Greatest Strategic Air Missions [Archive]

Howard Berkowitz

August 22nd 04, 07:22 PM

In article >, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

> "WalterM140" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
> result.
> > >End of story.
> > >
> >
> > Gee, Art.
> >
> > That just whacked a huge number of civilians.
> >
>
> Well no.
>
> Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
> Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
> which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.

To avoid any confusion, it was 2nd _General_ army. A regular Japanese
"army" was more like an Allied corps, an "area army" was equivalent to a
field army (i.e., four-star command). General Army was somewhere
between Army Group and Theater Army.

> There were large numbers of troops based there. At
> least 3 divisions IRC
>
> It was also a major communications center, a storage point,
> and the embarkation port for most of the troops who
> were sent to the Philipines, Malaya, China etc.
>
> To quote a Japanese newspaper report, "Probably more
> than a thousand times since the beginning of the war did
> the Hiroshima citizens see off with cries of 'Banzai' the
> troops leaving from the harbor."
>
> > Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam
> > Busters
> or
> > something?
> >
>
> Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
> strategic as it gets.
>
> Keith
>
>

Venik

August 23rd 04, 12:17 AM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

>>That just whacked a huge number of civilians.
>>
>
>
> Well no.

Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that
bombing?

>
> Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
> Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
> which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
> There were large numbers of troops based there. At
> least 3 divisions IRC

The bombing did not target any specific military facilities. According
to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted
for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese
soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

> Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
> strategic as it gets.

The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
were even considering a surrender. They figured maybe Stalin won't stop
with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
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BUFDRVR

August 23rd 04, 02:42 AM

Venik wrote:

>Thus, for every Japanese
>soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
>damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.

The judgement on whether a mission was a strategic success is not based on
collateral damage. In *most* circumstances high collateral damage will usually
translate to a strategic failure....but not in this case.

>The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
>were even considering a surrender.

Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

>Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
>to the Americans and nobody nuked them.

Uhh..the first successful nuclear bomb testing wasn't done until 16 July
1945....two months after Germany was defeated.

BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

The Enlightenment

August 23rd 04, 06:32 AM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
result.
> >End of story.
> >
>
> Gee, Art.
>
> That just whacked a huge number of civilians.

Most of them Japanese Catholics who while loyal Japanese were often
conscientious objectors.

I am told by some Malaysian friends of Eurasian extraction that the
Nunneries, Catholic schools etc were treated with deference by the Japanese
because they had enough soldiers in their own forces concerned about this.

>
> Wouldn't a strategic air mission have to be something like the Dam Busters
or
> something?

Ploesti? Don't know if it worked but Germany's synthetic fuel industry was
only ever capable of meeting 30% of requirements. It seems that Germany's
heavy bomber program was scrapped in part due to this even after the He 177
had become reliable and it made the Whermacht more vulnerable to the
eventualy attacks on the syn fuel plants themselves.

Both the Germans and Japanese were looking for a way of surrendering
conditionaly (ie not an armistice but a surrender with occupying forces).

Because the allies wouldn't except anything but unconditional surrender the
war had to drag on and many more people on both sides had to die.

Harry Morgentau (US secreatary of state) had particularly horrendous plans
in stall for Germany that involved starving to death about 15 million of the
population that would have made the Ukranian genocides 4.5 million pall in
comparison. It was an inkling of these plans, the knowledge of the carve
up of Germany and also the fact that the Germans wanted to surrender to the
US/UK rather than the Russians (whose atrocities involved tearing women
apart by the legs in Kongisberg using trucks) as well as Hitlers no
surrender mentality that extended the war.

>
> Or wrecking that canal (I forget the name) with Tall Boys?
>
> Seriously, something that caused a strategic effect for economical return,
like
> the Oil Campaign of 1944/45.
>
> Walt

Venik

August 23rd 04, 10:22 AM

BUFDRVR wrote:

> Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
> leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

I am sure the answers would have been different if these interviews were
conducted by the Soviets. In addition to trying to appease their
conquerors, these Japanese leaders probably also felt more comfortable
with the idea that their surrender was precipitated by a super weapon
and not but by their desire to salvage as much as possible out of a
hopeless situation.

As you know, during the Yalta conference Stalin promised to attack Japan
ninety days from the surrender of Germany. In return the USSR got the
Allied blessing to grab some territory back from Japan. It's hard to
imagine that the Japanese were not aware of the details of this deal.
Even before the Germany's surrender, the Japanese sent a diplomatic
delegation to the USSR to work out some sort of a surrender deal that
would allow Japan to keep the Emperor. By that time the US diplomats
have already got themselves into a bottle by pronouncing the policy of
Unconditional Surrender. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
particular problem with the Emperor.

Germans surrendered on May 8, which meant that Stalin was obligated to
attack Japan no later than August 8. US plans called for a limited
invasion of the Ryuku Islands in November and the invasion of the
mainland Japan was to take place in January of 1946 at the earliest. So
there definitely was a big gap between the timing of the Soviet invasion
of Japan and the US invasion. If the negotiations between Japan and the
USSR produced results (and there was no reason why they shouldn't have,
since both countries were not even at war with each other), the Soviet
"attack" on Japan could have been a very brief and victorious affair for
Stalin.

The US delayed the Potsdam conference for two weeks, during which the
first nuke was tested. And Truman authorized the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki just two days before the Soviet attack against Japan.
Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur. And the public
reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
middle. At the time, the significance of timing of these events was
quite obvious to anyone reading newspapers.

Japanese negotiated with both the US and the USSR and in both cases
their primary and only real condition was to retain the Emperor. They
would have preferred to surrender to the Americans for obvious reasons:
USSR had territorial claims against Japan and nobody in Japan was
looking forward to living under Kremlin's control. On the other hand,
negotiating with the USSR was less problematic because the two countries
were not at war and because the Soviets, unlike the US, did not demand
unconditional surrender.

In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender and
that's what prompted the Japanese surrender. And the use of the nukes
allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.
It's also important to remember that Truman counted on a much bigger
impact of the A-bomb on the Soviets, because, of course, he had no idea
that the Soviets have already taken from Los Alamos everything they
needed for their own bomb. During the Potsdam conference Truman even
attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
his failure to grasp the significance of the event., since Truman,
obviously, expected some sort of an emotional response from uncle Joe.
If Truman knew how quickly the USSR would build its own A-bomb, perhaps
he would have listened to his military commanders on this matter.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Keith Willshaw

August 23rd 04, 11:13 AM

"Venik" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> >>That just whacked a huge number of civilians.
> >>
> >
> >
> > Well no.
>
> Are you saying that a large number of civilians was not killed in that
> bombing?
>

Nope and a large number of civilians died in the
Soviet capture of Berlin - war is hell.

> >
> > Hirsohima was not only the home port for much of the
> > Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd Army Headquarters,
> > which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan.
> > There were large numbers of troops based there. At
> > least 3 divisions IRC
>
> The bombing did not target any specific military facilities.

Hiroshima was a major army and naval centre, like
Kronstadt , Portsmouth or Konigsberg

> According
> to the Japanese figures, military casualties from the attack accounted
> for less than 3% of the overall casualties. Thus, for every Japanese
> soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there was 97% of "collateral
> damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic air mission.
>
> > Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally is about as
> > strategic as it gets.
>
> The Soviet advances were the primary reason for the fact that the Japs
> were even considering a surrender.

The Japanese cabinet stated otherwise. Indeed more than one
of those in that body publically stated that only the use of the bomb
allowed them to surrender.

> They figured maybe Stalin won't stop
> with the Kurils. Same situation as with the Germans trying to surrender
> to the Americans

Hint the Americans refused to accept that surrender and
held out for uncoditional surrender - as with Japan.

The USSR lacked the amphibious capability to invade the
Japanese home islands. Even the combined carrier forces
of Britain and America were barely adequate at Okinawa.
Lots of luck trying to invade Honshu without air cover.

>
> and nobody nuked them.
>

Except that the Japanese werent prepared to surrender until after
the second bomb and even the the Emperor had to intervene.

Keith

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Keith Willshaw

August 23rd 04, 11:14 AM

"Venik" > wrote in message
...
> BUFDRVR wrote:
>
> > Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and
military
> > leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey.
>
> I am sure the answers would have been different if these interviews were
> conducted by the Soviets.

Well yes Beria had a way of getting the answers Stalin wanted to hear.

Keith

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Keith Willshaw

August 23rd 04, 11:27 AM

"The Enlightenment" > wrote in message
...
>
> "WalterM140" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Hiroshima. Nothing ever even came close in effect importance or end
> result.
> > >End of story.
> > >
> >
> > Gee, Art.
> >
> > That just whacked a huge number of civilians.
>
> Most of them Japanese Catholics who while loyal Japanese were often
> conscientious objectors.
>
> I am told by some Malaysian friends of Eurasian extraction that the
> Nunneries, Catholic schools etc were treated with deference by the
Japanese
> because they had enough soldiers in their own forces concerned about this.
>

Bull****

1) Most Malays are Muslim, Buddhist or Daoist

2) The Japanese brutall repressed the catholic population
of the Phillipines and had no qualms when it came to dsetroying
catholic schools , nunneries etc

3) less than 1% of Japanese were Catholic

4) The centre of the Cathlic church in Japan was
Nagasaki

5) The Cathlic church in japan collaborated quite
happily with the Japanese Government during
ww2 with churches issuing proclamations urging
their parishioners to fight on to total victory.

Keith

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Matt Wiser

August 23rd 04, 06:10 PM

It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and
Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough. Anything
that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be done.
Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the Soviet
invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito
decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails
and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear strike
date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave
Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million and
a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of
story and of war.

Venik > wrote:
>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>>>That just whacked a huge number of civilians.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Well no.
>
>Are you saying that a large number of civilians
>was not killed in that
>bombing?
>
>>
>> Hirsohima was not only the home port for much
>of the
>> Japanese Navy it was also the home of 2nd
>Army Headquarters,
>> which commanded the defense of all of southern
>Japan.
>> There were large numbers of troops based there.
>At
>> least 3 divisions IRC
>
>The bombing did not target any specific military
>facilities. According
>to the Japanese figures, military casualties
>from the attack accounted
>for less than 3% of the overall casualties.
>Thus, for every Japanese
>soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there
>was 97% of "collateral
>damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic
>air mission.
>
>> Getting the enemy to surrender unconditionally
>is about as
>> strategic as it gets.
>
>The Soviet advances were the primary reason
>for the fact that the Japs
>were even considering a surrender. They figured
>maybe Stalin won't stop
>with the Kurils. Same situation as with the
>Germans trying to surrender
>to the Americans and nobody nuked them.
>
>--
>Regards,
>
>Venik
>
>Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
>If you need to e-mail me, please use the following
>subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

Kevin Brooks

August 23rd 04, 06:37 PM

"Matt Wiser" > wrote in message
news:412a26b3$1@bg2....
>
> It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and Ivan crossing into Manchuria and
> Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might not have been enough.
Anything
> that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having to be executed had to be
done.
> Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to discuss Hiroshima and the
Soviet
> invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki strike. Next day Hirohito
> decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the attempted putsch that fails
> and the Surrender announcement comes on the 15th. Next probable nuclear
strike
> date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary. Bomb #3 was about to leave
> Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived. Two bombs and a million
and
> a half Russians in the space of four days forced Japan's surrender. End of
> story and of war.

Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences. A hell of a lot more
than that went into the Japanese surrender equation. The tightening sea
blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's, the creeping effects of the
B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas, the gaining of bases at Iwo
Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased airpower into range of
Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop garrisons in far-flung and
by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no longer had any navy to speak
of outside kamikaze attack light combatants being horded, along with their
remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion of Kyushu, and of course
that feared homeland invasion itself (and the fact that the more reasonable
Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go" was invariably doomed to
failure when that invasion did come)...all of these factors contributed to
the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb was an attention getter, the
Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn negotiated surrender hopes,
and the second bomb was the final closer.

Brooks

<snip>

BUFDRVR

August 23rd 04, 08:16 PM

Venik wrote:

>Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
>advisers

That's not correct. There were descenting voices but they were the minority.

>including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur

Only 1 of 3. Eisenhower was the only one of the above who opposed it.
MacArthur, after the war, admitted he was upset when told of the decsion, but
he made no protest. LeMay fully supported it.

>And the public
>reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
>middle.

Wrong. The U.S. public didn't care what device was used, just that it ended the
war. There was no public descent outside of scientific circles.

>In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender

Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt it would
allow for a more secure occupation.

>And the use of the nukes
>allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
>public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.

Wrong. No reputable historian would agree with that statement.

>Truman even
>attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
>his failure to grasp the significance of the event.

What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the results.
He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.

BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

Venik

August 23rd 04, 10:20 PM

BUFDRVR wrote:

> Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt
it would
> allow for a more secure occupation.

Of course they did, that why the US changed its policy of unconditional
surrender. They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
amount of nukes will solve the problem. In the end the Japanese got what
they wanted in a surrender deal.

> Wrong. No reputable historian would agree with that statement.

Since you are not one of them, your opinion, while appreciated, makes
little impression on me.

> What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the results.
> He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.

Apparently not the same books you were reading in school :-) Would
Truman's own memoirs satisfy you?

"On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special
interest. All he said was he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make
"good use of it against the Japanese." Harry S. Truman, Year of
Decisions , 1955, p. 416

How about Churchill's memoirs?

""I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest
attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do.
What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as
if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of
extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a
bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that
he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. " Winston
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , 1953, p. 669

I can give you several dozen other references or you can visit your
local library and lookup interviews and memoirs of James Byrnes, Charles
Bohlen, Anthony Eden, or Georgii Zhukov.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Fred the Red Shirt

August 23rd 04, 11:00 PM

Venik > wrote in message >...
> BUFDRVR wrote:
>
> > Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese civilian and military
> > leaders following WW II. Take a look at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.
>
> ...
>
> As you know, during the Yalta conference Stalin promised to attack Japan
> ninety days from the surrender of Germany. In return the USSR got the
> Allied blessing to grab some territory back from Japan. It's hard to
> imagine that the Japanese were not aware of the details of this deal.

Not hard for me. Like, who was going to tell them?

The Japanese had something like a million troops on the Asian Mainland,
yet less than 100,000 were positioned to resist the Soviet attack.

> Even before the Germany's surrender, the Japanese sent a diplomatic
> delegation to the USSR to work out some sort of a surrender deal that
> would allow Japan to keep the Emperor. By that time the US diplomats
> have already got themselves into a bottle by pronouncing the policy of
> Unconditional Surrender. The Soviets, on the other hand, had no
> particular problem with the Emperor.

Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets were happy to receive the
delegation to help mislead the Japanese into thinking that a Soviet
attack was NOT imminent

>
> Germans surrendered on May 8, which meant that Stalin was obligated to
> attack Japan no later than August 8. US plans called for a limited
> invasion of the Ryuku Islands in November and the invasion of the
> mainland Japan was to take place in January of 1946 at the earliest. So
> there definitely was a big gap between the timing of the Soviet invasion
> of Japan and the US invasion. If the negotiations between Japan and the
> USSR produced results (and there was no reason why they shouldn't have,
> since both countries were not even at war with each other), the Soviet
> "attack" on Japan could have been a very brief and victorious affair for
> Stalin.

The reason they "shouldn't have" produced results was that Stalin had
made a prior comitment to enter the war against Japan.

>
> The US delayed the Potsdam conference for two weeks, during which the
> first nuke was tested. And Truman authorized the bombing of Hiroshima
> and Nagasaki just two days before the Soviet attack against Japan.
> Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
> advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.

I am very interested in your source of information here. It is hard
to imagine Le May not wanting to use any weapon against Japan and
MacArthur (according to a biographical piece I saw recently on PBS)
wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

So this seems to me to be unlikely, but I'm open to evidence.

> And the public
> reaction in the US to the use of the A-bomb was split close to the
> middle.

Again, I'd like to know the source.

> At the time, the significance of timing of these events was
> quite obvious to anyone reading newspapers.
>
> Japanese negotiated with both the US and the USSR and in both cases
> their primary and only real condition was to retain the Emperor. They
> would have preferred to surrender to the Americans for obvious reasons:
> USSR had territorial claims against Japan and nobody in Japan was
> looking forward to living under Kremlin's control. On the other hand,
> negotiating with the USSR was less problematic because the two countries
> were not at war and because the Soviets, unlike the US, did not demand
> unconditional surrender.
>
> In the end, the US changed its policy of Unconditional Surrender and
> that's what prompted the Japanese surrender. And the use of the nukes
> allowed the US to obscure this rather embarrassing policy change from
> public scrutiny, as well as to give Stalin something to think about.

Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
the actual surrender negotiations?

> It's also important to remember that Truman counted on a much bigger
> impact of the A-bomb on the Soviets, because, of course, he had no idea
> that the Soviets have already taken from Los Alamos everything they
> needed for their own bomb. During the Potsdam conference Truman even
> attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
> his failure to grasp the significance of the event., since Truman,
> obviously, expected some sort of an emotional response from uncle Joe.
> If Truman knew how quickly the USSR would build its own A-bomb, perhaps
> he would have listened to his military commanders on this matter.

Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Ja[panese casualties
to be expected from a continuation of the war.

--

FF

Kevin Brooks

August 23rd 04, 11:26 PM

"Venik" > wrote in message
...
> BUFDRVR wrote:

<snip>

>
> I can give you several dozen other references or you can visit your
> local library and lookup interviews and memoirs of James Byrnes, Charles
> Bohlen, Anthony Eden, or Georgii Zhukov.
>

Great, but unfortuantely now a bit outdated, since we know the reason Stalin
was not overtly impressed by the mention of the bomb (not really a "brief",
now was it?) was actually because he already knew about it courtesy of folks
like Greenglass and the Rosenbergs.

Brooks

> --
> Regards,
>
> Venik
>

B2431

August 24th 04, 12:00 AM

>From: (BUFDRVR)

<snip>

>
>>Truman even
>>attributed Stalin's lack of response to the news of the A-bomb test to
>>his failure to grasp the significance of the event.
>
>What history books are you reading? Truman never briefed Stalin on the
>results.
>He briefed Churchill, but never told Stalin a thing.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
>

Actually Truman told Stalin at Potsdam we had the bomb. Stalin's reply was he
hoped we would use it wisely. He already knew about the bomb through spies in
the Manhattan Project.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

BUFDRVR

August 24th 04, 12:18 AM

Venik wrote;

>They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
>amount of nukes will solve the problem.

Actually they *thought* even if Japan capitulated that many in the Army (and
there were well over 2 million soldiers still in uniform) would continue to
fight unless the Emporer was still in power and commanded them to surrender.

> "On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of
>unusual destructive force.

Which hardy means he briefed Stalin on the results of the Mahatten Project as
you insinuated.

BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR

August 24th 04, 12:29 AM

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

>> Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
>> advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.
>
>I am very interested in your source of information here.

LeMay is ridiculous, Eisenhower (in his memoirs) claimed he opposed the
decision when asked for his advice and MacArthur (also in his memoirs)
confessed to being upset (sick to his stomach) when informed of the decision,
but made no protest.

BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR

August 24th 04, 12:39 AM

Dan wrote:

>Actually Truman told Stalin at Potsdam we had the bomb.

Well...not really. He told Stalin (who already knew about the Manhatten
project) that we had a new weapon that could end the war. That was about as
specific as it got. Meanwhile Truman briefed Churchill in detail.

BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

B2431

August 24th 04, 04:43 AM

>From: (BUFDRVR)
>Date: 8/23/2004 6:29 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Fred the Red Shirt wrote:
>
>>> Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his military
>>> advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.
>>
>>I am very interested in your source of information here.
>
>LeMay is ridiculous, Eisenhower (in his memoirs) claimed he opposed the
>decision when asked for his advice and MacArthur (also in his memoirs)
>confessed to being upset (sick to his stomach) when informed of the decision,
>but made no protest.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
>

Based on what I have read over the years I think MacArthur was upset he
wouldn't get to invade.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

Kevin Brooks

August 24th 04, 05:06 AM

"B2431" > wrote in message
...
> >From: (BUFDRVR)
> >Date: 8/23/2004 6:29 PM Central Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >Fred the Red Shirt wrote:
> >
> >>> Truman's decision to use the A-bombs was opposed by most of his
military
> >>> advisers, including Le May, Eisenhower and MacArthur.
> >>
> >>I am very interested in your source of information here.
> >
> >LeMay is ridiculous, Eisenhower (in his memoirs) claimed he opposed the
> >decision when asked for his advice and MacArthur (also in his memoirs)
> >confessed to being upset (sick to his stomach) when informed of the
decision,
> >but made no protest.
> >
> >
> >BUFDRVR
> >
>
> Based on what I have read over the years I think MacArthur was upset he
> wouldn't get to invade.

Bingo! You hit the nail on the head. Hardly surprising, I am afraid, given
his previous pique over not being able to invade Rabaul and his insistence
upon clearing the entire PI archipelago--rather typical of his notion that
his own glory came before the dictates of mission or men.

Brooks
>
> Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

WaltBJ

August 24th 04, 05:18 AM

Every time this subject comes up I am both amazed and appalled at the
revisionist/PC thinking based on fragmentary knowledge of the
situation existing then. The US had just been thorugh the Peleliu, Iwo
Jma, Phillipines and Okinawa campaigns and the casualties were
horrendous. Now we were going to invade the Japanese Home Islands and
we could reliably expect the fighting to be grimly intense. I strongly
recommend y'all find books on the above campaigns and read through
them and then look up the plans to invade Kyushu and then the Tokyo
beaches. Especially study the Japanese planned counteractions - they
had deduced where the landings were to take place. Not very difficult
- there's not that many choices. The Combined Japanese Air Forces had
held back 5,000 air-lanes for Kamikaze use! Note that the Services of
Supply had ordered 400,000 Purple Hearts for the two invasions. Also
note that President Truman had been in combat in WW1. ISTR he was a
field artillery battery CO - not a staff officer. He knew plenty about
battle casualties from real personal knowledge. So, with the atomic
bomb handy, would you-all have the guts (and gall) to sened your
troops into battle knowing that the casualties would be horrendous,
far greater than Iwo or Okinawa? And you would have to recycle ETO
infantry combat vets to replace the fully expected losses - guys that
had already 'seen the elephant'? Face it - the US was running low on
front line troops -
Now - would I have given the order? Damn right I would - given the
choice between killing the enemy and saving my own troops or doing a
grim trade-off of my guys for theirs - I'd nuke and re-nuke them until
they quit. They fro damn sure earned it. Unlike most of you-all I've
lost enough very close friends in combat, men I've trusted my life to.
Now stop all your maunderings until you've done some study of the
situation - as it existed back then! As for collateral damage - the
Russkies did a pretty good job on Warsaw and points west, culminating
in Berlin. Massive artillery barrages take a little longer than nuking
the places but the result was pretty much the same except the area of
destruction is larger. Walt BJ

Jack G

August 24th 04, 06:46 AM

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
Massive artillery barrages take a little longer than nuking
> the places but the result was pretty much the same except the area of
> destruction is larger. Walt BJ

Do not forget the far larger losses from the ongoing firebombing of Tokyo
that could have continued until there was nothing left to firebomb.

Jack G.

Keith Willshaw

August 24th 04, 09:54 AM

"Venik" > wrote in message
...
> BUFDRVR wrote:
>
> > Wrong. The U.S. chose to allow the Emporer to stay because they felt
> it would
> > allow for a more secure occupation.
>
> Of course they did, that why the US changed its policy of unconditional
> surrender. They knew that if the Emperor is not allowed to stay, no
> amount of nukes will solve the problem. In the end the Japanese got what
> they wanted in a surrender deal.
>

Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a
deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan
and Manchuria.

Keith

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Matt Wiser

August 24th 04, 03:26 PM

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote:
>
>"Venik" > wrote in message
...
>> BUFDRVR wrote:
>>
>> > Not according to interviews conducted with
>Japanese civilian and
>military
>> > leaders following WW II. Take a look at
>the U.S. Strategic Bombing
>Survey.
>>
>> I am sure the answers would have been different
>if these interviews were
>> conducted by the Soviets.
>
>Well yes Beria had a way of getting the answers
>Stalin wanted to hear.
>
>Keith
>
>
>
>
>----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure
>Usenet News==----
>http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service
>in the World! >100,000 Newsgroups
>---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers
>- Total Privacy via Encryption =---
You've got that right: supposedly Stalin was displeased with Beria's predecessor
Yezhov about not getting a confession out of Bukharin-Beria told Stalin "Let
me have him. I'll have him confessing he's the King of England." Stalin got
the confession, Beria got promoted, and both Bukharin and Yezhov were liquidated....

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

Matt Wiser

August 24th 04, 03:27 PM

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
>
>"Matt Wiser" > wrote
>in message
>news:412a26b3$1@bg2....
>>
>> It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and
>Ivan crossing into Manchuria and
>> Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might
>not have been enough.
>Anything
>> that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having
>to be executed had to be
>done.
>> Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to
>discuss Hiroshima and the
>Soviet
>> invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki
>strike. Next day Hirohito
>> decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the
>attempted putsch that fails
>> and the Surrender announcement comes on the
>15th. Next probable nuclear
>strike
>> date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary.
>Bomb #3 was about to leave
>> Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived.
>Two bombs and a million
>and
>> a half Russians in the space of four days
>forced Japan's surrender. End of
>> story and of war.
>
>Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences.
>A hell of a lot more
>than that went into the Japanese surrender equation.
>The tightening sea
>blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's,
>the creeping effects of the
>B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas,
>the gaining of bases at Iwo
>Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased
>airpower into range of
>Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop
>garrisons in far-flung and
>by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no
>longer had any navy to speak
>of outside kamikaze attack light combatants
>being horded, along with their
>remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion
>of Kyushu, and of course
>that feared homeland invasion itself (and the
>fact that the more reasonable
>Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go"
>was invariably doomed to
>failure when that invasion did come)...all of
>these factors contributed to
>the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb
>was an attention getter, the
>Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn
>negotiated surrender hopes,
>and the second bomb was the final closer.
>
>Brooks
>
><snip>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
And there was no way that the Kyushu invasion (OLYMPIC) could have been
repelled: Most Japanese defenses were on the beaches and inland in range
of NGFS, and a suggestion that the defense of Okinawa and Luzon be emulated
was rejected-the plan was defend on the beaches and in strength inland, but
once the beach defenses are broken, the Japanese coastal divisions have had
it, and the attempts to move reserves from South-Central Kyushu to counterattack
(Ariake Bay, where XI Corps with 1st Cav, 43rd and Americal Divisions would
have landed was considered by the Japanese to be the main battle area in
Kyushu) would have been exposed to air attack and have had very poor roads
on which to move anyway. Mostly grunts with little heavy equipment anyhow
and what armor they had would have suffered from air and naval gunfire before
even getting to the battle. Best case for Kyushu is 30 days, more likely
45-50 days before Southern Kyushu is relatively secure and the base-building
gets underway for to support CORONET.

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Matt Wiser

August 24th 04, 03:27 PM

Hear, Hear. I came to the same conculusion in my MA thesis when I researched
the planned invasion (DOWNFALL). While U.S. and Allied casualties would have
been high (at least some 75,000 for Kyushu in OLYMPIC and 2x that for the
Kanto in CORONET), Japanese losses both military and civilian would have
been much, much worse than those of the Allies. Add to that the probable
U.S./Allied use of gas, and Marshall asking if the A-bomb could be used in
a tactical role in the preinvasion bombardment of the beaches in Kyushu,
and that adds up the butcher's bill very quickly. Be glad 15 Kt on Hiroshima
and 20 Kt on Nagasaki were used-it ended the war within a week of the Nagasaki
strike.

(WaltBJ) wrote:
>Every time this subject comes up I am both amazed
>and appalled at the
>revisionist/PC thinking based on fragmentary
>knowledge of the
>situation existing then. The US had just been
>thorugh the Peleliu, Iwo
>Jma, Phillipines and Okinawa campaigns and the
>casualties were
>horrendous. Now we were going to invade the
>Japanese Home Islands and
>we could reliably expect the fighting to be
>grimly intense. I strongly
>recommend y'all find books on the above campaigns
>and read through
>them and then look up the plans to invade Kyushu
>and then the Tokyo
>beaches. Especially study the Japanese planned
>counteractions - they
>had deduced where the landings were to take
>place. Not very difficult
>- there's not that many choices. The Combined
>Japanese Air Forces had
>held back 5,000 air-lanes for Kamikaze use!
>Note that the Services of
>Supply had ordered 400,000 Purple Hearts for
>the two invasions. Also
>note that President Truman had been in combat
>in WW1. ISTR he was a
>field artillery battery CO - not a staff officer.
>He knew plenty about
>battle casualties from real personal knowledge.
>So, with the atomic
>bomb handy, would you-all have the guts (and
>gall) to sened your
>troops into battle knowing that the casualties
>would be horrendous,
>far greater than Iwo or Okinawa? And you would
>have to recycle ETO
>infantry combat vets to replace the fully expected
>losses - guys that
>had already 'seen the elephant'? Face it - the
>US was running low on
>front line troops -
>Now - would I have given the order? Damn right
>I would - given the
>choice between killing the enemy and saving
>my own troops or doing a
>grim trade-off of my guys for theirs - I'd nuke
>and re-nuke them until
>they quit. They fro damn sure earned it. Unlike
>most of you-all I've
>lost enough very close friends in combat, men
>I've trusted my life to.
>Now stop all your maunderings until you've done
>some study of the
>situation - as it existed back then! As for
>collateral damage - the
>Russkies did a pretty good job on Warsaw and
>points west, culminating
>in Berlin. Massive artillery barrages take a
>little longer than nuking
>the places but the result was pretty much the
>same except the area of
>destruction is larger. Walt BJ

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Matt Wiser

August 24th 04, 03:27 PM

(BUFDRVR) wrote:
>Venik wrote:
>
>>Thus, for every Japanese
>>soldier killed in the Hiroshima bombing there
>was 97% of "collateral
>>damage." So, no, it was not the greatest strategic
>air mission.
>
>The judgement on whether a mission was a strategic
>success is not based on
>collateral damage. In *most* circumstances high
>collateral damage will usually
>translate to a strategic failure....but not
>in this case.
>
>>The Soviet advances were the primary reason
>for the fact that the Japs
>>were even considering a surrender.
>
>Not according to interviews conducted with Japanese
>civilian and military
>leaders following WW II. Take a look at the
>U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.
>
>>Same situation as with the Germans trying to
>surrender
>>to the Americans and nobody nuked them.
>
>Uhh..the first successful nuclear bomb testing
>wasn't done until 16 July
>1945....two months after Germany was defeated.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
>
>"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those
>bomb doors open if it harelips
>everyone on Bear Creek"
Remember Venik: The bomb was meant to be delivered on Germany. While it
was used against Japan, Germany was considered the first target up until
early '45.

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Kevin Brooks

August 24th 04, 04:21 PM

"Matt Wiser" > wrote in message
news:412b51f9$1@bg2....
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote:
> >
> >"Matt Wiser" > wrote
> >in message
> >news:412a26b3$1@bg2....
> >>
> >> It took a double-whammy of the A-bomb and
> >Ivan crossing into Manchuria and
> >> Korea to end the war. The A-bomb alone might
> >not have been enough.
> >Anything
> >> that prevents OLYMPIC and CORONET from having
> >to be executed had to be
> >done.
> >> Period. The Japanese Cabinet was meeting to
> >discuss Hiroshima and the
> >Soviet
> >> invasion when word reached them of the Nagasaki
> >strike. Next day Hirohito
> >> decides that enough is enough. 14 Aug is the
> >attempted putsch that fails
> >> and the Surrender announcement comes on the
> >15th. Next probable nuclear
> >strike
> >> date was on 18 Aug with Kokura as the primary.
> >Bomb #3 was about to leave
> >> Los Alamos on 10 Aug when a hold order arrived.
> >Two bombs and a million
> >and
> >> a half Russians in the space of four days
> >forced Japan's surrender. End of
> >> story and of war.
> >
> >Overly simplistic, at least those last two sentences.
> >A hell of a lot more
> >than that went into the Japanese surrender equation.
> >The tightening sea
> >blockade, effective inshore mining by B-29's,
> >the creeping effects of the
> >B-29 raids against industrial and urban areas,
> >the gaining of bases at Iwo
> >Jima and Okinawa that now moved even more landbased
> >airpower into range of
> >Kyushu and Honshu, the isolation of large troop
> >garrisons in far-flung and
> >by then bypassed areas, the fact that they no
> >longer had any navy to speak
> >of outside kamikaze attack light combatants
> >being horded, along with their
> >remaining aircraft, to counter the feared invasion
> >of Kyushu, and of course
> >that feared homeland invasion itself (and the
> >fact that the more reasonable
> >Japanese leaders by then realized that "Ketsu-Go"
> >was invariably doomed to
> >failure when that invasion did come)...all of
> >these factors contributed to
> >the Japanese surrender. The first atomic bomb
> >was an attention getter, the
> >Soviet invasion was the closure of their forlorn
> >negotiated surrender hopes,
> >and the second bomb was the final closer.
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >
> And there was no way that the Kyushu invasion (OLYMPIC) could have been
> repelled

That is what I meant when I said that their more competent leaders realized
that Ketsu-Go was not a winning option; Ketsu-Go was their defensive plan
for the home islands that had succeeded the previous Sho-Go.

: Most Japanese defenses were on the beaches and inland in range
> of NGFS, and a suggestion that the defense of Okinawa and Luzon be
emulated
> was rejected-the plan was defend on the beaches and in strength inland,
but

True, but you must remember that their strategy was to try and neutralize
the NGFS and CAS superiority the US would have enjoyed by making it a
close-in "knife fight" that would have limited the usefullness of each of
those fire support systems. They were hamstrung, though, by their lack of
engineer units with which to prepare adequate defenses.

> once the beach defenses are broken, the Japanese coastal divisions have
had
> it,

The Japanese had already recognized that allowing the US to gain a beachhed
*anywhere* typically resulted in a rapid buildup of combat power that their
forces could not subsequently cope with, which is why they depended upon
first trying to hammer the invasion fleet with kamikaze attacks from the
air, the surface of the sea, and under the sea, and then engaging the
spearhead forces in close combat. Their best hope was that they could make
the cost so bloody to the allies that we would decide it was not worth the
effort--not a very likely outcome. But it would have likely been plenty
bloody for both sides.

and the attempts to move reserves from South-Central Kyushu to counterattack
> (Ariake Bay, where XI Corps with 1st Cav, 43rd and Americal Divisions
would
> have landed was considered by the Japanese to be the main battle area in
> Kyushu) would have been exposed to air attack and have had very poor roads
> on which to move anyway.

The Japanese staff did a pretty good job in terms of identifying the likely
invasion sites and arraying forces accordingly. And you are right, their
CATK forces would have been hard pressed to do their job; their plans called
for them to arrive and launch directly into battle from march order, so
those that *did* survive the inevitable pounding from allied air
interdiction efforts would have found themselves being fed into the
gristmill in a piecemeal fashion, not a good thing (for them).

Mostly grunts with little heavy equipment anyhow
> and what armor they had would have suffered from air and naval gunfire
before
> even getting to the battle. Best case for Kyushu is 30 days, more likely
> 45-50 days before Southern Kyushu is relatively secure and the
base-building
> gets underway for to support CORONET.

I'd be careful about overestimating the value of WWII long range NGFS;
history shows that it was often of limited value (the most valuable NGFS in
numerous operations was that provided by the tin cans operating
up-close-and-personal). Time and again we pounded the hell out of Japanese
defenses with NGFS, only to have to tangle with them when they emerged from
their bunkers and hidey-holes.

Brooks

>
> Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

EB Jet

August 24th 04, 04:43 PM

>Subject: Re: Greatest Strategic Air Missions
>From: (WaltBJ)
>Date: 8/23/04 9:18 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Every time this subject comes up I am both amazed and appalled at the
>revisionist/PC thinking based on fragmentary knowledge of the
>situation existing then. The US had just been thorugh the Peleliu, Iwo
>Jma, Phillipines and Okinawa campaigns and the casualties were
>horrendous. Now we were going to invade the Japanese Home Islands and
>we could reliably expect the fighting to be grimly intense. I strongly
>recommend y'all find books on the above campaigns and read through
>them and then look up the plans to invade Kyushu and then the Tokyo
>beaches. Especially study the Japanese planned counteractions - they
>had deduced where the landings were to take place. Not very difficult
>- there's not that many choices. The Combined Japanese Air Forces had
>held back 5,000 air-lanes for Kamikaze use! Note that the Services of
>Supply had ordered 400,000 Purple Hearts for the two invasions. Also
>note that President Truman had been in combat in WW1. ISTR he was a
>field artillery battery CO - not a staff officer. He knew plenty about
>battle casualties from real personal knowledge. So, with the atomic
>bomb handy, would you-all have the guts (and gall) to sened your
>troops into battle knowing that the casualties would be horrendous,
>far greater than Iwo or Okinawa? And you would have to recycle ETO
>infantry combat vets to replace the fully expected losses - guys that
>had already 'seen the elephant'? Face it - the US was running low on
>front line troops -
>Now - would I have given the order? Damn right I would - given the
>choice between killing the enemy and saving my own troops or doing a
>grim trade-off of my guys for theirs - I'd nuke and re-nuke them until
>they quit. They fro damn sure earned it. Unlike most of you-all I've
>lost enough very close friends in combat, men I've trusted my life to.
>Now stop all your maunderings until you've done some study of the
>situation - as it existed back then! As for collateral damage - the
>Russkies did a pretty good job on Warsaw and points west, culminating
>in Berlin. Massive artillery barrages take a little longer than nuking
>the places but the result was pretty much the same except the area of
>destruction is larger. Walt BJ
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Not much to add to that..Well said Walt.

Vello

August 24th 04, 08:14 PM

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> Every time this subject comes up I am both amazed and appalled at the
> revisionist/PC thinking based on fragmentary knowledge of the
> situation existing then. The US had just been thorugh the Peleliu, Iwo
> Jma, Phillipines and Okinawa campaigns and the casualties were
> horrendous. Now we were going to invade the Japanese Home Islands and
> we could reliably expect the fighting to be grimly intense. I strongly
> recommend y'all find books on the above campaigns and read through
> them and then look up the plans to invade Kyushu and then the Tokyo
> beaches. Especially study the Japanese planned counteractions - they
> had deduced where the landings were to take place. Not very difficult
> - there's not that many choices. The Combined Japanese Air Forces had
> held back 5,000 air-lanes for Kamikaze use! Note that the Services of
> Supply had ordered 400,000 Purple Hearts for the two invasions. Also
> note that President Truman had been in combat in WW1. ISTR he was a
> field artillery battery CO - not a staff officer. He knew plenty about
> battle casualties from real personal knowledge. So, with the atomic
> bomb handy, would you-all have the guts (and gall) to sened your
> troops into battle knowing that the casualties would be horrendous,
> far greater than Iwo or Okinawa? And you would have to recycle ETO
> infantry combat vets to replace the fully expected losses - guys that
> had already 'seen the elephant'? Face it - the US was running low on
> front line troops -
> Now - would I have given the order? Damn right I would - given the
> choice between killing the enemy and saving my own troops or doing a
> grim trade-off of my guys for theirs - I'd nuke and re-nuke them until
> they quit. They fro damn sure earned it. Unlike most of you-all I've
> lost enough very close friends in combat, men I've trusted my life to.
> Now stop all your maunderings until you've done some study of the
> situation - as it existed back then! As for collateral damage - the
> Russkies did a pretty good job on Warsaw and points west, culminating
> in Berlin. Massive artillery barrages take a little longer than nuking
> the places but the result was pretty much the same except the area of
> destruction is larger. Walt BJ

Great post in "politically correct" today world. We can't judge wartime
happenings on basis what we think is nice or not nice today. From the wars
in Bible antagonistic sides had done ALL they can to put enemy down. It is
wrong and sad - but it is just true. Any of fighting sides in ww2 had used
nukes for sure if they had one. And president or field commander who sents
million or more of his soldiers to death for reason he just don't wants to
use full potential of weaponry available would end up in court. For sure
things are different in Iraq or Vietnam or Afganistan - but those are more
police operations, not real war when life and fate of both side is on vague.

Venik

August 29th 04, 08:04 AM

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> Great, but unfortuantely now a bit outdated...

What is outdated?

, since we know the reason Stalin
> was not overtly impressed by the mention of the bomb (not really a "brief",
> now was it?)

Who said "brief"?

--
Regards,

Venik

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Venik

August 29th 04, 08:05 AM

BUFDRVR wrote:

> Which hardy means he briefed Stalin on the results of the Mahatten
Project as
> you insinuated.

Don't assume what wasn't said.

--
Regards,

Venik

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Venik

August 29th 04, 08:06 AM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a
> deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan
> and Manchuria.

Right, I suppose they wanted Alaska and Siberia as well.

--
Regards,

Venik

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Venik

August 29th 04, 09:47 AM

Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

> Not hard for me. Like, who was going to tell them?

I am sure the Japanese high command was waiting by the phone all day
Immediately following the Yalta conference, the Soviets initiated a
massive mobilization of military and industrial capabilities in the Far
East. The Soviet Pacific Fleet was reinforced with additional landing
craft, fast attack boats and other ships - preparations that the
Japanese could not have missed even if every last one of them was
looking south. So, unless the Japanese thought that the massive Soviet
military preparations in the Far East that immediately followed the
Yalta conference were to throw he biggest May Day parade Vladivostok has
ever seen, I am certain they had a fairly good chance of putting one and
one together. Really, there've been volumes written on the subject, so,
like, read a book, man, or something.

> Conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets were happy to receive the
> delegation to help mislead the Japanese into thinking that a Soviet
> attack was NOT imminent

And it was not imminent. The declaration of war, however, was. By
letting the Japanese know that the declaration of war was inevitable,
the USSR would have gained leverage to force a negotiated surrender from
Japan. Stalin had much to gain from such a deal as opposed to a
full-scale invasion, which was planned by Vasilevsky on August 26-31 and
was to be led by the 87th Infantry Corps.

> The reason they "shouldn't have" produced results was that Stalin had
> made a prior comitment to enter the war against Japan.

Once again, you are confusing the declaration of war with the actual
war. The Soviet preparations for a war with Japan were obvious and there
was an obvious chronological link between these preparations and the
Yalta conference. The fact that the USSR was going to attack Japan
following the defeat of Germany was well-known since the Tehran
conference, when Stalin said that the Soviet attack against Japan would
be possible by increasing the Soviet forces in the Far East threefold,
which can happen after the defeat of Germany. So, yes, Stalin's promise
to attack Japan made at the Yalta conference was definitely the secret
of Polichinelle.

> I am very interested in your source of information here. It is hard
> to imagine Le May not wanting to use any weapon against Japan

It's a well-known fact that Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the
A-bomb against Japan, believing that the war can be won by conventional
bombing. It is also a well-known fact that LeMay actively opposed the
use of the A-bomb, but carried out the orders imposed on him. LeMay
himself wrote about this in his memoirs. He believed in 1945 as he
believed in Do you people read or just watch PBS? Naturally, not all for
the same reasons, but a number of other US commanders did not support
the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
Arnold. And unlike most of them, Le May maintained his position even
after the A-bomb was used, saying during a press conference on September
20, 1945: "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at
all."

They hide this information in books, which you should try to read from
time to time to supplement your PBS education.

>and
> MacArthur (according to a biographical piece I saw recently on PBS)
> wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

I don't think we are talking about the same war...

> Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
> Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
> may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
> is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
> the actual surrender negotiations?

You must be joking. The question of the Emperor was the cornerstone of
this whole diplomatic spectacle. I can imagine the scene on board the
USS Missouri: Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and General Umezu are
glancing over the surrender deal before signing. Shigemitsu: "I'll be
damned, Yoshijiro, look: it says we can keep His Imperial Majesty after
all." MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
morning?"

> Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
> territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
> another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
> more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Ja[panese casualties
> to be expected from a continuation of the war.

Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Matt Wiser

August 29th 04, 02:57 PM

Venik > wrote:
>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted
>to hold out for a
>> deal that would leave them in control of Korea,
>Taiwan
>> and Manchuria.
>
>Right, I suppose they wanted Alaska and Siberia
>as well.
>
>--
>Regards,
>
>Venik
>
>Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
>If you need to e-mail me, please use the following
>subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse
If they had won, yes. But they didn't. They lost. Period. And Several of
the militarists got their necks stretched at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in
1948.

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

Venik

August 29th 04, 06:27 PM

Matt Wiser wrote:

> If they had won, yes. But they didn't. They lost. Period. And Several of
> the militarists got their necks stretched at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial in
> 1948.

I am not sure what you were trying to say, but I liked it, so keep it up.

--
Regards,

Venik

Visit my site: http://www.aeronautics.ru
If you need to e-mail me, please use the following subject line:
?Subject=Newsgr0ups_resp0 nse

Keith Willshaw

August 30th 04, 07:54 PM

"Venik" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > Incorrect, the militarists in charge wanted to hold out for a
> > deal that would leave them in control of Korea, Taiwan
> > and Manchuria.
>
> Right, I suppose they wanted Alaska and Siberia as well.
>

In fact they invaded parts of both so thats a good guess but
they were prepared to settle for the Empire pre 1936

Keith

Fred the Red Shirt

August 30th 04, 09:27 PM

Venik > wrote in message >...
> so,
> like, read a book, man, or something.

Please feel free to suggest one or more specific titles where we
can read that:

Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the A-bomb against Japan.
A number of other US commanders did not support
the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
Arnold.

>
> > Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
> > Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
> > may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
> > is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
> > the actual surrender negotiations?
>
> You must be joking.

No, I refer to the negotiations that took place after the Japanese
announced their surrender and befor the signing of the formal
surrender document onboard the USS MIssouri.

> MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
> morning?"

Seems I didn't get it either.

>
> > Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
> > territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
> > another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
> > more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Japanese casualties
> > to be expected from a continuation of the war.
>
> Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
> lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
> civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

They also say that he was dead set against using Nuclear weapons in
Korea and that was at the heart of his disagreement with MacArthur
who had requested '20 or 30' atomic bombs to be used gainst major
Chinese cities.

--

FF

Keith Willshaw

August 30th 04, 11:33 PM

"Fred the Red Shirt" > wrote in message
m...
> Venik > wrote in message
>...
> > so,
> > like, read a book, man, or something.
>
> Please feel free to suggest one or more specific titles where we
> can read that:
>
>
> Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the A-bomb against Japan.

Not quite

Curtis LeMay believed it was unnecessary because the conventional
B-29 fire raids were every bit as deadly and would have destroyed every
major Japanese population center by October. Hap Arnold
supported him in this view.

This course of action would have killed many more Japanese
than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, indeed both those
cities would have been among the target list for destruction

> A number of other US commanders did not support
> the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
> Arnold.
>

Neither Admiral King for Fleet Admiral Leahy dissented with regard
to the use of the bomb . Both however had grave misgivings about
invasion and argued for a continued blockade which would
of course cause mass starvation in Japan as the harvest there
was the worst for 40 years.

Would starving millions of Japanese be better than what happened ?

>
>
> >
> > > Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
> > > Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
> > > may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
> > > is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
> > > the actual surrender negotiations?
> >
> > You must be joking.
>
> No, I refer to the negotiations that took place after the Japanese
> announced their surrender and befor the signing of the formal
> surrender document onboard the USS MIssouri.
>

There were no negotistions, the Emperor gave his
decision to accept the terms outlined at Potsdam.
The Allies decided it was best to retain the Emperor
as a figurehead to minimise post war resistance.

> > MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
> > morning?"
>
> Seems I didn't get it either.
>
> >
> > > Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
> > > territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
> > > another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
> > > more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Japanese casualties
> > > to be expected from a continuation of the war.
> >
> > Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
> > lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
> > civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
>
> They also say that he was dead set against using Nuclear weapons in
> Korea and that was at the heart of his disagreement with MacArthur
> who had requested '20 or 30' atomic bombs to be used gainst major
> Chinese cities.
>

Quite so, the great 'anti nuke' Douggie was quite happy
to scatter em like confetti if he was in charge.

Keith

Vello

August 31st 04, 06:08 PM

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Fred the Red Shirt" > wrote in message
> m...
> > Venik > wrote in message
> >...
> > > so,
> > > like, read a book, man, or something.
> >
> > Please feel free to suggest one or more specific titles where we
> > can read that:
> >
> >
> > Arnold and LeMay did not favor using the A-bomb against Japan.
>
> Not quite
>
> Curtis LeMay believed it was unnecessary because the conventional
> B-29 fire raids were every bit as deadly and would have destroyed every
> major Japanese population center by October. Hap Arnold
> supported him in this view.
>
> This course of action would have killed many more Japanese
> than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, indeed both those
> cities would have been among the target list for destruction
>
>
>
> > A number of other US commanders did not support
> > the use of the A-bomb against Japan: Bradley, Strauss, King, Leahy,
> > Arnold.
> >
>
> Neither Admiral King for Fleet Admiral Leahy dissented with regard
> to the use of the bomb . Both however had grave misgivings about
> invasion and argued for a continued blockade which would
> of course cause mass starvation in Japan as the harvest there
> was the worst for 40 years.
>
> Would starving millions of Japanese be better than what happened ?
>
>
> >
> >
> > >
> > > > Again, can you show that the US gave Japan any guarantees as to the
> > > > Emperor's safety befor they agreed to surender? Such a guarantee
> > > > may have been in the formal terms of surrender, but the question
> > > > is, was such a guarantee communicated to the Japanese befor
> > > > the actual surrender negotiations?
> > >
> > > You must be joking.
> >
> > No, I refer to the negotiations that took place after the Japanese
> > announced their surrender and befor the signing of the formal
> > surrender document onboard the USS MIssouri.
> >
>
> There were no negotistions, the Emperor gave his
> decision to accept the terms outlined at Potsdam.
> The Allies decided it was best to retain the Emperor
> as a figurehead to minimise post war resistance.
>
> > > MacArthur: "Didn't you two clowns get the memo I sent out this
> > > morning?"
> >
> > Seems I didn't get it either.
> >
> > >
> > > > Nonsense. While Truman may have given some consideration to what
> > > > territory the Soviets might have gained had the war continued for
> > > > another year or more there is no reason to believe he did not give
> > > > more consideration to American, Chinese, and even Japanese
casualties
> > > > to be expected from a continuation of the war.
> > >
> > > Yes, he was a gentle and caring person this Truman. They say he even
> > > lost his appetite for a few days after nuking tens of thousands of
> > > civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
> >
> > They also say that he was dead set against using Nuclear weapons in
> > Korea and that was at the heart of his disagreement with MacArthur
> > who had requested '20 or 30' atomic bombs to be used gainst major
> > Chinese cities.
> >
>
> Quite so, the great 'anti nuke' Douggie was quite happy
> to scatter em like confetti if he was in charge.
>
> Keith