Can F-15s making 9G turns with payload?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote

Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
plunger-like device.

Trivia alert

Probably had a "zero, a/b, hold switch", and a caution lite. there was two
codes a-today b-tomorrow, and the hold kept your plunger data on a hot turn, while the
caution lite blinked when someone interrogated you, but your box
couldn't decode it, and it stayed on solid if you lost your crypto (plunger data) or
the computer went TU.

Usually the blinking lite is the worst, because it means the Patriot battery is now
trying to figure out a second way to ID you

In article ,
Mike Marron wrote:

We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
installed in the planes every single day.

Laughable!

Funny you should post this, at the same time one of our local fighter
pilots posted about having problems with switchology.

Got any more school boy fibs?

Got any more schoolboy insults?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Whoa! Time to throw a flag. If stuff were ripping off of airplanes,
whether through fatigue, corrosion, maintenance oversight or exceeding
design G limits, you can bet your butt, the pilots would know it. They
would NEED to know it, since separations for whatever reason can
endanger the whole airplane.

I agree, they *should* know something about this.

But if there was a rare case of something happening, you'd probably get
a debrief about "be sure to have your crewchiefs inspect all fasteners
to reduce the chance of ECM pod separation." You wouldn't get a
detailed pile of info on it, and you'd probably file it in the "rare"
incident pile. It sure wouldn't be something you could inspect on a
preflight.

We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
installed in the planes every single day.

Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
knew how to use it.

Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.
I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
from time to time.

If it were mission essential or mission critical
we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
every single mission with regard to employment of it.

....and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system. And they'd write
it up as bad because they did it wrong (the description in the writeup
would be completely correct except for pressing one button). And we'd
test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
until that same guy went back on the plane.

And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
ALQ-119 pods.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 02:51:39 GMT, Chad Irby wrote:

...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system. And they'd write
it up as bad because they did it wrong (the description in the writeup
would be completely correct except for pressing one button). And we'd
test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
until that same guy went back on the plane.

Eglin AFB second half 1968. Some of the F-4E had a newer model of the
APS-107 installed. The cycle through the APR-36/37 mod line somewhere
was not exactly speedy so we had a mix of rhaw.
Write up - Can not turn on APR-36/37.
Fix - Turned on APR-107. Ops chk OK..
Good for a laugh, but I knew what the crews were going through.
Besides some of the APS-107 wouldn't even work. No spares so we robbed
boards from some of them to keep others running..

And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
ALQ-119 pods.

They? Getting close to end of tour at Ubon in 1967 and we got in
either the QRC-160-8/ALQ-87. The 87 anyway. On failure it had some
weird light sequence on the pod control box. I don't remember any of
it at all, but it was something like this light on means something,
and this one blinking was some other failure. The first time I went in
debriefing for an ALQ-87 flight I saw the cheat sheet on the failure
light sequence and thought you have got to be kidding me. The guy in
back has to remember if lights are blinking and which one is on or
off!

Chad Irby posted:

Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.

I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
from time to time.

I'm guessing you were an EMS guy that dropped in to talk about 781
write-ups or unique problems you saw in the shop or on the line. You
didn't actually train aircrew how to operate the equipment in a
tactical sense, or did you?

...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, the only time I turned the ALR-46 on
as a "pilot" was as an IP in the backseat. Pilots generally speaking
let the WSO operate the RWR. Hell I was even a squadron ECP
(Electronic Combat Pilot) in Phantoms. In the Viper we used the
ALR-69.

And they'd write it up as bad because they did it wrong ... And we'd
test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
until that same guy went back on the plane.

Any chance that the guy making the write-up was a RTU student WSO?

And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
ALQ-119 pods.

How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
"war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
Red/Green Flag.

Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

Juvat

In article ,
Juvat wrote:

Chad Irby posted:

Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.

I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

"Getting tested on it" and "caring" are, as any high school kid can tell
you, two very different things. When you get a writeup that says,
basically, "RWR makes beeping sounds when in self-test," someone was
asleep in class...

I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
from time to time.

I'm guessing you were an EMS guy that dropped in to talk about 781
write-ups or unique problems you saw in the shop or on the line. You
didn't actually train aircrew how to operate the equipment in a
tactical sense, or did you?

No, we had a wing EWO for formal tactical training (and you should have
heard *him* complain!). But I did get to go in and do quick training
sessions with a lot of the pilots before they launched. Basic stuff,
short sessions about self-test and the like.

...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, the only time I turned the ALR-46 on
as a "pilot" was as an IP in the backseat. Pilots generally speaking
let the WSO operate the RWR. Hell I was even a squadron ECP
(Electronic Combat Pilot) in Phantoms. In the Viper we used the
ALR-69.

I'm using pilots and backseaters interchangeably here.

And they'd write it up as bad because they did it wrong ... And we'd
test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
until that same guy went back on the plane.

Any chance that the guy making the write-up was a RTU student WSO?

Maybe sometimes, but we didn't have a high rate of exchange in our wing.

And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
ALQ-119 pods.

How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
"war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
Red/Green Flag.

Exactly. If you don't use it, you don't care.

Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

And the way many officers dealt with it was... blow it off. If it's not
important, why care?

I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

Try being the guy who has to load it on the plane and then figure out
what was "wrong" with it when it comes back with a writeup that
describes, basically, normal operation.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Chad Irby posted:

Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.

Regarding the "severe lack of interest," I pointed out:

I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

So now Chad says:

"Getting tested on it" and "caring" are, as any high school kid can tell
you, two very different things.

Come on chad, we've gone from "severe lack of interest" to "caring?"
If I'm NOT getting tested, asked questions during
certification/verification briefings, mission qualification training,
and plain ol' ordinary day-to-day simulated "Fence" checks on a
flight...I guess you're right. But I'd feel kinda silly as a pilot
saying I "cared." Alan Alda might say he "cared" but I wouldn't. I had
to know about certain aspects of EC...as a guy in the FRONT seat I
couldn't operate the ALR-46 or the ALQ-119/131. As an IP, I could when
in the pit...at that point you would say I "cared."

Exactly. If you don't use it, you don't care.

Clearly that is the only conclusion you are able to draw. Others would
disagree.

And the way many officers dealt with it was... blow it off. If it's not
important, why care?

Again...negative training, that runs counter to "train like you
fight." C'est vrai?

Try being the guy who has to load it on the plane and then figure out
what was "wrong" with it when it comes back with a writeup that
describes, basically, normal operation.

Life isn't fair. But it would be fair to say that the guys making
those write-ups were not PILOTs...correct?

Juvat

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 04:50:20 GMT, Juvat
wrote:

How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
"war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
Red/Green Flag.

Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

Basically it would seem to be a command - higher up the ladder than
the flying crew problem. Expect crews to know the equipment, but don't
let them use it.

Wonder what B-52 EWOs had to go against in Europe? Fly around and run
everything in Standby?

Read somewhere that was a problem in SEA with B-52 EWOs along for the
ride basically when bombing the trails. I believe the fix was to bring
in an RBS site so the EWO's could keep up their proficiency..

I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

I'm starting to catch on to why a couple of ECM troops out of fighters
in Europe came into our shop at K.I. and couldn't wait to get back to
Europe ASAP. K.I. Sawyer B-52H we were working 12 hr days 7 days a
week supporting training missions where they actually used the
equipment. B-52 crews in the states trained as they would fight, but
fighter crews that were much closer to the "enemy" trained with one
hand tied behind their back?

Buzzer posted:

B-52 crews in the states trained as they would fight, but
fighter crews that were much closer to the "enemy" trained with one
hand tied behind their back?

WRT to turning the ALQ-119/131 on when you carried a war pod? Sure.
But in USAFE we routinely practiced/exercised all aspects of EC.

We got our Mode IV checked at EOR, getting a thumbs up or down from
the checking us. Did this in TAC and PACAF too.

We routinely did fence checks, ALR-46 in "Training" file rather than
"Open" or "Priority." Everybody...everybody knew what a ZSU-23/4
symbology looked like on the RWR. I remember what the F-16 radar
warning sounds like versus an F-4 radar. I knew that the "batwing" was
a high band threat and the "airplane" was medium band, and which
etched ring the four dots should be on...

Continuing with our everyday fence check...simulate the Pod in "Xmit 2
with xx buttons depressed." During NATO/USAFE or local exercises we
used certain local routes to simulate the Mike Plan (min risk ATC
procedures), and we used actual min risk recovery procedures. We got a
"mickey" from the Command Post after engine start to program the Have
Quick radios and checked them in secure mode but didn't use that
feature inflight since ATC and GCI weren't on the net.

And finally, Wings included pages to their aircrew weapon's guide (AKA
Ladies' Aid) that specifically covered unclassified ALR-46 and ALQ-119
operations, testing, and fault remedies. And this was for normal
day-to-day ops.

The only thing missing was carrying ECM pods routinely, and the lack
of EW ranges to practice. Once in a great while we could practice with
training pods on the Ramstein RBS or the Spade Adam range in the UK.

Juvat

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 15:59:17 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:


Does "inadvertent separation" cover those "dang, wrong button"
moments?

Al Minyard

No. Inadvertent means coming off without action (intended or
accidental) on the part of the aircrew. I've done some of those "dang
(or more scatological, crude or blasphemous words), wrong button"
moves. I mention one in When Thunder Rolled, where I conducted a well
choreographed sequence of finger manipulations to clean the airplane
of tanks, suspension gear and weapons--not necessarily in that order.
I fessed up.

I also dumped a C/L MER full of 750's one stress-filled afternoon by
choosing the wrong toggle switch when I intended to blow the inboard
450 tanks. I fessed up there as well and took an unbelievable amount
of harrassment from my squadron buds.

(To this day I contend it was a result of poor design ergonomics. The
three selective jettison toggle switches were on the right lower
console panel. Republic had them reading from left to right:
inboard, centerline, outboard. I contend the logical sequence should
have been starting from the inside of the row on the right side of the
airplane: centerline, inboard, outboard. Using my logic, when I wanted
to toggle the inboard stations, I incorrectly chose the centerline
jettison switch. Worst of all, I had to continue to the target area,
support my flight, not hurt the enemy cause I didn't have any bombs to
drop and, the final indignity was I got hit by 37mm while doing it.)

It is amazing to find someone who does not say/believe "I am perfect
and have never made a mistake" Thanks :-)))

Al Minyard