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#41
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On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: Tex Houston wrote: Guy and Ed, If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 . Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4 (or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why. Guy I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC business. For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission. Ed Rock was an instructor of mine at Nellis in '65-66 and arrived at Korat in June of '66 as one of the first contingent of F-105F Wild Weasels. (He wasn't on that mission that is excerpted for the book.) He flew his 100 mission tour in the summer and fall of '66 and became one of the first Weasels to survive the experience. Ed was back at Korat in '72 when I returned in the F-4. At that time he was commander of the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron (combined with the 561st WWS). He flew in both Linebacker I and II and we shared the experience on a couple of trips North together. He is probably one of the most unlikely looking fighter pilots you would ever meet. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:
Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com For Ed-I'm reading 'To Hanoi and back, the USAF and North VietNam, 1966-1973, Wayne Thompson, and in the first chapter he mentions that the late model F-4E had a rudimentary fly by wire back up for pitch control, for emergencies when PC-1/2 were gone...ever heard of this? Can ya try again Ed, I got an 'error' for your answer-you can email direct. |
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg. Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the (V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms". By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was almost twice as long. The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe. I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the pictures. It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time. While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc. are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the 388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates. I'll try and find a copy. I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out. Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to deny range/azimuth info to the defenses. If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly if popping up fdor weapon delivery. That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star of the show. By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72? '72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the '68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not. Coming in under the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars, denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns, etc. And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or AS (Azimuth-Sector)? I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know; there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they apparently figured that one out. Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first encounters with real RWR indications in combat. From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue. Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj. William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972, accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period. IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it. My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels. I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something. In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72 (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for pre-emptive firing. When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship, engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or preplanned pre-emptions. Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the (revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book. It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted. That is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down. Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism. That's the definition. Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon. That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.) No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air. Guy |
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Tex Houston wrote: Guy and Ed, If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 . Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4 (or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why. Guy I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC business. For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission. Yeah, now that you mention it, I remember reading that. snip Guy |
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On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or AS (Azimuth-Sector)? I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know; there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they apparently figured that one out. The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid between the airplane and the defender. Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so. Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first encounters with real RWR indications in combat. From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue. Just looked at Hobson. He reports six F-111s lost during Linebacker I/II. 28 Sept 72--Major AC and 1/Lt WSO 16 Oct --Capt AC and 1/Lt WSO 7 Nov-- Maj AC and Maj WSO 20 Nov-- Capt and Capt 18 Dec-- Lt Col and Major 22 Dec--Capt and 1/Lt So, we've got at least three first-timers and three more probable (the Captains.) Certainly at Korat in the F-105 community, the force was split 50/50 with experience and FNGs. In the F-4 side of the house we had probably 25% with previous tours and the rest were first timers (including, unbelievably, a couple of Majors with as much as 9 years experience in the F-4 and no previous combat!) Consider also that only BTDT crews who had participated in Rolling Thunder would be SAM and radar-guided defense experienced. Lots of previous tour guys had flown in S. Vietnam or during protracted bombing pauses and had never seen a real-world RWR indication. We actually had a half-dozen brand new 1/Lt arrivals both front and back cockpit, straight out of training in the F-4 going to RP VI on their first combat missions. Mike Stevens, squadron Ops Officer in the 34th went to Pack VI as a R/C/P flight lead/instructor pilot for some of the Linebacker II sorties. (That was something I flat refused to do!) My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels. I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something. In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72 (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for pre-emptive firing. When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship, engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or preplanned pre-emptions. Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the (revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book. "Iron Hand" It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted. That is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down. Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism. That's the definition. If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle group.) Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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Ed Rasimus wrote:
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or AS (Azimuth-Sector)? I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know; there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they apparently figured that one out. The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid between the airplane and the defender. Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so. Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library, so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near what it was for the typical Alpha Strike. My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels. I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something. In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72 (shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for pre-emptive firing. When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of "detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship, engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or preplanned pre-emptions. Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the (revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book. "Iron Hand" It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted. That is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down. Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism. That's the definition. If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle group.) As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the 67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts: ---------------------------------------------------------------- matheson Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options Ed Rasimus wrote in message et... Kurt Plummer wrote: snippage I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command & Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations. That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73. When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the system. Les -------------------------------------- Even more relevant was this one: -------------------------------------- Robert W. King Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options Hi Ed! Ed Rasimus wrote in message t... [stuff snipped] I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command & Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations. In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight, yelled "SAM" and called for a break. I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was ordered by the President in November 68. (Bob was Major Robert J. Beck, Command Bar-Stooler and highly experienced Thud driver previously stationed at Spangdahlem AB. He was a sierra hotel dive bomber.) It was a couple of months later when that happened. My memory says it was in Feb 1969 but I'm too lazy to dig out my log book. It was mid-morning. We were crusing at altitude southbound over Laos a few miles west of the west end of the DMZ. I had my head down in the cockpit updating the Doppler when from the corner of my eye, I saw the Shrike come off the outboard station. Being the Wild Weasel bear of our little crew and in charge of listening for enemy radar signals (There were none.) and being an all-around alert chap, I said "What the hell was that!" and then asked Bob what he was shooting at. He mumbled a bit and then said "We'll talk about it at the debrief." So I held my water until we got on the ground. In the step-van on the way in from the flight line to debrief, I got the whole story. As you know, there aren't a lot of suitable locations to stash loose items such as checklists, maps and what-not in the cockpit of the Thud. Bob's solution for map storage when it was not in use was to stick it under his left thigh. In the course of stretching, he had shifted his weight on the seat and the map had slid off the seat to the left between the seat and left console. He tried picking it up with his left hand. He could only touch the edge of the map with his fingertips. So in an effort to force his left hand a bit further into the narrow space between the seat and the console and recapture the map, he moved his right hand from its normal position on the stick and re-gripped it with his right wrist rotated so that the thumb was pointed down instead of up. In that unfamiliar configuration -- while fishing for a map near the cockpit floor with his left hand -- his right pinkie came in contact with the pickle button on the stick. The Shrike, ever obedient to its electrical signals, launched on a independent search and destroy mission over southern Laos. It was astonishing how much attention we garnered after landing back at Takhli without that AGM-45 hanging on the outboard. With the bombing halt still in progress, the Weasels hadn't expended a Shrike in months. As Bob put it later that night at the bar, "I've been on this base nine months but I had to debrief guys I'd never seen or heard of before this afternoon." -- Robert W. King I'm an ingenieur, NOT a bloody locomotive driver! ------------------------------------------------------ So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they started flying separate missions). Guy |
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On Sun, 27 Mar 2005 09:02:41 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library, so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near what it was for the typical Alpha Strike. You are correct, the -111s didn't tank routinely and they preferred night solo. But, my point was that even given that you weren't at high altitude, the HUMINT reports for the bad guys from the bases as well as ground observers along the rather limited route options would be more than enough to let the target area know someone was coming. If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle group.) As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the 67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts: ---------------------------------------------------------------- matheson Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options Ed Rasimus wrote in message et... Kurt Plummer wrote: snippage I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command & Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations. That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73. That demonstrates that my statements have been consistent for lo these many years. And, it also points out that the IAF had a better concept of tactics as well as a better supply chain than we did. Since their wars tended to be of the week or less variety, they probably could expend a bit more aggressively. (I know, the week or less comment is a bit of exaggeration.) When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the system. Les You might note that '78 is a mere six years after the end of LB II. And, I mention writing about it in '77 at ACSC. -------------------------------------- Even more relevant was this one: -------------------------------------- Robert W. King Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options Hi Ed! Ed Rasimus wrote in message t... [stuff snipped] In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight, yelled "SAM" and called for a break. While I've got great respect for Bear King's experience, I've got to say that as one of about eight crews of H/K specialists in the F-4 squadron at the time, I would have seen it done or at least briefed during the summer and fall of '72. And, while the AGM-78 "Standard ARM" often got a SAM call from newbies in the area, a Shrike shot was way too short in duration and too small for most folks to see. If someone did see it, the greater probability would be an "Atoll" call. (The Standard sightings were enough of a problem that Weasels began to alert the force with a call of "Shotgun" prior to firing the big brute.) I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was ordered by the President in November 68. So, an inadvertent firing recount and a confirmation that it wasn't done in '68. So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they started flying separate missions). Guy The 67th deployment was late in the year. (I'm too lazy to look it up this AM, but I'd say Oct-Nov of '72). They did some pairings with the 561st/17th F-105G guys for local orientation, but that was mostly to lower Route Packs and very brief. When they finally got thrown into LB II, there was so much activity upon arrival in RP-VI that pre-empting would have been virtually impossible. And, if you're going to have all sort of hot sites on the scope, why not target specific ones? Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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