On 12 Oct 2003 11:34:00 -0700, (Michael P. Reed)
wrote:


Strange how after they evacuated Boston in March 1776 (less than a
year after Lexington & Concord) they never came back,
and how Howe and
Burgoyne's operations thereafter concentrated on New York, then
Philadelphia. For one who likes to cast aspersions on the knowledge
of others, you don't seem too clued-up yourself.

Another poor ignorant soul in the need for elucidation I see. g
Apologies in advance for what is going to be a rather long post.

The origins of British strategy date back to the summer of 1775
(prior to that they did not have one),

On the contrary, I suggest you actually aquaint yourself with Gage's
correspondance with the Northern Department in 1773-75, and the
increase in troop movements to Boston by the War Office which
resulted..

when Bill Legge, a.k.a. 2nd
Earl of Dartmouth and Secretary of American Affairs in the Colonial
Office had some discussions with some folks knowledgable (or more
correctly with folks who thought themselves knowledgeable) of affairs
in America. After which, he came up with his grand plan of campaign.
Writing to Thomas Gage about it in August, he suggested that two
armies ought to be assembled. One in Boston, which was to be
reinforced, and the other, and Main, to occupy New York City, which
was to be a piece of cake since it was loyal.

And this plan was carried out to the point of Howe's force taking New
York while Boston was evacuated.... shurely shome mishtake if the plan
was to occupy Boston? The British made no attempt to return to Boston
after the spring of 1786. So much for it being a central aim of their
strategy.


screams for actions for protection. British officialdom missed the
boat twice. The first clue that the rebellion was not centered in New
England was the invasion of Canada. It being obvious that the army
which did so was not composed of New Englanders (other than a few from
New Hampshire).

And more from Connecticut and New York. Guess where the first of
those states is. Yes, that's right, New England.

As mentioned, Howe pulled out (precipitacely) in March of '76 after
Henry Knox had drug some former British heavy artillery from
Ticonderoga to the heights overlooking the RN's anchorages in Boston
Harbor. Howe was to have pulled out before the onset of winter, but
had decided, for reasons that are really not clear, to remain, and
I've a sneaking suspicion that he had intended on keeping a garrison
in Boston despite the plan not too. We'll never know, though.

But we do know what Howe was recommending to Germain, and we know what
he actually did, and neither of these involved any plan to continue to
occupy Boston. That you prefer to give scope to unfounded speculation
on this point rather than adhere to the evidence of the historical
record is instructive.

[snip long, patronising and turgid exposition]

I would not subject myself to this to begin with if I didn't have some
clue about using responsible primary and secondary sources to form my
opinion. I've no intention of persisting if you want to indulge
yourself by lecturing an imaginary class of five-year olds. You might
also want to diversify your reading of British strategy from sources
which make an effort to understand the context and internal logic
involved. Macksey wouldn't be a bad start, although he's not perfect.


Now, what was this about Paine? Never really studied him.

Shame; you seem to have a good handle on prejudicial
characterisations of British strategy and policy which might be based
on his particular propaganda.

Gavin Bailey

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