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The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff



 
 
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  #1  
Old January 28th 07, 06:50 AM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
chickenlittle92071
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 3
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff


To Whom It May Concern:

The FAA has told us that the lone controller at Lexington tower turned
his back on Comair 191 and was busy with "administrative duties,
traffic count" after he cleared Comair191 for takeoff while it was on
the wrong runway. Initially, he admitted seeing Comair on the wrong
runway and later changed his testimony..

The FAA released the tapes the other day and I downloaded it from
their site at....

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/a.../comair_tapes/

If you download the ATC Communications audio (MP3) tape there and play
it, you can hear Diane English, an FAA employee, say she made the tape
from 0944 Coordinated Universal Time - 1026 Coordinated Universal Time
on August 27, 2006. The accident occurred at 1006 Coordinated
Universal Time.

If you want to understand what happened, download the tape and play it
while you read the following information....

At 06:52 into the tape, Comair 191 calls clearance delivery for his
clearance to Atlanta.

Christopher Damron, operating initials CD, the lone controller, was
working four positions. (1) Flight data/clearance delivery(FD/CD)
where he had to contact center and transmit clearances to aircraft on
one frequency, (2) Ground Control (GC) where he had to issue taxi
clearance and watch taxiing aircraft on ramp and taxiways on another
frequency, Local Control (LC) where he had to watch aircraft on the
runway and in the traffic pattern in the control zone out to five mile
radius on a third frequency, and Radar Departure Control (DC) where he
had to give heading to fly for arrivals and departures below 10,000
ft. on a fourth frequency. This is not too much to handle if things
fall in a staggered sequence, but when you get busy, someone has to
wait. You can't talk on four frequencies at once or talk to ten
aircraft at once. In the business, it's called going "Down the tubes".
During the day, all these positions are manned and in addition the
local control position can be split between two controllers. There is
a supervisor and cab coordinator (CC) also who monitor all positions
to insure safe operations. I have a photo I took a LGB where you can
see ten controllers in the tower cab.

As you listen to the tape, you will see that CD doesn't have a lot of
time to catch his breath in the minutes before Comair is cleared for
takeoff. After that, he has nothing to do. He let his guard down.
These times show it to some degrees but his transmissions are
sometimes lengthy and there is little time between each transmission.

At 06:58, CD issues Comair his clearance to ATL and..
At. 07:12 Comair reads back the clearance and admits he missed his
arrival route into ATL. CD had to spell it out for him.

At 13:30 CD makes a blanket broadcast that the ATIS has changed to
Bravo and the new altimeter setting is 30.00.

At 13:54, the controller, operating initials Charley Delta, calls
ARTCC. He doesn't key his microphone while dialing (old rotary pulse
phone) but has to key in to talk to center at 13:58. That is when you
hear CD breathing and the music in the background from the radio. He
unkeys his mike at 14:05 and the music can no longer be heard. We hear
it again at 14:09 when he keys in. ARTCC hasn't come up on the line so
the music can only be in the tower cab. At 14:08, ARTCC comes on the
line and CD requests a release on Skywest 6819. Center releases him
and CD gives his initials and hangs up at 14:12. The music stops at
that time.

At 16:04 into the tape, Comair 191 advises he is about to push back.
At 16:09, ATC responds Roger, advise ready for taxi.
At 16:11, Comair says Roger.

At 16:32 into the tape, Eagleflight 882 calls for taxi and at 16:43 he
taxis him to RWY22.
At 17:26, Skywest 6819 calls for takeoff clearance at RWY22
At 17:30, ATC says Thanks, turn right heading 270, Runway 22, cleared
for takeoff. Since there was only one active runway, it is not
required that ATC specify the runway when issuing takeoff clearance.
At 17:35, Skywest 6819 acknowledges cleared for takeoff.

At 18:33, Eagle 882 calls ready for departure
At 18:36, ATC replies, Eagle 882, roger, hold short.
At 18:40, Eagle 882 acknowledges, Hold short of the runway.

At 18:57, Comair 191 advises he is ready for taxi instructions and
states that he has Alpha. At 13:30 the ATIS changed to Bravo and he
was not aware that the ATIS had changed .This means he has listened to
the Airport Terminal Information Service (ATIS) on a separate
frequency which gives him the active runway, winds, altimeter setting,
and other NOTAMS (Notice To Airman) about taxiway closures, instrument
approach outages, lights out of service, etc. You can also hear it on
the phone, as well. In the government pages of the white pages, it's
under Transportation, Department of, FAA, ATIS. To his credit, CD
caught this and re-issued and winds and altimeter to Comair.

At 19:02, Comair 191 acknowledges that he is to taxi to rwy 22.
At 19:09, CD clears Eagle 882 for takeoff
At 19:11 CD calls radar contact on Skywest 6819 and gives him further
instrutions.

At 20:27, CD calls radar contact on Eagle 882 and gives clearance to
10,000FT.

At 20:48 CD goes on the land line and dials center (ARTCC).
At 20:55 CD again keys his mike and we hear the music. While waiting
for center, Skywest 6819 can be heard on the speaker in the background
saying he is passing 10,000ft.and requesting a turn to 300 degrees to
avoid weather. CD approves his request and immediately center comes on
the line and CD request a release on Comair. He had to be watching
Comair approaching the approach end of the short runway because he
call for the release in advance of him arriving at runway 22.


At 21:09 CD keys his mike and again we hear the music and hear him
tapping the flight progress strip for Comair191 on the console. He
asked center for a release on Comair and center issues the release, CD
gives his initials and hangs up the line.

He immediately calls another sector and requests the 300 heading for
Skywest 6819 to "get around some weather", but he had already approved
the turn for Skywest.

At 21:19, CD tells Skywest 6819 to contact center.
At 21:23 Skywest acknowledges the frequency change.

At 21:25 CD gives Eagle 882 a new heading
At 21:30 Eagle882 acknowledges the turn.

At 22:07 Comair 121 transmits that he is ready to go.

At 22:10 CD says Comair 191, Lexington Tower, fly runway heading,
cleared for takeoff.

If Comair 191 is at the approach end of the wrong runway, he is
nowhere near runway 22. In an interview CD acknowledges that he saw
Comair 191 on the wrong runway and NOT on the taxiway to runway 22,
but 30 minutes later changed his testimony.

At 22:14 Comair acknowledged fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff.

CD immediately focuses back on Eagle 882 and ...

At 22:17 CD asked Eagle 882 if the heading he gave him worked for him
or did he want a further turn to the northwest of the weather that's
ahead of him.

At 22:23 Eagle 882 says "That looks fantastic, thank you very much"

CD missed the response and...

At 22:25 CD transmits "Say again, please" to Eagle 882, while Comair
is rolling on the wrong runway. He is NOT doing traffic count as the
FAA is telling us.

At 22:26, Eagle882 repeats "This heading looks great,

At 22:30, CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking
to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.

This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't
seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his
runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on
the wrong runway. He claimed he did see him on the wrong runway but
said nothing to him and didn't cancel his takeoff clearance.

It's odd that a station agent for American Eagle saw Comair on the
wrong runway, but the controller claims he saw nothing,.....
eventually.

Here's the articles...

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/16486163.htm

and..

http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky.../16486135.htm?
source=rss&channel=kentucky_local

In this second article, it states....

Damron told investigators that he did not know the plane had taken off
from the wrong runway until a union official, who had reviewed radar
data, told him. If Comair would have taken off on the right runway, he
would have contacted tower on departure and CD would have issued radar
contact. CD should have been at the radar scope waiting for Comairs
call instead of doing the traffic count.

According to the other tape I downloaded at the FAA site at...

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/a.../comair_tapes/

this one labeled..

ATC Phone Call to Fire and Rescue audio (MP3)*

CD pulled the crash phone and reported the aircraft crash, (an Alert
III ) at 06:29 into the tape.

Again, the crash phone recording was narrated by Diane English. The
tape runs from 1002 CUT-1013CUT on August 27, 2006

That means that CD pulls the hook at 1008:30 CUT. That is about 2 1/2
minutes after the crash. Traffic count doesn't take 2 1/2 minutes to
perform. The accident occurred at about 1006 CUT. CD had to be doing
something else for that other two minutes. What could he have been
doing for all that time? Maybe he took the clipboard over to the radio
to change stations. He wouldn't have gone to the bathroom when he was
expecting a call from Comair.

He tells the crash crew that the aircraft is off the approach end of
runway 8. That is the departure end of runway 26. 80 plus 180 degrees
is 260, BUT then he tells the crash crew the aircraft took off of
runway 22. I can't understand how he thought Comair took off runway 22
and ended up off the departure end of runway 26. If he took off of 22,
he would have had to go off the right side of runway 22 before he got
halfway down the runway.

If there would have been a second controller working the radar scope,
CD could have been watching his runway a lot closer, but that is no
excuse when the runway is the primary responsibility. CD wasn't
focusing on his primary responsibility, the runway, but let his
attention focus in the wrong direction dealing with radar traffic in
the air. Traffic count had nothing to do with this accident.

CD had three departures in a short period of time with a lot of
coordination with ARTCC. He is listening to music in the background.
If he did the traffic count when he was finished talking with
Eagle882, Comair was at the departure end of runway 26 or colliding
into the trees off the departure end. Comair crashed before he started
the traffic count. He should have seen it happening. CD should have
been watching his runway. Aircraft in the air pose little threat to
safety compared to ones on the runway.

CD never did tell us why he wasn't looking at the radar scope and
telling Comair that he had radar contact on him. He should have been
wondering why no radar target showed up at the departure end on runway
22. The traffic count scenario is just smoke and mirrors.

Today, I read an article about the FAA refusing to have weather band
radios in the control towers siting it would be a distration. Here's
the article....

http://blogs.usatoday.com/weather/20..._yes_radi.html

According to a spokeswoman from the FAA, the decision to pull the
radios seeks to limit distractions for controllers and ensure safe
operation of the airspace.

We had a radio with a cd player in the tower cab at MYF and we used to
bring our own cd's to work and listen to them while working traffic.
Once at LGB tower, we had a portable TV in the tower cab watching a
football game and I forgot to take it home when the tower closed. The
next morning, the chief saw it and demanded to know who's it was. I
confessed and he chewed my butt until I promised him it would never
happen again.


Traffic count should be done on the hour and is a secondary function.
The crash occurred at about 6 minutes after the hour. Six minutes
prior to the accident, CD was busy with Eagle882 ready for departure.
Traffic count is not important. CD had three departures and all he had
to do was write down 0-2-0-0-0 on a clipboard to complete the traffic
count, Takes all of two seconds. Comair was on the wrong runway for
close to 25 seconds.

Here is some inside information for the layman, you don't have to turn
your back on the runway to do traffic count. You read the numbers off
the counter in front of you and put them on a clipboard, again, in
front of you. He should have been watching his radar scope when Comair
was no longer on the runway, again in front of him. There is NO reason
to turn your back.

The pilot and first officer were given toxicology tests after the
crash but I have never heard of a controller being tested for drugs or
alcohol following and accident or incident. We hear of the TSA people
reporting pilots when they smell alcohol on their breath and they have
been pulled off of airliners and registered massive amounts of alcohol
in their systems.

Since the 70's, control towers that used to be above the terminals
were moved across the airport and the public never came in contact
with us if we didn't want them around. At Christmas, pilots used to
drop off gifts for us, it's an old tradition. We got candy and
cookies, but the main item offered to us was booze, and lots of it.
Why would you want to give your controller a bottle of scotch, I never
understood it. When I tell people about all the drugs being used on
the job, the number one response I get is "Well, it's a really
stressful job, isn't it?" I guess they feel if you are in a stressful
job, you ought to be able to shoot up a little heroin now and then.

The FAA knows that the public knows nothing about the functions of a
control tower and it is easy to "hoodwink" the masses. Now you know
the truth.

I came across a letter to AvWeb from a controller claiming things are
worse now than when I blew the whistle. AvWeb has been able to confirm
her identity. Her letter is at ....

http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archive...printable.html

I have been at this for close to 20 years now. Who is looking out for
the safety of the flying public? The FAA ALWAYS says safety is their
number one concern. If that was true, they wouldn't have hired one on
my co-workers after he had been busted twice in the US Navy for
trafficing in drugs. And another who would come to work drunk once a
week. They would not have hired me when they knew I had vision
problems. But they fired me when I had seen it all too many times and
told my chief we were getting tipped off about random drug testing and
over half of us were using on the job. He was the one who tipped us
off the day before the drug team arrived so we could switch shifts
with a non-using controller, if we could find one. And the guy who the
chief told was the guy who was dealing all the drugs.

I have played tapes of telephone calls with my co-workers where they
admit knowledge of druguse on the job to my Congressman, Duncan
Hunter, and to the press in San Diego. Nothing is done. I have sent
the tapes to the Aviation Subcommittee of Congress and to the White
House. Nothing is done.

Who is going to stop this from happening again and again. We have been
ignored, attacked, and accused of having our own agenda by the press,
government officials, and family members of such tragedies as TW800,
Swissair111, Egyptair990, and ValuJet 592. Now one of the Comair191
family members has asked me to remove him from my mailing list.

We are the head wiring experts from Boeing and the Dept. of Defense,
airline pilots, two FAA lead airline inspectors, an FAA security
expert who reported problems at Boston Logan and resigned after the
FAA cooked his reports (before 9/11), an airline mechanic, and the
inventor of the smoke hood for airline cockpits. Everyone talks about
wanting to make sure nothing like this happens again, but when we give
them what they need to do something about it, it's "shoot the
messenger".

The press could report these crimes, but they refuse to let the people
know the truth in our land of the free. I have told reporters that if
they get this story past their editor, the next big story they will be
working on is the bear problem at the dump. How can our President say
people are jealous of our freedom?

Now YOU know the truth about what happened to Comair191. The NTSB
final report will say that the controller had his back turned away
from the runway and nothing more. If you don't believe me, look at how
the NTSB covered up the crash of VJ592 and screwed over the families
there. You can read all about it on my website at....

http://users.sdccu.net/chickenlittle

The Congress won't let me testify because they can't have everyone
knowing the real story about aviation safety and the way they are
watching over the system. We will just have to hear about more
innocent people dying by the hundreds over and over again. I will be
wasting my time for decades to come.

Regards,


James Bergquist
Air Safety Activist
Former USAF and FAA air traffic controller
Former San Diego Country NATCA representative

  #2  
Old January 28th 07, 11:35 AM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Dave S
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 406
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he clearedComair 5191 for takeoff

Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?
  #3  
Old January 28th 07, 02:20 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Mxsmanic
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 9,169
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

Dave S writes:

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?


It is pretty obviously the latter. None of the data provided in the
article supports the assertions and implications made by the article
when examined closely.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.
  #4  
Old January 28th 07, 02:35 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
A Lieberma
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 318
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:

Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?


While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen
  #5  
Old January 28th 07, 03:19 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Sam Spade
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 1,326
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he clearedComair 5191 for takeoff

A Lieberma wrote:
Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:


Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?



While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen


Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff."
If it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a
IFR tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as
local controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data
controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This
may be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other
written information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide
aircraft identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway
information as follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft
has been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other
movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so,
why is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in
a position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot
informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may
discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because
someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe
situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the
appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation
of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot’s prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue
the alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).
  #6  
Old January 28th 07, 05:51 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Mxsmanic
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 9,169
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

Sam Spade writes:

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.


Even if he was hopelessly overworked, the final responsibility rests
with the flight crew. And it doesn't appear that he did anything
wrong, anyway, however overworked he might have been.

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.
  #7  
Old January 28th 07, 06:48 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Jim Carter[_1_]
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 403
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff



-----Original Message-----
From: Mxsmanic ]
Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
Subject: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

....

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.


Because they couldn't find the reset button?

(I just had to take the shot...)


  #8  
Old January 28th 07, 06:49 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Matt Barrow
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 603
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff


"A Lieberma" wrote in message
. 18...
Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:


Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?


While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.


ATC's job is separation. If they catch something, that's dandy. As such, if
a passenger catches something, that's dandy, too.


  #9  
Old January 28th 07, 06:51 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Matt Barrow
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 603
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff


"chickenlittle92071" wrote in message
ups.com...

To Whom It May Concern:


And Bush flew those missles into the WTC, right?


  #10  
Old January 28th 07, 06:52 PM posted to rec.aviation.ifr
Matt Barrow
external usenet poster
 
Posts: 603
Default The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff


"Jim Carter" wrote in message
news:001f01c74304$7e55a260$4b01a8c0@omnibook6100.. .


-----Original Message-----
From: Mxsmanic ]
Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
Subject: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

...

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.


Because they couldn't find the reset button?

(I just had to take the shot...)

Cheap shot! :~)



 




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