A aviation & planes forum. AviationBanter

If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.

Go Back   Home » AviationBanter forum » rec.aviation newsgroups » Soaring
Site Map Home Register Authors List Search Today's Posts Mark Forums Read Web Partners

Put your money where the risk is



 
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
  #61  
Old November 29th 19, 06:41 PM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
2G
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,439
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 10:12:17 PM UTC-8, wrote:
Tom, actually I completely agree with you that good risk management will definitely improve ones odds. It will not, however, change your “luck”. (Luck management) is kind of an oxymoron.
Some of us feel, based on our experience, that often it seems “Fate is the Hunter” . Luck being pretty much the same as Fate sans the higher power. You feel that poor airmanship is the principal cause of fatal accidents. Both reasonable positions. Both impossible to prove.
Peace

Dale


One point I will agree with you on is that you can't reduce all of your risks to zero - for example, if someone comes at you from your blind position with tunnel vision, it's damn hard to avoid a mid-air (it's happened to me, but I did avoid him). Nonetheless, the accident reports are replete with examples of ****-poor airmanship that are totally avoidable, including Masak's.

Tom
  #62  
Old November 29th 19, 06:55 PM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
2G
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,439
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 7:36:05 AM UTC-8, wrote:
When someone once told me that I was lucky in life, I replied "I make my own luck."


I agree, but one has to draw a useful lesson.

Consider BlackJack with card counting. Definitely luck is involved because the cards are still random. Skill is involved to be able to understand the situation and choose when and how to play. Applying this skill allows one to manipulate the odds so that there will likely be a favorable outcome.. Does this not qualify as "making your own luck"?

Airplane flying requires knowledge and good judgment in choosing when, where, and how to fly. I can appreciate that there is a great deal of this separating old from bold pilots.


Performance soaring has the added random in that you are also dependent on the micro weather as a lift source. You deal with this by putting yourself in the best position to gather energy, hopefully while still accomplishing your task, but always remembering that things are unlikely to work out exactly as expected, so you are continually adjusting.

So for the final glide example, you do your best to setup a final glide, but if you hit continual sink, then move over to get out of the sink street quickly and into the lift street. If that doesn't work, you might be able to circle before getting too low. If that doesn't work, then you should have landing options near the airport. Continuing a deteriorating glide hoping that some unknown will prevent you from having to make your own luck seems one of those 'let us not do that again' things that makes good judgment.


Yes, developing black jack skills is an example of "making your own luck."

I once retrieved a guy who damaged his glider landing out in the Nevada desert sagebrush (they really aren't brush, but actually are small trees). He had a perfectly landable farmer's field on the other side of the valley, but chose to waste his valuable altitude looking for elusive lift. Obviously, this was a bad decision by the pilot that was totally avoidable. In this case, he made his own BAD luck.

People use "bad luck" instead of admitting to poor judgment. To paraphrase, luck is not a strategy, good planning and execution is.

Tom
  #63  
Old November 29th 19, 09:44 PM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
Andy Blackburn[_3_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 608
Default Put your money where the risk is

I think you have a much stronger sense that you are master of your destiny than many of us. I've certainly read the stall-spin stories of pilots in benign-handling trainers on a clear, windless day simply misjudging the turn to final by getting too low and ruddering the turn until they depart the airplane. It happens and it's about as close to 100% pilot error and poor airmanship as you can get. There are a number of those in the public record. I just think many cases are more complex than that and sit at the end of an accumulation of decisions where the pilot estimates wrong on which is the less-risky choice to make. I think this is particularly true if you are pushing for performance - you make risk-reward tradeoffs all the time and many of those are based on a sample of experience that is just insufficient for the range of situations that randomness can throw at you - but they work out 99.9% of the time - you just don't know if it's 99.9% or 99.999% and over time that matters.

Example: The Ethiopian 737MAX flight crew, faced with runaway trim and control forces too high to hold the nose up elected to re-engage the MCAS system to get electric trim back. It turned out not to help and lot of people died. It is possible that if they'd made the exact right choices at the exact right time they might've saved the aircraft, so is the fact that they failed '****-poor airmanship' or something more complex? They knew that MCAS-induced trim runaway was possible from the prior accident only weeks before. There was a much-criticized NYT op-ed that basically called the Ethiopian crew bad pilots. Most other experts said the situation was one that put so much stress on the crew that it's not reasonable to expect airmanship should be the correct solution to the problem, even if airmanship could've saved it. With perfect airmanship Sully could've gotten his A320 back to Laguardia, so was landing in the Hudson ****-poor airmanship? After all, he destroyed an airplane. I see more gray out there than you do and it give me pause..

Which brings me to one final thought. There is also a human factors aspect of all of this. My personal experience is that there are a number of pilots with an extremely strong "internal locus of control". In their own estimation, they know exactly what the airplane will do, are excellent at reading the weather and always keep perfectly sufficient margins. Many (not all) of this personality type are hostile to feedback or thought that challenges that internal view. It's more than a handful of pilots I've encountered who, when confronted with feedback that they cut another pilot off in a thermal (or other similar behavior) responded with what amounted to "I'm fine - if you don't like it get out of my way". This, too, has given me pause, and in more than one case individuals have been encouraged to seek other forms of entertainment - particularly in the racing community. So, what happens to the pilot who is absolutely certain that his margins are good and he's read the weather right, configured the aircraft properly, etc. when a flying situation gets outside of their rock-solid belief system of what might happen? Do they go into denial or are they flexible in their view that they may have miscalculated something? Since many accidents are based on accumulations of decisions, the ability to re-estimate one's assumptions is a critical personality trait in breaking the potential accident chain.

Skill certainly counts, but so does attitude. It might be more humility than skill that saves your life.

Andy Blackburn
9B

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 9:41:14 AM UTC-8, 2G wrote:

One point I will agree with you on is that you can't reduce all of your risks to zero - for example, if someone comes at you from your blind position with tunnel vision, it's damn hard to avoid a mid-air (it's happened to me, but I did avoid him). Nonetheless, the accident reports are replete with examples of ****-poor airmanship that are totally avoidable, including Masak's.

Tom

  #64  
Old November 29th 19, 11:53 PM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
2G
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,439
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:44:05 PM UTC-8, Andy Blackburn wrote:
I think you have a much stronger sense that you are master of your destiny than many of us. I've certainly read the stall-spin stories of pilots in benign-handling trainers on a clear, windless day simply misjudging the turn to final by getting too low and ruddering the turn until they depart the airplane. It happens and it's about as close to 100% pilot error and poor airmanship as you can get. There are a number of those in the public record. I just think many cases are more complex than that and sit at the end of an accumulation of decisions where the pilot estimates wrong on which is the less-risky choice to make. I think this is particularly true if you are pushing for performance - you make risk-reward tradeoffs all the time and many of those are based on a sample of experience that is just insufficient for the range of situations that randomness can throw at you - but they work out 99.9% of the time - you just don't know if it's 99.9% or 99.999% and over time that matters.

Example: The Ethiopian 737MAX flight crew, faced with runaway trim and control forces too high to hold the nose up elected to re-engage the MCAS system to get electric trim back. It turned out not to help and lot of people died. It is possible that if they'd made the exact right choices at the exact right time they might've saved the aircraft, so is the fact that they failed '****-poor airmanship' or something more complex? They knew that MCAS-induced trim runaway was possible from the prior accident only weeks before. There was a much-criticized NYT op-ed that basically called the Ethiopian crew bad pilots. Most other experts said the situation was one that put so much stress on the crew that it's not reasonable to expect airmanship should be the correct solution to the problem, even if airmanship could've saved it. With perfect airmanship Sully could've gotten his A320 back to Laguardia, so was landing in the Hudson ****-poor airmanship? After all, he destroyed an airplane. I see more gray out there than you do and it give me pause.

Which brings me to one final thought. There is also a human factors aspect of all of this. My personal experience is that there are a number of pilots with an extremely strong "internal locus of control". In their own estimation, they know exactly what the airplane will do, are excellent at reading the weather and always keep perfectly sufficient margins. Many (not all) of this personality type are hostile to feedback or thought that challenges that internal view. It's more than a handful of pilots I've encountered who, when confronted with feedback that they cut another pilot off in a thermal (or other similar behavior) responded with what amounted to "I'm fine - if you don't like it get out of my way". This, too, has given me pause, and in more than one case individuals have been encouraged to seek other forms of entertainment - particularly in the racing community. So, what happens to the pilot who is absolutely certain that his margins are good and he's read the weather right, configured the aircraft properly, etc. when a flying situation gets outside of their rock-solid belief system of what might happen? Do they go into denial or are they flexible in their view that they may have miscalculated something? Since many accidents are based on accumulations of decisions, the ability to re-estimate one's assumptions is a critical personality trait in breaking the potential accident chain.

Skill certainly counts, but so does attitude. It might be more humility than skill that saves your life.

Andy Blackburn
9B

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 9:41:14 AM UTC-8, 2G wrote:

One point I will agree with you on is that you can't reduce all of your risks to zero - for example, if someone comes at you from your blind position with tunnel vision, it's damn hard to avoid a mid-air (it's happened to me, but I did avoid him). Nonetheless, the accident reports are replete with examples of ****-poor airmanship that are totally avoidable, including Masak's.

Tom


Andy,

I am getting the strong sense of deflection from my basic premise. First off, I am not talking about a complex airliner accident which involves a clear design error on the part of the manufacturer (Boeing). I know Boeing engineers, and they are saying that Boeing screwed up. To blame the pilots for this is far more than a stretch.

Second, the article I think you are referring to (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/b...sh-school.html) made no such claim. In fact, it lauds the Ethiopian flight school. It only mentioned the copilots flight time (200 hr), which is a matter of fact.

Third, trying to analyze the difference between 99.9% (1 in 1000) and 99.999% (1 in 100,000) is a fool's errand. In a good year, I might have 40 flights, 50 tops. 1 in 1000 means it will take forty to fifty years to occur, which MIGHT be once in my lifetime, at best. 1 in 100,000 means forget it: it's not important. I am talking about situations that have a reasonable chance of occurring on a flight, like 1 in 10 or 1 in 100. Take Masak's accident; as he was gliding toward the ridge line he had to see the ridge climbing on his canopy; what did he think the odds were of clearing the ridge, 1 in 2 if that? But he kept pressing on until he could see that he was BELOW the tree tops and had NO chance of clearing them. That delayed decision making process is why I categorize the accident cause as a CFIT; the stall/spin was merely a last second desperation maneuver with no chance of success. This accident was TOTALLY AVOIDABLE, yet it happened to a high-time, skilled pilot flying in a familiar area!

Other types of fatal avoidable accidents include hitting the only tree in field during a landout, flying IFR in the mountains and stall/spins in the pattern. Yes, all of these have occurred in the last two years to glider pilots, two to commercial pilots (one of those carrying a paying passenger).

I don't want to over-think things here - it actually is a pretty basic concept. If you have poor stick and rudder skills, or poor decision making skills, or both, you are an accident waiting to happen.

Tom
  #65  
Old November 30th 19, 03:10 AM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
[email protected]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 478
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 5:53:54 PM UTC-5, 2G wrote:
On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:44:05 PM UTC-8, Andy Blackburn wrote:
I think you have a much stronger sense that you are master of your destiny than many of us. I've certainly read the stall-spin stories of pilots in benign-handling trainers on a clear, windless day simply misjudging the turn to final by getting too low and ruddering the turn until they depart the airplane. It happens and it's about as close to 100% pilot error and poor airmanship as you can get. There are a number of those in the public record. I just think many cases are more complex than that and sit at the end of an accumulation of decisions where the pilot estimates wrong on which is the less-risky choice to make. I think this is particularly true if you are pushing for performance - you make risk-reward tradeoffs all the time and many of those are based on a sample of experience that is just insufficient for the range of situations that randomness can throw at you - but they work out 99.9% of the time - you just don't know if it's 99.9% or 99.999% and over time that matters.

Example: The Ethiopian 737MAX flight crew, faced with runaway trim and control forces too high to hold the nose up elected to re-engage the MCAS system to get electric trim back. It turned out not to help and lot of people died. It is possible that if they'd made the exact right choices at the exact right time they might've saved the aircraft, so is the fact that they failed '****-poor airmanship' or something more complex? They knew that MCAS-induced trim runaway was possible from the prior accident only weeks before. There was a much-criticized NYT op-ed that basically called the Ethiopian crew bad pilots. Most other experts said the situation was one that put so much stress on the crew that it's not reasonable to expect airmanship should be the correct solution to the problem, even if airmanship could've saved it. With perfect airmanship Sully could've gotten his A320 back to Laguardia, so was landing in the Hudson ****-poor airmanship? After all, he destroyed an airplane. I see more gray out there than you do and it give me pause.

Which brings me to one final thought. There is also a human factors aspect of all of this. My personal experience is that there are a number of pilots with an extremely strong "internal locus of control". In their own estimation, they know exactly what the airplane will do, are excellent at reading the weather and always keep perfectly sufficient margins. Many (not all) of this personality type are hostile to feedback or thought that challenges that internal view. It's more than a handful of pilots I've encountered who, when confronted with feedback that they cut another pilot off in a thermal (or other similar behavior) responded with what amounted to "I'm fine - if you don't like it get out of my way". This, too, has given me pause, and in more than one case individuals have been encouraged to seek other forms of entertainment - particularly in the racing community. So, what happens to the pilot who is absolutely certain that his margins are good and he's read the weather right, configured the aircraft properly, etc. when a flying situation gets outside of their rock-solid belief system of what might happen? Do they go into denial or are they flexible in their view that they may have miscalculated something? Since many accidents are based on accumulations of decisions, the ability to re-estimate one's assumptions is a critical personality trait in breaking the potential accident chain.

Skill certainly counts, but so does attitude. It might be more humility than skill that saves your life.

Andy Blackburn
9B

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 9:41:14 AM UTC-8, 2G wrote:

One point I will agree with you on is that you can't reduce all of your risks to zero - for example, if someone comes at you from your blind position with tunnel vision, it's damn hard to avoid a mid-air (it's happened to me, but I did avoid him). Nonetheless, the accident reports are replete with examples of ****-poor airmanship that are totally avoidable, including Masak's.

Tom


Andy,

I am getting the strong sense of deflection from my basic premise. First off, I am not talking about a complex airliner accident which involves a clear design error on the part of the manufacturer (Boeing). I know Boeing engineers, and they are saying that Boeing screwed up. To blame the pilots for this is far more than a stretch.

Second, the article I think you are referring to (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/b...sh-school.html) made no such claim. In fact, it lauds the Ethiopian flight school. It only mentioned the copilots flight time (200 hr), which is a matter of fact.

Third, trying to analyze the difference between 99.9% (1 in 1000) and 99.999% (1 in 100,000) is a fool's errand. In a good year, I might have 40 flights, 50 tops. 1 in 1000 means it will take forty to fifty years to occur, which MIGHT be once in my lifetime, at best. 1 in 100,000 means forget it: it's not important. I am talking about situations that have a reasonable chance of occurring on a flight, like 1 in 10 or 1 in 100. Take Masak's accident; as he was gliding toward the ridge line he had to see the ridge climbing on his canopy; what did he think the odds were of clearing the ridge, 1 in 2 if that? But he kept pressing on until he could see that he was BELOW the tree tops and had NO chance of clearing them. That delayed decision making process is why I categorize the accident cause as a CFIT; the stall/spin was merely a last second desperation maneuver with no chance of success. This accident was TOTALLY AVOIDABLE, yet it happened to a high-time, skilled pilot flying in a familiar area!

Other types of fatal avoidable accidents include hitting the only tree in field during a landout, flying IFR in the mountains and stall/spins in the pattern. Yes, all of these have occurred in the last two years to glider pilots, two to commercial pilots (one of those carrying a paying passenger).

I don't want to over-think things here - it actually is a pretty basic concept. If you have poor stick and rudder skills, or poor decision making skills, or both, you are an accident waiting to happen.

Tom


I get it, if I believe in my airmanship then I'm exempt from the accident pool. Statistics don't apply to us 'cause airmanship.
  #66  
Old November 30th 19, 03:18 AM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
2G
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,439
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 6:10:20 PM UTC-8, wrote:
On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 5:53:54 PM UTC-5, 2G wrote:
On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:44:05 PM UTC-8, Andy Blackburn wrote:
I think you have a much stronger sense that you are master of your destiny than many of us. I've certainly read the stall-spin stories of pilots in benign-handling trainers on a clear, windless day simply misjudging the turn to final by getting too low and ruddering the turn until they depart the airplane. It happens and it's about as close to 100% pilot error and poor airmanship as you can get. There are a number of those in the public record. I just think many cases are more complex than that and sit at the end of an accumulation of decisions where the pilot estimates wrong on which is the less-risky choice to make. I think this is particularly true if you are pushing for performance - you make risk-reward tradeoffs all the time and many of those are based on a sample of experience that is just insufficient for the range of situations that randomness can throw at you - but they work out 99.9% of the time - you just don't know if it's 99.9% or 99.999% and over time that matters.

Example: The Ethiopian 737MAX flight crew, faced with runaway trim and control forces too high to hold the nose up elected to re-engage the MCAS system to get electric trim back. It turned out not to help and lot of people died. It is possible that if they'd made the exact right choices at the exact right time they might've saved the aircraft, so is the fact that they failed '****-poor airmanship' or something more complex? They knew that MCAS-induced trim runaway was possible from the prior accident only weeks before. There was a much-criticized NYT op-ed that basically called the Ethiopian crew bad pilots. Most other experts said the situation was one that put so much stress on the crew that it's not reasonable to expect airmanship should be the correct solution to the problem, even if airmanship could've saved it. With perfect airmanship Sully could've gotten his A320 back to Laguardia, so was landing in the Hudson ****-poor airmanship? After all, he destroyed an airplane. I see more gray out there than you do and it give me pause.

Which brings me to one final thought. There is also a human factors aspect of all of this. My personal experience is that there are a number of pilots with an extremely strong "internal locus of control". In their own estimation, they know exactly what the airplane will do, are excellent at reading the weather and always keep perfectly sufficient margins. Many (not all) of this personality type are hostile to feedback or thought that challenges that internal view. It's more than a handful of pilots I've encountered who, when confronted with feedback that they cut another pilot off in a thermal (or other similar behavior) responded with what amounted to "I'm fine - if you don't like it get out of my way". This, too, has given me pause, and in more than one case individuals have been encouraged to seek other forms of entertainment - particularly in the racing community. So, what happens to the pilot who is absolutely certain that his margins are good and he's read the weather right, configured the aircraft properly, etc. when a flying situation gets outside of their rock-solid belief system of what might happen? Do they go into denial or are they flexible in their view that they may have miscalculated something? Since many accidents are based on accumulations of decisions, the ability to re-estimate one's assumptions is a critical personality trait in breaking the potential accident chain.

Skill certainly counts, but so does attitude. It might be more humility than skill that saves your life.

Andy Blackburn
9B

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 9:41:14 AM UTC-8, 2G wrote:

One point I will agree with you on is that you can't reduce all of your risks to zero - for example, if someone comes at you from your blind position with tunnel vision, it's damn hard to avoid a mid-air (it's happened to me, but I did avoid him). Nonetheless, the accident reports are replete with examples of ****-poor airmanship that are totally avoidable, including Masak's.

Tom


Andy,

I am getting the strong sense of deflection from my basic premise. First off, I am not talking about a complex airliner accident which involves a clear design error on the part of the manufacturer (Boeing). I know Boeing engineers, and they are saying that Boeing screwed up. To blame the pilots for this is far more than a stretch.

Second, the article I think you are referring to (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/b...sh-school.html) made no such claim. In fact, it lauds the Ethiopian flight school. It only mentioned the copilots flight time (200 hr), which is a matter of fact.

Third, trying to analyze the difference between 99.9% (1 in 1000) and 99.999% (1 in 100,000) is a fool's errand. In a good year, I might have 40 flights, 50 tops. 1 in 1000 means it will take forty to fifty years to occur, which MIGHT be once in my lifetime, at best. 1 in 100,000 means forget it: it's not important. I am talking about situations that have a reasonable chance of occurring on a flight, like 1 in 10 or 1 in 100. Take Masak's accident; as he was gliding toward the ridge line he had to see the ridge climbing on his canopy; what did he think the odds were of clearing the ridge, 1 in 2 if that? But he kept pressing on until he could see that he was BELOW the tree tops and had NO chance of clearing them. That delayed decision making process is why I categorize the accident cause as a CFIT; the stall/spin was merely a last second desperation maneuver with no chance of success.. This accident was TOTALLY AVOIDABLE, yet it happened to a high-time, skilled pilot flying in a familiar area!

Other types of fatal avoidable accidents include hitting the only tree in field during a landout, flying IFR in the mountains and stall/spins in the pattern. Yes, all of these have occurred in the last two years to glider pilots, two to commercial pilots (one of those carrying a paying passenger).

I don't want to over-think things here - it actually is a pretty basic concept. If you have poor stick and rudder skills, or poor decision making skills, or both, you are an accident waiting to happen.

Tom


I get it, if I believe in my airmanship then I'm exempt from the accident pool. Statistics don't apply to us 'cause airmanship.


No, I'm sorry, but you DON'T get it.

Tom
  #67  
Old November 30th 19, 04:08 AM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
[email protected]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 478
Default Put your money where the risk is

No, I'm sorry, but you DON'T get it.

Tom


Tom don't you want others to have the same safety level you have? Let us all come together in the cult of airmanship. Believe and immortality is yours.
  #68  
Old November 30th 19, 04:51 AM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
2G
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,439
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 7:08:21 PM UTC-8, wrote:
No, I'm sorry, but you DON'T get it.

Tom


Tom don't you want others to have the same safety level you have? Let us all come together in the cult of airmanship. Believe and immortality is yours.


No, I'm sorry, you DON'T get it.

Tom
  #69  
Old November 30th 19, 09:30 AM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
Branko Stojkovic
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 42
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:53:54 PM UTC-8, 2G wrote:
I don't want to over-think things here - it actually is a pretty basic concept. If you have poor stick-and-rudder skills, or poor decision making skills, or both, you are an accident waiting to happen.

Tom


It is true that poor stick-and-rudder skills and/or poor decision-making skills cause majority of fatal and non-fatal accidents, and near misses. Case closed!

Or is it?

With regards to the stick-and-rudder skills, the matter is pretty straight forward. In general, there is a direct correlation/causation between the flying experience and the stick-and-rudder skill level, i.e., the beginners have limited skills and the experts have excellent skills. Furthermore, most pilots can fairly accurately assess their own stick-and-rudder skills. A yearly check ride with an instructor provides a useful feedback about the areas that need improvement.

Okay, so what about them decision-making skills, which also vary among the glider pilot population? It is safe to say that in this case there is a much weaker correlation between the flying experience and the skill level. It seems that the decision-making skills are much more related to the psychological makeup of the pilot and makes things much more complicated and causes several intractable problems.

Problem #1: Few of us who have poor decision-making skills are aware of that fact. The simplest reason is that we have been getting away with making certain types of poor decisions. Even if our poor decisions caused us a few incidents or near misses, we are inclined to place the blame elsewhere (very likely), instead of openly examining our decision-making processes (not likely) or seeking help/advice (very unlikely).

Problem #2: There are no established methods of tracking the decision-making skills, nor of providing feedback, like there is for the stick-and-rudder skills. Some experienced pilots, when they see that someone has made a poor decision, will speak to that pilot and point out the problem. Others will not, likely because of their own personality and/or the offending pilot's personality. In any case, only few of our bad decisions will be pointed out to us.

Problem #3: Even if someone tells me that I made a bad decision, or God forbid, that my decision-making skills are lacking, I will likely take that as a personal attack because of an instant emotional reaction of my injured ego. What happens next will depend on my psychological makeup. If I am rough around the edges, or have a short fuse, I may tell you to bugger off and mind you own damn business. On the other hand, if I'm polite and easy going, I may smile and say "okay thanks I appreciate it," but in my head I'd be thinking "F#@$ YOU, you know-it-all." The problem is that in either case, I have not learned a damn thing from this experience. If anything, it may motivate me to do the same thing (make the same poor decision) again, just to prove (at least to myself) that it's no big deal.

If the above analysis is correct, then is there a solution? There better be, because lives are at stake. I suggest starting by asking yourself a simple question:

"Do I sometime make poor decisions that could cause me to have an accident?"

If your answer is "yes", then you are sufficiently self-aware and you are probably in the process of improving your decision-making skills.

If your answer is "no" or "not that I'm aware off", then you have a problem that might one day cost you your life. In order to make progress you may need help, professional or otherwise.

Branko XYU

  #70  
Old November 30th 19, 01:29 PM posted to rec.aviation.soaring
Martin Gregorie[_6_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 699
Default Put your money where the risk is

On Sat, 30 Nov 2019 00:30:19 -0800, Branko Stojkovic wrote:


A good analysis. Thanks.


--
Martin | martin at
Gregorie | gregorie dot org

 




Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

vB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Forum Jump

Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
Gliding risk.... [email protected] Soaring 141 December 11th 19 06:25 PM
YOUR safety is at risk BR549 Instrument Flight Rules 0 December 13th 07 01:21 AM
Safety at risk in FAA Peterpan Piloting 7 February 24th 05 09:58 PM
how much money have you lost on the lottery? NOW GET THAT MONEY BACK! shane Home Built 0 February 5th 05 08:54 AM
U.S. SCHOOLKIDS AT RISK Cribsheet Piloting 0 December 5th 04 06:29 PM


All times are GMT +1. The time now is 08:23 PM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.6.4
Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright 2004-2024 AviationBanter.
The comments are property of their posters.