Hi,

Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some political
rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.

As I predicted:
1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
4. "As the airplane proceeded east from the departure airport, the pilot
reported that he was having trouble maintaining outside visual contact and
controlling the airplane and wanted help getting back to the airport."

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051227X02016&key=1

I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
flight in those conditions.

Hilton

Hilton wrote:
>I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that flight in those conditions.

Sounds like pilot error from the start. :^)

The Monk

Hilton > wrote:

> I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
> flight in those conditions.

Are you referring to the weather/night conditions or are you stating you
wouldn't fly under all four of the accident flight circumstances you
listed?

If the latter, I agree (although I am not a CFI).

--
Peter

On Wed, 28 Dec 2005 22:00:28 GMT, "Hilton" > wrote:

>I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
>flight in those conditions.

I did not see the original thread.

What, exactly, are you implying?

Are you implying you would not feel comfortable flying night IMC, which is
what is described in the NTSB report? Or are you implying something else?

I found it interesting to do a little research on the web concerning the
weather at WVI and at FAT (and SNS and RHV) for times bracketing the
accident. (The report says he was going to Fresno).

Given the reported weather, it seems to me as if an IFR flight by a
competent IFR pilot would be reasonable, but perhaps not in a C172 if there
were icing conditions at the MEA at that time.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

"Hilton" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> Hi,
>
> Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some
> political rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.
>
> As I predicted:
> 1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
> 2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
> 4. "As the airplane proceeded east from the departure airport, the pilot
> reported that he was having trouble maintaining outside visual contact and
> controlling the airplane and wanted help getting back to the airport."
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051227X02016&key=1
>
> I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
> flight in those conditions.
>
> Hilton
>

Hilton,
We seem to share the frustration of watching someone's reckless disregard
for the consequences inherent in aviation result in the death of themselves
or those who depend on their judgment. In this case it would be revealing
to know if this flight was undertaken through ignorance (which could be a
training issue) or if other external forces (pilot or passenger
getthereitis) or other human factor caused the pilot to disregard the
recommendation regarding VFR flight not recommended. It seems that this
pilot did not recognize the level of risk (and final terror) to which he was
exposing his family.

This frustration lead me to start a thread last April subject "human factors
recklessness", where I said in part
I am tempted to ask why? where are we failing? are we glorifying
recklessness? Are we truly self destructive (cigarettes, food, alcohol,
pollution etc)? what can we do? but

I know that we must each find the answers within ourselves and to strive for
the personal situational control to handle these situations and temptations.
Training (and experience) helps, as do mentors. (Thank you Dudley, Gene
etal)

The study of human factors recognizes that (like Pogo) "We have seen the
problem and it is US". Controlling the aircraft is only a part of
successful flight operation, control of the pilot seems to be the largest
part of the problem.

My condolences and sympathy to all mourning family and friends.

In article >,
"Peter R." > wrote:

> Hilton > wrote:
>
> > I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
> > flight in those conditions.
>
> Are you referring to the weather/night conditions or are you stating you
> wouldn't fly under all four of the accident flight circumstances you
> listed?
>
> If the latter, I agree (although I am not a CFI).

The area in question has hills that go up to 4000 ft, from approximately
sea level.

Scud running over flat terrain by day is one thinh; scud running ovver
flat terrain at night is another; scud running in mountains by day is
dicey; at night it is suicide.

--
Remve "_" from email to reply to me personally.

Orval Fairbairn > wrote in
:

>> Are you referring to the weather/night conditions or are you
>> stating you wouldn't fly under all four of the accident flight
>> circumstances you listed?
>
Lately, we've had more than our share of accidents in the SF Bay
Area.

Earlier this month, the person who purchased our Piper Lance several
years ago left Reid-Hillview at about 10:30 AM for a trip to Visalia
(in the San Joaquin Valley). The visibility in Visalia at the time
was less than 1/4 mile with a ceiling of 100. He held Comm/ME/Inst
but both he and his wife died in the crash and ensuing fire.


--

On 2005-12-29, Ron Rosenfeld > wrote:
> Are you implying you would not feel comfortable flying night IMC, which is
> what is described in the NTSB report? Or are you implying something else?

I can't (obviously) speak for Hilton but there is night IMC, and then
there is other night IMC.

As a preamble - but I find it odd that in training, huge emphasis is put
on instrument approaches. You do approach after approach after approach
as if it's the real thing, but not so many departures. Personally, I
find the approach a piece of cake. You have time to mentally prepare
yourself for it as you start getting close to your destination and
assess what's happening, and everything happens relatively slowly.
You're already in the 'IFR groove' so to speak when you're starting
the approach.

Departure on the other hand I find _much_ higher workload, single pilot
IFR (especailly at night), especially in a high performance plane (less
so in a C172). Things are happening quickly, and at least when I lived
in Houston, it seems that you rarely got the clearance you asked for and
had some sort of re-route just about when you'd levelled off at your
initial altitude, meaning another climbing turn. Plus the effects on
your inner ear seem to be the most pronounced at this point too (by the
time you're on an approach, you're usually 'in the groove' so to speak).
Night IFR plus mountains has to be higher workload still as there are
even more fsck ups that can lead you to be smeared over the ground - in
the flatlands, a minor navigational error is unlikely to kill you.

Personally, I wouldn't do single pilot IFR at night in the mountains
while solo, let alone with the added distraction of having family
members along for the ride.

--
Dylan Smith, Port St Mary, Isle of Man
Flying: http://www.dylansmith.net
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
Frontier Elite Universe: http://www.alioth.net

Recently, Hilton > posted:

> Hi,
>
> Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some
> political rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.
>
> As I predicted:
> 1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
> 2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
>
What does this mean, exactly? A clear, moonless night in a rural area
would qualify. I thought this accident was during a time when IMC
prevailed, regardless of the time of day?

> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>
Would that have made a difference?

> 4. "As the airplane proceeded east from the departure airport, the
> pilot reported that he was having trouble maintaining outside visual
> contact and controlling the airplane and wanted help getting back to
> the airport."
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051227X02016&key=1
>
> I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
> flight in those conditions.
>
My own rule-of-thumb is that, one might survive a single bad decision, but
would be unlikely to survive multiple simultaneous bad decisions. If this
person took off in IMC (not being instrument rated), he made the worst
possible decision, and any other aspect of the flight only served to
guarantee his demise.

Neil

On 2005-12-29, Neil Gould > wrote:
>> Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some
>> political rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.
>>
>> As I predicted:
>> 1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
>> 2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
>>
> What does this mean, exactly? A clear, moonless night in a rural area
> would qualify. I thought this accident was during a time when IMC
> prevailed, regardless of the time of day?

It may qualify, but officially night IMC doesn't mean a clear moonless
night - that's still (officially) night VMC. Also, anywhere where there
is significant amount of lighting on the ground, night VMC (on a clear
moonless night, which is likely to also mean smooth flying conditions)
compared to a cloudy night with poor visibility (which may include
turbulence and icing in the clouds).

--
Dylan Smith, Port St Mary, Isle of Man
Flying: http://www.dylansmith.net
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
Frontier Elite Universe: http://www.alioth.net

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 10:46:48 -0000, Dylan Smith >
wrote:

>Departure on the other hand I find _much_ higher workload, single pilot
>IFR (especailly at night), especially in a high performance plane (less
>so in a C172). Things are happening quickly, and at least when I lived
>in Houston, it seems that you rarely got the clearance you asked for and
>had some sort of re-route just about when you'd levelled off at your
>initial altitude, meaning another climbing turn.

That's pretty common in the Northeast, also. More so when I lived closer
to NYC than now, though. But that's something you become more able to
handle with experience. Also, if there is an Obstacle Departure procedure,
I always fly it.


>Plus the effects on
>your inner ear seem to be the most pronounced at this point too

I've never noted that in my instrument flying.

>Night IFR plus mountains has to be higher workload still as there are
>even more fsck ups that can lead you to be smeared over the ground - in
>the flatlands, a minor navigational error is unlikely to kill you.
>
>Personally, I wouldn't do single pilot IFR at night in the mountains
>while solo, let alone with the added distraction of having family
>members along for the ride.

Everyone has to draw a line someplace according to their risk tolerance.
With more (good) experience, you become more able to handle cockpit
"distractions" and increased workload. Personally, I draw a firm line with
regard to icing conditions; and I also won't fly in the mountains if the
winds are too high. I don't know what they were on the route in question,
though.

The equipment you're flying has much to do with it, too. I'd much rather
be in a high-performance aircraft in night IMC in the mountains than in a
C172, though.

But I was wondering about the specifics of Hilton's objection to this
flight, in view of the fact that he wrote he was a CFII so shouldn't have a
problem with the IMC.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 12:14:10 -0000, Dylan Smith >
wrote:

>On 2005-12-29, Neil Gould > wrote:
>>> Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some
>>> political rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.
>>>
>>> As I predicted:
>>> 1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
>>> 2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
>>>
>> What does this mean, exactly? A clear, moonless night in a rural area
>> would qualify. I thought this accident was during a time when IMC
>> prevailed, regardless of the time of day?
>
>It may qualify, but officially night IMC doesn't mean a clear moonless
>night - that's still (officially) night VMC. Also, anywhere where there
>is significant amount of lighting on the ground, night VMC (on a clear
>moonless night, which is likely to also mean smooth flying conditions)
>compared to a cloudy night with poor visibility (which may include
>turbulence and icing in the clouds).

A bit off topic, but it does depend on what you credit as being "official".
Certainly, for the purpose of logging instrument flight time, a moonless
night over water may qualify.

From a published FAA legal opinion:

"... actual instrument conditions may
occur in the case you described a moonless night over the ocean with
no discernible horizon, if use of the instruments is necessary to
maintain adequate control over the aircraft. "

It is also true that you do not require an IFR flight plan under these
conditions.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

On 2005-12-29, Ron Rosenfeld > wrote:
>>Plus the effects on
>>your inner ear seem to be the most pronounced at this point too
>
> I've never noted that in my instrument flying.

Are you sure? The pitch changes in the departure phase tend to be
greater, as well as acceleration effects. In most light planes, 10
degrees pitch up makes your initial climb. In the enroute phase or
approach phase, pitch changes are usually nowhere near 10 degrees or
large changes of speed in a short period of time while trying to
transition from looking out the windscreen to being on instruments. The
busiest times I've ever had single pilot IFR have been taking off in a
Bonanza in low IFR conditions to add to this. I'm not surprised that
non-proficient in IMC pilots get screwed up and crash on departure.

> The equipment you're flying has much to do with it, too. I'd much rather
> be in a high-performance aircraft in night IMC in the mountains than in a
> C172, though.

I would out of principle too, but there's no denying it's a lot less
busy in a C172 especially on departure!

> But I was wondering about the specifics of Hilton's objection to this
> flight, in view of the fact that he wrote he was a CFII so shouldn't have a
> problem with the IMC.

If I'm not mistaken, it was in the mountains in a fairly marginal plane
(a C172 loaded with people is pretty marginal when it comes to climb
rate). I'm not sure I'd want to launch at night in the mountains in IMC
in a C172 either! I'd want something that could climb _well_ and had
good instrumentation.

--
Dylan Smith, Port St Mary, Isle of Man
Flying: http://www.dylansmith.net
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
Frontier Elite Universe: http://www.alioth.net

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

> "... actual instrument conditions may
> occur in the case you described a moonless night over the ocean with
> no discernible horizon, if use of the instruments is necessary to
> maintain adequate control over the aircraft. "

That's IC but not IMC. My take on the phase "IMC" has been that the IC must
be caused by M.

- Andrew

Dylan Smith wrote:
....
> Night IFR plus mountains has to be higher workload still as there are
> even more fsck ups that can lead you to be smeared over the ground - in
> the flatlands, a minor navigational error is unlikely to kill you.

I agree but these these were not really mountains. There are no
airports in these "mountains" either so really these bumps are only
during the enroute phase. Big woop. Typically You are cruising
along typically at 6000 to 8000 feet all fat dumb and happy. There
is literally no reason to be lower. The killer (literally, no pun
intended) was the pilot was pushed lower and/or continued into IMC and
was forced lower into ground whether that was at 0 MSL or 3000 MSL.
It wasn't like he was flying in a valley in the mountains. There are
no real valleys that you can fly in these 'mere continous
rounded bumps.'

I've flown in this area a bunch of times. If I were VFR-only, I would
NOT have chosen this route especially at night. Following
Interstate 5 gives you nearly continuous visual contact with the
ground below. there are a million and a half airports along the -5-
too. In fact, right after getting my private, I did do this exactly
while going northbound. There was stratus and once I knew the
terrain was increasing a little and the stratus sloping downwards,
I turned around about 6 miles north of Modesto and spent the night.
A year later I did this during the day. The visibility was great below
the 5000 MSL stratus 10 miles south of MOD. I went over these mountains
and it was VERY easy to avoid the terrain. Now at night, I would have
definitely stayed higher if given the option. This guy was not.

There was just a Lear accident at Truckee. That is mountainous terrain.
what those guys did was insane. Mountainous with known severe updrafts
and downdrafts, at visibility minimums (I don't have any reports on the
ceiling), in snow or rain and probably below freezing, non-precision
approaches only with one of which only is a circle to land. Ummm,
sounds to me like they should have gone to Reno's 11000 foot runway
with an ILS.

Gerald

Neil wrote:
>> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>>
> Would that have made a difference?

Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.

Hilton

Hilton wrote:
> Neil wrote:
>>> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>>>
>> Would that have made a difference?
>
> Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.

I don't follow you. He could've asked for a pop-up clearance.

-jav

"Hilton" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> Neil wrote:
> >> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
> >>
> > Would that have made a difference?
>
> Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.

This case really amazes me. The guy had his PPL for a month or so, and had
no problem at all with departing at night, in the rain, with his wife, and 2
kids they planned to adopt.

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 15:10:54 -0000, Dylan Smith >
wrote:

>On 2005-12-29, Ron Rosenfeld > wrote:
>>>Plus the effects on
>>>your inner ear seem to be the most pronounced at this point too
>>
>> I've never noted that in my instrument flying.
>
>Are you sure? The pitch changes in the departure phase tend to be
>greater, as well as acceleration effects. In most light planes, 10
>degrees pitch up makes your initial climb. In the enroute phase or
>approach phase, pitch changes are usually nowhere near 10 degrees or
>large changes of speed in a short period of time while trying to
>transition from looking out the windscreen to being on instruments. The
>busiest times I've ever had single pilot IFR have been taking off in a
>Bonanza in low IFR conditions to add to this. I'm not surprised that
>non-proficient in IMC pilots get screwed up and crash on departure.

No question but that pitch changes may be greater on takeoff than enroute.
But I've not noted any equilibrium problems while flying IMC. Maybe that's
from practice relying on the instruments and ignoring body cues?


>
>> The equipment you're flying has much to do with it, too. I'd much rather
>> be in a high-performance aircraft in night IMC in the mountains than in a
>> C172, though.
>
>I would out of principle too, but there's no denying it's a lot less
>busy in a C172 especially on departure!

I suppose. But I don't seem to have a problem handling the few "extra"
tasks in my Mooney.

>
>> But I was wondering about the specifics of Hilton's objection to this
>> flight, in view of the fact that he wrote he was a CFII so shouldn't have a
>> problem with the IMC.
>
>If I'm not mistaken, it was in the mountains in a fairly marginal plane
>(a C172 loaded with people is pretty marginal when it comes to climb
>rate). I'm not sure I'd want to launch at night in the mountains in IMC
>in a C172 either! I'd want something that could climb _well_ and had
>good instrumentation.

Concur!
Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 10:13:06 -0500, Andrew Gideon >
wrote:

>That's IC but not IMC. My take on the phase "IMC" has been that the IC must
>be caused by M.

Upon reflection, I would agree with you.
Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

Javier Henderson wrote:
> Hilton wrote:
>> Neil wrote:
>>>> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>>>>
>>> Would that have made a difference?
>>
>> Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.
>
> I don't follow you. He could've asked for a pop-up clearance.

I'm not sure what you're not following, I simply cut-n-pasted from the
report; i.e. he had not filed, period. So no, he wasn't IFR, had no
instrument rating, and did not ask for a pop up (according to the report -
see my previous post for the link).

Hilton

Tom wrote:
>
> Hilton wrote:
>> Neil wrote:
>> >> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>> >>
>> > Would that have made a difference?
>>
>> Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.
>
> This case really amazes me. The guy had his PPL for a month or so, and
> had
> no problem at all with departing at night, in the rain, with his wife, and
> 2
> kids they planned to adopt.

Tom, it's unbelievable isn't it. Let's ignore what could have or should
have been taught to him, syllabii etc. How about common sense??? And also
perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private pilots need
more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.

Hilton

Dylan wrote:
> Are you sure? The pitch changes in the departure phase tend to be
> greater, as well as acceleration effects.

The worst vertigo I had was taking a Duchess out of SQL. The departure goes
something like, runway heading till 400', right turn onto what is
essentially the downwind and maintain 800' (because of jets landing at SFO).

So, rotate, climb at 1000 fpm or so, gear up, flip frequencies, all the
other stuff going into the clouds, right turn at 400', in the turn get to
800', level off, reduce power and roll out the turn all pretty much at the
same time. Whoa... Took me a few seconds, to get things under control -
not the plane, my head.

Hilton

Javier Henderson wrote:
>>>>3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
>>>Would that have made a difference?
>>Some pilots on this NG were asking if he was IFR.
> I don't follow you. He could've asked for a pop-up clearance.

isn't a pop-up clearance a flight plan? you just happen to
file it in the air...

--Sylvain

Hilton wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Unfortunately some folks have degraded the initial thread to some political
> rambling, so I figured I'd post this to a new thread.
>
> As I predicted:
> 1. "non-instrument rated private pilot"
> 2. "Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed"
> 3. "a flight plan was not filed for the cross-country flight"
> 4. "As the airplane proceeded east from the departure airport, the pilot
> reported that he was having trouble maintaining outside visual contact and
> controlling the airplane and wanted help getting back to the airport."
>
> http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20051227X02016&key=1
>
> I am a CFI-I and I wouldn't have taken my wife and two kids up on that
> flight in those conditions.

I certainly would have in my Mooney but I'd have gone IFR. Of course I
know that there are a few on this list that consider single engine
planes far too dangerous for IFR.

-Robert, CFI

I agree Ron, it sounds like a bunch of 172 pilots. I would have had no
problem flying my Mooney under the same situation (IFR of course), in
fact I've flown that route several times. However, I know my Mooney. I
have a factory new (not factory reman, not rebuilt, not overhauled,
factory new) engine with regular oil analysis and scoping. I've also
been known to cross the Gorman pass IFR at night IMC as well (or, if
icing exists, the V25/V27 coastal route).

-Robert

Ron Rosenfeld wrote in message
>...
>On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 10:13:06 -0500, Andrew Gideon >
>wrote:
>
>>That's IC but not IMC. My take on the phase "IMC" has been that the IC
must
>>be caused by M.

Instrument Moon Conditions?

Invisible Moon Conditions?

>Upon reflection, I would agree with you.
>Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

- Rick

"Robert M. Gary" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>I agree Ron, it sounds like a bunch of 172 pilots. I would have had no
> problem flying my Mooney under the same situation (IFR of course), in
> fact I've flown that route several times. However, I know my Mooney. I
> have a factory new (not factory reman, not rebuilt, not overhauled,
> factory new) engine with regular oil analysis and scoping. I've also
> been known to cross the Gorman pass IFR at night IMC as well (or, if
> icing exists, the V25/V27 coastal route).

You like to throw the dice, and hope they come up double 6's. I hope they
do.

If ever you are slapped with some system failure that is necessary to keep
the plane in the air, you just shot craps. In the mountains, (in IFR
especially) you are not too likely to find a good enough landing place to
save your life.

It is all about risk management, and risk acceptance. You are willing to
minimize the risk, and take what ever hand is dealt, from there on out.
Some are not.
--
Jim in NC

On 2005-12-29, Ron Rosenfeld > wrote:
> No question but that pitch changes may be greater on takeoff than enroute.
> But I've not noted any equilibrium problems while flying IMC. Maybe that's
> from practice relying on the instruments and ignoring body cues?

Ignoring them isn't the problem, but you can still feel them and it adds
yet another thing on top of an already busy time. Added to this that it
is winter, it is night, there's a possibility of winds generating
turbulence off the terrain, and being winter - icing. I can hardly blame
a CFII for making a no-go decision in such conditions. It's nothing to
do with proficiency or 'being uncomfortable in night IMC'. It's a matter
of adding up the risk factors and finding the risk factors are too high
for a likely successful flight.

I'm not entirely sure where these events took place, but even with our
mild climate here, I wouldn't launch in day IMC here in a light plane
because the freezing level is often below 2000 feet - even if I had
20,000 hours experience. From my 1000 hours or so experience of flying
in the United States, much of it outside the gulf coast seems to have
fairly low icing conditions in the winter.

--
Dylan Smith, Port St Mary, Isle of Man
Flying: http://www.dylansmith.net
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
Frontier Elite Universe: http://www.alioth.net

On 2005-12-30, Dylan Smith > wrote:
> I'm not entirely sure where these events took place, but even with our
> mild climate here, I wouldn't launch in day IMC here in a light plane
> because the freezing level is often below 2000 feet

.... scratch that, I've just read the quoted NTSB report and the
temperature was far too high for icing. Given a Bonanza with decent
instrumentation and an IFR flight plan, I'd have probably gone too.

--
Dylan Smith, Port St Mary, Isle of Man
Flying: http://www.dylansmith.net
Oolite-Linux: an Elite tribute: http://oolite-linux.berlios.de
Frontier Elite Universe: http://www.alioth.net

In article >,
Dylan Smith > wrote:

> On 2005-12-30, Dylan Smith > wrote:
> > I'm not entirely sure where these events took place, but even with our
> > mild climate here, I wouldn't launch in day IMC here in a light plane
> > because the freezing level is often below 2000 feet
>
> ... scratch that, I've just read the quoted NTSB report and the
> temperature was far too high for icing. Given a Bonanza with decent
> instrumentation and an IFR flight plan, I'd have probably gone too.


Of course, the problem here is that a VFR pilot, who didn't even have
the ink dry on his PP Certificate, launched at night, in lousy
conditions, into mountainous terrain.

Darwin, anyone?

--
Remve "_" from email to reply to me personally.

"Morgans" > wrote

> You like to throw the dice, and hope they come up double 6's. I hope they
> do.
>
> If ever you are slapped with some system failure that is necessary to keep
> the plane in the air, you just shot craps. In the mountains, (in IFR
> especially) you are not too likely to find a good enough landing place to
> save your life.
>
> It is all about risk management, and risk acceptance. You are willing to
> minimize the risk, and take what ever hand is dealt, from there on out.
> Some are not.

I believe that statistics would indicate that fatal crashes that are the
result of an actual mechanical or electrical failure are quite rare. I also
suspect that the number of twin engine aircraft that have suffered an engine
failure in flight in IMC and then landed without incident is also quite low.
The risk comparison between single engine vs multi engine for a flight like
this in reality is probably close, although psychologically it may seem like
there is a vast difference.

How many multi-engine pilots do you know who routinely go out and practice
engine failure procedures? How many multi-engine crashes have been
attributed to mismanagement of the aircraft after an engine failure?

In the mountains it won't matter anyway, because the single engine service
ceiling of most light twins is down around 8,000 feet or so.

"Nick Danger" > wrote

> I believe that statistics would indicate that fatal crashes that are the
> result of an actual mechanical or electrical failure are quite rare.

> No doubt. It does suck,if you are the one that the "rare" statistic bites
> your butt. The point is, that you are out of options. Prolly will not
> happen. It could.

> I also
> suspect that the number of twin engine aircraft that have suffered an
> engine
> failure in flight in IMC and then landed without incident is also quite
> low.
> The risk comparison between single engine vs multi engine for a flight
> like
> this in reality is probably close, although psychologically it may seem
> like
> there is a vast difference.

No arguement there, either. As they say, a second engine is there to take
you to the crash site, <^o))
--
Jim in NC

Rick wrote:

> Invisible Moon Conditions?

Those are the nights I won't fly. It's just too high a risk. If I cannot
see it, how can I avoid hitting it?

I certainly wouldn't trust the "big sky" theory.

- Andrew

I don't hope I have a well maintained plane, I know I do.
I don't hope I have a factory new engine, I know I do.
I don't hope I have regular scope inspections of my engine, I know I
do.
I don't hope that I complete 6 month IPCs with our local FAA Desginated
Pilot Examiner, I know I do.
I don't hope that I can fly my plane single pilot IFR, I know I do.

The "mountains" we are talking about here are baby hills. We're not
talking the Sierras here. On a typical IFR flight you maybe have 3
minutes of time you cannot glide out of the mountains to the well lit
freeway on the other side.

-Robert, CFI

Airways?

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 10:48:43 -0000, Dylan Smith >
wrote:

>On 2005-12-29, Ron Rosenfeld > wrote:
>> No question but that pitch changes may be greater on takeoff than enroute.
>> But I've not noted any equilibrium problems while flying IMC. Maybe that's
>> from practice relying on the instruments and ignoring body cues?
>
>Ignoring them isn't the problem, but you can still feel them

For whatever reason, I just don't feel the equilibrium problems that you
and others have described. Perhaps "ignore" is the wrong word to use, but
it has not ever been an issue for me, even during training.


> and it adds
>yet another thing on top of an already busy time. Added to this that it
>is winter, it is night, there's a possibility of winds generating
>turbulence off the terrain, and being winter - icing. I can hardly blame
>a CFII for making a no-go decision in such conditions. It's nothing to
>do with proficiency or 'being uncomfortable in night IMC'. It's a matter
>of adding up the risk factors and finding the risk factors are too high
>for a likely successful flight.

I did mention the possibility of icing in another post. But I still have
not seen any note from Hilton as to why, as a CFII (he pointed out), *HE*
would not have made that trip in the reported weather conditions.

Clearly one should not have gone VFR!

>
>I'm not entirely sure where these events took place, but even with our
>mild climate here, I wouldn't launch in day IMC here in a light plane
>because the freezing level is often below 2000 feet - even if I had
>20,000 hours experience. From my 1000 hours or so experience of flying
>in the United States, much of it outside the gulf coast seems to have
>fairly low icing conditions in the winter.

I agree that you have to assess your equipment and experience before
launching into any type of conditions. But this morning in eastern ME, the
freezing level was well above the MEA. I would have no hesitation about
flying under those circumstances.
Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 02:08:01 -0500, "Morgans" >
wrote:

>
>"Robert M. Gary" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>>I agree Ron, it sounds like a bunch of 172 pilots. I would have had no
>> problem flying my Mooney under the same situation (IFR of course), in
>> fact I've flown that route several times. However, I know my Mooney. I
>> have a factory new (not factory reman, not rebuilt, not overhauled,
>> factory new) engine with regular oil analysis and scoping. I've also
>> been known to cross the Gorman pass IFR at night IMC as well (or, if
>> icing exists, the V25/V27 coastal route).
>
>You like to throw the dice, and hope they come up double 6's. I hope they
>do.
>
>If ever you are slapped with some system failure that is necessary to keep
>the plane in the air, you just shot craps. In the mountains, (in IFR
>especially) you are not too likely to find a good enough landing place to
>save your life.
>
>It is all about risk management, and risk acceptance. You are willing to
>minimize the risk, and take what ever hand is dealt, from there on out.
>Some are not.

Yes, I, and I presume Robert, minimize our risk by assuring that excellent
maintenance is done on our equipment; and by keeping current in our own
aircraft.

This gives us a substantially better than the 1 in 35 chance you seem to
expect you would have had on that flight (that's the odds of rolling double
6's). If those were my odds, I, too, would not take the risk. :-)


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:56:20 -0500, Andrew Gideon >
wrote:

>Rick wrote:
>
>> Invisible Moon Conditions?
>
>Those are the nights I won't fly. It's just too high a risk. If I cannot
>see it, how can I avoid hitting it?
>
>I certainly wouldn't trust the "big sky" theory.
>
> - Andrew


I'm not sure what you're flying, but in my Mooney, I don't think I'd have
much of a problem avoiding the moon, even if I couldn't see it.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

Ron wrote:
> I did mention the possibility of icing in another post. But I still have
> not seen any note from Hilton as to why, as a CFII (he pointed out), *HE*
> would not have made that trip in the reported weather conditions.

Sorry, Ron, been really busy here with a new software release, etc...

I thought of a long reply that included the risks of flying, how people
needed to be really good at understanding themselves, the weather, the
aircraft systems, etc etc etc, but I guess it boils down to this:

Let's assume a 172 and IFR (which the accident pilot wasn't): Night, IMC
(cloudy, rainy, not benign fog), single-engine, hills which have claimed
lives, plane full of people (more chance of distraction), etc. Each of
these reduce your safety margin, or increase your risk. It's just not very
well stacked in my favor. You say you would do it, what if you had an
engine failure? You have no out, you and your passengers would likely die
or at best be very serously injured. I don't like those odds. Others might
be OK with them, others might put more faith in their engines than I do.
Allow me to quote a couple of sentences from the latest Nall Report (2004):

"Accidents in such conditions, for example, adverse weather or at night, are
more likely to result in fatality."
"...only 14.0 percent of daytime accidents resulted in fatalities. At night,
more than one in three (36.1 percent) was fatal."

I fly at night, I fly IMC, I never fly IMC at night, and definitely not over
hills in a single engine with a 1956 172 (assuming it did not have the newer
6-pack configuration). You're welcome to say I'm too conservative, but
there you go. I know of a very experienced test pilot, Reno Race racer who
will not fly single-engine at night period, even in perfect VMC conditions.

Hilton

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 23:51:58 GMT, "Hilton" > wrote:

>and definitely not over
>hills in a single engine with a 1956 172 (assuming it did not have the newer
>6-pack configuration). You're welcome to say I'm too conservative, but
>there you go.

That clarifies a lot for me.

And no, I would not say that you're too conservative. Not knowing more
about the route than looking at it using FliteStar, I, too, would not fly
it night IMC in a 1956 C172.

But you're unadorned statement that started this particular thread left me
wondering about *your* reasons.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

Hilton > wrote:

> I fly at night, I fly IMC, I never fly IMC at night, and definitely not over
> hills in a single engine with a 1956 172 (assuming it did not have the newer
> 6-pack configuration). You're welcome to say I'm too conservative, but
> there you go. I know of a very experienced test pilot, Reno Race racer who
> will not fly single-engine at night period, even in perfect VMC conditions.

I also know many who would never go up "in any of those little planes" and
would prefer to sit on their couch all day long hiding from any perceived
risk the world may hand out.

This is certainly not meant to be a slam on your personal limits. My point
is simply that it is a matter of perspective and a mitigation of the risks
involved.

I have had discussions with high-time corporate pilots who have had the
fortune to build their careers behind the yoke of a state-of-the-art, glass
cockpit corporate jet. These pilots also will not fly single engine IFR,
day or night.

How much of this rejection is based on the real risk versus how much is
based on emotion? It is certainly conceivable to me that a pilot with
many thousands of hours in a very well equipped aircraft may have forgotten
how to mitigate the risks of night IMC because they haven't done so in many
years. Thus, they shun night IMC out of emotion, rather than logic.

--
Peter

>> This case really amazes me. The guy had his PPL for a month or so, and
>> had
>> no problem at all with departing at night, in the rain, with his wife,
>> and 2
>> kids they planned to adopt.
>
> Tom, it's unbelievable isn't it. Let's ignore what could have or should
> have been taught to him, syllabii etc. How about common sense??? And
> also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private pilots
> need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.

Do you really think that would have helped?

This guy launched into conditions that would have given pause to many
experienced instrument-rated pilots. He clearly had no common sense, and
even less concern for his family. Extra training wouldn't hurt, but it
also won't help guys like this.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

Peter R. wrote:
> How much of this rejection is based on the real risk versus how much is
> based on emotion?

Well, in the post to which you replied, I quoted hard statistics, so that's
real risk; remember people had to die to create those fatality statistics.
Secondly, tell me how you would handle an engine failure over the unlit
hills in the clouds (that 'cover' the hills), at night, IMC, etc etc etc.

It seems real to me.

Hilton

"Jay Honeck" wrote in message news:6Tntf.660955$x96.555576@attbi_s72...
> Do you really think that would have helped?
>
> This guy launched into conditions that would have given pause to many
> experienced instrument-rated pilots. He clearly had no common sense, and
> even less concern for his family. Extra training wouldn't hurt, but it
> also won't help guys like this.

An obvious case of Darwinism in action... For once, Darwin was awake... He
removed the offending genes by way of the pilot and his kids... He removed
the wife because her genes were defective in that she had obviously even
been inclined to mate with the owner of the defective genes, thus her genes
were obviously also defective...

Now, myself on the other hand -- well, Darwin tends to have been asleep over
the years when I'm doing things that stupid...

Neither would I.

One wonders what was so pressing that he just had to go at this time. I
am sure he did not just wake up that morning and say to himself, "Today
I am going to kill myself and my whole family." Well, reasonably sure,
anyway. Maybe that is exactly what he did.

"Grumman-581" > wrote in message
...
> "Jay Honeck" wrote in message news:6Tntf.660955$x96.555576@attbi_s72...
> > Do you really think that would have helped?
> >
> > This guy launched into conditions that would have given pause to many
> > experienced instrument-rated pilots. He clearly had no common sense,
and
> > even less concern for his family. Extra training wouldn't hurt, but it
> > also won't help guys like this.
>
> An obvious case of Darwinism in action... For once, Darwin was awake... He
> removed the offending genes by way of the pilot and his kids... He removed
> the wife because her genes were defective in that she had obviously even
> been inclined to mate with the owner of the defective genes, thus her
genes
> were obviously also defective...
>

By and large an accurate assessment except for the kids. The news said they
were adopting the kids.

Jay Honeck wrote:
>> And also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private
>> pilots need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.
>
> Do you really think that would have helped?

Yes Jay, I do believe training improves a pilot's skills.

Hilton

"Hilton" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> Jay Honeck wrote:
>>> And also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private
>>> pilots need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.
>>
>> Do you really think that would have helped?
>
> Yes Jay, I do believe training improves a pilot's skills.

Keeping in mind that better flying skills will not always save your butt,
training does not always teach someone to have better decision making
skills. I've got to think that was the biggest contributor, in this case,
don't you?
--
Jim in NC

Jay Honeck wrote:

>>>This case really amazes me. The guy had his PPL for a month or so, and
>>>had
>>>no problem at all with departing at night, in the rain, with his wife,
>>>and 2
>>>kids they planned to adopt.
>>
>>Tom, it's unbelievable isn't it. Let's ignore what could have or should
>>have been taught to him, syllabii etc. How about common sense??? And
>>also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private pilots
>>need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.
>
>
> Do you really think that would have helped?
>
> This guy launched into conditions that would have given pause to many
> experienced instrument-rated pilots. He clearly had no common sense, and
> even less concern for his family. Extra training wouldn't hurt, but it
> also won't help guys like this.

Yes, judgment is exceedingly hard to teach.


Matt

Hilton wrote:

> Jay Honeck wrote:
>
>>>And also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private
>>>pilots need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.
>>
>>Do you really think that would have helped?
>
>
> Yes Jay, I do believe training improves a pilot's skills.

This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most
pilot training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely
covers much about judgment. Some instructors are much better in this
regard than others, but it simply isn't high on the list typically.


Matt

Hilton > wrote:

<snip>
> Secondly, tell me how you would handle an engine failure over the unlit
> hills in the clouds (that 'cover' the hills), at night, IMC, etc etc etc.

What about over the hills in low IMC during the day?

To me the risks seem the same, yet many pilots only single out night IMC as
the boogy man in single engine aviation.

In terms of answering your question, I would handle an engine failure at
night the same as day IMC. I should point out that I do fuel plan
meticulously prior to *every* flight I make and I fly my own
high-performance, 150 hours since rebuilt engine aircraft that is
meticulously maintained, so as to further reduce the odds of an engine
failure.

However, I don't mean to drift this thread away from your original topic,
with which we share the same reaction.


--
Peter

"Hilton" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> Allow me to quote a couple of sentences from the latest Nall Report
> (2004):
> "Accidents in such conditions, for example, adverse weather or at night,
> are more likely to result in fatality."
> "...only 14.0 percent of daytime accidents resulted in fatalities. At
> night, more than one in three (36.1 percent) was fatal."

That's not a meaningful comparison, though. A higher proportion of
fatalities among nighttime accidents could result from a lower rate (per
hour) of nonfatal accidents rather than a higher rate of fatal accidents.

However, the fatality rate at night is indeed higher (and for night IMC,
it's higher still). But I don't know whether that's due to a greater danger
following an engine failure or electrical failure, or instead due to the
danger of, for example, maneuvering accidents during circling approaches
under a low ceiling. If the latter, the increased danger could be eliminated
by avoiding such approaches at night.

--Gary

Morgans wrote:

> As they say, a second engine is there to take
> you to the crash site.

Then "they" aren't worth listening to. One guess why the safety record
of twin-engine light planes isn't better...

....the answer is in the left seat. Operate them according to their
abilities and limitations and you'll do just fine. The fact that you
can't do that on a casual basis, and get away with it as easily as you
can with a 172, seems to escape some people. That sort of thinking is
the inspiration for the Darwin awards.

At least the comment had something to do with aviation -- a nice change
from the rest of the thread.


Jack

Gary Drescher wrote:

> However, the fatality rate at night is indeed higher (and for night IMC,
> it's higher still). But I don't know whether that's due to a greater danger
> following an engine failure or electrical failure, or instead due to the
> danger of, for example, maneuvering accidents during circling approaches
> under a low ceiling. If the latter, the increased danger could be eliminated
> by avoiding such approaches at night.

An excellent suggestion. Years ago our airline raised the minimum
altitude for circling approaches to 1000' HAA. A few years later it
eliminated circling approaches altogether. A wise move which more
operators should follow -- in particular those non-professionals who
don't do them on a regular basis.

You may have gotten away with one or a few, but night circling
approaches in unfavorable weather conditions are among the most
difficult things to do safely. Without regular, frequent practice and
familiarity with the equipment, facilities, and procedures you are far
better off without them, in the long run.


Jack

Hilton wrote:

> And also
> perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private pilots need
> more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part 61.

Additional practice on instruments won't help someone scud-run. The only thing
that would have saved this guy once he decided to launch would have been the
ability to file IFR.

George Patterson
Coffee is only a way of stealing time that should by rights belong to
your slightly older self.

"Tom Conner" wrote in message
nk.net...
> By and large an accurate assessment except for the kids. The news said
they
> were adopting the kids.

Well, absent any other evidence to the contrary, I guess it was just a case
of Darwin considering it acceptable collateral damages... <sick-grin>

"Dylan Smith" wrote in message
...
> It may qualify, but officially night IMC doesn't mean a clear moonless
> night - that's still (officially) night VMC. Also, anywhere where there
> is significant amount of lighting on the ground, night VMC (on a clear
> moonless night, which is likely to also mean smooth flying conditions)
> compared to a cloudy night with poor visibility (which may include
> turbulence and icing in the clouds).

I was flying from Houston to New Orleans a year or so ago at night...
Technically, it was VMC, but from a practical standpoint, I was flying by
instruments... There was no moon and a high cloud layer that blocked view of
the stars... There were no lights on the ground because I was flying over
swamps... An interesting experience for a VFR pilot, but the air was
smooth, so the stress level wasn't that bad...

"Ron Rosenfeld" > wrote in message
...
> The equipment you're flying has much to do with it, too. I'd much rather
> be in a high-performance aircraft in night IMC in the mountains than in a
> C172, though.

Yeah, it would be nice to be able to fly *over* the mountains instead of
*through* them...

NOTE: "through" is different than "around"...

Morgans wrote:
> Hilton wrote:
>> Jay Honeck wrote:
>>>> And also perhaps another example (together with the stats) that Private
>>>> pilots need more (real) instrument time that what's required by Part
>>>> 61.
>>>
>>> Do you really think that would have helped?
>>
>> Yes Jay, I do believe training improves a pilot's skills.
>
> Keeping in mind that better flying skills will not always save your butt,
> training does not always teach someone to have better decision making
> skills. I've got to think that was the biggest contributor, in this case,
> don't you?

I agree 100% with you. Here are my thoughts. This guy just finished
training, went through the practical and passed; i.e. proficient per the
requirements. He couldn't handle the IMC, and the statistics say that many
many others couldn't too; i.e. the ones who crash. So, why then do we teach
instrument skills? Either pilots need to be proficient enough to be able to
do a 180 - that's all this pilot needed to do, or not. If not, scrap the 3
hours from Part 61. If they should be able to fly (to safety) in IMC, then
IMHO pilots need a lot more instrument training for their private. Bottom
line, this scenario is so high on the 'killer' list, clearly something is
wrong with the requirement and/or training.

Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad - that's why
I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in IMC, why could he
not do a 180 after he had just very recently finished the training and
checkride to do just that?

Hilton

Matt Whiting wrote:
> This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most pilot
> training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely covers much
> about judgment. Some instructors are much better in this regard than
> others, but it simply isn't high on the list typically.

I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly not
enough instrument training for the Private. While these are the leading
causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily maneuvers additions
and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of instrument Private training
was sufficient, the why do non-IFR Private pilots only last 178 seconds in
IMC?

Hilton

Hilton wrote:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
>
>>This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most pilot
>>training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely covers much
>>about judgment. Some instructors are much better in this regard than
>>others, but it simply isn't high on the list typically.
>
>
> I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
> requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly not
> enough instrument training for the Private. While these are the leading
> causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily maneuvers additions
> and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of instrument Private training
> was sufficient, the why do non-IFR Private pilots only last 178 seconds in
> IMC?

I almost wonder if it would be better to not require the hood time at
all. I wonder if it doesn't build a false sense of security as any
instrument pilot knows that three hours just isn't sufficient to give
you any real capability at all, especially if you don't get recurrent
hood training.

I thought that hood flying was pretty easy when I got my private. Then
I began instrument training and had to not only fly the airplane, but
talk to ATC, navigate, check the weather, handle equipment failures,
etc. All of a sudden, it didn't seem so easy ... until about 40 hours
later! :-)


Matt

Nick Danger wrote:


> I also suspect that the number of twin engine aircraft that have
> suffered an engine failure in flight in IMC and then landed without
> incident is also quite low.

Based on what? Published statistics? Personal experience? For me it's
4/4. You rarely hear about any of the majority which conclude without
further incident.


> The risk comparison between single engine vs multi engine for a flight like
> this in reality is probably close, although psychologically it may seem like
> there is a vast difference.

Since the risk came primarily from the pilot, and not from the airplane,
you may be correct. Such a mental attitude would be fatal in any airplane.


Jack

Recently, Hilton > posted:
>
> Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
> that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
> IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
> finished the training and checkride to do just that?
>
As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
would have crashed elsewhere.

Neil

Recently, Hilton > posted:

> Matt Whiting wrote:
>> This was more of a judgment issue than a flying skills issue. Most
>> pilot training, at least short of the airline's CRM training, rarely
>> covers much about judgment. Some instructors are much better in
>> this regard than others, but it simply isn't high on the list
>> typically.
>
> I totally agree. Please see my reply to "Morgans". Our certificate
> requirements include very little about decision making, and clearly
> not enough instrument training for the Private.
>
Being able to teach decision making is the one difference between
trainers/schools. I don't know how any of these "quick-course" schools can
teach good decision making, as the student doesn't have any practical
experience to associate with the theory (even if they could remember the
theory, which test scores suggest otherwise). This case is a prime example
of someone not knowing when to make a "no-go" decision.

> While these are the
> leading causes of fatal accidents, the PTS changes are primarily
> maneuvers additions and removals. For example, if our 3 hours of
> instrument Private training was sufficient, the why do non-IFR
> Private pilots only last 178 seconds in IMC?
>
Simple: because they don't use 90 of those seconds to reverse course and
get out of IMC. Those that do so survivie and don't become part of the
statistic.

Neil

"Jack" > wrote

> Then "they" aren't worth listening to. One guess why the safety record of
> twin-engine light planes isn't better...

Agreed. I forgot the smiley! <g>


The cost of maintaining and operating a twin, along with the absurd
insurance rates, mean that the only ones operating twins are people with a
good bit of money to throw around. If they have that money, those that have
to work for it are too busy (possibly)to keep current and do recurrent
training, and get in over their heads.

That's my theory, anyway! <g>
--
Jim in NC

Neil Gould wrote:
> Recently, Hilton posted:
>>
>> Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
>> that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
>> IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
>> finished the training and checkride to do just that?
>>
> As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
> he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
> would have crashed elsewhere.

He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the airport,
but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his (approximate)
position.

Saying "...the likely outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere."
doesn't make sense. I have heard numerous ATC recordings of people that fly
into IMC and had ATC to help them to a VFR airport. Had this pilot
maintained control of the aircraft using instruments, I have no doubt ATC
could have vectored him back to E16 or even SJC.

Hilton

Recently, Hilton > posted:

> Neil Gould wrote:
>> Recently, Hilton posted:
>>>
>>> Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
>>> that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
>>> IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
>>> finished the training and checkride to do just that?
>>>
>> As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it
>> sounded like he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely
>> outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere.
>
> He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
> obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the
> airport, but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his
> (approximate) position.
>
What lead me to this conclusion is that he only flew "... a few
minutes...", which isn't very far in a 172, before calling ATC. He should
have still been in visual range of the airport. Therefore, I suspect that
the much of the area (if not all of it) was IMC, and he chose to take off
in it anyway.

Neil

On 2006-01-01, Matt Whiting > wrote:
> I almost wonder if it would be better to not require the hood time at
> all. I wonder if it doesn't build a false sense of security as any
> instrument pilot knows that three hours just isn't sufficient to give
> you any real capability at all, especially if you don't get recurrent
> hood training.

On the flip side - how many pilots does hood training save? This is
simply an unknown. If the hood training means more pilots manage to save
themselves when they do screw up compared to how many would be lost in
the same situation, then it's worth keeping. The trouble is it's very
difficult to measure. How many non-IFR pilots make an ASRS report when
they get themselves in a VFR-into-IMC situation?

The trouble is to have a good study of it you have to ask pilots to
incriminate themselves and face FAA action if you're to find the ones
who have a false sense of security and deliberately enter IMC without
the rating.

In article et>,
"Hilton" > wrote:

> Neil Gould wrote:
> > Recently, Hilton posted:
> >>
> >> Having said all that, yes, the decision to go was extremely bad -
> >> that's why I called this thread 'Angry'. But once the pilot was in
> >> IMC, why could he not do a 180 after he had just very recently
> >> finished the training and checkride to do just that?
> >>
> > As I read it, part of the problem was that he was lost, as it sounded like
> > he was in IMC soon after he was up. So, the likely outcome is that he
> > would have crashed elsewhere.
>
> He took off, turned east, flew a few minutes, and entered IMC. Kinda
> obvious the airport was west. Sure he asked ATC to get back to the airport,
> but he wasn't lost in the sense that he didn't know his (approximate)
> position.
>
> Saying "...the likely outcome is that he would have crashed elsewhere."
> doesn't make sense. I have heard numerous ATC recordings of people that fly
> into IMC and had ATC to help them to a VFR airport. Had this pilot
> maintained control of the aircraft using instruments, I have no doubt ATC
> could have vectored him back to E16 or even SJC.
>
> Hilton

There is another factor not mentioned here. About 10 years ago, a friend
did some radar surveying for San Jose and found a radar hole in the
vicinity of South County, up to about 3000 ft. It is possible that the
pilot, thinking he would have instantaneous radar, took off, attempted
to raise SJC Approach and maintained heading right into the hills.

There is no excuse for his instructor(s) or flight school to turn him
loose without at least a rudimentary knowledge of the risks involved
with scudrunning (especially at night, in the hills).

--
Remve "_" from email to reply to me personally.

Orval Fairbairn wrote:
> There is another factor not mentioned here. About 10 years ago, a friend
> did some radar surveying for San Jose and found a radar hole in the
> vicinity of South County, up to about 3000 ft. It is possible that the
> pilot, thinking he would have instantaneous radar, took off, attempted
> to raise SJC Approach and maintained heading right into the hills.

Orval,

I have flown in that area MANY times (I fly out of RHV) and never heard of
that radar hole, I've also never heard ATC even mention it to me or anyone
else. Do you have any additional information on it? have they 'plugged the
hole' by now?

I find it very surprising that he took off and called SJC tower which is
23nm NW when he was going East. They could pick him up and correctly handed
him off the Departure. Why did he call the tower? Perhaps he didn't
know/remember the freq of Departure, perhaps his papers fell on the floor,
perhaps he already had his hands full with the IMC and did a little CRM,
perhaps it was his inexperience... For a low time pilot, dialling in
120.7/124.0, calling them, squawking some number and identing, waiting,
having them say "sorry, call 120.1", dialing that in, calling them, etc...
must have been a huge distraction given the 'bad' conditions he was in.
Just some things that jumped out at me while reading the report.

But again, a visit to Starbucks on that cloudy night would have been the
better option. Sad.

FYI: The crash site was only 4nm east of E16.

Hilton

Oops, I meant SJC Tower "couldn't pick him up" - the report says: "San Jose
was unable to make radar contact with the airplane and suggested NorCal
TRACON."

Hilton

In article et>,
"Hilton" > wrote:

> Oops, I meant SJC Tower "couldn't pick him up" - the report says: "San Jose
> was unable to make radar contact with the airplane and suggested NorCal
> TRACON."
>
> Hilton

That sounds like the radar hole!

--
Remve "_" from email to reply to me personally.

In article >,
Hilton > wrote:
>Orval Fairbairn wrote:
>> There is another factor not mentioned here. About 10 years ago, a friend
>> did some radar surveying for San Jose and found a radar hole in the
>> vicinity of South County, up to about 3000 ft. It is possible that the
>> pilot, thinking he would have instantaneous radar, took off, attempted
>> to raise SJC Approach and maintained heading right into the hills.
>
>I have flown in that area MANY times (I fly out of RHV) and never heard of
>that radar hole, I've also never heard ATC even mention it to me or anyone
>else. Do you have any additional information on it? have they 'plugged the
>hole' by now?

Climbing out of South County, Norcal usually can't pick me up on
radar until Morgan Hill or so. Overflying South County I've had
no trouble being seen on radar at 3000ft and above. I haven't
flown out of South County in awhile, so my data point is probably
a few years old.

It would be interesting to know where the radar transmitters are
in the area. If the radar transmitters covering South County are at
SJC and MRY, they would have a hard time seeing traffic down low
near South County.

John
--
John Clear - http://www.clear-prop.org/

GS wrote:
> I agree but these these were not really mountains. There are no
> airports in these "mountains" either so really these bumps are only
> during the enroute phase. Big woop. Typically You are cruising
> along typically at 6000 to 8000 feet all fat dumb and happy. There
> is literally no reason to be lower. The killer (literally, no pun
> intended) was the pilot was pushed lower and/or continued into IMC and was
> forced lower into ground whether that was at 0 MSL or 3000 MSL.

I disagree. I believe (and I could be wrong) that he took of into low
clouds (IMC), lost control, and spun it in. FYI: He crashed 4 miles east of
his departure airport.


> I've flown in this area a bunch of times. If I were VFR-only, I would
> NOT have chosen this route especially at night. Following
> Interstate 5 gives you nearly continuous visual contact with the
> ground below.

Sure, but to get to Hwy 5 you need to cross these hills. Anyway, if he had
actually managed to get to Hwy 5, I bet he would have headed for Fresno
(east) and not followed Hwy 5 (SE).


> There was just a Lear accident at Truckee. That is mountainous terrain.
> what those guys did was insane. Mountainous with known severe updrafts
> and downdrafts, at visibility minimums (I don't have any reports on the
> ceiling), in snow or rain and probably below freezing, non-precision
> approaches only with one of which only is a circle to land. Ummm,
> sounds to me like they should have gone to Reno's 11000 foot runway
> with an ILS.

Where did you get all that meteorological condition information? There were
witness reports of watching the airplane on the approach, so I would
question you comment "visibility minimums".

Hilton