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#121
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In article , The Revolution Will Not
Be Televised writes They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour, especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17. Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel. The B1 Specials had virtually everything not nailed down stripped out, lost their armour and most of their guns. The Lanc achieved its greatest bombload in 1944-5 by daylight. The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of the quad 303s. -- John |
#122
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ArtKramr wrote:
Subject: #1 Jet of World War II From: Guy Alcala Date: 7/23/03 3:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: Right, by '44 they seem to be using exclusively 250 lbers (which agrees with Art's memory that he never dropped a 300 lb. bomb). As I said previously, they appear to have used them up by the 3rd or 4th quarter of '43. From my memory of Freeman, they ran out of the 600 and 1,100 lb. Sounds like 600 pound bombs and 1100 pound bombs are just typos. No, as mentioned earlier in the thread the M30 series 600 and 1,100 lb. bombs were in use in 1942 and maybe into the early part of 1943 (don't remember for sure). Guy |
#123
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In article , Guy Alcala
writes In short, design and equip them to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just ludicrous. The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to follow US practises and fly in the big box formations. Whilst this may have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another. One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour, flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced significantly. -- John |
#124
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On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 11:40:46 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: [Lanc bombing height] The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet. Odd that you should mention that, as Middlebrook ("The Nuremberg Raid") says that a/c of all the Groups on the mission (with the exception of No. 1 GP; see below), whether Lanc or Halifax, were evenly assigned to one of four cruise heights -- 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet. This was common practice: although I was suprised to see 3 Group getting the lower height bands even as they started to re-equip with Lancasters in early 1944. The raids I researched may not be representative, however, and I think those might have included some late Stirling raids, which would explain it, although they were normally banded by Group and by type within that, just like the wave timings for TOT. As it happens, the bombing height for the crew in question varied from aircraft to aircraft, and seemingly independent of the assigned height bands. The highest bombing altitude recorded was 21,500 ft (30/31 Jan 44, Berlin) otherwise 20,000 -20,500 ft (27/28 Sep 43, Nuremburg; 3/4 Sep 43, Berlin) and a lot of 18,000 -19,000 ft (31 Aug/1 Sep 43, Berlin; Munchengladbach 30/31 Sep 43, etc, etc). In addition to the engine differences, there's the considerable difference in fixed weights (carried both to and from the target) due to extra crew, armor, guns, turrets etc., and the extra fuel required for formation assembly (an extra 1/2 to 2 hours before setting out), climb to higher cruise altitude and flying in formation (throttle jockeying). Yeah, I've just exhumed that one myself. [snipadoodledo] In short, design and equip them to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just ludicrous. Agreed. Still, it beats doing the housework. Gavin Bailey -- "...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." - 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11' The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003 |
#125
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On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:49:11 +0100, John Halliwell
wrote: They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour, especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17. Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel. Look at the trend evident in the Rose turreted B.1/B.IIIs, and the engine installation in the Lanc IV which directly influenced the Lincoln (two-stage Merlins with armoured, annular radiators), let alone the massively increased armament in the Lincoln (e.g. twin 20mm Hispanos in the mid-upper turret). The only way to get more fuel in the Lanc for Tiger Force operations was in the bomb-bay, which had obvious implications for the bombload carried. This just represents a gradual and evolutionary change in operational emphasis. The B1 Specials had virtually everything not nailed down stripped out, lost their armour and most of their guns. And consisted of one squadron. Two, if you count 9 Squadron. The Lanc achieved its greatest bombload in 1944-5 by daylight. But I think the future development pattern was clear, and in favour of increased defensive resources. The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of the quad 303s. Sure, but this still represented an increase in effectiveness at daylight engagement ranges. Gavin Bailey -- "...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." - 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11' The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003 |
#126
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On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:00:12 +0100, John Halliwell
wrote: The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to follow US practises and fly in the big box formations. Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved further in that direction. Whilst this may have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another. Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the Lancasters in the Augsburg raid). One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour, flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced significantly. This works at night, where difficulty of interception is the primary defence. It would have been a lot less effective when some measure of resiliance and defensive capacity was required, which is why the RAF stuck self-sealing tanks, protective armour and increased armament on their bombers after their daylight experiences in 1939. Increasing height and cruising speed at night made it harder for night-fighters with a marginal performance advantage to achieve an interception, particularly within a context where there were easier targets at slower speeds and lower height to engage first. The same dynamic doesn't neccessarily apply in daytime, in fact loose formations and seperation from the main body positively attract enemy fighter attention in those circumstances. Gavin Bailey -- "...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." - 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11' The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003 |
#127
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"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" wrote in message ... On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:00:12 +0100, John Halliwell wrote: The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to follow US practises and fly in the big box formations. Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved further in that direction. More likely reverted to night bombing. Without air superiorty over the target daylight bombing created too many losses. Whilst this may have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another. Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the Lancasters in the Augsburg raid). Which were unmitigated disasters. The Heligoland raid had 50% losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12 aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight raids were unsustainable. One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour, flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced significantly. This works at night, where difficulty of interception is the primary defence. It would have been a lot less effective when some measure of resiliance and defensive capacity was required, which is why the RAF stuck self-sealing tanks, protective armour and increased armament on their bombers after their daylight experiences in 1939. Increasing height and cruising speed at night made it harder for night-fighters with a marginal performance advantage to achieve an interception, particularly within a context where there were easier targets at slower speeds and lower height to engage first. The same dynamic doesn't neccessarily apply in daytime, in fact loose formations and seperation from the main body positively attract enemy fighter attention in those circumstances. Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without fighter escort. Once air superiority had been gained the major risk came from flak and in that case a tight formation may be a liability ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented a more dispersed target for the flak. Keith |
#128
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On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:35:11 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote: Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved further in that direction. More likely reverted to night bombing. Of course. Without air superiorty over the target daylight bombing created too many losses. No disagreement here. Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the Lancasters in the Augsburg raid). Which were unmitigated disasters. Of course they were. The point is that the RAF when flying in daylight, did rely on some extent to formation flying and gun defence. This was known to be inadequate in the absence of air superiority, and I'm not claiming otherwise. The Heligoland raid had 50% losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12 aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight raids were unsustainable. The .5in-armed B-17's suffered from the same dynamic. Given the ranges at night were generally closer, the .303s were more effective as a night defensive armament than by day. Even so, the main value of a night bomber gunner was as a lookout to initiate evasive action. Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without fighter escort. Of course not, and I'm not contending otherwise. I'm just pointing out how the late-war Lanc family evolved in the operational climate of 1944-45, which was permissive enough to allow daylight bombing to be resumed and a certain level of adaption for that role in terms of aircraft equipment to be utilised. ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented a more dispersed target for the flak. Formation flying in fully-laden B.1S Lancs was never a practicable proposition - there was almost no margin of available power in hand for formating. Gavin Bailey -- "...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance." - 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11' The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003 |
#129
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Peter Stickney wrote:
In article , Guy Alcala writes: Cub Driver wrote: I shall have to re-play my tape of a UK airshow that Douglas Bader narrates and tells of his first flight in a jet it went something like "Well, there I sat in the cockpit ready for my first flight and braced myself.....and you know, the thing took off down the runway like an old lorry!" That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would crash if it had to go around. While correct about the B-47, you're talking about two separate issues. The Meteor's (and all early jets) slow accel time on take-off had nothing to do with spool-up time, as they'd already be spooled up prior to takeoff, and everything to do with their relatively low power to weight ratios and low thrust at low speeds. I will now make way for Mr. Stickney, who I trust will be along any moment now to give his thrust vs. power lecture, much as it must irritate him to have to constantly repeat it ;-) To quote Lazlo, the Human Cannon Ball, "Once more into the Breech!" I'm going to make this a bit elementary, in some ways. Not patronizing, by any means, but it's kinda late, and I'm a bit Elementary right now myself. I just want to keep the context clear. So, let's define what our terms are. What's Power? Power is the amount of force required to move a certain mass a certain distance in a certain time. The usual measure is Horsepower, which corresponds to the effort required to lift 550 lbs 1 foot in 1 second, or, to put it another way, 550 lbs-ft/sec. (You metric folks would read this as about 0.75 Kilowatts.) snip -- Pete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster Actually, power is the product of the amount of force required to move a certain mass a certain distance in a certain time times that distance and the reciprocal of that time. Joe -----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =----- http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! -----== Over 80,000 Newsgroups - 16 Different Servers! =----- |
#130
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John Halliwell wrote:
In article , Guy Alcala writes In short, design and equip them to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just ludicrous. The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to follow US practises and fly in the big box formations. No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance would be within a few % either way of the B-17's. Nowhere did I say that you had to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc vs. B-17 threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges. Whilst this may have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another. See above. One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour, flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced significantly. And so did B-17 and B-24 groups operating by day at various times and places, and that's my point - it's ludicrous to compare two aircraft designed and equipped for totally different missions and claim that one is "superior" to the other, by looking _only_ at the mission for which one of them is optimised. In the B-17 vs. Lanc argument, this method is routinely used to 'prove' that the Lanc had a better payload/radius than the B-17, by comparing the Lanc's performance operating singly at night, with the B-17's performance operating in formation by day at higher altitudes. Basing a conclusion on such an 'analysis' is a prime example of GIGO. Guy |
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