F-4 chaff/flare loads

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 10:23:25 GMT, "Tom Cooper" wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .

No flares on F-4s in SEA. (Photo-flash carts on RF-4s only). No
self-protection chaff carts either. We carried cardboard boxes (about
the size of a box of Xmas tree tinsel) in the speedbrake wells. Open
the boards to deploy. Try not to use speed brakes earlier in the
mission. One time use.

Ed,
do you possibly know the reasons why no chaff/flare dispensers were mounted
on Phantoms at the time (and, AFAIK, for most of the 1970s)?

From the standpoint of our days this appears as a very strange measure to
me: given how many R-13 shots could have been averted over Vietnam alone....

Tom Cooper

They weren't mounted because they didn't yet exist. The ALE-40 (the
blister dispenser bolted on the side of the wing pylons) came into
production around '73 or '74 after the air war was over. As I
mentioned, the operational E-models got them, but they never got
retrofitted to the C's that were still active. (I don't know about the
D's.)

The ALE-40 may not have existed, but (according to Thornborough, pg. 16) the navy
was using the ALE-18 starting from April of 1966, at the same time they installed
the ALQ-51, APR-25 RHAWS and APR-27 LWR (for some reason the navy used the latter
rather than the APR-26). The ALE-29 seems to have replaced the ALE-18 from 1967
or 1968, and I think the ALE-39 was available before the end of the war. There's
no obvious reason why the air force couldn't have used dispensers on their
tactical a/c at the same time. Hell, the F-105D had its dispenser (an ALE-2)
removed from the spec as a cost cutting measure (along with the APS-92 RWR and
ALQ-31 jammer), in about 1959 or 1960.

Guy

"Juvat" wrote in message
...
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Token
blurted out:

I can not comment on the story of photo-flash carts being used to
defeat any seeker.

OK

I imagine it would work, I see no reason it should
not, but as I am not familiar with the burn times or dispense patterns
of the cartridges I can only guess.

Not surprisingly, you're impression was common back then.

While I can see that photo-flash stuff would be tailored to emit the
most energy in the optical band of interest, it is very hard, some
would say impossible, to design such a device that did not also emit
in unwanted bands.

I just flipped thru my notes from a 1984 course at TAWC, and can't
find the reference. I only got to keep some of them. The course had
guys from every tactical jet in USAFE, TAC, and PACAF. The question
was raised about the effectiveness of photo-flash carts versus IR
missiles during an IRCM lecture.

The short answer was they're ineffective due to the lack of sufficient
coverage of the IR spectrum (not enough heat), plus they're ejected
above and to the side before "blooming" which probably puts them
outside the seeker's centroid (depending on the missile's range from
the RF-4). But not a problem with A-10s' flare dispensers out near the
wingtip.

Juvat,
I understand your points and the reasoning behind it. My question is only:
why would the crew of the RF-4E in question then explain such a story?

After all, they said they used these cartriges to decoy the missiles, and
evaded four R-3/R-13s fired by the MiG in question, and also the Soviet
pilot rammed them in desperation. OK, the Atolls were not that problematic
to evade, but an RF-4E at supersonic speed is also not that maneuvreable
either.

Do you have any idea what kind of cartriges were used at earlier times?

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

Tom Cooper asked:

I understand your points and the reasoning behind it. My question is only:
why would the crew of the RF-4E in question then explain such a story?

Short answer...it would appear that since all Atolls missed, the
efficacy of photo-flash carts as IRCM was proven, at least
anecdotally. But wait...

What is missing from the story, are significant details like, time of
day (chased into the sun?), altitude of the fight, cloud cover (bright
white puffy ones)...even in the 80's the AIM-9 Papa was decoyed by
bright clouds.

After all, they said they used these cartriges to decoy the missiles, and
evaded four R-3/R-13s fired by the MiG in question, and also the Soviet
pilot rammed them in desperation.

Okay, here's a skeptical guess, merely throwing it out. What if the
MiG pilot was hosing off missiles from Max range in an clever attempt
to make the Phantom pilot turn, allowing the MiG to get closer (maybe
for a gun kill, not trusting the Atolls). BS? As the guy in the front
seat of the Phantom you would rely upon the WSO to tell you the MiG
fired a missile and which direction to break (assumes I can't see him,
i.e. he's in my vulnerable cone)

OK, the Atolls were not that problematic to evade, but an
RF-4E at supersonic speed is also not that maneuvreable either.

Indeed a big ass turn circle, which would give credence to the Max
range Atoll shot. Call me a skeptical asshole for thinking there is no
way in hell a Phantom is going to cruise Supersonic in Mil Power.

So from my perspective the supersonic RF-4 must be in Burner/Reheat/AB
and just think how much heat (IR energy) is thrown off by the exhaust
and the nozzles versus a few photo-flash carts. Based upon the TAWC
lectures and videos, I think it is unlikely photo-flash carts worked
as IR decoys under these circumstances.

As an aside, the mantra for using flares as IRCM included "ya gotta be
out of burner, and ya gotta maneuver the jet." So, here' what I'd toss
out. You've got an RF-4 going supersonic in Max AB, the WSO calls the
Atoll shots and tells the pilot to Break L/R, forcing the pilot to
Idle, Speedbrakes, and put 7.33 Gs on (and oh yeah watch out for Mach
Tuck as you slow down). Now the jet is subsonic and the fight stays
that way until they get speared by the MiG guy...AND perhaps the
mid-air was accidental.

Or you got this RF-4 going supersonic in Max AB and the pilot is smart
enough to try and keep the MiG(s) at the edge of the vulnerable cone
(out near the wingtip in terms of relative position seen from the FCP)
and out of Atoll parameters. These check-turns and extensions alter
direction, Left/Right in an attempt to keep going in the right
direction...Iran.

Tom this truly is an interesting story with so many missing variables
to ponder.

Do you have any idea what kind of cartriges were used at earlier times?

The reason that jumps out at me was the common belief that photo-flash
carts worked. There was no test data to support that belief, but what
the heck...photo-flash produce lots of light (energy) so they probably
will work as a decoy. I find absolutley nothing wrong with the logic
of that thinking (considering the infancy of IRCM).

Juvat

Tom Cooper posted:

After all, they said they used these cartriges to decoy the missiles, and
evaded four R-3/R-13s fired by the MiG in question, and also the Soviet
pilot rammed them in desperation. OK, the Atolls were not that problematic
to evade, but an RF-4E at supersonic speed is also not that maneuvreable
either.

Just to recap from the earlier reply of mine:

"What is missing from the story, are significant details like, time of
day (chased into the sun?), altitude of the fight, cloud cover (bright
white puffy ones)...even in the 80's the AIM-9 Papa was decoyed by
bright clouds."

Taking that last phrase a bit further, this was for a Mil Power
target.

So perhaps the MiG was shooting first generation Atolls. Recalling
that they were noted for poor target/IR source discrimination, perhaps
the photo-flash did decoy the missiles. But I'd still speculate that
the RF-4 would not have been in AB for it to work.

Just to connect the dots of my train of thought...
Early generation Atoll with zero IRCCM and poor IR discrimination,
could get decoyed by lots of things (sun, bright clouds, warm surface
background)...possibly/probably photo-flash.

Ten years later leaps and bounds in seeker technology and IRCCM on
both sides of the Cold War. At that point in time photo-flash carts
were determined to be ineffective versus current IR missiles.

Works for me, just because they (photo-flash carts) didn't work in the
early 80's doesn't prove they NEVER worked as IRCM.

Les?...Ed?...Guy? Make sense to y'all?

Tom, does the USAF WSO which to remain anonymous? If so why?

Juvat

On Wed, 24 Sep 2003 19:51:58 GMT, Juvat
wrote:

Tom Cooper posted:

After all, they said they used these cartriges to decoy the missiles, and
evaded four R-3/R-13s fired by the MiG in question, and also the Soviet
pilot rammed them in desperation. OK, the Atolls were not that problematic
to evade, but an RF-4E at supersonic speed is also not that maneuvreable
either.

Anyone who is doing recce work who allows themselves to get rammed has
clearly slowed down too much and did way too much turning.

I doubt that RF was super. Even so, he should have had great
maneuvering potential. Kinetic translates to potential energy very
quickly.

Just to recap from the earlier reply of mine:

"What is missing from the story, are significant details like, time of
day (chased into the sun?), altitude of the fight, cloud cover (bright
white puffy ones)...even in the 80's the AIM-9 Papa was decoyed by
bright clouds."

Taking that last phrase a bit further, this was for a Mil Power
target.

So perhaps the MiG was shooting first generation Atolls. Recalling
that they were noted for poor target/IR source discrimination, perhaps
the photo-flash did decoy the missiles. But I'd still speculate that
the RF-4 would not have been in AB for it to work.

Just to connect the dots of my train of thought...
Early generation Atoll with zero IRCCM and poor IR discrimination,
could get decoyed by lots of things (sun, bright clouds, warm surface
background)...possibly/probably photo-flash.

Ten years later leaps and bounds in seeker technology and IRCCM on
both sides of the Cold War. At that point in time photo-flash carts
were determined to be ineffective versus current IR missiles.

Works for me, just because they (photo-flash carts) didn't work in the
early 80's doesn't prove they NEVER worked as IRCM.

Les?...Ed?...Guy? Make sense to y'all?

My impression is that if the recce were in AB and then choose to honor
the shot by turning into it (and without the sophistication of knowing
to come out of burner and get quiet) then remember that the heat plume
is on the lag side of the turn.

Back in the days before the invention of fire when I was doing this
sort of thing, the best IR shot was taken by maneuvering to lag--not
cutting off inside the turn circle but lag rolling to outside the
target's flight path giving you a clear look up the pipes rather than
at the top of the wing.

Then, assuming that the RF-4E still had the cart doors at about the
same place, look for the turning recce to be firing photo-carts left
and right of flight path, but inside the turn circle.

If the MiG is trying to lead pursue and cut off (a natural thing to do
in a low-wing-loaded, high-G capable aircraft) then he's not getting a
good lag shot at the AB plume and he is closer to solution with the
photo carts. Sounds to me like a good transfer of the missile seeker
situation.

It's sure more fun to figure these things out at the PC with a cup of
coffee than twisted around in the seat at seven G and wishing you
could get two more.

I had to dig deep into my files to find the most important things out, and
here it is.

The RF-4Es delivered to Iran and used for these flights were partially
"white tails" (or so-called "UKIs" = Unknown Iranians), and partially the
first six examples officially sold to the IIAF, namely the 72-0266 thru
72-0269 (which are strange FY-numbers, given that the first IIAF RF-4Es
arrived in Iran already in March 1971, replacing two USAF RF-4Cs that were
used for this task already since 1970). The project apparently run under the
code-name "Dark Genie" or "Dark Gene".

The first examples supplied lacked the ALQ-126, but this was mounted later.
What they have got nevertheless (and this already in 1971) was the AAS-118
IR-linescaner set, the ALR-69(V) RWR, and the ALR-17, plus a (still)
clasiffied HF radio transceiver (with secure voice communications), and then
the AN/ALQ-71, 72, and 87(V)4 ECM-pods. Later also the AN/ALQ-125 tac
electronic recce system was added, plus the ALQ-101(V)-10 and ALQ-119(V)-10
ECM-pods. One of the planes had its underside painted black (last noticed in
1986): I don't know why.

Re. the case of 28 November 1973: the plane was flown by Maj. Shokhounia
(executed by the Islamic regime in 1980), and the USAF officer known to me
only as Col. Saunders.

Although he later said he was not sure if these have indeed decoyed the AAMs
fired at them, Saudners fired all the 54 flash cartriges (27 were carried in
two ejector racks, one each on one side of the aircraft), that were aboard
and commented, "it looked like we were flying just ahead of the sun."

The MiG finally approached from the left bellow and hit the rear part of the
Phantom, somewhere in the area of the engine noozles, disintegrating in the
process and killing the pilot. The RF-4E fell into a nose dive, the crew
ejected and the plane hit the ground at supersonic speed, being completely
destroyed on the impact (one reason more why the Russians became pretty mad:
they could not recover anything from the "wreckage").

I have no additional data, especially not if this happened by day or night,
but my guess is that the weather was clear (it is usually in that part of
Iran and Turkmenistan), but if this is indeed such an interesting topic as
it seems I could try to get more (besides, this would certainly result in an
interesting article for some airspace mag.). One thing is su I'm
currently working on a book about the F-14s in Iranian service, and - while
this was not easy to prepare by any means - it costed my co-workers and me
far more efforts to learn even so little about the Iranian RF-4Es and that
mission than the whole story about the Tomcats (which includes dozens of
narratives about air combats in which the type participated).

Obviously, for reasons that are completely unclear to us, most of the
involved still consider these operations as _very_ sensitive...

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585