Why did Britain win the BoB? How could have the Allies have done even better? Homework help!

[John Freck]

Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?

To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?

John Freck

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> standing on your team when the game is played.
> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> what must the Allies do better?
>

The Germans need to

1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
were largely above ground and vulnerable
3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
strike missions not as heavy fighters
4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
airbases was a massive waste of resources
5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
and keep hitting it

> To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> Allies list?
>

1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes
2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method
3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms
4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
under +ve G done as a matter of priority
7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.

Keith

[Steven Vincent]

Keith Willshaw wrote:
> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...
>
>>Why did Britain win the BoB?
>>
>>Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
>>assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
>>are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
>>GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
>>standing on your team when the game is played.
>>The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
>>commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
>>on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
>>and anytime relevant to military studies.
>>
>>The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
>>what must the Allies do better?
>>
>
>
> The Germans need to
>
> 1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
> 2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
> were largely above ground and vulnerable
> 3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
> strike missions not as heavy fighters
> 4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
> airbases was a massive waste of resources
> 5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
> and keep hitting it
>
>
>>To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
>>little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
>>things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
>>Allies list?
>>
>
>
> 1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes

They did - Defiants got one or two daylight outings during the BoB.
After that their main roles were Night Fighting (more Effective than
Hurricanes), SAR (safer than a Lysander!) and Convoy cover (Better than
an Anson if range permitted). Better Defiants than Battles - Bomber
command were actually rebuilding Battle squadrons at this time.

> 2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method

Getting rid of the outdated Vics and formations and going to Finger Four
or Loose Duce tactics yes. RAF tactical control of Fighter formations
was way ahead of the Luftwaffe's.

> 3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms


> 4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
> 5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
> work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
> 6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
> under +ve G done as a matter of priority

I think you mean -ve G. Indeed this is the major shortfall that the RAF
should have anticipated


> 7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
> deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.

Night intruders would be a good improvement on things but we need to
keep in mind that 2 Group actually did a god job of bombing the invasion
ports and impacting the German build up of barges etc.

Less important than the aircraft production is to get more Pilots into
Fighter command earlier. Dowding - Leigh-mallory is not a real time
issue. Parks vs Leigh-Mallory was an issue but Dowding was on top of
it. Most of the differences there were down to the nature of the
problem in Kent VS north of the Thames. Parks could not use a big wing
because his warning periods were to short to assemble it. Leigh Mallory
had a relatively long period between alert and engagement which could
usefully be used to assemble the big wings. Park's problem was that
LM's reinforcements were taking to long to arrive with the result that
the Germans were being hammered AFTER Park's airfields had been trashed
rather than before.

That said the RAF could have withdrawn from Kent and still punished the
LW enough to prevent Germany being able to secure the beaches. LM's big
wings performing a fighter sweep timed with a mass 2 group attack would
sure mess up Germanys ad hoc landing forces. One thing the post war
aggrandizement and publicity does not make clear is that the RAF was in
no way out of options during the BoB - they continually had the choice
of when and where to engage and were able to conserve and rotate forces
through the whole Battle. The Luftwaffe on the other hand was making a
much more committed effort and with much less flexibility about what
they hit and where.

One of the things I find most odd about Histories of the Battle of
Britain is how one sided the stories are on the British side. Very few
give Bomber or Coastal command a mention yet these were the forces that
would have been committed to hitting them "on the beaches". The
presence of Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadrons in the UK are also
unmentiond but their locations would have been such as to "free up" RAF
squadrons.

The big thing that the LW should have done is take out the Radar
stations and the Sector stations. The LW only made one serious attempt
to take out the Radar chain and the RAF managed to cover the resulting
hole with the one replacement radar set they had and a couple of bluffs
that fooled the LW signals into thinking that at least 2 other stations
were still functioning (They were transmitting but the receiver complex
was u/s for a couple of days). The RAF needed to get CH Low going
earlier that was not something that could have been sorted out between
Jan and July '40.

Given the timeframe the RAF should have been taking over the Skua and
Roc's of the Fleet Air Arm and forming Dive bomber squadrons with them
in place of Battle Squadrons. Capacity was there to do this - BP
produced both Roc and Defiant and it would not have been a major loss to
turn the Roc production over to a Dedicated Skua/Roc Dive Bomber. (2 gun
turret instead of 4, No Wing folding kit etc. -> larger bomb load). Note
that these aircraft used Bristol engines so freeing the Merlins for H &
S that would have been used in Battles and Defiants.

I am not saying that the Roc dive bomber would have been able to operate
in the face of Bf109's but it would have been an improvement over the
Battle since as a dive bomber it would have had better accuracy at
hitting ships and front line targets than the Battle. Also 2~4 turret
mg's has got to be better than 1 hand trained mg!




>
> Keith
>
>
>

[Keith Willshaw]

"Steven Vincent" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
> > "John Freck" > wrote in message
> > om...
> >
> >>Why did Britain win the BoB?
> >>
> >>Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> >>assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> >>are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> >>GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> >>standing on your team when the game is played.
> >>The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> >>commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> >>on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> >>and anytime relevant to military studies.
> >>
> >>The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> >>what must the Allies do better?
> >>
> >
> >
> > The Germans need to
> >
> > 1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
> > 2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
> > were largely above ground and vulnerable
> > 3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
> > strike missions not as heavy fighters
> > 4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
> > airbases was a massive waste of resources
> > 5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
> > and keep hitting it
> >
> >
> >>To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> >>little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> >>things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> >>Allies list?
> >>
> >
> >
> > 1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes
>
> They did - Defiants got one or two daylight outings during the BoB.
> After that their main roles were Night Fighting (more Effective than
> Hurricanes), SAR (safer than a Lysander!) and Convoy cover (Better than
> an Anson if range permitted). Better Defiants than Battles - Bomber
> command were actually rebuilding Battle squadrons at this time.
>

They withdrew the squadrons but didnt immediately re-equip
them at a time when pilots were in much shorter supply than
aircraft.

> > 2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method
>
> Getting rid of the outdated Vics and formations and going to Finger Four
> or Loose Duce tactics yes. RAF tactical control of Fighter formations
> was way ahead of the Luftwaffe's.
>
> > 3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms
>
>
> > 4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
> > 5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
> > work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
> > 6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
> > under +ve G done as a matter of priority
>
> I think you mean -ve G. Indeed this is the major shortfall that the RAF
> should have anticipated
>
>
> > 7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
> > deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.
>
> Night intruders would be a good improvement on things but we need to
> keep in mind that 2 Group actually did a god job of bombing the invasion
> ports and impacting the German build up of barges etc.
>
> Less important than the aircraft production is to get more Pilots into
> Fighter command earlier. Dowding - Leigh-mallory is not a real time
> issue. Parks vs Leigh-Mallory was an issue but Dowding was on top of
> it. Most of the differences there were down to the nature of the
> problem in Kent VS north of the Thames. Parks could not use a big wing
> because his warning periods were to short to assemble it. Leigh Mallory
> had a relatively long period between alert and engagement which could
> usefully be used to assemble the big wings. Park's problem was that
> LM's reinforcements were taking to long to arrive with the result that
> the Germans were being hammered AFTER Park's airfields had been trashed
> rather than before.
>
> That said the RAF could have withdrawn from Kent and still punished the
> LW enough to prevent Germany being able to secure the beaches. LM's big
> wings performing a fighter sweep timed with a mass 2 group attack would
> sure mess up Germanys ad hoc landing forces. One thing the post war
> aggrandizement and publicity does not make clear is that the RAF was in
> no way out of options during the BoB - they continually had the choice
> of when and where to engage and were able to conserve and rotate forces
> through the whole Battle. The Luftwaffe on the other hand was making a
> much more committed effort and with much less flexibility about what
> they hit and where.
>

True enough

> One of the things I find most odd about Histories of the Battle of
> Britain is how one sided the stories are on the British side. Very few
> give Bomber or Coastal command a mention yet these were the forces that
> would have been committed to hitting them "on the beaches". The
> presence of Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadrons in the UK are also
> unmentiond but their locations would have been such as to "free up" RAF
> squadrons.
>

Yes at the time a every bomber squadron had to keep
an anti-invasion flight on readines 24/7

> The big thing that the LW should have done is take out the Radar
> stations and the Sector stations. The LW only made one serious attempt
> to take out the Radar chain and the RAF managed to cover the resulting
> hole with the one replacement radar set they had and a couple of bluffs
> that fooled the LW signals into thinking that at least 2 other stations
> were still functioning (They were transmitting but the receiver complex
> was u/s for a couple of days). The RAF needed to get CH Low going
> earlier that was not something that could have been sorted out between
> Jan and July '40.
>

The radar stations were quite hard targets to hit and even if they were
knocked out some warning was available from the observer
corps. The sector stations were the point where everything
converged and in many cases were little more than an Nissen
hut

> Given the timeframe the RAF should have been taking over the Skua and
> Roc's of the Fleet Air Arm and forming Dive bomber squadrons with them
> in place of Battle Squadrons. Capacity was there to do this - BP
> produced both Roc and Defiant and it would not have been a major loss to
> turn the Roc production over to a Dedicated Skua/Roc Dive Bomber. (2 gun
> turret instead of 4, No Wing folding kit etc. -> larger bomb load). Note
> that these aircraft used Bristol engines so freeing the Merlins for H &
> S that would have been used in Battles and Defiants.
>

The Skua/Roc werent very survivable though and production
was in such small numbers that I doubt ramping up was very
practical. A better option may have been to fit bomb racks
to the P-40's (Tomahawk I and Tomahawk IIA) the RAF
got in June 1940

> I am not saying that the Roc dive bomber would have been able to operate
> in the face of Bf109's but it would have been an improvement over the
> Battle since as a dive bomber it would have had better accuracy at
> hitting ships and front line targets than the Battle. Also 2~4 turret
> mg's has got to be better than 1 hand trained mg!
>

Trouble is with the power turret fitted the Roc couldnt carry
the bombload the Skua did, arguably the cleaner, fatster
and more manoeuverable Skua was more survivable.

Keith

[WaltBJ]

Here's some programs:
1) Have the Governor-General of Canada light a fire under Mackenzie
King and get the Canada portion of the Empire Aircrew Training Program
rolling full speed ASAP. No 'nice guy' treatment.
2) get the Polish fighter pilots cracking ASAP. They were held back
too long.
3) get the cannon Hurricane program cracking ASAP^2 for anti-bomber
work.
4) send Leigh-Mallory off to New Zealand.
5) move Bader to Kenley or Manston.
6) get a meaningful night intruder program working every night all
night.
7) External tank on Spitfires to bounce 109s sucking fumes on the way
home. See if they can swim the rest of the way. (Route Spits around
the battle scene to arrive at intercept points with height advantage
and lots of internal fuel. Bounce and go home.)
Walt BJ

[John Freck]

"Herbert Pocket" > wrote in message >...


> Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
> macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing (with
> 20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.


<Snip>


> In no particular order:


> A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development of
> improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's poor
> performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that the job
> was being well done).


Herbert Pocket,

Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of the
strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with much
less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could have
had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.

All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by long
ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all the
crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by long-ranged
fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude, and
almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.

One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in low
in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very troublesome
to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany then
to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.




John Freck

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Herbert Pocket" > wrote in message
>...
>
>
> > Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
> > macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing
(with
> > 20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> > In no particular order:
>
>
> > A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development
of
> > improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's
poor
> > performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that
the job
> > was being well done).
>
>
> Herbert Pocket,
>
> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.

There were no strategic bombers in 1940

RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.

Keith

Keith

[Guy Alcala]

WaltBJ wrote:

> Here's some programs:

<snip>

> 7) External tank on Spitfires to bounce 109s sucking fumes on the way
> home. See if they can swim the rest of the way. (Route Spits around
> the battle scene to arrive at intercept points with height advantage
> and lots of internal fuel. Bounce and go home.)

No, this one's not going to fly, if you'll excuse the expression. Already
by August 18th, Park had ordered his controllers not to puruse
reconnaissance a/c out to sea, and to engage major formations 'over land
or within gliding distance of the coast', to cut down on pilots being lost
over the channel. Pilot losses were starting to hurt, and they couldn't
afford to lose pilots shot down over the North Sea and Channel, but
otherwise okay at the time of bailout.

Guy

[John Freck]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message


>> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
Allies
>> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.

<Snip>


> There were no strategic bombers in 1940

I was getting beyond the time frame I began with, July 1st 1940.
My commentary gets more and more relevant from July 1st, 1940,
however.
IMO, the RAF had strategic bombers if the strategically bombed. To me
then,
'strategic bomber' is any plane dropping bombs on a strategic mission
bombing run.
This then begs the question what is 'strategic bombing'. If on July
1st, 1940 a single Hurricane Super Marine
Spitfire drops a single 1,000lbs bomb on a railroad line near Arnhiem,
then a strategic bombing mission occured. I find it important to
note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.



> RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
> with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
> The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
> such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.

You are telling me that the RAF had no heavy bomb load capacity
4-engined bombers yet by July 1st, 1940, or not many. Furthermore,
you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed to
"light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than me,
and that we need to understand our idiomatical difference and develop
from there carefully.


John Freck

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>
>
> >> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
> Allies
> >> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> > There were no strategic bombers in 1940
>
> I was getting beyond the time frame I began with, July 1st 1940.
> My commentary gets more and more relevant from July 1st, 1940,
> however.
> IMO, the RAF had strategic bombers if the strategically bombed. To me
> then,
> 'strategic bomber' is any plane dropping bombs on a strategic mission
> bombing run.
> This then begs the question what is 'strategic bombing'. If on July
> 1st, 1940 a single Hurricane Super Marine
> Spitfire drops a single 1,000lbs bomb on a railroad line near Arnhiem,
> then a strategic bombing mission occured.

No that would have been a bloody miracle since there never was such
a thing as a Hurricane Super Marine Fighter

> I find it important to
> note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
> 'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
> of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
> maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
> are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
> July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
> bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.
>

They DID favor fighters, there was no such thing as the fighter bomber
at the time and the bomber force was being used in the tactical
role to attack the invasion barges. The strategic attack on German industry
didnt begin in earnest until 1942.

>
>
> > RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
> > with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
> > The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
> > such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.
>
> You are telling me that the RAF had no heavy bomb load capacity
> 4-engined bombers yet by July 1st, 1940, or not many.

Exactly that, not one 4 engined bomber was in service.

> Furthermore,
> you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed to
> "light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than me,


Thats for sure, I also know what missions RAF bomber command
flew in 1940 do you ?

> and that we need to understand our idiomatical difference and develop
> from there carefully.
>

I think you need to read up a little on the subject , here's a free clue.

Of the 13,000 tons of bombs the RAF dropped in 1940 only
137 tons fell on Industrial towns, the majority were on airfields,
naval targets and troop concentrations.

These usually count as tactical missions.

In fact raids on tactical targets exceeded those on strategic ones
until 1942.

Of the 13,000 bombs dropped in 1940 5,000 were delivered by
Wellingtons (twin engined) , 3000 by Whitleys (twin engined),
2700 by Hampdens (twin engined), 2000 by Blenheims (twin engined)
and the remainder by the single engined Fairey battle.

Keith

[John Freck]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

<Snip>


> No that would have been a bloody miracle since there never was such
> a thing as a Hurricane Super Marine Fighter


But 'Hurrican or Super Marine Spitfire', and it is considered
exteremly poor manners to point out less that proof solid writting
error on the usenet which is a chat environment. Look, I'm not your
pupil, buddy.


> > I find it important to
> > note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
> > 'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
> > of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
> > maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
> > are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
> > July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
> > bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.

> They DID favor fighters, there was no such thing as the fighter bomber
> at the time and the bomber force was being used in the tactical
> role to attack the invasion barges. The strategic attack on German industry
> didnt begin in earnest until 1942.


You are losing all context. I mearly encouraged and elaborated upon a
posters suggestion. The whole idea of killing off 4-engined bombers
is an extention of the chat Herbert Pocket posted. As I have already
told you, I admit the bomber issue as I cast has more and more
relevance further down time. Your point on Britain have a complete
lack of fighter bombers is of course true, and from July 1st, 1940 it
would be smart for them to get cracking.


<Snip>

>> Furthermore,
>> you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed
to
>> "light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than
me,

> Thats for sure, I also know what missions RAF bomber command
> flew in 1940 do you ?

I have the "The Times Atlas of the Second World War, edited by John
Keegan" open now.

> I think you need to read up a little on the subject , here's a free clue.


Is everyone rude, where you come from? Do you have that Scottish
anger of something?


> Of the 13,000 tons of bombs the RAF dropped in 1940 only
> 137 tons fell on Industrial towns, the majority were on airfields,
> naval targets and troop concentrations.


You really need to re-read the thread carefully. Especially, look
where I am responding to herbert Pockets responce to me. It is nice
that the entire "conversation" is preserved.


> These usually count as tactical missions.

> In fact raids on tactical targets exceeded those on strategic ones
> until 1942.

> Of the 13,000 bombs dropped in 1940 5,000 were delivered by
> Wellingtons (twin engined) , 3000 by Whitleys (twin engined),
> 2700 by Hampdens (twin engined), 2000 by Blenheims (twin engined)
> and the remainder by the single engined Fairey battle.

The RAF also procured 3,500 bombers in 1940 and 4,500 bombers in 1941
and 6,000 bombers in 1942 and 8,000 bombers in 1943.


John Freck







> Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
m...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> > No that would have been a bloody miracle since there never was such
> > a thing as a Hurricane Super Marine Fighter
>
>
> But 'Hurrican or Super Marine Spitfire', and it is considered
> exteremly poor manners to point out less that proof solid writting
> error on the usenet which is a chat environment. Look, I'm not your
> pupil, buddy.
>

It is however just fine to point out egregious errors, no Spitfire
or Hurricane had the range or equipment to drop bombs
on Arnhem in 1940


>
> > > I find it important to
> > > note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
> > > 'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
> > > of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
> > > maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
> > > are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
> > > July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
> > > bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.
>
> > They DID favor fighters, there was no such thing as the fighter bomber
> > at the time and the bomber force was being used in the tactical
> > role to attack the invasion barges. The strategic attack on German
industry
> > didnt begin in earnest until 1942.
>
>
> You are losing all context. I mearly encouraged and elaborated upon a
> posters suggestion.

YOU were the original poster

Its YOUR Post I am responding too


> The whole idea of killing off 4-engined bombers
> is an extention of the chat Herbert Pocket posted.

Indeed and its that I am responding to.

> As I have already
> told you, I admit the bomber issue as I cast has more and more
> relevance further down time. Your point on Britain have a complete
> lack of fighter bombers is of course true, and from July 1st, 1940 it
> would be smart for them to get cracking.
>

They did as soon as aircraft became available. From 1940
onwards the Hurricane transitioned into the ground attack
role as did the P-40's acquired from the USA

>
> <Snip>
>
> >> Furthermore,
> >> you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed
> to
> >> "light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than
> me,
>
> > Thats for sure, I also know what missions RAF bomber command
> > flew in 1940 do you ?
>
> I have the "The Times Atlas of the Second World War, edited by John
> Keegan" open now.
>
> > I think you need to read up a little on the subject , here's a free
clue.
>
>
> Is everyone rude, where you come from? Do you have that Scottish
> anger of something?
>

No I have that English disdain for those who dont do their homework

>
> > Of the 13,000 tons of bombs the RAF dropped in 1940 only
> > 137 tons fell on Industrial towns, the majority were on airfields,
> > naval targets and troop concentrations.
>
>
> You really need to re-read the thread carefully. Especially, look
> where I am responding to herbert Pockets responce to me. It is nice
> that the entire "conversation" is preserved.
>

I did sir you said.

"Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
time much sooner. "

You made an error sir, there were no 4 engined bombers to cut
during the BOB and they were indeed producing strong fast
and long ranged 2 engined bombers.



>
> > These usually count as tactical missions.
>
> > In fact raids on tactical targets exceeded those on strategic ones
> > until 1942.
>
> > Of the 13,000 bombs dropped in 1940 5,000 were delivered by
> > Wellingtons (twin engined) , 3000 by Whitleys (twin engined),
> > 2700 by Hampdens (twin engined), 2000 by Blenheims (twin engined)
> > and the remainder by the single engined Fairey battle.
>
> The RAF also procured 3,500 bombers in 1940 and 4,500 bombers in 1941
> and 6,000 bombers in 1942 and 8,000 bombers in 1943.
>
>

And until 1942 they were predominantly twin engined types used
for tactical attacks. There is indeed a case to be made that mistakes
were made in the direction of aerial assets in 1942-44 but
this had ZERO effect on the conduct of the BOB which is
after all the subject

Keith

[WaltBJ]

Bah.
The question was - what could have been done better.
Guy, don't tell me selected pilots (Poles; they would have loved the
task) could not have been used to attrit the minimum fuel 109s fleeing
for home, using the one pass haul ass tactic. Once the LW realized
what was going on - and this would happen at squadron level pretty
quick - 109 pilots would have raised the bingo fuel level markedly,
leaving their escorted forces in the lurch.

As for the off-subject topic of using fighter-bombers - lots of luck
with 109s and radar eying them.

The biggest miss of the bombing campaign was ignoring the electrical
grid. Those big transformers in the distribution yards do not grow on
trees and indeed are not heavily stockpiled. Nor are the turbines,
generators, etc - they're built to order, not on spec.
Walt BJ

[John Freck]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...



> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> m...



<Snip>



>> But 'Hurricane or Super Marine Spitfire', and it is considered
>> extremely poor manners to point out less that proof solid writing
>> error on the usenet which is a chat environment. Look, I'm not
your
>> pupil, buddy.



> It is however just fine to point out egregious errors, no Spitfire
> or Hurricane had the range or equipment to drop bombs
> on Arnhem in 1940



Yes, it is true that Britain had no fighter bombers, I guess; but I
did say, frankly, that my commentary becomes more relevant further
down time.



<Snip>



>> You are losing all context. I merely encouraged and elaborated
upon a
>> posters suggestion.



> YOU were the original poster
> Its YOUR Post I am responding too



In my original post you will find no mention of Allied strategic
bombing.
Reread my response to Herbert Pocket; this is a tangential subject.
The subject line should read: ‘Were heavy bombers the best use of
resources: Was...'.
As far as the BoB goes in a SimWWII war-game? Fighter command can get
cracking on fighter bombers; and get fuel, material, and manpower from
bomber command



>> The whole idea of killing off 4-engined bombers
>> is an extension of the chat Herbert Pocket posted.



> Indeed and its that I am responding to.



He should speak for himself, but I feel that fighter bombers would
have been better for Britain to have from July 1st, 1940 than any of
the bombers that they had. Of course, to have Britain without any
bombers on July 1st, 1940 would require war-game that allows for a
beginning before July 1st, 1940.



>> As I have already
>> told you, I admit the bomber issue as I cast has more and more
>> relevance further down time. Your point on Britain having a
complete
>> lack of fighter bombers is of course true, and from July 1st, 1940
it
>> would be smart for them to get cracking.



> They did as soon as aircraft became available. From 1940
> onwards the Hurricane transitioned into the ground attack
> role as did the P-40's acquired from the USA



<Snip>



> No I have that English disdain for those who dont do their homework



You are just a complete rude jerk.


<Snip>



> "Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
> Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
> have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
> long ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
> time much sooner. "



> You made an error sir, there were no 4 engined bombers to cut
> during the BOB and they were indeed producing strong fast
> and long ranged 2 engined bombers.



Good. You are still rude. Bombers were a poor use of limited
resources.



> And until 1942 they were predominantly twin engined types used
> for tactical attacks. There is indeed a case to be made that mistakes
> were made in the direction of aerial assets in 1942-44 but
> this had ZERO effect on the conduct of the BOB which is
> after all the subject



The subject became the relative value of bombers opposed to fighter
bombers generally in W.W.II. You are acting like a military officer
who tries to dominate as a form of leadership.
I suppose you think there will be a bright future for humanity if
Israel-USA-UK jointly occupy the whole Middle East too, and you don't
car much for those who differ.



John Freck





> Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
>
>
>
> > "John Freck" > wrote in message
> > m...
>
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >> But 'Hurricane or Super Marine Spitfire', and it is considered
> >> extremely poor manners to point out less that proof solid writing
> >> error on the usenet which is a chat environment. Look, I'm not
> your
> >> pupil, buddy.
>
>
>
> > It is however just fine to point out egregious errors, no Spitfire
> > or Hurricane had the range or equipment to drop bombs
> > on Arnhem in 1940
>
>
>
> Yes, it is true that Britain had no fighter bombers, I guess; but I
> did say, frankly, that my commentary becomes more relevant further
> down time.
>

But its irrelevant to the topic

>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >> You are losing all context. I merely encouraged and elaborated
> upon a
> >> posters suggestion.
>
>
>
> > YOU were the original poster
> > Its YOUR Post I am responding too
>
>
>
> In my original post you will find no mention of Allied strategic
> bombing.
> Reread my response to Herbert Pocket; this is a tangential subject.
> The subject line should read: 'Were heavy bombers the best use of
> resources: Was...'.
> As far as the BoB goes in a SimWWII war-game? Fighter command can get
> cracking on fighter bombers; and get fuel, material, and manpower from
> bomber command
>
>
>
> >> The whole idea of killing off 4-engined bombers
> >> is an extension of the chat Herbert Pocket posted.
>
>
>
> > Indeed and its that I am responding to.
>
>
>
> He should speak for himself, but I feel that fighter bombers would
> have been better for Britain to have from July 1st, 1940 than any of
> the bombers that they had. Of course, to have Britain without any
> bombers on July 1st, 1940 would require war-game that allows for a
> beginning before July 1st, 1940.
>
>

In your earlier post you advocated producing twin engined bombers
of the type the RAF actually DID procure, now you want to forgo
all bomber production. Make up your mind sir.

>
> >> As I have already
> >> told you, I admit the bomber issue as I cast has more and more
> >> relevance further down time. Your point on Britain having a
> complete
> >> lack of fighter bombers is of course true, and from July 1st, 1940
> it
> >> would be smart for them to get cracking.
>
>
>
> > They did as soon as aircraft became available. From 1940
> > onwards the Hurricane transitioned into the ground attack
> > role as did the P-40's acquired from the USA
>
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> > No I have that English disdain for those who dont do their homework
>
>
>
> You are just a complete rude jerk.
>

Ad Hominem noted.

>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> > "Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
> > wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
> > Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
> > have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
> > long ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
> > time much sooner. "
>
>
>
> > You made an error sir, there were no 4 engined bombers to cut
> > during the BOB and they were indeed producing strong fast
> > and long ranged 2 engined bombers.
>
>
>
> Good. You are still rude.

If pointing out your errors is rude so be it.

> Bombers were a poor use of limited
> resources.
>

The US Strategic bombing survey and other indpendent sources
disagree, the real debate is on how those resources are best used.

>
>
> > And until 1942 they were predominantly twin engined types used
> > for tactical attacks. There is indeed a case to be made that mistakes
> > were made in the direction of aerial assets in 1942-44 but
> > this had ZERO effect on the conduct of the BOB which is
> > after all the subject
>
>
>
> The subject became the relative value of bombers opposed to fighter
> bombers generally in W.W.II. You are acting like a military officer
> who tries to dominate as a form of leadership.

Your inability to answer the point is noted.


> I suppose you think there will be a bright future for humanity if
> Israel-USA-UK jointly occupy the whole Middle East too, and you don't
> car much for those who differ.
>
>

Changing the subject doesnt help much either.

Keith

[Guy Alcala]

WaltBJ wrote:

> Bah.
> The question was - what could have been done better.
> Guy, don't tell me selected pilots (Poles; they would have loved the
> task) could not have been used to attrit the minimum fuel 109s fleeing
> for home, using the one pass haul ass tactic.

There was no shortage of pilots willing to chase. Indeed, that was the
problem -- too many of them wound up getting shot down or otherwise going
down in the North Sea/Channel, which was why Park ordered his controllers
to keep them close to shore.

> Once the LW realized
> what was going on - and this would happen at squadron level pretty
> quick - 109 pilots would have raised the bingo fuel level markedly,
> leaving their escorted forces in the lurch.
>
> As for the off-subject topic of using fighter-bombers - lots of luck
> with 109s and radar eying them.
>
> The biggest miss of the bombing campaign was ignoring the electrical
> grid. Those big transformers in the distribution yards do not grow on
> trees and indeed are not heavily stockpiled. Nor are the turbines,
> generators, etc - they're built to order, not on spec.

If the Luftwaffe had been intent on a strategic bombing campaign in a war
of attrition, I'd agree, but they weren't. They were hitting what were
essentially tactical targets during the BoB (even the aircraft factories
qualified in this case, given the near immediate effect) so that they
could launch a successful invasion. The Brits could have easily provided
power to essential industries, and it was summer so the weather was good
and the days were long, lessening the effect on the civilian population.
The Luftwaffe didn't hit electricity for the same reason that we (mostly)
didn't in our most recent conflict; why destroy what you're going to need
in a short while, if you don't have to?

Guy

[WaltBJ]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...
>>>>>>TEN-HUT! Knock off the 'ad hominem' crap; save that for direct
commnication. You're boring me and every one else.

I commend "A Question of Honor", a new book by Olsen and Cloud, ISBN
0-375-41197-6, published ths year by A. Knopf. It covers the Polish
Air Force and their airmen, from the get-go through service in the RAF
up to the triumph of Solidarity. Highly interesting, in that the
highest scoring fighter squadron in the RAF during the BoB was the
Kosciuszko Squadron RAF# 303.) The highest scorer was Joseph
Frantisek, a Czech AF pilot, (17 kills), who was known to sneak out
over the Channel and bounce low-on-fuel 109s heading home. All y'all
interested in fighters should read this book.
Walt BJ