs, and everyone else. Thus, as pointed out, from E4 to E6 really
wasn't much more than a payraise. Indeed, going from seaman to PO was
really no more than a payraise plus a 2-day "petty officer indoctrination".
I would contrast this with, say the Marine Corps, where in my
experience the difference between an E4 and E5, let alone E6, could be
night and day. In terms of job responsibility, accountability, treatment,
etc. etc. In the navy, other than people looking to punch you on the
shoulder, getting a promotion often meant absolutely nothing to the command
nor how you were treated.
I'd also point out that this is a problem with the "professionaliztion"
path the CPO community took. The idea that Chiefs are 'managers' divorced
from "technical" detail has hurt. In my field, too many Chiefs wanted
administrative duties and did not keep up with --or even in touch with --
the changes in their fields. This was compounded by "zero detailing" where
background and NEC didn't matter. A lot of this, however, was a backhanded
effort to correct sea/shore imbalances and has hopefully been rationalized
over the last several years.
The same general theme seemed to extend to warrant officers. Most
navy warrant officers seemed to be strictly administrative types, very
few "techs" or operators. The Army, on the other hand, had a community of
warrant officers who were at that rank precisely because of their technical
expertise and operations skills ( helo pilots is another example ). As
a result, we navy types were usually trained by civilian, while our
army counterparts were often trained by warrants and SFCs.

Of course, I would argue that probably the biggest single effect
has been the "diamond" rank structure replacing the "pyramid" one. In
the modern US navy, recruits are often an oddity outside of bootcamp, and
even nonrates are in short supply. When most of your people are found in
paygrade E5 -- halfway up the rank structure -- it's little wonder that
they don't have experience leading. In effect, "middle management" has
taken over. I would suggest that a lot of this has been in an effort to
aid retention. Unable to get paygrade increases, the navy has responded
by simply promoting people faster into higher grades.

regards,
----------------------------------------------------------------

On Mon, 20 Sep 2004 03:57:27 +0000 (UTC), Steven James Forsberg
wrote:

snip well written response

Unable to get paygrade increases, the navy has responded
by simply promoting people faster into higher grades.

And drastically watering down what it means to be a Petty Officer.

Mark


----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups
---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =---

:Unable to get paygrade increases, the navy has responded
:by simply promoting people faster into higher grades.

: And drastically watering down what it means to be a Petty Officer.

Indeed. When I was in the term for someone coming right out of
a school was 'IPO' - Instant Petty Officer. But it was becoming the
norm. The normal response, upon seeing a non-rate in the field, was
"what did you do to get busted?" I recall listening to a Master Chief
who described making PO3 after 3 years in (I made E5 in almost 3 years
to the day, from E1). He was in a new berthing area that day, and
instantly became the 'first line' supervisor for a dozen non-rates. He
wrote evals (rarely changed) as an E5, so on and so on. Of course that
was in contrast to our (then) current structure. As an E5 I never even
had input on evals (heck, many times our PO1 had to bitch just to get to
write an eval or two for "practice").
But we were overloaded with CPOs. And PO1s, etc. which I guess
is the point. Nothing like dividing up one good job 3 or 4 ways to mess
things up. I'm not familiar with current manning practices, but this
may be true at sea now, as well. (at least as far as EW/CT is concerned).

regards,
-----------------------------------------------------------------

I was an enlisted man in the 60s. In the Aviation Community there
seemed, to me, to be increasing responsibility with my promotions.
Retention was a big issue in the technical field so rate came fast for
those who scored well on the tests. I made E4 in one year and E5 in
under 2 years. After making E4 I went to a week long school called
POIS (petty officer indoctrination school) that began the training for
decision making and leadership. After being advanced to E5 I was sent
to a petty officer leadership school that I think was also a week
long.

As an E4 I was responsible for some of the E3s in the shop as well as
other collateral duties. As an E5 I was a communications shop
supervisor. When I reported abord ship I was the night supervisor in
the ECM shop. The same held true for others I knew in the AT field.
I can't speak for other ratings but I was fortunate.

Also - In my day the Chief was supreme. There were those who were
idiots and sluggards BUT for the most part the Chief ran the part of
the Navy that I lived in.

Too bad that changed.

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
R. David Steele /OMEGA wrote:

:But even at an infantry platoon level, the NCOs take on decision
:making that it seems in the Navy is done by the division officer.
:The Chiefs may supervise but are just not the leaders that Army
:NCOs are.

You don't have the slightest idea what you're talking about.

Whenever I was on a gator, and had to go into CPO country, and knocked on
the door of their mess to request permission to come in to deliver a
message, I sure as hell didn't think they were "supervising". In fact, they
were God, and I quaked in fear before them. One time I forgot to knock and
ask for permission to enter, and just opened the hatch and strolled in, on
one amphib - BAD mistake. Very BAD mistake.

Even petty officers in the USN have significant leadership responsibilities.
I never noticed that any of the PO's I knew were not charged with duties and
decision-making that was not comparable to equal ranks in other services.

AHS

On Mon, 20 Sep 2004 11:37:50 -0300, "Arved Sandstrom"
proclaimed:

Even petty officers in the USN have significant leadership responsibilities.
I never noticed that any of the PO's I knew were not charged with duties and
decision-making that was not comparable to equal ranks in other services.

What time frame?
That was definitely not the picture in the late 50's in Nav-Air.

"Steven James Forsberg" wrote in message
...
: Part of the problem is the Navy's culture of leadership, or lack
: thereof. As I understand it, other services begin training people in
: leadership at the E-3 level. In the Navy, leadership training barely
: starts at the E-4 level. Until a Sailor makes E-5, they get very
: little formal leadership training. Sailors are not taught to command
: or make decisions. They are taught to simply read the tech manual/PMS
: card/work package and obey it. Learning is by rote memorization of
: facts and figures. So now we have a whole generation of Sailors -
: people going up for the Chief's board - who don't even know how to
: make a simple decision without referring to documentation. Those who
: know how to make decisions are afraid to for fear of reprisals from
: above.

It seems that part of this stems from the very "specialness" of
the CPO itself, as viewed by the enlisted community. In my experience, a
PO was PO was PO. There were only really two types of enlisted people,
Chiefs, and everyone else. Thus, as pointed out, from E4 to E6 really
wasn't much more than a payraise. Indeed, going from seaman to PO was
really no more than a payraise plus a 2-day "petty officer
indoctrination".
I would contrast this with, say the Marine Corps, where in my
experience the difference between an E4 and E5, let alone E6, could be
night and day. In terms of job responsibility, accountability, treatment,
etc. etc. In the navy, other than people looking to punch you on the
shoulder, getting a promotion often meant absolutely nothing to the
command
nor how you were treated.
[ SNIP ]

In the Marine Corps, a PFC or Lance Corporal (E-2 or E-3) is already
considered to be a leader. By the time you become a corporal or sergeant you
will likely have formal junior NCO training. As a staff NCO, you certainly
will have formal schools.And yes, you're quite right, the difference between
every rank in the Marine Corps is large. In one sense, though, it's not,
because every Marine is taught to be a leader right from the start. If your
gunnery sergeant goes down, the corporal is expected to be able to manage
the situation.

AHS

Arved Sandstrom wrote:

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...

R. David Steele /OMEGA wrote:

:But even at an infantry platoon level, the NCOs take on decision
:making that it seems in the Navy is done by the division officer.
:The Chiefs may supervise but are just not the leaders that Army
:NCOs are.

You don't have the slightest idea what you're talking about.


Whenever I was on a gator, and had to go into CPO country, and knocked on
the door of their mess to request permission to come in to deliver a
message, I sure as hell didn't think they were "supervising". In fact, they
were God, and I quaked in fear before them. One time I forgot to knock and
ask for permission to enter, and just opened the hatch and strolled in, on
one amphib - BAD mistake. Very BAD mistake.

Even petty officers in the USN have significant leadership responsibilities.
I never noticed that any of the PO's I knew were not charged with duties and
decision-making that was not comparable to equal ranks in other services.

AHS


I've been reading this thread with interest. I was on active and reserve
duty in the USN from June 1957 to July 1963, started on active duty
kiddie cruise at 17 yo. At 18 I was a PO3 and at 19 a PO2. Guaranteed I
had responsibility when I supervised men and material and if I screwed
up it was on me. Don't know about the modern Navy but, as Arved says,
Chiefs sat on the right hand of God and were listened to by officer and
enlisted back then. The best officers I ever served under were mustangs
that had been long service chiefs. They knew their stuff and knew more
about supervising men than most ring knockers ever did. Just one old
swab's thoughts on this subject.

George

(Atcrossroad) wrote in message


.. I think you have some misconceptions, a Ph.D. is rarely a
plus when one wants an engineering job in mat. sci./metallurgy. Maybe
in some other fields, but in mat. sci. Ph.D.s are doomed to be lab or
paper writing rats. I'd rather be on shop's floor.


If you would have included the pertinent information in your
original post it is unlikely I would have responded as I have never
worked with anyone with your specific situation. I have spent 20
years working with scientists and engineers in the EE, ME, AeroE, and
Physics fields. I have worked with a few Systems Engineers but have
not noticed the problems you state. I stand by my statement that in
your case, enlisting in the Navy would be a bizarre solution.

BB

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 9/19/04 8:44 AM, in article ,
"R. David Steele" /OMEGA wrote:

The biggest area is the MI analyst and counter intelligence
agent. Both are officer functions in the Navy. The Army uses CI
NCOs and Warrants, in NIS is almost all officers. The same for
Army CID work.

But even at an infantry platoon level, the NCOs take on decision
making that it seems in the Navy is done by the division officer.
The Chiefs may supervise but are just not the leaders that Army
NCOs are.


I don't know what your background is, but you obviously haven't seen CPO's
in action.

Navy Chiefs are some of the most empowered decision makers in all of the
armed services. Naval officers RELY on their chiefs... Those that don't
are
bound to fail.

--Woody

Hmmm depends on where you're at. I've seen CPO messes that ran the ship's
routine, from writing the watch bills, assigning PQS, deciding who the next
helmsman will be, the next OSL, etc., Additionally, making on the spot
decisions regarding discipline matters.

Howerver, the chain of command is not always there to back up and
support the CPO(s). This is part of the problem. Trust me until I screw
up, then second guess me. Wardrooms tend to second guess and question
right off the bat. I handle it by doing the job my way, apparently I now
have
to "earn" the trust of some "Ensign", but if I do it right, he'll see that
he can
always trust, and depend on the Chief, so when he moves on he'll
hopefully listen to his next Chief.

(stepping off soap box now)

HAFND,

Mark