Scared of mid-airs

Jeff Crowell wrote:
You have been claiming that the speed of the USAF flight
was "480 knots (550 mph) at impact" (your post, 7/14),
when actual recorded speed at impact was 356 KCAS
per the accident report.

Larry Dighera wrote:
[That would be Message-ID:
]

AIB Report mentions the 480 knot closure speed twice:
AIB Report:
"The closure rate of Cessna 829 and Ninja 1 based on
radar-measured conflict alert data just prior to the collision was
approximately 480 KTAS."

"Based on their closure rate of approximately 480 knots," ...

With regard to your 356 KCAS airspeed at the time of impact, that is
not given as Ninja 2's speed in the AIB nor NTSB reports. Here's the
only reference to that number I was able to find in either document:

AIB Report:

"Ninja 1's displayed airspeed at the time of the midair was
356 KCAS" ...

You'll recall that Ninja 1 was not the aircraft that impacted the
Cessna. (I find the fact that the AIB report equates 'displayed
airspeed' with calibrated air speed a bit puzzling. Do F-16 airspeed
indicators actually display calibrated airspeed?)

I certainly grant the difference between Ninjas 1 and 2.
Don't you think that if Ninja 2 was flying form on Ninja 1,
their speeds must have been pretty close? And, I say again,
blithely using closure speed as speed of the mishap aircraft is
purposely deceptive.

As for KCAS versus KIAS in displays, I have no time in
F-16s, so I can't answer that categorically. But since
KCAS corrects for system error, it is more accurate than
KIAS, so why not? It would not surprise me if what's
displayed on the HUD, for example, and therefore
recorded by the tapes, is KCAS, since data displayed
there has been massaged by the aircraft's air data
computer (or some analogous system)...


So, lacking evidence to the contrary, I used the closing speed as the
speed at the time of impact. That may be incorrect, but lacking
better information, it seems reasonable to me, and not an exaggeration
nor hyperbole.

It doesn't strike you as even a little bit inflammatory in light
of your usage of that number? What the hey, you're only
off by 25%. Close enough, huh?


Per the F-16 Dash 1 he was allowed to be at 350 knots at
that altitude, and was traveling only slightly faster at the time
of the collision. What about that statement (from the
accident investigation) do you not understand?

Jeff, I understand that 450 knots within congested terminal airspace
is about one third faster than the 350 knot speed limit you state
above. One third is not 'slightly faster'. It is _significantly_
faster. (The 450 knot figure is quoted from the AIB report at the
beginning of this follow up article.) Perhaps you can provide the
reasoning you used in arriving at your conclusion.

Speed of the F-16 at impact was 356 KCAS.

Limiting the discussion to your 356 KCAS speed at the time of impact
figure disregards this fact:

Final NTSB Report MIA01FA028A:

http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief2.asp?...A028A &akey=1
"Speeds of up to 450 knots were noted during the descent."

Why would you overlook that 450 knot speed? Does the F-16 Dash 1 only
pertain to the speed at time of impact? :-)

Somewhere during the entire flight, Ninja 2's speed might
easily have been supersonic; would that have had any influence
on the collision? (other than the cosmic scheduling of it all--
obviously, anything which might have occurred to either F-16
or Cessna to speed or delay their movements throughout their
respective flights that day would have prevented this tragedy).
Seen that way, if Ninja had gone even a little faster then this
would have been nothing more than a close miss.

I never debated that Ninja flight recorded a speed of 450
knots during the flight. I'm simply saying that the speed
that really matters is the speed immediately prior to the
collision. I have not seen any claim other than yours that
Ninja was knocking down 450 knots within that critical
interval. And you are clearly selecting your data to put
your argument in the best possible light.

Similarly, the fact that closure rate was 480 knots of
course has meaning in terms of how much time was
available to both pilots to see and avoid. But to imply or
suggest that this is in any way the same as saying
that Ninja was making almost 500 knots at impact is a
blatant lie.


Jeff

Keep the kid off the racetrack and everybody's happy. Responsible adults do that.

Race cars are not raced =to= the racetrack on side streets. You also
have to keep the race car off the sidestreets to make everybody happy.

Airliners aren't known for great visibility either.

And yet they have so few MAC's. Why is that?

Magic. Actually, I think the military also has few MACs (though I
haven't looked at the stats), and the airlines =have= had a few MACs of
note.

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 14:21:30 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 04:49:37 GMT, 588 wrote in
::

Larry Dighera wrote:

An equally onerous solution would be to curtail MTR operations in the
CONUS.

No, that would be a far less satisfactory solution than converting
airspace associated with military training routes to Restricted
areas.

The more I think about such a conversion, the more appropriate I think
it would be. If Restricted airspace were created around MTRs, the
hazardous area would be fully depicted on charts. Instead of MTRs
being shown as a thin gray line, their true lateral dimensions would
be represented. Of course the chart might become so cluttered as to
be incomprehensible, but that doesn't seem to be a factor of concern
for those charged with designing airspace nor their cartographers.

OK, your homework for this week is to pick a major USAF tactical base.
You seem familiar with MacDill, but you could use Langley, Luke,
Nellis, Seymour-Johnson or similar. Now, draw up a minimum of four low
level MTRs, each a minimum of 300 miles in length. Be sure that entry
and exit points are close enough to base of origin for local
operations during a typical 90 minute flight. Have at least two of the
routes terminate on a weapons range. Consider the routes restricted
airspace. Now, how does your GA traffic go anywhere? You have
effectively created boxes that don't allow anyone else to use the
airspace.

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?


Of course, military high-speed, low-level MTR operations outside the
Restricted airspace bounds would be prohibited. So if a MTR run
impaled a civil aircraft outside of R airspace, there would be no
ambiguity about who was responsible (and don't give me that
see-and-avoid weasel clause; it's absurdly unrealistic at the speeds
involved).

How much time do you have driving an airplane at 300 knots or more?
I've got about 4000 hours of tactical jet operation and never seemed
to find it too difficult to see-and-avoid other aircraft.

Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

Let's also note something regarding your favorite 250 knot restriction
below 10M'. For a period of time (long ago, galaxy far, far away), I
operated an aircraft that flew final approach at typical landing
weight at 205 KIAS. That was landing configuration with gear and flaps
down. In clean configuration, 350 knots was generally the minimum
maneuverable speed. At 250 knots clean, my agile fighter suddenly
became a shuddering block of non-aerodynamic technology with little
more G available than your Cessna 172. Not practical.

Today, aircraft operate comfortably at lower speeds, but still need
operational flexibility and therefore the exemption of the 250 knot
restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.



[...]

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?


That contacting ATC doesn't mean you'll be cleared to enter a Restricted
Area.




Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?


Of course, military high-speed, low-level MTR operations outside the
Restricted airspace bounds would be prohibited. So if a MTR run
impaled a civil aircraft outside of R airspace, there would be no
ambiguity about who was responsible (and don't give me that
see-and-avoid weasel clause; it's absurdly unrealistic at the speeds
involved).

How much time do you have driving an airplane at 300 knots or more?
I've got about 4000 hours of tactical jet operation and never seemed
to find it too difficult to see-and-avoid other aircraft.

Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

Let's also note something regarding your favorite 250 knot restriction
below 10M'. For a period of time (long ago, galaxy far, far away), I
operated an aircraft that flew final approach at typical landing
weight at 205 KIAS. That was landing configuration with gear and flaps
down. In clean configuration, 350 knots was generally the minimum
maneuverable speed. At 250 knots clean, my agile fighter suddenly
became a shuddering block of non-aerodynamic technology with little
more G available than your Cessna 172. Not practical.

Today, aircraft operate comfortably at lower speeds, but still need
operational flexibility and therefore the exemption of the 250 knot
restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.



[...]

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace?

There may be overlying SUA, or overlying clouds, or GL may already be
pretty high up.

If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC.

I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the
charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't
know whether it's hot or not.

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:28:47 GMT, Larry Dighera
wrote:

On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:25:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote in
::

OK, your homework for this week is to pick a major USAF tactical base.
You seem familiar with MacDill, but you could use Langley, Luke,
Nellis, Seymour-Johnson or similar. Now, draw up a minimum of four low
level MTRs, each a minimum of 300 miles in length. Be sure that entry
and exit points are close enough to base of origin for local
operations during a typical 90 minute flight. Have at least two of the
routes terminate on a weapons range. Consider the routes restricted
airspace. Now, how does your GA traffic go anywhere? You have
effectively created boxes that don't allow anyone else to use the
airspace.

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?

You've added a factor not previously in evidence. If you draw the MTR
with those altitude specs, then you MAY be able to create routes that
would be meet training requirements and allow for reasonably
unhindered GA traffic.

You're overlooking the fact that ATC doesn't usually have coverage at
those altitudes in areas typically employed for MTRs. They won't be
able to offer you the desired "no responsibility on the part of the GA
pilot" guarantee of no threat because they can't see traffic at those
altitudes.

Additionally, training maneuvers on an MTR may require formation
repositioning, simulated evasive maneuvers, simulated armed
reconnaisance maneuvering and even simulated weapons delivery
maneuvers and re-attacks. Those requirements could seriously mitigate
your ability to create 500-1500' AGL corridors.

Isn't joint-use under VFR more practical?

Joint use of MTR airspace causes a hazard to air navigation because of
the high speeds involved. Practicality is trumped by air safety in my
mind. Is it not in yours?

If you ask that last sentence question, you must not have been paying
attention throught the last 120 messages here. The (relatively) high
speeds involved are not the problem you continually try to make them.

How much time do you have driving an airplane at 300 knots or more?
I've got about 4000 hours of tactical jet operation and never seemed
to find it too difficult to see-and-avoid other aircraft.

Would you characterize yourself as typical of the skill level attained
by the majority of military fighter pilots?

You demonstrate here that you actually don't know many military
fighter pilots (BTW, there is no other kind--all fighter pilots are
military). Show me a fighter pilot who does not contend that his
personal skill level is above the average and I'll show you a pilot
who will lose tomorrow.

My skill level was generally above the majority. But the training
level I required of those who were my students, those in my squadron
and those in my flights was more than adequate to do the job safely.

Let's also note something regarding your favorite 250 knot restriction
below 10M'. For a period of time (long ago, galaxy far, far away), I
operated an aircraft that flew final approach at typical landing
weight at 205 KIAS. That was landing configuration with gear and flaps
down. In clean configuration, 350 knots was generally the minimum
maneuverable speed. At 250 knots clean, my agile fighter suddenly
became a shuddering block of non-aerodynamic technology with little
more G available than your Cessna 172. Not practical.

Today, aircraft operate comfortably at lower speeds, but still need
operational flexibility and therefore the exemption of the 250 knot
restriction remains necessary.

I don't recall having said the exemption isn't necessary.

My objection is to the _hazard_ operating in excess of the speed limit
the National Airspace System designers chose while creating the
system. If you think the 250 knot limit below 10,000' is unwarranted,
perhaps your credentials are superior to those who designed the
system. Doubtful.

My credentials may be different than theirs. But, they recognized the
operational and aerodyamic necessity of the exception as well as I do.
You are apparently the only one who does not recognize that some high
performance tactical aircraft require that exemption to operate
safely. 'Tis you Moriarty, not I.

Let's do a little analysis.

VFR minimum visibility: 3 statute miles = 15,480'

250 knots: 417' per second

Time to impact at 250 knots closing: 37 seconds (3 statute miles)

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

These times do not take into consideration the speed of BOTH aircraft,
and more importantly, they do not allow for the time it takes to
recognize the threat, decide to maneuver out of the path, and the time
it takes for the aircraft to respond and actually finish clearing the
path.

Three seconds? Maybe five if you can't make a decision quickly.

More likely, the exemption was issued as a necessary expedient at a
time when the sky was much bigger (if you know what I mean), and there
was less oversight. Today that exemption creates a negative impact on
air safety, and the whole issue should be objectively reexamined by
qualified engineers.

Not engineers you twit. Operators!

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?
That contacting ATC doesn't mean you'll be cleared to enter a Restricted
Area.

I think there's the implication that one might be able to obtain
permssion to do so via ATC (and if not, one stays away).

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 15:59:33 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
wrote in
. net:


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .

With regard to low-level MTRs, isn't the ceiling 500' AGL to 1,500'
AGL? Why not just fly over top of the proposed MTR restricted
airspace? If that approach should happen to interfere with
navigation, then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC. I don't see the problem you apparently do.
What am I overlooking?


That contacting ATC doesn't mean you'll be cleared to enter a Restricted
Area.


True. Wouldn't you presume, that any denial of access into R airspace
would be predicated on the fact that there is training activity
occurring with in that R airspace (it's hot)? If so, it probably
wouldn't be a good idea to enter that MTR at that time even if it
remained joint use. Right?

OK, hold your breath for 37 seconds. It's an incredibly long time.

It's a lot of sky to scan. And if nose to nose, you only have 19 seconds.

Jose
--
The monkey turns the crank and thinks he's making the music.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Thu, 03 Aug 2006 16:02:22 GMT, Jose
wrote in :

then the pilot would do what he always does to enter R
airspace: Contact ATC.

I've attempted that, and also contacting the FSS as printed on the
charts themselves, and often the putative controlling agency doesn't
know whether it's hot or not.

That is true. Why do you suppose that occurs?

Do you think ATC is so disorganized, that they can't find the military
activity information, or do you think the military has provided
ambiguous information, what? It would seem, that given the system in
place for activating and deactivating Restricted airspace, there
should be a concrete answer available at all times.