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#21
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Kills with Guns
Joining this late because I have been gone but if it helps here is a
collection of data I put out years ago ---- An Air Combat Summary for Western Fighters: Since 1979, American made fighters have been engaged in air combat at least 214 times and have downed around 214 aircraft. Air Battles that have occurred were from the Bekaa Valley and Persian Gulf to around the world during the coup attempt in Venezuela. Engagements and Kills were recorded throughout more than 3400 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat sorties. Western aircraft included the F-4E Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-5E Tiger II, Mirage F-1, and F-18 Hornet fighter-bombers. These engagements resulted in (with this data base) 214 confirmed Kills with only the two air-to-air combat losses. No direct correlation is made with those kills offically sanctioned by the respective air forces; for instance, Israel and Pakistan will make a determination of "personal kill" versus "squadron kill" based on the exact way the pilot performed rulling out louck and chance in the scoring. There we 23 x M-61 gun kills 48 x AIM-7 Sparrow kills from F-15, F-18, & F-14's 04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM kills from the F-16 (4) and F-15 (1) 03 x AIM-54 Phoenix Kills 130 x IR missile kills from all types of aircraft utilizing either AIM-9 Sidewinder, Magic 550, or Python missiles 2 x maneuvering suicides 1 x bail out 3 x from air-to-ground ordnance while airborne ------ 214 During this time, only two Western aircraft were downed by Russian built aircraft. One South African Mirage F-1 by a Cuban flown Angolian MiG-23 with an AA-8 Aphid and a US Navy F/A-18C by an Iraqi flown MiG-25 Foxbat with an AA-6 Acrid. There were two Saudi F-15C's that downed 2 x Iranian F-4E's back in the mid 1980's when they were trying to defect. Also a Navy F-14 downed a USAF RF-4C in an advertent Sidewinder firing over the Med. There were other statistics where dedicated attack aircraft were downed by fighters but the details have not been accounted for here. The First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) there were well over 300 air-to-air encounters with the Iranian scoring around 135 Kills and the Iraqi's around 85, but the data is still very confused because there were not engagements just run downs and encounters during strike missions. Surprisingly the Iraqi's favored the Super 530 IR version on the F-1 Mirage because of its range. The Iranians were reported to have made at least three AIM-54 kills which have been recorded because they would be F-14 kills and it does represent the only combat use of the AIM-54. A Summary of the Gulf War and Bosnian Air-to-Air Kills 06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum's ... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills ... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill ... 1 x Maneuvering Suicide's 08 x F-1 Mirages ... 4 x AIM-7 Kills ... 2 x AIM-9 Kills ... 1 x Maneuvering Suicide 04 x MiG-21/F-7 Fishbed's ... 3 x AIM-9 Kills ... 1 x AIM-7 Kill 08 x MiG-23 Flogger's ... 6 x AIM-7 Kills ... 2 x AIM-9 Kills 03 x MiG-25 Foxbat's ... 2 x AIM-7 Kills ... 1 x AIM-120 Kill 06 x Su-7/17/22 ... 3 x AIM-7 Kills ... 2 x AIM-9 Kills ... 1 x Mk-83 Bomb 02 x Su-25 Frogfoot ... 2 x AIM-9 Kills 01 x IL-76 Candid transport ... 1 x AIM-7 Kill 01 x PC-9 Trainer ... pilot bailout 07 x Helo's ... 2 x AIM-7 Kills ... 1 x AIM-9 Kills ... 2 x Gun Kills ... 1 x LGB Kill ... 1 x Walleye Kill 04 x Gastreb Light Attack ... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills ... 3 x AIM-9M Kills 02 x Blackhawk Helicopters (fratricide) ... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill ... 1 x AIM-9M Kill --------------------------------------- ..... 24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for 73%) ..... 04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (6 fired) ..... 16 x AIM-9 KIlls (19 launches for 84%) ..... 02 x 30mm Gun Kills ..... 02 x Maneuvering Suicides ..... 01 x Bailout ..... 03 x Air-to-Ground Ordnance --------------------------------------- 52 x Total Gulf/Bosnia Air-to-Air Victories Then Add: 04 x USN Kills on Libyan Su-22's 01 x USN Kill on an RF-4C 01 x RSAF Kills on 2 x F-4E's from Iran 03 x AIM-54 Kills from Iranian F-14's 24 x Israeli Air Force Kills From 1979 to the Bekaa Valley 89 x Israeli Air Force Kills During the Bekaa Valley War: 13 x Pakistani Air Force Kills During the Border War: 03 x Venezuelan Air Force Kills During the 2nd Coup Attempt: 18 x South African Air Force Kills During the Angolian War: 04 x Gastreb's downed over Bosnia 02 x Iraqi Aircraft downed after Gulf War ----- 214 None of these engagements occurred directly against Soviet/Warsaw Pact Air Forces although almost all were against Soviet manufactured machines. Some were fourth generation MiG-29 Fulcrums but no Su-27 Flanker fighters. A couple of Su-25 Frogfoot were downed by Pakistani F-16's and the one Pakstani F-16 lost to fratricide is counted not as a combat loss but as a missile kill. Sukhoi Su-27's have since seen combat in the sporadic air war between Ethiopia and Euritrea, no real numbers available now. Enemy fighters have fired 19 to 22 missiles and made five gun passes with only three hits and two kills. It is interesting to note that over half of the attacks were considered out-of-envelope attempts due to the fact that the enemy pilots could not achieve a better position or did not understand how to. So the pilot-factor in these engagements had a significant impact on the outcome. During the dynamics of these engagements the average radar first contacts were under 20 NM until the Gulf War and then the average appeared to slip out to 28 NM, even though some individual pilots acquired contacts as far as 50 NM. This is surprising for many considering that the F-15 was employed by the Israelis, but the Bekaa Valley was characterized by very short range radar contacts. The lack of an average longer range radar contact was primarily due to the complex and sophisticated nature of the operational environment that required pilot compensation for formations, terrain, weather, surface-to-air threats, and the presence of enemy aircraft. The demands for the positive ID (identification) of targets also effected the nature of the air battles. The Soviets employed, by themselves or through numerous surrogate pilots, tactical "experiments", as Soviet analyst Col Babich would say, that were not yet addressed in the literature from the Warsaw Pact Air Forces. Only recently have these more exotic evaluations been identified in the writings by Soviet tacticians. With a better understanding of the capabilities of modern Western weapon systems, the Soviets have attempted to produce tactical geometry's and intercept dynamics that utilize larger numbers of aircraft with the objective of exceeding the technical capabilities of the radar such as scan and track rate, search volume, and overall pilot task loading. Ultimately these factors would try to reduce "situation awareness" (SA) and "mutual support" (MS) bringing the friendly formations into "killing zones" or "ambush points". "Decoy" or "monkey" formations would serve as obvious "bait" in an attempt to set up the more tactically experienced Western pilots for an unobserved entry by a MiG element or trapped into one or more of these "killing zones" for demise by the whole enemy formation. Because of this, most targets were not "cooperative" and therefore the actual engagement setups were basically short ranged and radar lock-ups were discouraged due to the numbers of targets at many different bearings. There was also a basic "timing" problem, that directly relates to the skill level of the engaged pilots. In many cases, the Soviet advisory technicians and their brothers in arms thought that they had properly "pincered" or "enveloped" the formation of US built fighters. In other words, they were satisfied from a C3I standpoint that the enemy formation was properly countered and engaged by their fighters who were given an entry advantage. Why their pilots never came home was a big mystery, especially since it looked so good on the GCI radar scopes. What of course happened was that the US built fighters, through superior onboard systems, system mechanization, air-to-air weapons, maneuver performance, pilot skills, and overall realistic training, were able to correct for a bad start and quickly kill the attackers inside the resolution cell of their command and control system. Despite the fact that the Soviets are now saying all of the "right things" when it comes to appreciating these kinds of air battles, but they are far from realizing any wide spread benefits from changing the emphasis of their training. The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events. The pilot's ability to keep his eyes and attention outside the aircraft and still monitor his sensors and weapon system carried the day. During the approximately 30 Middle East engagements, situation awareness was lost only three times, according to unofficial pilot debriefs. That means the pilots and their flight members lost track of events only 1% of the time. Most of us couldn't do that well driving home from work. To make that remarkable fact happen took exactly what is called "Western Technology". The sad thing is, considering all of what we said, that we can abuse this incredible edge over the Soviets by over-doing it on the "technology" and system "pet rock" side without a corresponding balance in requirements. The keep it simple stupid (KISS) principle has never been more important. Exchange ratios from the major air conflicts since the Korean War. The air-to-air exchange ratio is straight forward but the campaign exchange reflects the simple ratio of aircraft lost to all causes divided by the number destroyed from all causes. We have a tendency to dwell on the successes and not examine the failures. The Soviets just look at the bottom line, aircraft invested versus aircraft expended. In the Korean War, despite our great air-to-air success rate over the MiG-15 by the F-86, the Soviets praise the North Koreans for "a draw" with the US Superpower since in the overall "campaign" the US lost around the same 2000 machines that they did. That is also why they have looked so seriously at the Middle East Wars, their "campaign" averages were mush worse. A best guess determination at what it took to get a missile kill throughout the conflicts since South East Asia. Together they give a fairly interesting picture of how the various air wars went and they all agree on the fact that the Soviet equipment didn't carry the day. Technology was clearly in the favor of the West, but there was such an excessive amount of it with little regards to the support side of the weapons, success was hit or miss and sometimes actually overlooked. The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it. Despite limited F-8 experiences, it was the USAF that became the Vietnam War's "gun fighters", simply because Navy Phantoms (F-4B/N/J/S) had none by choice, despite later regrets. Perhaps the best success story has been that of the Sidewinder "L" (AIM-9L) version that has been so |
#22
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Kills with Guns
No offense, but your article format isn't easy to read. And I think you're
off with your AMRAAM #s. I believe the totals stand closer to at least 6 rather than 4 (2 F16 Iraq, 2 F16 Bosnia, 2 F15 Bosnia). And I'm not sure what your general points are. "The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events" More to the point, could you simply say they had better A-A training? I don't understand the difficult to see bit, given that Western fighters are typically larger. The lesson that experience counts, in combat or anything else, it hardly new. And it was learned in Linebacker via Top Gun (and FWS later) if it was forgotten. "The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it." I'm not sure where you got these ideas. The USAF had such success with the Sparrow because a hand-picked unit of F-15 fighters, with the best available NCTR technology (unavailable to the Navy) were given the cherry-picked opportunities to pursue A-A BVR engagements. An F-14 pilot is quoted as commenting that the AIM-7 is a magic bullet once it gets off the rails. How many BVR engagements has the USN had? One (by a panicky RIO)? And the USAF was embarrased into adopting the Sidewinder? Professionally, Eagle Drivers are embarrased to be forced into a dogfight (vs. smacking BVR), but I've never heard one be embarrased by the AIM-9 unless they were on the receiving end of one in training! TV |
#23
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Kills with Guns
"TV" wrote in message ... Olds died and it wasn't even mentioned here!?! Wow. For a long time, based on interview snippets I heard from him, I thought he was an arrogant git. But I saw a TV interview of him, that was fairly recent, where a lot of those comments were shown to be taken out of context. Confident, yes. Git, not. Great stories in general, and he definitely projected a solid image. Certainly was covered here. Remember though the memorial service was held on the 30th he died on the 14th. Tex Houston |
#24
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Kills with Guns
Since I could not follow up on every detail as I did then over time you
may be right in the AMRAAM's but in the beginning the admission of who or what aircraft was carrying them and even if they were entered into the Gulf War were very sketchy in details. Fact was the F-15's retained the AIM-7 longer because of vibration and flow-issues over the wing with slammer's on the rails and the fact that they had a special Sparrow tailored to their liking. The F-16 entered the Gulf Zone after the War but in time to get the first AMRAAM kill (active pit bull as it was) and then time moved on. The Sparrow was a favorite to the F-15 for a longer time and especially the Israeli's who wanted the US to embargo it to the Middle East but that did not last long. Main concerns were fratricide of course, where the Sparrow could be made dumb but shutting off the radar or the CW which in one case was documented by the IAF during the Bekaa, but it was not to avoid a friendly it was to prevent the MiG from being hit over Syria - an ROE no no. The first years of AMRAAM training generally saw in the simulators the attrition of friendlies pretty high. As to preferring the BVR to the WVR shot well I guess that is all good bar talk but in reality things began to merge as the IR missiles became stronger in range and ability to "see" a target - hence they were used more and more in the forward hemisphere - while the Sparrow with its large motor and warhead continued to run down targets better in the stern. The Bekaa data would be the latest good sort out of missiles. The Iraq data with all the US kills shows the trend moving to chasing down the enemy although there were still a couple of good engagements more of the classical style. Dorr has a great summary of the F-15 kills in the Gulf War and I have summarized that and other inputs in the book done during the events. Now take all the lessosn from AIM ACE and yopu see as you said that the air to air environment is getting real deadly to all players and the ability to launch (F-Pole perhaps) far out makes a difference even over sorting - so what would an Iranian Air War look like, that will be interesting. But with MiG-31's, linked MiG-29M's and Su-30's, ground SA-10 and SA-15's merged into an IADS the whole nice world of the F-15 and F-22 could suddenly pop holes - so I suspect they are working that real carefully. Then again - the better pilot survives longer - and in that he generally gets more kills regardless of his mount, but with an enemy flying stronger machines both sides loose many more. And the missiles like AMRAAM are slowly taking a back seat to some longer range beauties - and again the race is on. So I am just offering you what I had for the groups to ponder - there is no real message and it is my opinions from about 35 years of being in the middle of a lot of it - so if you don't like them fine "TV" wrote in message ... No offense, but your article format isn't easy to read. And I think you're off with your AMRAAM #s. I believe the totals stand closer to at least 6 rather than 4 (2 F16 Iraq, 2 F16 Bosnia, 2 F15 Bosnia). And I'm not sure what your general points are. "The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events" More to the point, could you simply say they had better A-A training? I don't understand the difficult to see bit, given that Western fighters are typically larger. The lesson that experience counts, in combat or anything else, it hardly new. And it was learned in Linebacker via Top Gun (and FWS later) if it was forgotten. "The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it." I'm not sure where you got these ideas. The USAF had such success with the Sparrow because a hand-picked unit of F-15 fighters, with the best available NCTR technology (unavailable to the Navy) were given the cherry-picked opportunities to pursue A-A BVR engagements. An F-14 pilot is quoted as commenting that the AIM-7 is a magic bullet once it gets off the rails. How many BVR engagements has the USN had? One (by a panicky RIO)? And the USAF was embarrased into adopting the Sidewinder? Professionally, Eagle Drivers are embarrased to be forced into a dogfight (vs. smacking BVR), but I've never heard one be embarrased by the AIM-9 unless they were on the receiving end of one in training! TV |
#25
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Kills with Guns
On Tue, 3 Jul 2007 20:54:12 -0400, "TV" wrote:
Coincidentally Ed, I'm just reading Palace Cobra now. I might have more questions when I finish, but for now do you mind if I ask: 1- Relating to this thread, what do you think was most missing from U.S. A-A? Guns, more reliable missiles, better ROE, Combat Tree (NCTR), or better communication (like when you guys got robbed of thos Migs- the "Mig-hoarding" of Udorn reminds me of the 55th in Desert Storm)? Or just more Migs? Training--realistic, concentrated, dissimilar training. Tactics--abandonment of welded wing and training in fluid attack/loose deuce mutual support tactics. I always had a gun--both F-105 and F-4E. Not a factor. Missile reliability was. Poor training in AIM-7 applications was an issue. Only Fighter Weapons School guys in USAF got really concentrated training in the Sparrow. Frequent carriage of the missiles with attendant thumps, bumps and stresses caused deterioration and low reliability. ROE was definitely a factor. Required VID for most of the war for most of the players. No airfield strikes until Linebacker was another issue. Combat Tree was a late technology advance and would have made a difference as well. 2- Would you have prefered to fly the F-105G or the F-4E for your missions? For the planes as well as for the separate hunter/killer missions. As the "killer" element, I liked the F-4E. It was compatible with the F-105G and carried a good load with good systems. When it was available in the early years, the F-105D (single seat) was a good killer as well. 3- This relating to Olds. I also recently read Going Downtown. Having read Thud Ridge a long time ago, it was also pretty decent. Broughton certainly didn't suffer from lack of confidence either! I know you and the other River Rats don't feel the warmest feelings towards him, but I was wondering why when he was on trial (and Yeager was backing him up, so he couldn't have been a total buffoon), Olds backed away from the trial. Career politics or something more personal? I certainly don't want to much rake Olds in any way, I'm curious about the history of the moment. General Ryan certainly seemed like a jack-ass. Olds was airborne and just a few miles N. of Haiphong during the Turkestan incident. He actually saw the strafing occur. I spoke with him about it (actually he spoke and I listened,) a few years ago. He recalled being astonished that someone was doing that since the ship and the restrictions were specifically briefed that morning! He was investigating officer for 13th AF on the incident. He didn't think too much of Broughton's actions. 4- Did they really conduct an ORI in the middle of a successful air campaign?! The ORI took place in January of '73, right after completion of Linebacker II, exactly as recounted in Palace Cobra. (I still see Turk Turley ever year at River Rats reunions.) Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
#26
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Kills with Guns
John Carrier wrote:
wrote in message oups.com... On Jun 30, 1:54 pm, "John Carrier" wrote: "Schlomo Lipchitz" wrote in message ... Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any) have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns??? On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun kill in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a hard-maneuvering engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be. An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105, perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there. No Crusader gun kills? The question was about the modern aircraft. For the F-8, if I counted correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no ordnance expended ;-). And another 10 or so which were Sidewinder only. John, Given the lack of reliability of the F-8's guns, how much were you really relying on them? Was doctrine at the time to take advantage of the situation that since, in order to set yourself up for a gun shot, you'd drive right through the Sidewinder's best engagement zone and geometry, that you'd push for the gun shot, but it was mostly a follow-up if the missile didn't work? -- Pete Stickney Without data, all you have is an opinion |
#27
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Kills with Guns
"Peter Stickney" wrote in message ... John Carrier wrote: wrote in message oups.com... On Jun 30, 1:54 pm, "John Carrier" wrote: "Schlomo Lipchitz" wrote in message ... Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any) have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns??? On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun kill in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a hard-maneuvering engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be. An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105, perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there. No Crusader gun kills? The question was about the modern aircraft. For the F-8, if I counted correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no ordnance expended ;-). And another 10 or so which were Sidewinder only. John, Given the lack of reliability of the F-8's guns, how much were you really relying on them? Was doctrine at the time to take advantage of the situation that since, in order to set yourself up for a gun shot, you'd drive right through the Sidewinder's best engagement zone and geometry, that you'd push for the gun shot, but it was mostly a follow-up if the missile didn't work? The guns weakness was the length of the flexible feeds from the ammo cans located behind the cockpit (head high) and the guns which were in the lower forward fuselage. Under G, some flexing would occur, the belted ammo would catch and break a link. The trick was to avoid firing at anything over 4 G, and preferably around 2.5 ... not easy against a turning adversary. As I noted in an earlier post, you usually flew though the Sidewinder envelope prior to reaching a gun solution. So ... rely on the missile. Snap (opportunity) shot at high TCA was still available with guns. The WCS allowed both guns and missiles to be available, missiles on the pickle and guns on the trigger. Pushing for the gun shot was generally ill-advised in a multi-plane engagement. The time expended from sidewinder envelope (1NM and within 40 degrees in the era) to guns (1000') created a predictable path the free bogey could exploit. The Thuds got lots of gun kills because most of the time that's what they had and all they had. With A/A missile armament, the gun is primarily a weapon of (somewhat unusual) opportunity and often (in the training environment) ego. R / John |
#28
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Kills with Guns
The article at:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2007/0707strafing.asp includes the following: "We're using the gun quite a bit in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The fighters are using lots of 20 mm off F-15Es and F-16s and 30 mm off A-10s to hit ground targets. Why is that? For individuals, the gun is probably one of the most accurate weapons, with the least collateral damage. That 20 mm will end the bad guy's life, but stray rounds will just drive into the ground, and that's it. In Iraq, the adversary uses both road networks and riverine networks. There have been a number of occasions where boats have been identified carrying insurgents on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and we've used 20 mm and 30 mm guns to destroy those boats. A moving target is hard to hit with a bomb. With a gun, it's no big deal. In one instance, the enemy was getting ready to move people somewhere to do something later that night, but we removed them from the fight. The same thing happened in Balad, where we found people going to get roadside bomb supplies. We have been using the gun against single persons who have been planting improvised exposive devices. You'll have an individual with a truck, and a couple of other individuals; you'll see them get out and move around, trying to dig a hole, and you'll bring in an F-16 or an F-15E, or maybe an A-10, and you'll use 20 or 30 mm and go kill them. If you have troops in contact, or you have individuals in buildings, you do the same thing." Discussions about aircraft guns usually center on air-to-air usage, but nowadays, that's a secondary mission. With the primary usage of aircraft guns being strafing. For how long has this been true? |
#29
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Kills with Guns
On Jun 30, 8:44 pm, vincent norris wrote:
An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105, perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there. John, there ought to be some interesting stories about those kills. Americans should be ashamed to talk about what they did to Vietnam. vince norris |
#30
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Kills with Guns
Certainly was covered here. Remember though the memorial service was held
on the 30th he died on the 14th. Huh, I don't have any such thread from the 14th onwards showing up. Darn newsgroup provider! TV |
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